It takes a man a long time to learn all the lessons of all his mistakes.They say there are two sides to everything.But there is only one side to the stock market;and it is not the bull side or the bear side,but the right side.It took me longer to get that general principle fixed firmly in my mind than it did most of the more technical phases of the game of stock speculation.
I have heard of people who amuse themselves conducting imaginary operations in the stock market to prove with imaginary dollars how right they are.Sometimes these ghost gamblers make millions.It is very easy to be a plunger that way.It is like the old story of the man who was going to fight a duel the next day.
His second asked him,“Are you a good shot?”
“Well,”said the duelist,“I can snap the stem of a wineglass at twenty paces,”and he looked modest.
“That's all very well,”said the unimpressed second.“But can you snap the stem of the wineglass while the wineglass is pointing a loaded pistol straight at your heart?”
With me I must back my opinions with my money.My losses have taught me that I must not begin to advance until I am sure I shall not have to retreat.But if I cannot advance I do not move at all.I do not mean by this that a man should not limit his losses when he is wrong.He should.But that should not breed indecision.All my life I have made mistakes,but in losing money I have gained experience and accumulated a lot of valuable don'ts.I have been flat broke several times,but my loss has never been a total loss.Otherwise,I wouldn't be here now.I always knew I would have another chance and that I would not make the same mistake a second time.I believed in myself.
A man must believe in himself and his judgment if he expects to make a living at this game.That is why I don't believe in tips.If I buy stocks on Smith's tip I must sell those same stocks on Smith's tip.I am depending on him.Suppose Smith is away on a holiday when the selling time comes around?No,sir,nobody can make big money on what someone else tells him to do.I know from experience that nobody can give me a tip or a series of tips that will make more money for me than my own judgment.It took me five years to learn to play the game intelligently enough to make big money when I was right.
I didn't have as many interesting experiences as you might imagine.I mean,the process of learning how to speculate does not seem very dramatic at this distance.I went broke several times,and that is never pleasant,but the way I lost money is the way everybody loses money who loses money in Wall Street.Speculation is a hard and trying business,and a speculator must be on the job all the time or he'll soon have no job to be on.
My task,as I should have known after my early reverses at Fullerton's,was very simple:To look at speculation from another angle.But I didn't know that there was much more to the game than I could possibly learn in the bucket shops.There I thought I was beating the game when in reality I was only beating the shop.At the same time the tape-reading ability that trading in bucket shops developed in me and the training of my memory have been extremely valuable.Both of these things came easy to me.I owe my early success as a trader to them and not to brains or knowledge,because my mind was untrained and my ignorance was colossal.The game taught me the game.And it didn't spare the rod while teaching.
I remember my very first day in New York.I told you how the bucket shops,by refusing to take my business,drove me to seek a reputable commission house.One of the boys in the office where I got my first job was working for Harding Brothers,members of the New York Stock Exchange.I arrived in this city in the morning,and before one o'clock that same day I had opened an account with the firm and was ready to trade.
I didn't explain to you how natural it was for me to trade there exactly as I had done in the bucket shops,where all I did was to bet on fluctuations and catch small but sure changes in prices.Nobody offered to point out the essential differences or set me right.If somebody had told me my method would not work I nevertheless would have tried it out to make sure for myself,for when I am wrong only one thing convinces me of it,and that is,to lose money.And I am only right when I make money.That is speculating.
They were having some pretty lively times those days and the market was very active.That always cheers up a fellow.I felt at home right away.There was the old familiar quotation board in front of me,talking a language that I had learned before I was fifteen years old.There was a boy doing exactly the same thing I used to do in the first office I ever worked in.There were the customers—same old bunch—looking at the board or standing by the ticket calling out the prices and talking about the market.The machinery was to all appearances the same machinery that I was used to.The atmosphere was the atmosphere I had breathed since I had made my first stock-market money—$3.12 in Burlington.The same kind of ticker and the same kind of traders,therefore the same kind of game.And remember,I was only twenty-two.I suppose I thought I knew the game from A to Z.Why shouldn't I?
I watched the board and saw something that looked good to me.It was behaving right.I bought a hundred at 84.I got out at 85 in less than a half hour.Then I saw something else I liked,and I did the same thing;took three-quarters of a point net within a very short time.I began well,didn't I?
Now mark this:On that,my first day as a customer of a reputable Stock Exchange house,and only two hours of it at that,I traded in eleven hundred shares of stock,jumping in and out.And the net result of the day's operations was that I lost exactly eleven hundred dollars.That is to say,on my first attempt,nearly one-half of my stake went up the flue.And remember,some of the trades showed me a profit.But I quit eleven hundred dollars minus for the day.
It didn't worry me,because I couldn't see where there was anything wrong with me.My moves,also,were right enough,and if I had been trading in the old Cosmopolitan shop I'd have broken better than even.That the machine wasn't as it ought to be,my eleven hundred vanished dollars plainly told me.But as long as the machinist was all right there was no need to stew.Ignorance at twenty-two isn't a structural defect.
After a few days I said to myself,“I can't trade this way here.The ticker doesn't help as it should!”But I let it go at that without getting down to bed rock.I kept it up,having good days and bad days,until I was cleaned out.I went to old Fullerton and got him to stake me to five hundred dollars.And I came back from St.Louis,as I told you,with money I took out of the bucket shops there—a game I could always beat.
I played more carefully and did better for a while.As soon as I was in easy circumstances I began to live pretty well.I made friends and had a good time.I was not quite twenty-three,remember;all alone in New York with easy money in my pockets and the belief in my heart that I was beginning to understand the new machine.
I was making allowances for the actual execution of my orders on the floor of the Exchange,and moving more cautiously.But I was still sticking to the tape—that is,I was still ignoring general principles;and as long as I did that I could not spot the exact trouble with my game.
We ran into the big boom of 1901 and I made a great deal of money—that is,for a boy.You remember those times?The prosperity of the country was unprecedented.We not only ran into an era of industrial consolidations and combinations of capital that beat anything we had had up to that time,but the public went stock mad.In previous flush times,I have heard,Wall Street used to brag of two-hundred-and-fifty-thousand-share days,when securities of a par value of twenty-five million dollars changed hands.But in 1901 we had a three-million-share day.Everybody was making money.The steel crowd came to town,a horde of millionaires with no more regard for money than drunken sailors.The only game that satisfied them was the stock market.We had some of the biggest high rollers the Street ever saw:John W.Gates,of‘Bet-you-a-million' fame,and his friends,like John A.Drake,Loyal Smith,and the rest;the Reid-Leeds-Moore crowd,who sold part of their Steel holdings and with the proceeds bought in the open market the actual majority of the stock of the great Rock Island system;and Schwab and Frick and Phipps and the Pittsburgh coterie;to say nothing of scores of men who were lost in the shuffle but would have been called great plungers at any other time.A fellow could buy and sell all the stock there was.Keene made a market for the U.S.Steel shares.A broker sold one hundred thousand shares in a few minutes.A wonderful time!And there were some wonderful winnings.And no taxes to pay on stock sales!And no day of reckoning in sight.
Of course,after a while,I heard a lot of calamity howling and the old stagers said everybody—except themselves—had gone crazy,But everybody except themselves was making money.I knew,of course,there must be a limit to the advances and an end to the crazy buying of A.O.T.—Any Old Thing—and I got bearish.But every time I sold I lost money,and if it hadn't been that I ran darn quick I'd have lost a heap more.I looked for a break,but I was playing safe—making money when I bought and chipping it out when I sold short—so that I wasn't profiting by the boom as much as you'd think when you consider how heavily I used to trade,even as a boy.
There was one stock that I wasn't short of,and that was Northern Pacific.My tape reading came in handy.I thought most stocks had been bought to a standstill,but Little Nipper behaved as if it were going still higher.We know now that both the common and the preferred were being steadily absorbed by the Kuhn-Loeb-Harriman combination.Well,I was long a thousand shares of Northern Pacific common,and held it against the advice of everybody in the office.When it got to about 110 I had thirty points profit,and I grabbed it.It made my balance at my brokers' nearly fifty thousand dollars,the greatest amount of money I had been able to accumulate up to that time.It wasn't so bad for a chap who had lost every cent trading in that selfsame office a few months before.
If you remember,the Harriman crowd notified Morgan and Hill of their intention to be represented in the Burlington-Great Northern-Northern Pacific combination,and then the Morgan people at first instructed Keene to buy fifty thousand shares of N.P.to keep the control in their possession.I have heard that Keene told Robert Bacon to make the order one hundred and fifty thousand shares and the bankers did.At all events,Keene sent one of his brokers,Eddie Norton,into the N.P,crowd and he bought one hundred thousand shares of the stock.This was followed by another order,I think,of fifty thousand shares additional,and the famous corner followed.After the market closed on May 8,1901,the whole world knew that a battle of financial giants was on.No two such combinations of capital had ever opposed each other in this country.Harriman against Morgan;an irresistible force meeting an immovable object.
There I was on the morning of May ninth with nearly fifty thousand dollars in cash and no stocks.As I told you,I had been very bearish for some days,and here was my chance at last.I knew what would happen—an awful break and then some wonderful bargains.There would be a quick recovery and big profits—for those who had picked up the bargains.It didn't take a Sherlock Holmes to figure this out.We were going to have an opportunity to catch them coming and going,not only for big money but for sure money.
Everything happened as I had foreseen.I was dead right and—I lost every cent I had!I was wiped out by something that was unusual.If the unusual never happened there would be no difference in people and then there wouldn't be any fun in life.The game would become merely a matter of addition and subtraction.It would make of us a race of bookkeepers with plodding minds.It's the guessing that develops a man's brain power.Just consider what you have to do to guess right.
The market fairly boiled,as I had expected.The transactions were enormous and the fluctuations unprecedented in extent.I put in a lot of selling orders at the market.When I saw the opening prices I had a fit,the breaks were so awful.My brokers were on the job.They were as competent and conscientious as any;but by the time they executed my orders the stocks had broken twenty points more.The tape was way behind the market and reports were slow in coming in by reason of the awful rush of business.When I found out that the stocks I had ordered sold when the tape said the price was,say,100 and they got mine off at 80,making a total decline of thirty or forty points from the previous night's close,it seemed to me that I was putting out shorts at a level that made the stocks I sold the very bargains I had planned to buy.The market was not going to drop right through to China.So I decided instantly to cover my shorts and go long.
My brokers bought;not at the level that had made me turn,but at the prices prevailing in the Stock Exchange when their floor man got my orders.They paid an average of fifteen points more than I had figured on.A loss of thirty-five points in one day was more than anybody could stand.
The ticker beat me by lagging so far behind the market.I was accustomed to regarding the tape as the best little friend I had because I bet according to what it told me.But this time the tape double-crossed me.The divergence between the printed and the actual prices undid me.It was the sublimation of my previous unsuccess,the selfsame thing that had beaten me before.It seems so obvious now that tape reading is not enough,irrespective of the brokers' execution,that I wonder why I didn't then see both my trouble and the remedy for it.
I did worse than not see it;I kept on trading,in and out,regardless of the execution.You see,I never could trade with a limit.I must take my chances with the market.That is what I am trying to beat—the market,not the particular price.When I think I should sell,I sell.When I think stocks will go up,I buy.My adherence to that general principle of speculation saved me.To have traded at limited prices simply would have been my old bucket-shop method inefficiently adapted for use in a reputable commission broker's office.I would never have learned to know what stock speculation is,but would have kept on betting on what a limited experience told me was a sure thing.
Whenever I did try to limit the prices in order to minimize the disadvantages of trading at the market when the ticker lagged,I simply found that the market got away from me.This happened so often that I stopped trying.I can't tell you how it came to take me so many years to learn that instead of placing piking bets on what the next few quotations were going to be,my game was to anticipate what was going to happen in a big way.
After my May ninth mishap I plugged along,using a modified but still defective method.If I hadn't made money some of the time I might have acquired market wisdom quicker.But I was making enough to enable me to live well.I liked friends and a good time.I was living down the Jersey Coast that summer,like hundreds of prosperous Wall Street men.My winnings were not quite enough to offset both my losses and my living expenses.
I didn't keep on trading the way I did through stubbornness.I simply wasn't able to state my own problem to myself,and,of course,it was utterly hopeless to try to solve it.I harp on this topic so much to show what I had to go through before I got to where I could really make money.My old shotgun and BB shot could not do the work of a high-power repeating rifle against big game.
Early that fall I not only was cleaned out again but I was so sick of the game I could no longer beat that I decided to leave New York and try something else some other place.I had been trading since my fourteenth year.I had made my first thousand dollars when I was a kid of fifteen,and my first ten thousand before I was twenty-one.I had made and lost a ten-thousand-dollar stake more than once.In New York I had made thousands and lost them.I got up to fifty thousand dollars and two days later that went.I had no other business and knew no other game.After several years I was back where I began.No—worse,for I had acquired habits and a style of living that required money;though that part didn't bother me as much as being wrong so consistently.
于人而言,吃一塹長一智需要花費(fèi)大量時(shí)間。誰都知道事物具有兩面性,可股市卻始終只有一面。不是多頭的一面,也不是空頭的一面,而是正確的一面。真正記住這條通則所花費(fèi)的時(shí)間,遠(yuǎn)遠(yuǎn)超過股票投機(jī)游戲中很多技術(shù)層次的東西。
據(jù)說有人能模擬操作股市,證明自己有多厲害。這些玄幻的賭徒有時(shí)的確能賺很多錢,這樣很容易讓人成為大賭特賭的賭徒,就像老故事里說的那樣,某人第二天要與人決斗。
助手問他:“你能行嗎?”
決斗的人說:“當(dāng)然,我能在二十步之外射中酒杯腳?!彼€一副很謙虛的樣子。
“厲害啊?!敝譀]任何反應(yīng),“可酒杯上若有個(gè)手槍對著你的心臟,而且已經(jīng)上膛了,你還能行嗎?”
我覺得,必須要擁有實(shí)際賺到的錢才能證明自己的觀點(diǎn)正確。我過去栽的跟頭讓我明白:只有百分百堅(jiān)信不會后退,才可以開始前進(jìn)。如果不能前進(jìn),那就蟄伏待動。我的意思并非說人犯錯(cuò)了不要去止損。他就該那樣做,不過最好不要把自己培養(yǎng)成優(yōu)柔寡斷的人。我這輩子總在犯錯(cuò),不過我會吸取教訓(xùn),也總結(jié)了一些很實(shí)用的經(jīng)驗(yàn)。有那么幾次,我的虧損很大,但是我的虧損從來都不是徹底的虧損。不然的話,我現(xiàn)在也就不是我了。我總是相信自己還有機(jī)會,我不會在同一條道上摔兩次。我相信自己。
如果誰要靠這種游戲過活的話,就必須要自信,只有自信才不至于盲目相信各種亂七八糟的內(nèi)幕消息。如果按照史密斯的內(nèi)幕消息去買進(jìn)賣出,那他就成了我的心理依靠,他一旦外出度假,又恰逢交易的好機(jī)會來了,那該怎么辦?不能這樣啊,先生,可不能靠別人教我們怎么去賺錢。以我的經(jīng)驗(yàn)來看,只有靠自己的判斷才能賺更多錢,不管誰提供的消息都比不上這個(gè),我用五年時(shí)間才學(xué)會了怎么聰明地玩這個(gè)游戲,足以讓我在自己正確時(shí)賺大錢。
我身上沒有多少你認(rèn)為的那種有趣經(jīng)歷。我的意思是,學(xué)習(xí)怎么樣去投機(jī)股票,這個(gè)歷程沒有什么趣味性。我有好多令人不爽的失敗經(jīng)歷,跟華爾街上的那些人一模一樣。投機(jī)是一件非常耗人的艱難事情,玩的人一定要緊盯著不能松懈,不然的話隨時(shí)都可能會失業(yè)。
本來,我要做的事情也不難,在受到富勒頓公司的打擊后我就應(yīng)該知道了:換個(gè)角度去看待投機(jī)。但我沒有很快認(rèn)識到,其實(shí)很多東西在對賭行都沒辦法學(xué)到。我覺得在投機(jī)過程中已經(jīng)能手到擒來了,其實(shí)只不過是在對賭行有點(diǎn)小小戰(zhàn)績而已。而在對賭行的那些日子的確讓我的分析判斷能力有所提升,尤其是訓(xùn)練了記憶力。這兩點(diǎn)我學(xué)得很好。身為交易人士,我起先的那些成功經(jīng)歷都源于這兩點(diǎn),而并不是我有多么聰明或者多么博學(xué),我沒受過頭腦訓(xùn)練,是很無知的。在玩這個(gè)游戲的過程中我學(xué)會了操作,而且這個(gè)游戲也在教導(dǎo)我的同時(shí)很冷血地鞭打我。
直到現(xiàn)在我都記得初到紐約那天的情形。我提到過對賭行不跟我做生意,所以我只能去找名號響亮的經(jīng)紀(jì)人。我原來有個(gè)同事在紐交所會員企業(yè)哈丁兄弟公司工作,我早上到紐約后,中午一點(diǎn)前就在那家公司開好了股票賬戶,準(zhǔn)備交易。
我沒有跟你解釋過。我是多么自然而然地就玩起對賭行那一套,瞅準(zhǔn)股價(jià)走勢,伺機(jī)捕捉一小段一定會出現(xiàn)的價(jià)格變化。沒人對我說這與原來有何不同,要是有人告訴我這樣是不行的,那我也一定會去驗(yàn)證一番。只有賠錢才讓我相信我錯(cuò)了,只要能賺錢就是正確之道。這就是投機(jī)的實(shí)質(zhì)。
那段時(shí)日,股市活躍,股民們輕松快活,很讓人興奮,我一下子就如魚得水。熟悉的股市行情公告就在我的眼前,大家談的話我15歲以前就學(xué)會了。有個(gè)男孩干著我剛開始做事時(shí)干的那些活,股民們一動不動地看著股市行情公告牌,大喊著股價(jià)數(shù)字,討論著行情。機(jī)器跟我熟悉的機(jī)器顯然完全一樣??諝夂臀以诓`頓賺到第一筆錢(就是那3.12美元)以來所呼吸的空氣一樣。行情還是那樣的行情,股民還是那種股民,游戲也還是那個(gè)游戲。不要忘記,這時(shí)候我才22歲,我覺得自己已經(jīng)完全掌握了這個(gè)游戲規(guī)則,難道不是這樣嗎?
我專心觀察著股市行情公告牌,看準(zhǔn)了想買的股票,它的形勢不錯(cuò),84美元,我買了100股,沒到半個(gè)小時(shí),我就以85美元拋掉。緊接著,我又瞅準(zhǔn)了另一只股票,然后用相同手法行事,在很短的時(shí)間里凈賺3/4個(gè)點(diǎn)。初試身手就旗開得勝,不是嗎?
請注意,在這家名氣很響的地方,光在頭一天只花了兩個(gè)小時(shí),我就買賣了1100股,搶進(jìn)搶出。但是那天的結(jié)果是,我賠掉了1100美元,意思是我在紐交所第一次出手就損失了一半資金。請記住,有賺錢的時(shí)候,但最后賠掉了1100美元。
我沒有在意,因?yàn)槲腋静恢滥睦锍鲥e(cuò)了。我的每一步都穩(wěn)穩(wěn)當(dāng)當(dāng),如果在之前的對賭行,肯定是穩(wěn)賺不賠的。失去的那1100美元很清楚地告訴我,機(jī)器沒有以正常的方式對待我,可只要機(jī)器操作人員沒有問題,就沒什么可擔(dān)心的。22歲年輕人的懵懂不是什么大弱點(diǎn)。
過了幾天,我告訴自己:“在這里這樣交易可不行,這里出來的信息沒有多大的參考價(jià)值?!辈贿^這也就是一閃念的事,我沒深想,繼續(xù)按照老路子玩,有賺有賠,一直賠到一文不剩,我就去跟老富勒頓借了500美元。后來我?guī)е鴱膶€行賺到的那些錢,再次由圣路易斯跑到紐約。
我學(xué)得更加謹(jǐn)慎,有一陣子還玩得比較順手。手頭一寬裕,我就盡力讓生活愜意點(diǎn)。我認(rèn)識了一些新朋友,日子過得還不錯(cuò)。不要忘記,我才不到23歲,一個(gè)人能闖蕩紐約,口袋里也有掙來的錢,我心中堅(jiān)信我已經(jīng)開始了解新的股價(jià)機(jī)器了。
我開始考慮我的單子下到證券交易所大廳后實(shí)際的執(zhí)行情況,行動變得特別謹(jǐn)慎,不過我還是相信來自紙上的那些信息,沒有在意普遍性的規(guī)則。我一直不轉(zhuǎn)變方式,就看不出自己操作上的真正問題。
1901年,經(jīng)濟(jì)開始進(jìn)入大增長時(shí)期,我掙了很多錢——對一個(gè)年輕人來說——是很多錢。你還記得那些日子嗎?國家經(jīng)濟(jì)繁榮,工業(yè)兼并和資本重組來勢洶洶,股市被瘋狂地托舉起來。我聽說以前日子紅火時(shí),華爾街號稱日成交量達(dá)到了25萬股,一天能倒騰2500萬美元的股票。到1901年,股民們制造了日成交量300萬股的創(chuàng)世紀(jì)錄,每個(gè)人都在賺錢。那些揮金如土的鋼鐵巨頭也進(jìn)來了,都是些百萬富翁,能讓他們感到滿意的游戲就是闖蕩股市。我們曾遇到過這樣的大人物:約翰·蓋茨和他的一群朋友,他們常掛在嘴邊的一句話就是“賭個(gè)100萬”,比如約翰·德里克、羅伊爾·史密斯這些里德-利茲-摩爾集團(tuán)的人,他們把鋼鐵公司的股份賣掉,然后在股市把羅德島系統(tǒng)的一大半股份買進(jìn)手里。還有施瓦布、弗里克、菲甫斯和匹斯堡集團(tuán),更別提很多很多在這場金錢易主的游戲中虧了本,但在其他行當(dāng)里都被奉為大作手的人了。你可以買賣所有的股票。凱恩炒熱了美國鋼鐵公司的股票。一個(gè)經(jīng)紀(jì)人幾分鐘就能賣掉10萬股,多美好的時(shí)代啊,多令人艷羨的巨頭啊,而且人們不用為賣掉股票納稅,簡直就是一派沒有終點(diǎn)的祥和氣氛。
沒多久,我聽到了熊市要來的流言。老手們都說,除了他們,其他人都是瘋子。可事實(shí)卻是除了他們外,其他人都賺到了錢。我自然知道,牛市總有到頭的時(shí)候,見股票就收入囊中的瘋勁兒也有終止的一天——我做好了面對熊市的心理準(zhǔn)備??晌颐看钨u出后都在虧,如果不是我出手快,可能會賠更多。我夢想著股市暴跌,但我也小心翼翼地操作。我買進(jìn)的股票賺了錢,拋掉的又賠本了,一直沒賺什么大錢,雖然你們會因?yàn)槲页鍪趾浪X得我賺了不少。
有一只股票我一直沒放空,就是北太平洋鐵路的股票。我以往具有的那些能力有了用武之地,通過分析后我覺得大多數(shù)股票都已經(jīng)被人買到久盤不動了,而北太平洋的走勢卻很好,可能還會上漲。我們現(xiàn)在都清楚,當(dāng)時(shí)不管是普通股還是優(yōu)先股,都被庫恩-羅布-哈里曼集團(tuán)收入囊中。我手里握著北太平洋1000普通股,沒有被其他人的意見左右,一直牢牢抓住不放。當(dāng)它漲到110美元的時(shí)候,已經(jīng)上漲了30個(gè)點(diǎn),我立馬伺機(jī)賣掉,賺了將近5萬美元,這是那時(shí)候我賺得最多的一筆錢。對于幾個(gè)月前在同一個(gè)地方還賠得吐血的人來說,這種成績就算非常難得了。
你可能記得,哈里曼集團(tuán)那時(shí)候通知摩根集團(tuán)和希爾集團(tuán)說,他們要取代摩根在北太平洋鐵路公司的地位,然后摩根集團(tuán)事先讓操盤的凱恩買進(jìn)5萬股北太平洋,設(shè)法保住他們對公司的控股權(quán)。據(jù)說,凱恩讓銀行家羅伯特·培根做好了買15萬股的準(zhǔn)備,羅伯特照辦了??傊?,凱恩派了他的經(jīng)紀(jì)人艾迪·諾頓去買北太平洋的10萬股。我覺得,他們接下來又買了5萬股,然后演變成一場著名的收購大戰(zhàn)。1901年5月8日閉市后,誰都知道有兩家金融巨鱷的戰(zhàn)爭正在持續(xù)。這個(gè)國家從未出現(xiàn)過規(guī)模如此龐大的巨頭資本之戰(zhàn),哈里曼對戰(zhàn)摩根,真正的棋逢對手啊。
5月9日早上,我拿著5萬美元現(xiàn)金,沒有一只股票。我說過,我做好了迎接熊市的準(zhǔn)備,現(xiàn)在機(jī)會來了。我知道接下來要發(fā)生的事情:從暴跌開始,接著很多價(jià)格低廉的股票充斥股市,用不了多久又馬上反彈,然后那些低價(jià)買進(jìn)的股民們就會大賺。這都不用他福爾摩斯來推理我也能判斷出這一點(diǎn)。我們即將有機(jī)會在股價(jià)一漲一跌之間穩(wěn)穩(wěn)當(dāng)當(dāng)?shù)孬@取巨大利潤。
所有事情都在我的預(yù)料之中,可是我卻賠盡了錢。我沒有料到會有一些意外出現(xiàn)。如果人們不遇到突發(fā)事件,大家就不會有什么差別,生活該是多么無趣,炒股也就只是乏味的增減,而股民也只是思維僵化的記賬員而已。恰恰就是預(yù)測讓人腦洞大開。你只要想想要猜得正確你必須做什么,就知道這一點(diǎn)。
就像我預(yù)測的那樣,股市又變得瘋狂了,巨額的成交量,變幻無常的股價(jià)。我下了一大堆賣單。我看到想做的股票開盤價(jià)不是太好,心里一陣興奮。經(jīng)紀(jì)人為我忙著,他們與其他經(jīng)紀(jì)人一樣兢兢業(yè)業(yè),可等到他們執(zhí)行我的單子時(shí),價(jià)格已經(jīng)跌了20多個(gè)點(diǎn)。成交量太大了,報(bào)價(jià)紙帶上的數(shù)字遠(yuǎn)遠(yuǎn)落在市況之后。當(dāng)我按報(bào)價(jià)紙帶顯示的股價(jià),比如100美元,下單賣出股票時(shí),經(jīng)紀(jì)人卻以80美元替我賣掉,比前一天的收盤價(jià)還低三四十美元,這好像是我花錢讓股價(jià)跌落到我想買的低價(jià)了。不過股價(jià)不會一直這樣下跌,所以我馬上決定平了空頭,掉轉(zhuǎn)方向做多頭。
經(jīng)紀(jì)人按照交易所接到單子時(shí)候的那個(gè)股價(jià)買進(jìn)股票,并不能按照能讓我有利可圖的那個(gè)股價(jià)買,而是他們的場內(nèi)人員拿到我的委托單時(shí),證券交易所的市價(jià)。他們付出的價(jià)格比我預(yù)估的高出15點(diǎn),誰能受得了一天之內(nèi)就損失35點(diǎn)呢。
我被滯后的信息完全損傷了,根據(jù)報(bào)價(jià)機(jī)信息判斷行情的習(xí)慣耍了我,紙上顯示的股價(jià)和真實(shí)的股價(jià)不符讓我遭受了大損失。我被曾經(jīng)讓我失敗過的東西再次打倒。如此看來,光靠那些滯后的信息,而不顧經(jīng)紀(jì)人是怎么操作的會吃大虧。我特別吃驚,為什么早沒有搞明白這點(diǎn)而找到應(yīng)對措施呢。
我的行為比看不出來還糟糕,我繼續(xù)交易,繼續(xù)搶進(jìn)搶出,也沒考慮經(jīng)紀(jì)人的操作規(guī)律。你知道,我沒做過限價(jià)交易,我要抓住機(jī)會,打敗股市而不是股價(jià)。我一旦覺得可以賣就趕緊賣掉,覺得股價(jià)會漲就趕緊買進(jìn),堅(jiān)守投機(jī)的這一條通則挽救了我。在對賭行里的那一套——簡單地玩限價(jià)交易——在股票交易所里也可以使用。倘若不是吃了虧,我就學(xué)不到實(shí)打?qū)嵉耐稒C(jī)玩法,只能按照粗淺的經(jīng)驗(yàn)一直冒險(xiǎn)。
為了減少紙帶機(jī)滯后于股市的不利影響,我每次都嘗試玩限價(jià)買賣,但股市一直飛速變化,我只好放棄這樣的做法。我都不知道為什么會有這樣的改變,耗了那么多年,我才知道不能賭隨后幾檔的小小起伏,而應(yīng)該賭預(yù)期即將出現(xiàn)的大波動。
5月9日賠了以后,我就改變了做法,不過還是有漏洞。要不是偶爾會賺點(diǎn)錢,我可能會更快地學(xué)到市場中的智慧。但我賺到的錢也夠我舒服地生活,開心地享受生活。那年夏天,我跟其他富裕發(fā)達(dá)的華爾街人一樣,到新澤西海濱去避暑,只是賺的錢不足以支撐我的虧損和生活開銷。
我繼續(xù)那樣交易,不是因?yàn)槲翌B固不化,而是我不知道問題出在哪里,更別說如何解決了。我不厭其煩地說這些,只是想讓你知道,天將降大任于我,必會先讓我吃些苦。在對付大型動物時(shí),我的那桿老獵槍與高超的來復(fù)槍相比,劣勢太明顯了。
這年秋天,我一方面輸?shù)袅巳康馁Y金,另一方面對屢敗屢戰(zhàn)的炒股游戲也產(chǎn)生了厭倦,我做出了離開紐約的決定,想換個(gè)地方換個(gè)方向玩。我從14歲開始玩股票,15歲賺到第一個(gè)1000美元,21歲賺到第一個(gè)1萬美元。我很多次賺了上萬美元又虧掉了。我在紐約賺過幾千、幾萬美元,又把這些錢虧掉了。我最多賺過5萬美元,兩天后,又賠得血本無歸。我沒有其他的生意,也不知道別的游戲。幾年以后,我被打回原點(diǎn)。更不幸的是,我變得花錢如流水一般,雖然這沒有賠錢那樣令我不舒服。
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