Pfeffer and Sutton come to a similar conclusion about most efforts to boost performance by creating pay incentives:
普費(fèi)弗(Pfeffer)和薩頓(Sutton)分析了試圖通過(guò)提供薪酬激勵(lì)提高績(jī)效的多數(shù)措施,并得出一個(gè)類(lèi)似的結(jié)論:
' There is, in fact, little evidence that equity incentives of any kind, including stock options, enhance organizational performance. One review of more than 220 studies concluded that equity ownership had no consistent effect on financial performance. Another massive study and review of research on executive compensation published by the National Bureau of Economic Research reported that most schemes designed to align managerial and shareholder interests failed to do so.'
“實(shí)際上,幾乎沒(méi)有證據(jù)表明任何種類(lèi)的股權(quán)激勵(lì)──包括股票期權(quán)──能夠提高組織績(jī)效。一篇對(duì)220多項(xiàng)研究的文獻(xiàn)綜述得出結(jié)論,股權(quán)對(duì)財(cái)務(wù)績(jī)效沒(méi)有一致性影響。”另一篇由美國(guó)國(guó)家經(jīng)濟(jì)研究局(National Bureau of Economic Research)發(fā)表的關(guān)于管理層薪酬研究的大型研究與文獻(xiàn)綜述稱(chēng),多數(shù)旨在協(xié)調(diào)管理層利益與股東利益的薪酬方案都失敗了。”