想在亞洲稱雄的高盛必須面對(duì)激烈競(jìng)爭(zhēng)
高盛(Goldman Sachs)還是想當(dāng)?shù)谝?。就此而言，這是高盛的慣常做派，這家銀行喜歡在每次報(bào)告盈利時(shí)夸耀其在全球排行榜上的榜首位置。
But the ambition here relates to Asia’s equity capital markets — a market increasingly dominated by Chinese business the US bank cannot get. Is this brash overconfidence, or a shrewd bet on the long-term future of what has become the world’s biggest equity capital-raising region?
但這里的抱負(fù)說的是亞洲股權(quán)資本市場(chǎng)——該市場(chǎng)日益由這家美資銀行爭(zhēng)取不到的中國業(yè)務(wù)主導(dǎo)。高盛的抱負(fù)究竟是自以為是的過度自信，還是對(duì)亞洲這個(gè)世界最大股本募集地區(qū)的長遠(yuǎn)未來的精明押注?
Goldman’s decision to maintain its top spot target follows a shocker of a year in 2016, where the bank failed to even make the top 10 in Asia-Pacific, according to Dealogic, after two decades in which it had never dropped lower than fourth.
力爭(zhēng)榜首的決定是在高盛經(jīng)歷了令人震驚的2016年后做出的。根據(jù)Dealogic的數(shù)據(jù)，2016年該行甚至沒能進(jìn)入亞太排行榜前10名，而此前20年期間該行從未跌出前四名。
Its 15th-place finish in the region left it unable to tout a global number-one ECM ranking for the first time in six years. Even more galling will have been the fact that Morgan Stanley finished top in Asia last year, one of only three non-Chinese banks to make the grade, ahead of Deutsche Bank in fourth and UBS in seventh.2016年高盛在亞太地區(qū)屈居第15名，這使其6年來首次無法標(biāo)榜自己榮居股權(quán)資本市場(chǎng)(ECM)全球排行榜榜首。更讓高盛窩火的是摩根士丹利(Morgan Stanley)去年在亞洲摘得桂冠，而且是擠入前10名的三家非中資銀行之一，另外兩家是排在第4的德意志銀行(Deutsche Bank)和排在第7的瑞銀(UBS)。
Put a league table in front of a banker who cannot boast the top spot, and brace for a stream of reasons why the tables do not matter, how any old bank can get credit, why no one follows them any more and why what really matters is which bank made money.
把排行榜放在無法吹噓所在銀行獲得第一的銀行家面前，準(zhǔn)備好聽聽他拋出的一連串理由吧——為什么這些排行榜不重要，為什么任何老牌銀行都能夠在排行榜上名列前茅，為什么沒有人再關(guān)心排行榜，以及為什么真正重要的是哪家銀行賺到了錢。
In Asia, which holds the global record for bookrunners credited with an initial public offering — 26 to sell $2bn of equity — and where deal fees can still amount to a nominal rupee or renminbi, that last point has real merit.
亞洲曾創(chuàng)下最多承銷商參與一次首次公開發(fā)行(IPO)的全球紀(jì)錄——多達(dá)26家承銷商幫助中國郵政儲(chǔ)蓄銀行出售了20億美元的股權(quán)——而且亞洲的交易傭金依然微薄，往往只是很小的一筆盧比或者人民幣，因此上述最后一點(diǎn)的確有道理。
But league tables can still speak to a bank’s ambition, and in Asia, its assessment of a fast-changing — and growing — landscape. In the first half of this year, ECM deals in Asia totalled $136.7bn, putting the region ahead of the US on $126.6bn.
但排行榜依然表明一家銀行的抱負(fù)，及其對(duì)快速變化且越來越大的亞洲市場(chǎng)格局的評(píng)估。今年上半年，亞洲的股權(quán)資本市場(chǎng)交易總額達(dá)到1367億美元，使該地區(qū)超過了美國的1266億美元。
Equity business is proportionally more important in the region too, since it makes up on average about 40 per cent of the fee pool, compared with 25 per cent globally.
與此同時(shí)，股權(quán)業(yè)務(wù)在比例上在亞洲地區(qū)更為重要，因?yàn)樵摰貐^(qū)股權(quán)業(yè)務(wù)平均占傭金池的40%，而在全球范圍這個(gè)比例為25%。
Goldman’s poor showing last year was partly due to its absence in some important deals, including a $6.6bn convertible bond from SoftBank that helped the Japanese dealmaker cash out some of its Alibaba stake.
高盛去年表現(xiàn)糟糕的部分原因是其缺席了一些重要的交易，包括日本交易撮合者軟銀(SoftBank)發(fā)行66億美元的可轉(zhuǎn)債，幫助變現(xiàn)其在阿里巴巴(Alibaba)所持股權(quán)。
The sheer volume of mainland China deals is a longer-term threat to Goldman and its international rivals, who get only the smallest share of this business. In the first half of this year, onshore China accounted for 46 per cent of all equity deal volume in the region. Last year’s 15th place prompted a discussion among the bank’s senior ranks in the region: was a commitment to aiming for top spot in the equity business worth it? Or would it too, like many rivals, have to learn to box clever?
中國內(nèi)地龐大的交易規(guī)模給高盛及其國際競(jìng)爭(zhēng)對(duì)手構(gòu)成了更長期威脅;它們只能得到這塊業(yè)務(wù)的很小一部分。今年上半年，中國境內(nèi)股本交易總量占到地區(qū)總量的46%。去年位列第15的名次引發(fā)了高盛亞洲高層內(nèi)部的一場(chǎng)討論：力爭(zhēng)股本業(yè)務(wù)第一的投入值得嗎?或者它也應(yīng)該像很多競(jìng)爭(zhēng)對(duì)手一樣，學(xué)會(huì)靈活應(yīng)對(duì)?
Western banks have since the financial crisis focused on their strengths and on balance sheet discipline. That is especially necessary in Asia, where each country needs a genuine local presence.
自金融危機(jī)以來，西方銀行一直聚焦于提高自身實(shí)力和遵守資產(chǎn)負(fù)債表紀(jì)律。這對(duì)亞洲來說尤為必要，這里的每個(gè)國家都需要金融機(jī)構(gòu)真正落地。
Big international banks also face powerful domestic competition. In any good year for Japan, Nomura and Daiwa Securities muscle their way back into the league table top 10. The same goes for China, only more so because of its size. No international bank makes the top 10 when ranked by China-related equity revenues.
大型國際銀行還面臨激烈的本土競(jìng)爭(zhēng)。在日本，野村證券(Nomura)和大和證券(Daiwa Securities)在任何一個(gè)景氣年份都有望重返排行榜前10名之列。中國也一樣，而且因?yàn)槠湟?guī)模而更加突出。若以中國相關(guān)股本交易的收入排名，沒有一家國際銀行能躋身前10。
Western bankers often point out that most onshore deals are not business they would want, partly because profits are so small they make Hong Kong’s miserly average fee of 2 per cent look good (New York’s is 5-7 per cent). Also, they say that the reputational risk from much onshore business is too great.
西方銀行人士常常指出，大多數(shù)境內(nèi)交易都不是他們想要的業(yè)務(wù)，部分是因?yàn)槔麧櫸⒈。鼈兪瓜愀燮骄?%的微薄傭金率都顯得相對(duì)優(yōu)厚(紐約的傭金率為5%-7%)。此外，他們還表示，很多境內(nèi)業(yè)務(wù)帶來的聲譽(yù)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)太大了。
Goldman’s top-spot ambition therefore implies it believes either the Chinese market will open to foreigners or that it can win more business offshore in Hong Kong.
因此，高盛想當(dāng)?shù)谝坏谋ж?fù)意味著，要么它認(rèn)為中國市場(chǎng)將向外國人開放，要么它可以在香港拿到更多境外業(yè)務(wù)。
Both are probably true to some extent. The bank has long pushed for foreign companies to be allowed majority control — suggesting it wants a greater presence onshore. If it also wants a greater share of the onshore equity business, that is a bet that deal quality will also improve.
在某種程度上，兩種想法可能都沒錯(cuò)。該行長期推動(dòng)允許外資企業(yè)在華獲得多數(shù)控股權(quán)——似乎表明它希望在中國境內(nèi)擴(kuò)大業(yè)務(wù)地盤。如果它也希望得到更大份額的境內(nèi)股本業(yè)務(wù)，那意味著押注于交易質(zhì)量也將改善。
“Number one is what we do. It’s why people want to work here,” says one Goldmanite. “And we think there is more than enough profitable work for us with Chinese companies who want exposure to international markets.”
“拿到第一是我行應(yīng)該做的事情。這是人們想在這工作的原因，”一名高盛人表示，“而且我們認(rèn)為，鑒于有很多中國企業(yè)想要獲得國際市場(chǎng)敞口，有足夠的有利可圖的業(yè)務(wù)可以做。”
This year the bank has fought back, reclaiming the region’s top spot ahead of China’s Citic Securities and CICC, as well as Morgan Stanley and UBS. The busiest months in the Hong Kong equity calendar — its regional home turf — are to come, too.
今年高盛已經(jīng)采取了反擊，贏回了地區(qū)第一的位置，領(lǐng)先于中國的中信證券(Citic Securities)和中國國際金融股份有限公司(CICC，簡(jiǎn)稱中金公司)、以及摩根士丹利和瑞銀。高盛在亞洲的大本營香港股本交易最繁忙的月份也即將到來。
But it will have to fight harder still against its Chinese rivals to retain that regional crown for long.
但它將必須與中國競(jìng)爭(zhēng)對(duì)手展開更激烈的較量，才能保住地區(qū)冠軍的桂冠。
