參議院認(rèn)為酷刑無助于追殺本·拉登

參議院認(rèn)為酷刑無助于追殺本·拉登

WASHINGTON — Months before the operation that killed Osama bin Laden in 2011, the Central Intelligence Agency secretly prepared a public-relations plan that would stress that information gathered from its disputed interrogation program had played a critical role in the hunt. Starting the day after the raid, agency officials in classified briefings made that point to Congress.

華盛頓——在2011年開展行動殺死奧薩馬·本·拉登(Osama bin Laden)的幾個月前，美國中央情報局(Central Intelligence Agency，簡稱CIA)秘密籌備了一套公關(guān)方案，打算強調(diào)通過有爭議的審訊操作獲取的情報，在追捕過程中發(fā)揮了關(guān)鍵作用。從突襲行動后的第二天起，CIA官員就開始在秘密匯報時向國會這樣陳述。

But in page after page of previously classified evidence, the Senate Intelligence Committee report on C.I.A. torture, released Tuesday, rejects the notion that torturing detainees contributed to finding Bin Laden — a conclusion that was also strongly implied in “Zero Dark Thirty,” the popular 2012 movie about the hunt for the Qaeda leader.

但參議院情報委員會(Senate Intelligence Committee)周二發(fā)布的一份關(guān)于CIA刑訊逼供的報告，卻通過一頁頁之前屬于機密的證據(jù)，駁斥了拷打在押人員對追查本·拉登下落做出了貢獻的說法。2012年頗受歡迎的電影《刺殺本·拉登》(Zero Dark Thirty)也強烈地暗示了這一結(jié)論。該影片講述的是追捕這名基地組織領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人的故事。

“The vast majority of the intelligence” about the Qaeda courier who led the agency to Bin Laden “was originally acquired from sources unrelated to the C.I.A.’s detention and interrogation program, and the most accurate information acquired from a C.I.A. detainee was provided prior to the C.I.A. subjecting the detainee to the C.I.A.’s enhanced interrogation techniques,” the Senate report said.

參議院的報告稱，有關(guān)基地組織那名信使的“絕大部分情報最初的來源，都和CIA的羈押和審訊項目無關(guān)，并且在CIA對一名囚犯使用加強型審訊技巧之前，對方就已供出了最精確的信息”。正是那名信使指引CIA找到了本·拉登。

It added that most of “the documents, statements and testimony” from the C.I.A. regarding a connection between the torture of detainees and the Bin Laden hunt were “inaccurate and incongruent with C.I.A. records.”

報告接著表示，CIA為證明拷打囚犯和追捕本·拉登之間的聯(lián)系而提供的大部分“文件、聲明和證詞”都“不準(zhǔn)確，且與CIA的記錄不符”。

On Tuesday, the C.I.A. disputed the committee’s portrayal that it had been misleading and disingenuous about the role of that program in the hunt for Bin Laden.

該委員會認(rèn)為，對于相關(guān)計劃在追捕本·拉登的過程中所起的作用，CIA的表述有誤導(dǎo)性，而且并不誠實。CIA在周二進行了反駁。

The crucial breakthrough in the hunt was the identification of the courier, known as Abu Ahmed al-Kuwaiti, who was the terrorist leader’s link to the outside world from his secret compound in Abbottabad, Pakistan. His significance gradually came into sharper focus.

追捕過程中的重大突破，是確認(rèn)了名為阿布·艾哈邁德·科威提(Abu Ahmed al-Kuwaiti)的那名信使的身份，他是身在巴基斯坦阿伯塔巴德那處秘密院落的本·拉登與外部世界之間的聯(lián)系。他的重要性逐漸得到了顯現(xiàn)。

But the Senate report shows that the C.I.A. was already actively collecting information about him earlier than was previously known and long before it had obtained any intelligence about him from detainees in its custody.

但參議院的報告顯示，CIA開始積極收集科威提相關(guān)情報的時間，早于之前知道的時間。還沒有從在押人員那里取得任何情報之前，就已經(jīng)開始了。

The United States had started wiretapping a phone number associated with Mr. Kuwaiti by late 2001, and as early as 2002, the C.I.A. had obtained from other sources — including reports from allies based on detainees in their custody — the courier’s alias and the fact that he was one of Bin Laden’s few close associates and “traveled frequently” to meet with him. It also had data on his age, physical appearance and family connections, as well as a recording of his voice — all of which proved crucial to finding him.

在2001年末之前，美國就已經(jīng)開始竊聽與科威提相關(guān)的一個電話號碼了。并且早在2002年，CIA就通過其他來源——包括各盟國根據(jù)其關(guān)押囚犯的口供撰寫的報告——得知了這名信使的化名，也得知了他是本·拉登少數(shù)幾名親信之一，且“頻繁前去”與他會面。CIA還掌握了有關(guān)他的年齡、體貌特征、家庭關(guān)系的數(shù)據(jù)，并且還有他的錄音。所有這些信息，后來都對查清他的下落起到了關(guān)鍵作用。

It was in 2004 that the C.I.A. came to realize that it should focus on finding Mr. Kuwaiti as part of the hunt for Bin Laden, after it interrogated a Qaeda operative, Hassan Ghul, who had been captured in Iraqi Kurdistan. The report concludes that Mr. Ghul provided “the most accurate” intelligence that the agency produced about Mr. Kuwaiti’s role and ties to Bin Laden.

到2004年，審問過在伊拉克庫爾德斯坦俘獲的基地組織人員哈桑·古爾(Hassan Ghul)后，CIA意識到應(yīng)該集中精力捉拿科威提，將其作為追捕本·拉登的一部分。報告斷定，CIA得到的有關(guān)科威提的角色，以及他與本·拉登之間關(guān)系的“最精確”情報，便是由古爾提供的。

But the report emphasizes that Mr. Ghul provided all the important information about the courier before he was subjected to any torture techniques and spoke freely to his interrogators. During that two-day period in January 2004, it said, the C.I.A. produced 21 intelligence reports from Mr. Ghul, who one officer said “sang like a Tweety Bird.”

但該報告強調(diào)，在CIA對他采取任何拷問技巧之前，古爾就已自愿向?qū)徲嵢藛T交代了有關(guān)那名信使的所有重要信息。報告稱，2004年1月進行的為期兩天的審訊期間，CIA根據(jù)古爾的供述撰寫了21份情報報告。一名CIA特工形容，古爾的招供“就像翠迪鳥唱歌一樣”。

“He opened up right away and was cooperative from the outset,” the officer added.

“他馬上就開口了，從一開始就很配合，”這名特工接著說。

In those initial interrogations, Mr. Ghul portrayed Mr. Kuwaiti as Bin Laden’s “closest assistant” and said he was always with him, identifying him as a likely courier who ran messages between Bin Laden and other leaders of Al Qaeda. He listed him as one of three people most likely to be with Bin Laden, who he speculated was living in a house in Pakistan, with Mr. Kuwaiti handling his needs.

在最初那些審訊中，古爾說科威提是本·拉登“最親密的助手”，并稱本·拉登總是和科威提在一起，并指出科威提可能充當(dāng)信使，負(fù)責(zé)在本·拉登和基地組織的其他頭目之間傳遞信息。他把古爾列為最有可能和本·拉登在一起的三個人之一，并猜測本·拉登生活在巴基斯坦的某棟房屋里，科威提負(fù)責(zé)為其采辦必需品。

Nevertheless, the C.I.A. then decided to torture Mr. Ghul to see if he would say more. He was transferred to a “black site” prison, where he was shaved, placed in a “hanging” stress position, and subjected to 59 hours of sleep deprivation, after which he began hallucinating; his back and abdomen began spasming; his arms, legs and feet began experiencing “mild paralysis”; and he began having “premature” heart beats. During and after that treatment, he provided “no actionable threat information” that resulted in the capture of any leaders of Al Qaeda, the report said.

盡管如此，CIA后來還是決定對古爾使用酷刑，看他能不能再說出什么來。他被轉(zhuǎn)移到了一個“地下”監(jiān)獄，在那里，他被剃掉了毛發(fā)，保持“懸吊”的不適姿態(tài)，59個小時不能睡覺，此后，他開始出現(xiàn)幻覺;后背和腹部開始抽搐;胳膊、腿部和腳經(jīng)歷了“輕度癱瘓”;他還出現(xiàn)了“心臟早搏”。報告稱，在用刑期間和用刑之后，古爾都沒有提供導(dǎo)致基地組織的任何領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人被抓的“有實用價值的線索”。

In its statement pushing back on the report, the C.I.A. insisted another detainee, Ammar Al Baluchi, had been “the first to reveal” Mr. Kuwaiti was a courier, after Mr. Baluchi’s arrest and subjection to “enhanced” interrogation techniques in May 2003.

在反駁這份報告的聲明中，CIA堅持說，另一名叫做阿馬爾·巴盧希(Ammar Al Baluchi)的囚犯，才是“第一個揭發(fā)了”科威提是本·拉登信使的人，而這發(fā)生在巴盧希2003年5月被逮捕并遭受“加強型”審訊技巧之后。

But the Senate report shows that Mr. Baluchi’s claim was not recognized as a breakthrough, in part because he recanted what he had said under torture. The report also notes that to make its claim about the significance of Mr. Baluchi’s information, the agency “ignores” detailed information in its records from 2002, from several detainees in the custody of other governments, “suggesting al-Kuwaiti may have served as a courier” for Bin Laden.

但參議院的報告顯示，巴盧希的說法沒有被視作重大進展，一個原因是，他后來否認(rèn)了酷刑之下的口供。報告還指出，為了突出巴盧希提供的情報的重要性，CIA對該局2002年的記錄中體現(xiàn)的情報細(xì)節(jié)“視而不見”。這些情報來自其他國家收押的幾名囚犯，“表明科威提可能是本·拉登的信使”。

The C.I.A.’s statement also said that Mr. Ghul had provided “more concrete and less speculative” information that Mr. Kuwaiti was a courier after Mr. Ghul was subjected to its “enhanced” interrogation techniques. The Senate report called the agency’s rebuttal “incorrect,” citing contemporaneous C.I.A. reports.

CIA的聲明還說，在受到“加強型”審訊技巧之后，古爾提供了“更為具體，且不那么可疑”的信息，稱科威提是本·拉登的信使。參議院的報告中引述CIA同一時期的其他一些報告，指出CIA的反駁“不正確”。

The C.I.A.’s records also show that detainees subjected to the torture techniques “provided fabricated, inconsistent and generally unreliable information” about the courier throughout their detention, the report said.

參議院的報告稱，CIA的記錄還顯示，在被關(guān)押期間，受到酷刑的犯人在本·拉登信使的問題上“提供了憑空捏造、前后不一，而且基本上不可靠的信息。”

The C.I.A. countered that statements by two other detainees playing down the importance of Mr. Kuwaiti were significant corroboration that he was a secret worth protecting. The Senate report showed that the agency pressed both detainees about the courier in the summer of 2005 and thought both were lying.

CIA反駁稱，另外兩名囚犯淡化科威提重要性的口供有力地證明了，科威提是一個值得保護的神秘角色。參議院的報告顯示，CIA在2005年夏天迫使這兩名囚犯說出了關(guān)于本·拉登信使的消息，但后來認(rèn)為兩人都在說謊。

But the Senate report suggested that the agency had already sharpened its focus on Mr. Kuwaiti by the time of those denials. On Sept. 1, 2005, an internal agency bulletin on the hunt for Bin Laden reported that the search for his couriers was going nowhere because detainees were being unhelpful, adding, “We nonetheless continue the hunt for Abu Ahmed al-Kuwaiti.”

不過，參議院的報告顯示，在否認(rèn)上述口供之前，CIA已經(jīng)把更多注意力放在了科威提身上。2005年9月1日，關(guān)于追查本·拉登的內(nèi)部公告稱，尋找本·拉登信使的行動沒有取得進展，因為囚犯的口供沒有幫助。公告中接著說，“我們?nèi)匀粫^續(xù)尋找阿布·艾哈邁德·科威提。”