美國(guó)政要第15課
The RMA Force
--Interview with Dr. James R. Blaker, Senior Advisor to Former Vice Chairman of Joint Chief of Staffs, Gen. (Re.) William A. Owens 訪美國(guó)參聯(lián)會(huì)原副主席歐文斯上將的高級(jí)顧問詹姆斯•布萊克博士
MR. CHEN BOJIANG: In your paper “Understanding the Revolution in Military Affairs: A Guide to America’s 21st Century defense”, you suggest building up the RMA force. Is the RMA force a part of RMA or a result of it?
DR. BLAKER: Well, it’s both. You have to understand that that paper was part of this debate. It was an exaggerated1 view. It was written at a time when nobody had tried to be specific about what were the real changes that the American RMA implied.
The paper argued the United States should move toward smaller forces because, by making them smaller they become more agile2, and you can substitute3 knowledge for mass. That's the hypothesis4. It's not proven, but that' s the hypothesis. The paper was an effort to try to portray what those sorts of organizations might look like.
So, if we got to that point, it would be a result of the RMA. But there was also an argument that said that, we don' t really know how to do this. In order to make the kinds of changes that might be necessary, it would really be necessary to do a great deal of experimentation. And the way to do that experimentation was to take some part of the active military5, free it from the current readiness requirements, make the organizational changes, and then ask them to test whether or not those organizations were the right ones.
To do that meant that in the U.S. you would have to use the reserve forces6 differently than we had used them before. The reserve forces in this scheme7 would be used to provide force presence8, peacekeeping operations9, many of the things that the acting force is now charged with.
So it was a means of accelerating the changes that we think might be involved in this revolution. And as such, it was considered too radical10.
MR. CHEN: Could you describe the technological templates11 for the RMA force?
DR. BLAKER: Well, I'm not sure what you mean by the templates. But the templates do not depend on the traditional way in which the military's looked at technology. In the American case, military technology in aircraft was always associated with advanced forms of the platform itself: aircraft that would fly faster, farther, carry more, things like that.
In the Navy it was always associated12 with platforms. Ships that would go faster, carry more armament, those things. And in the Army, particularly the armored forces, it was always associated with tanks which were more heavily armored13, could shoot faster and more accurately, could go longer, things like that.
The real technology template for the RMA has much less to do with14 advanced platforms than with the things that they carry. It is, again, information technology-based, which deals less with the amount of armor that the tank carries, and more with its ability to communicate, its ability to receive information, and/or trade that information to the tank crew, etc.
So the template was counter-intuitive15 because it did not say that you should spend your research and development money on new tanks or new aircraft, you should spend it on the ability to integrate those platforms better.
MR. CHEN: What are the necessities and goals of building up the RMA force? According to your estimate, how long will it take to shift to the RMA force from the current situation?
DR. BLAKER: The necessities are the will to try it and the courage to change. It sounds like a cliche, but that's the real necessity.
Because the changes are likely to be significant, many of the people inside the military are reluctant16 to try to change, because they don't know where it will lead. And because we have not lost a war since Vietnam, there's a reluctance, a smugness17, an arrogance18, that works against the willingness to try to experiment to change.
If we had the courage to do this, I think it would take 10 years, but the changes would be dramatic in those 10 years.
MR. CHEN: What changes in the armed forces will take place during the building up of the RMA force?
DR. BLAKER: Well, I think that the changes will be in the form of appliques19. What I mean by that is that the technology is arriving. It's almost a done deal20. It’s in place. For the most part, it's been applied to existing organizations and doctrines.
What the Army is doing is a good example. They are taking information technology, and applying it to existing tanks within the existing organizations, and operating as they develop these devices. As such, the real capabilities of this technology will be reached only slowly as people come to the realization that, for instance, if you really do have a dominant knowledge of what is occurring, then perhaps you don't need things like tactical reserves21. Tactical reserves have always been meaningful in the context of22 not having knowledge. They were an insurance policy against the sudden breakthrough, or an enemy capability which you did not expect.
But if you really have a much better understanding of what is occurring on the battlefield, then perhaps you don't need a reserve force. And those kinds of implications go throughout the use of military forces.
The Americans have developed a concept of close air support23, primarily in which the Air Force, provides close air support to the Army. But close air support has always been something seen by the Army and the Air Force, and the United States, as something like the reserves; something that you use when you come up against an unexpected event. But if there are fewer unexpected events, then maybe you don't have to have that concept of close air support.
So, the implications of this are massive. They involve challenges to existing doctrine. Yet the current approach in using the technology is to apply it to existing doctrine, existing organization. And as such, the changes and the power of the concepts will be slow in coming. That's why Owens and others, myself included, have argued that we should experiment much more rapidly and much more radically. We want to condense24 the time at which the revolution will occur, from 20 years to 10 years.
MR. CHEN: What are the main obstacles25 to be overcome in building up the RMA forces? How will the military capabilities be maintained during the building up of the RMA force?
DR. BLAKER: The biggest obstacles again are lack of courage, traditional commitments, and the parochialism26 of the separate services. The way to overcome them is to move toward joint operations, joint command control structures. And speaking as an American, I believe the Americans should do this now—do this sooner rather than later. We should do the experimentation now, when the threat is relatively low.
Practice Listening to words詞匯聽力練習(xí)：
1.exaggerated []夸大的
2.agile []靈活的
3.substitute [] v. 替換
4.hypothesis [] n. 假設(shè)
5.active military現(xiàn)役部隊(duì)
6.reserve forces預(yù)備役部隊(duì)
7.scheme [] n. 安排，配置
8.force presence兵力存在
9.peacekeeping operations維和作戰(zhàn)
10.radical [] adj. 激進(jìn)的
11.template [] n. 模板，模式
12.associated [] adj. 關(guān)聯(lián)的
13.armored [] adj. 裝甲的
14.have…to do with 與…有關(guān)
15.intuitive [] adj. 直覺的
16.reluctant [] adj. 勉強(qiáng)的
17.smugness [] n. 沾沾自喜
18.arrogance [] n. 傲慢，自大
19.applique [] n. 鑲嵌
20.a done deal（技術(shù)）已成型、完善
21.tactical reserves戰(zhàn)術(shù)預(yù)備隊(duì)
22.in the context of 在……情況下
23.close air support近距空中支援
24.condense [] v.（使）濃縮
25.obstacle [] n.障礙
26.parochialism [] n.本位主義
【參考譯文】
軍事革命部隊(duì)
陳伯江：在你的一篇題為“理解軍事革命----美國(guó)21世紀(jì)防務(wù)指南”的文章中，你提出要建立軍事革命部隊(duì)。軍事革命部隊(duì)是軍事革命的組成部分，還是軍事革命的結(jié)果？
布萊克：噢，軍事革命部隊(duì)既是軍事革命的組成部分，又是軍事革命的結(jié)果。你應(yīng)當(dāng)了解那篇文章是為了闡述這種觀點(diǎn)而寫的，它用的是矯枉過正的辦法，這篇文章是在還沒有人試圖對(duì)美國(guó)軍事革命真正意味著什么樣的變化進(jìn)行專門研究的時(shí)候?qū)懗傻摹?
我在那篇文章中提出，美國(guó)軍隊(duì)?wèi)?yīng)當(dāng)建立規(guī)模更小的部隊(duì)。因?yàn)橥ㄟ^使軍隊(duì)更小型化，它們會(huì)變得更加靈活，并且你可能用知識(shí)來取代集中。這只是一種假設(shè)，尚未被證明。該文章旨在勾畫新軍隊(duì)編成可能是什么樣的。
因此，如果我們實(shí)現(xiàn)了文中所勾畫的藍(lán)圖，這就將是軍事革命的一個(gè)結(jié)果。但也還有另一種觀點(diǎn)，認(rèn)為我們的確不知道該怎樣做。為了進(jìn)行這種可能是必要的變革，有必要進(jìn)行大量的試驗(yàn)。進(jìn)行實(shí)驗(yàn)的方式是拿出一部分現(xiàn)役部隊(duì)，不讓他們擔(dān)負(fù)戰(zhàn)備任務(wù)，然后改革它們的編制，并要求他們?cè)囼?yàn)新編制是否可行。
那樣做意味著美國(guó)必須以與過去不同的方式運(yùn)用預(yù)備役部隊(duì)。在這種構(gòu)成中，預(yù)備役部隊(duì)將被用來提供兵力存在、維和行動(dòng)、以及目前由現(xiàn)役部隊(duì)擔(dān)負(fù)的許多任務(wù)。
因此，建立軍事革命部隊(duì)是加快我們認(rèn)為與這場(chǎng)革命有關(guān)的變革的——種辦法。但是有人認(rèn)為這樣做過于激進(jìn)。
陳：你能說明一下軍事革命部隊(duì)的技術(shù)模式嗎?
布萊克：我不太清楚你所說的技術(shù)模式的意思。但這種模式將不再以傳統(tǒng)的那種軍隊(duì)尋求技術(shù)的方式為依據(jù)。就美國(guó)的情況來說，傳統(tǒng)軍用飛機(jī)的技術(shù)總是與平臺(tái)本身的先進(jìn)型號(hào)相聯(lián)系，即要求飛得更快、更遠(yuǎn)、載重更大及其它更好性能的飛機(jī)。
海軍也總是與平臺(tái)相聯(lián)系。要求船的速度更快、載乘部隊(duì)更多等等。陸軍特別是裝甲兵，也總是與坦克相聯(lián)系，要求坦克具有更厚的裝甲、能更快更準(zhǔn)地發(fā)射武器、能去更遠(yuǎn)的地方等等。
軍事革命的技術(shù)模式與先進(jìn)的平臺(tái)關(guān)系不大，而與平臺(tái)所攜帶的東西密切相關(guān)。它同樣也是以信息技術(shù)為基礎(chǔ)。它對(duì)坦克裝甲板的厚度要求不高，而對(duì)坦克的通訊能力、接收信息的能力、以及與坦克乘員交換信息的能力等等要求很高。
因此，這種技術(shù)模式是與直覺背道而馳的，因?yàn)樗恢鲝垖⒀芯亢桶l(fā)展的投資放在新坦克或飛機(jī)上；它主張將錢花在進(jìn)一步提高那些作戰(zhàn)平臺(tái)的一體化能力上。
陳：建立軍事革命部隊(duì)的必要條件和目標(biāo)是什么?根據(jù)你的預(yù)測(cè)，由目前的狀況向軍事革命部隊(duì)轉(zhuǎn)變需要多長(zhǎng)時(shí)間?
布萊克：敢于嘗試的意愿和進(jìn)行變革的勇氣是改革的必要條件。這聽起來像一句老生常談，但它卻是真正的必要條件。
變革可能是巨大的，因此軍隊(duì)中的許多人不愿嘗試變革，他們不知道這場(chǎng)變革將導(dǎo)向何處。美國(guó)自越戰(zhàn)以后還沒有在—場(chǎng)戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)中失敗過，所以存在著—種抵觸情緒、—種沾沾自喜、一種驕傲自大，它們是阻礙為變革進(jìn)行試驗(yàn)的力量。
如果我們有勇氣進(jìn)行這場(chǎng)變革，我認(rèn)為它將需要10年時(shí)間，但在這10年，種種變化將會(huì)非常之大。
陳：在建立軍事革命部隊(duì)過程中，美國(guó)武裝力量將會(huì)發(fā)生哪些變化?
布萊克：我認(rèn)為這些變化將以鑲嵌的形式出現(xiàn)。我這樣說的意思是技術(shù)正在出現(xiàn)，它幾乎是現(xiàn)成的，已經(jīng)在那里。其中的大部分已經(jīng)用于現(xiàn)在的編制和條令之中。
陸軍目前的所作所為就是一個(gè)很好的例子。他們正在發(fā)展信息技術(shù)，并將其運(yùn)用于現(xiàn)有編制內(nèi)的坦克中，并在發(fā)展新裝備的同時(shí)執(zhí)行作戰(zhàn)任務(wù)。這樣，這一技術(shù)的實(shí)際能力只能隨著人們逐步認(rèn)識(shí)的程度而慢慢發(fā)揮出來。例如，如果你確實(shí)對(duì)戰(zhàn)場(chǎng)所發(fā)生的一切有了主導(dǎo)性知識(shí)，那么也許你不再需要諸如戰(zhàn)術(shù)預(yù)備隊(duì)這類東西。戰(zhàn)術(shù)預(yù)備隊(duì)通?？偸窃趯?duì)戰(zhàn)場(chǎng)情況不甚了解的情況下才有意義。它是預(yù)防突然變故或敵方能力出乎意料時(shí)的保險(xiǎn)措施。然而，如果確實(shí)能對(duì)戰(zhàn)場(chǎng)情況了如指掌，那么也許你就不需要—支預(yù)備隊(duì)。諸如此類的影響在軍事力量的運(yùn)用中比比皆是。
美國(guó)人曾經(jīng)發(fā)展了近距空中支援的概念。主要是空軍向陸軍提供近距空中支援。然而，這種支援總是被陸軍、空軍和美國(guó)人看作是—種預(yù)備隊(duì)；當(dāng)遇到未曾預(yù)料的情況時(shí)，就使用這種近距空中支援。但是，如果未曾預(yù)料的情況寥寥無幾，近距空中支援的概念也就可有可無了。
因此，技術(shù)影響是大量的。它們包括對(duì)現(xiàn)有條令的挑戰(zhàn)，而日前對(duì)待技術(shù)的做法是將其運(yùn)用于現(xiàn)有的條令、現(xiàn)有的編制。這樣做，各種變革以及新作戰(zhàn)概念的威力將只能緩慢地顯示出來。這就是為什么歐文斯和其他——些人(包括我本人)，一再?gòu)?qiáng)調(diào)我們應(yīng)當(dāng)更快、更積極主動(dòng)地進(jìn)行試驗(yàn)。我們希望把這場(chǎng)軍事革命的時(shí)間從20年壓縮到10年。
陳：建立軍事革命部隊(duì)需要克服的主要障礙是什么?在建立軍事革命部隊(duì)的過程中，如何保持軍事能力?
布萊克：最大的障礙是缺少勇氣、傳統(tǒng)的束縛，以及各軍種的本位主義。克服這些障礙的途徑是向作戰(zhàn)、聯(lián)合指揮控制結(jié)構(gòu)發(fā)展。作為一個(gè)美國(guó)人來說，我認(rèn)為美國(guó)人應(yīng)當(dāng)從現(xiàn)在做起----趕早不趕晚! 在當(dāng)前威脅相對(duì)較少之時(shí)，我們應(yīng)當(dāng)抓緊進(jìn)行實(shí)驗(yàn)。
