企業(yè)太愛存錢困擾日本經(jīng)濟

Prime minister Shinzo Abe’s victory in the recent election in Japan opens up significant opportunities for political and economic change. But not in the case of one of the biggest structural problems facing the Japanese economy — the tendency of business to save vastly more than it invests, with deflationary consequences.

日本首相安倍晉三(Shinzo Abe)在最近的大選中獲勝為政治和經(jīng)濟改革開啟了重大機遇。但日本經(jīng)濟面臨的最大的結構性問題之一仍無起色，這個問題就是企業(yè)儲蓄資金往往遠遠超過投資，由此帶來通縮性后果。

In an ageing society like Japan’s, deflation ought to be a dwindling threat. Rising numbers of elderly people could be expected to save less while consumption should increase with age thanks to relatively generous pensions and healthcare. At the same time, a shrinking workforce should enjoy increased labour market power and demand higher wages.

在一個像日本這樣的老齡化社會里，通縮威脅理應日漸式微。隨著老年人日益增多，得益于相對慷慨的養(yǎng)老金和醫(yī)療服務，儲蓄理應下降，同時消費應該隨著年齡增長而增加。與此同時，勞動力日益減少應該意味著勞動者在就業(yè)市場上的力量上升，他們可以要求更高的薪資。

In the event Japanese households have reduced their savings close to zero. Yet this has been more than offset by the rise in corporate savings. At the same time wage growth has failed to materialise. Lifetime employees continue to value security of employment and feel a loyalty to the company, which keeps them docile. There has also been a big increase in the number of part time workers whose bargaining power is weak.

實際上，日本家庭的儲蓄的確下降至接近于零的水平。然而，這完全被企業(yè)儲蓄的增長所抵消。與此同時，工資增長未能實現(xiàn)。終身雇員繼續(xù)看重就業(yè)安全，并對公司保持忠誠，這讓他們保持順從。談判實力較弱的兼職人員數(shù)量也大幅增加。

Too much income is trapped in a risk-averse corporate sector awash with record profits, while Japan suffers from a structural deficiency of consumer income. The country has only escaped a 1930s-style slump because the government has run huge deficits to sustain demand, at the cost of soaring public sector debt.

太多的盈余被厭惡風險的企業(yè)部門留存，這些企業(yè)的利潤達到創(chuàng)紀錄水平，同時日本遭遇消費者收入結構性匱乏的問題。日本避免了上世紀30年代的那種衰退，只是因為政府運行巨額赤字以維持需求，代價是公共部門債務飆升。

The Abe government’s response to cash hoarding has been to push for higher wages and try to make corporate governance more shareholder friendly. The companies act was amended in 2014 to promote better boards and a corporate governance code was introduced the following year. The aim was to enhance corporate performance and encourage co-operation with stakeholders while securing shareholder rights. A stewardship code was also brought in to prod institutional investors into engaging with company management.

安倍政府對企業(yè)囤積現(xiàn)金的回應是呼吁提高薪資，并努力讓企業(yè)治理對股東更加友好。日本在2014年修訂了公司法以強化董事會職能，并在第二年出臺了企業(yè)治理條例。目的是增強企業(yè)表現(xiàn)，并鼓勵公司在保障股東權利的同時，與所有利益相關者合作。日本還推出了管理守則，以促使機構投資者參與公司管理。

While the reforms have encouraged a greater focus on returns on equity, there has been no radical change in business behaviour. As deputy prime minister Taro Aso acknowledged recently, there is an issue here of form versus substance. Akira Matsumoto, chairman of food group Calbee, declared at an OECD conference last month that his governance priorities were customers first, followed by employees, then the community, with shareholders trailing in fourth place. That view is widely shared by other business leaders. And Japan continues to have the lowest dividend payout ratio among the Group of Seven major developed countries.

雖然這些改革鼓勵了公司加大關注股本回報率，但商業(yè)行為并沒有發(fā)生根本變化。正如日本副首相麻生太郎(Taro Aso)最近承認的那樣，這里存在著形式與實質的問題。食品集團卡樂比(Calbee)董事長松本晃(Akira Matsumoto)上月在經(jīng)濟合作與發(fā)展組織(OECD)的一個會議上宣稱，他的治理重點首先是顧客，其次是員工，然后是社區(qū)，股東位居第四。其他企業(yè)領導人普遍認同這一觀點，而日本在七國集團(G7)中的股息支付率仍然是最低的。

The limited effectiveness of Japan’s governance reforms is, in one sense, unsurprising. Japanese company law in the postwar period made directors formally accountable to shareholders. But in a dispersed ownership system lacking dominant family shareholders, such accountability was meaningless. Companies were run in the interests of managers and workers. Indeed, the genius of the postwar Japanese model of capitalism was that it did away with capitalists. In place of the money motive as the motor for economic growth, it substituted the employees’ work ethic.

日本治理改革效果有限從某種意義上說不足為奇，日本在戰(zhàn)后出臺的公司法使得董事們在正式的層面向股東負責。但是在缺乏家族大股東的分散的所有權體系中，這種問責制度毫無意義。公司為了經(jīng)理和工人的利益而經(jīng)營。的確，戰(zhàn)后日本資本主義模式的高明之處在于排除了資本家。就經(jīng)濟增長動力而言，社會用員工的職業(yè)道德取代了金錢激勵。

The Japanese economy is currently enjoying a cyclical upturn. Yet Japan remains stuck with its structural savings surplus and governance scandals endure. When I asked Tomoyuki Furusawa, deputy director-general of the supervisory bureau of Japan’s Financial Services Agency, how long it would take for genuine shareholder accountability to emerge, he suggested five years.

日本經(jīng)濟目前正處于周期性好轉階段。然而日本仍然受到結構性儲蓄盈余的困擾，同時治理丑聞?chuàng)]之不去。當我問日本金融廳(Financial Services Agency)監(jiān)督局官房擔當古澤知之(Tomoyuki Furusawa)真正的股東問責制將需要多久才能出現(xiàn)的時候，他提出要五年。

Responding to the same question, Mark Mobius of fund manager Franklin Templeton, opted for 20 years. He felt the stakeholder mindset was too entrenched to permit earlier change. Certainly governance reform alone seems unlikely to secure sweeping changes in business savings behaviour.

在回答同樣的問題時，基金公司富蘭克林鄧普頓(Franklin Templeton)的麥樸思(Mark Mobius)給出的答案是20年。他覺得利益相關者的思維定勢太深，以至于不會允許更早的變革。當然，單單治理改革似乎不太可能徹底改變企業(yè)儲蓄行為。