財政紀律真有那么可貴嗎？

Faster economic growth last year coincided with smaller tax rises and public spending cuts in many countries. That is at least partly why many economists are so keen on the use of fiscal policy — spending and tax — to stabilise economies.

去年經(jīng)濟增速加快伴隨著很多國家縮小增稅幅度和公共支出降幅。至少這在一定程度上解釋了為什么很多經(jīng)濟學家如此渴望利用財政政策(支出和稅收)來穩(wěn)定經(jīng)濟。

Growth in 2016 and 2017 has been faster than many predicted early last year, when fear of a potential new global downturn played a role in fiscal policymakers loosening the purse strings last year.

2016年和2017年的經(jīng)濟增速快于去年初很多人的預測，當時對一場潛在的新的全球低迷的擔憂，在一定程度上促使財政政策制定者去年放松錢袋子。

Although this loosening coincided with an acceleration in growth, it was not the only explanation for the rebound. “It does seem that most of the action was related to other factors,” says Vitor Gaspar, director of the fiscal affairs department at the International Monetary Fund.

盡管財政政策的放松與經(jīng)濟增速加快同時出現(xiàn)，但這并不是經(jīng)濟增長反彈的唯一解釋。國際貨幣基金組織(IMF)財政事務部門主管維托爾•加斯帕(Vitor Gaspar)表示：“大部分增長似乎確實與其他因素有關(guān)。”

Growth was also helped by businesses and individuals having easier access to credit as banks continued rebuilding their balance sheets. In the eurozone, the European Central Bank expanded quantitative easing and business confidence increased, which helped boost private investment. An increase in commodity prices helped ease pressure on countries that rely on production of those goods.

隨著銀行繼續(xù)重建其資產(chǎn)負債表，更容易獲得貸款的企業(yè)和個人也助推了經(jīng)濟增長。在歐元區(qū)，歐洲央行(ECB)擴大了量化寬松政策，企業(yè)信心增強，這幫助提振了私營部門投資。同時大宗商品價格上漲，幫助緩解了依賴這些大宗商品生產(chǎn)的國家的壓力。

There was broad agreement in 2008 and into 2009 that borrowing should be allowed to rise to cushion the impact of the financial crisis. But by 2010, with growth returning, policymakers were keen that it should be scaled back to reassure markets that government debt would not get out of hand, and so head off a sharp rise in borrowing costs.

從2008年至2009年最初幾個月，人們普遍認為：應該允許增加借款，以緩解金融危機的影響。但是到了2010年，隨著增長回歸，政策制定者們熱衷于減少借款，以便讓市場相信，政府債務不會失控，從而防范借款成本大幅上升。

Many economists agreed, but their views have since shifted. “We’ve learned over the past 10 years that fiscal policy can have pretty powerful effects in deep recessions when central banks have hit very low policy interest rates,” says Alan Auerbach, professor of economics at Berkeley. “We’ve also learnt, at least from the experience in the UK and the US, that we would have benefited from . . . turning less immediately to measures aimed at deficit reduction.”

很多經(jīng)濟學家當時認同這種觀點，但此后他們的觀點發(fā)生了變化。“過去10年，我們領(lǐng)悟到，財政政策在嚴重衰退、央行已把政策利率降至極低水平的時期可能產(chǎn)生非常強有力的效果，”加州大學伯克利分校經(jīng)濟學教授艾倫•奧爾巴赫(Alan Auerbach)表示，“我們還認識到，至少從英國和美國的經(jīng)驗來看，我們將受益于……不那么急切地轉(zhuǎn)向旨在減少赤字的措施。”

The evolution of thinking on fiscal policy has been less radical than the soul-searching among monetary policymakers, who are reassessing the models they use to inform interest rate setting.

財政政策思路的演變，沒有貨幣政策制定者的反省那么激進，后者正在重新評估他們用來為制定利率提供依據(jù)的模型。

However, the period since the financial crisis has been unusual in three main ways that have affected some economists’ views on when and how to use fiscal policy. The effects of the crisis have lasted much longer than after previous downturns; many monetary policymakers believe they are close to the limits of their policy toolboxes; and the interest rates on debt issued by many governments, including long-term debt, remain extremely low despite a big rise in debt levels.

然而，自金融危機以來的這段時期在3個主要方面不同尋常，這些方面影響了經(jīng)濟學家們對于何時以及如何動用財政政策的看法。此次危機的影響持續(xù)的時間遠遠超過前幾次經(jīng)濟衰退;很多貨幣政策制定者認為，他們正接近政策工具箱的極限;盡管債務水平大幅上升，但很多政府發(fā)行的債券(包括長期債券)的利率仍然極低。

Under these circumstances, there is a strong case for loosening fiscal policy and borrowing more. This is especially true for policies that put money directly into the hands of people who will spend it quickly and counteract sluggish demand, and for investments that have long-term benefits.

在這些情況下，放松財政政策并增加借款有著充足的理由。尤其是那些把資金直接送入那些會迅速花掉的人手中、從而抵消需求不振的政策，以及那些具有長期效益的投資。

“Economies do not self-stabilise,” said Olivier Blanchard, senior fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics, reflecting at a conference on macroeconomic policy, on lessons of the financial crisis for monetary and fiscal policy.

彼得森國際經(jīng)濟研究所(Peterson Institute for International Economics)高級研究員奧利維爾•布蘭查德(Olivier Blanchard)在一次有關(guān)宏觀經(jīng)濟政策的會議上談到金融危機給貨幣和財政政策帶來的教訓時表示：“經(jīng)濟不會自我穩(wěn)定。”

But politicians and advisers in the developed world still emphasise reining in government deficits and cutting debt, particularly if there appears to be little spare capacity in the economy.

但發(fā)達國家的政治人士和顧問仍強調(diào)控制政府赤字和削減債務，尤其是在經(jīng)濟中似乎幾乎沒有富余產(chǎn)能的情況下。

“Markets can ignore or underweight risks, including fiscal risks, for long periods,” said Robert Rubin, former US Treasury Secretary at the Peterson Institute conference. “Until they don’t — and then the reaction can be rapid and savage.”

“市場可能會長時期地忽視或低估各種風險，包括財政風險，”美國前財長羅伯特•魯賓(Robert Rubin)在彼得森國際經(jīng)濟研究所的會議上表示，“但有朝一日他們可能突然清醒過來，接下來的反應可能迅速而劇烈。”

As for the low level of interest rates charged on the debt issued by many major economy governments since 2008, policymakers say they cannot rely on this being repeated.

至于很多大型經(jīng)濟體的政府自2008年以來發(fā)行的債券利率較低，政策制定者表示，他們不能指望這種情況重演。

Eswar Prasad, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution think-tank, is sympathetic to policymakers’ concerns about abrupt market reactions. But he hopes that in the next recession, “governments would test markets a little more . . . instead of letting a desire for fiscal virtue get in the way”.

智庫布魯金斯學會(Brookings Institution)高級研究員埃斯瓦爾•普拉薩德(Eswar Prasad)認同政策制定者對于市場突然做出反應的擔憂。但他希望在下一次衰退中，“政府會更多地試探一下市場……而不是被嚴守財政紀律的愿望綁住手腳”。