美國(guó)政要第14課
Information Edge & information umbrella
--Interview with Former Vice Chairman of Joint Chief of Staffs, Gen. (Re.) William A. Owens 訪美國(guó)參聯(lián)會(huì)原副主席威廉•歐文斯上將(退役)
MR. CHEN BOJIANG: I am very glad to have the opportunity to interview you. When I was looking for interviewees on military revolution, future warfare and national defense development, you were strongly recommended to me as one of the major RMA advocators and contributors whose work had a significant influence on this field. I really appreciate that you are able to meet with me given your busy schedule1. I have read several of your articles on military revolution and U. S. National defense development. I would like to begin our interview by asking you some questions about issues dealt with in your articles.
After your article “America’s Information Edge2” was published in 1996, “Information Edge” became a hot topic. In the Information Age, what are the changes in the concept of force and the balance of force? How can this new framework3 be used to assess force and the balance of force?
GEN. OWENS: It is trying to say you can replace an existing military force, in our case an Army of 9,000 tanks, and a navy of 340 ships and an Air Force of 20 tactical fighter wings. You can replace all of that, replace the force capability from the existing force of these 20 tactical fighter wings, and these 340 ships, for example, with fewer forces but with the same force capability. Now, we're talking about force capability, what you can do with the forces. An example of what I mean might be satellite systems. They have been present for some time but we never thought much about them as supplements4 or trade-offs5 for combat forces.
The same has been true about UAVs6, or commercial satellites. All these types of things can multiply the capability of the "good enough" platforms7. You can replace and multiply the capability of the force without replacing or adding new weapon system. That's the new idea, because we always thought that if you decommissioned8 a ship, you had to get a new ship, but I think not any longer. You replace force capability with a new force, that looks different and is based on information. I think that's in our mindset9.
MR. CHEN: In the future development of national defense, which kinds of advanced technologies will be a priority10 for the U.S.? How will these kinds of advanced technologies influence American military capability?
GEN. OWENS: The easiest way of thinking about it is to list the kinds of technologies that are most important, those technologies that allow you to see, sensors, the technologies that allow you to tell, the communications, and the tech¬nologies that allow you to guide the preci¬sion guided munitions11. And those are the technologies that are of main interest to a military that wants to become modern. These tend to be in the area of information technology, and telecommunications, and in systems integration. Remember the is¬sue of "system-of-systems"12 What this all means is that this will be central to mili¬taries and the future, not tanks and air¬planes.
MR. CHEN: Some have argued that the speed in the development of technolo¬gies has exceeded that of the development of military doctrine. Therefore, the em¬phasis of military revolution should be fo¬cused on the military doctrine, structure and organization so as to adapt to the de¬velopment of technology. In your opinion, what is the emphasis of the RMA?
GEN. OWENS: I completely agree. It is the biggest challenge of the Revolu¬tion in Military Affairs to change the doc¬trine and the concepts and the culture. We have in the U.S., 1.5 million soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines who have all been raised in the stereotypes'3 of the Army, Navy, Air Force and Marines. We teach them about ships and tanks and air¬planes and the tradition of the military and remember what I said about history and tradition. I think it is interesting, but not very. It is the future that matters most. So culturally, we have to get ourselves in this mindset of new functions and not stay in the mindset of the culture of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines. We have to change the culture into how to see the battlefield, and how do you apply force through dominant maneuver14 armies and marines in strategic ways in the battlefield, not in force-on-force confrontation, and how you put precision weapons on targets without platforms, and finally how you support those things. That's a big change. I think it will take years and I think it will have to be top-down. That's the only way you can do it, by taking the senior people and convincing them that they have to have a revolution and drive the revolution down, because you can't start from the bottom up.
MR. CHEN: Can the information technology driving America's emerging15 military capabilities change classic deter¬rence16 theory? What is the information umbrella? What is the difference between the information umbrella and the nuclear umbrella? Can the information umbrella replace the nuclear umbrella?
GEN. OWENS: I think that it is ab¬solutely true that you can change the deter¬rence theory with the revolution in military affairs. It means that our nation can influ¬ence other nations with an information um¬brella, if I say to Saddam Hussein, I have the ability to put an information umbrella over Iraq. I can see everything you do. I am able to do that, and I will do that, if you don't comply17 with the United Na¬tions resolutions. I will be able to show, if I desire, on CNN18 what I saw from my information umbrella and then be able to inform the world, or I may be able to put bombs on specific targets if you persist in not doing what the UN19 wants you to do. It is because of the very strong element of deterrence theory that you are able to say, our country is so smart we will be able to take this information umbrella over your country and it has enormous ramifications20 for your country. It's not the size of my carriers or the size of my air force. It' s the size of my smarts, it' s my ability to think about and use the information um¬brella. The answer to your question is yes, the information umbrella can replace the nuclear umbrella. I believe we need to reduce our nuclear weapons radically, not just slowly. We need to rid the world, to the extent we can, of nuclear weapons. You can continue to maintain a deterrence strategy with an information umbrella, and I believe that the nuclear umbrella that we have used with our allies in the past is overcome by events. We have an ability now to put that information umbrella in its place. And it's a much more peaceful um¬brella. It's not that dire threat, but I be¬lieve it's equally effective in terms of21 aggressors like Saddam Hussein22. We have a much bigger potential23 to use the information umbrella than to use a nuclear weapon. People said that they don’t think we’ll really use nuclear weapons, and they’re right. But the information umbrella, we’ll use it, and that’s good. So all of us who want to see peace in the world, and security, and I personally believe that’s the kind of thing we should start to think about and do with our allies24. I gave a speech yesterday where I talked about the cooperation between our nations, and we should be able to talk about these kinds of issues, and how we can do these things together, especially as a part of a group of nations, and forming a security blanket around the Pacific.
Practice Listening to words詞匯聽力練習(xí)：
1.schedule [] n. 時(shí)間表
2.information edge 信息優(yōu)勢(shì)
3.framework [] n.（理論）框架
4.supplement [] n.補(bǔ)充
5.trade-off交換，替換
6.UAV:Unmanned Aerial Vehicle 無人駕駛航空器
7.platform [] n.平臺(tái)
8.decommission [] vt. 使退役
9.mindset [] n. 思維模式
10.priority [] n. 優(yōu)先
11.precision guided munition精確制導(dǎo)武器（彈藥）
12.system-of-systems系統(tǒng)（體系）集成
13.stereotype []ｎ．鉛版、陳規(guī)，此處意為：模式、熔爐
14.dominant maneuver主導(dǎo)性機(jī)動(dòng)
15.emerge [] vi. 顯現(xiàn)，形成
16.deterrence [] n. 威懾
17.comply [] vi. 順從
18.CNN:Cable News Network美國(guó)有線新聞網(wǎng)
19.UN:United Nations聯(lián)合國(guó)
20.ramification [] n.衍生物，此處意為：影響
21.in terms of 在……，從……（來說）
22.Saddam Hussein薩達(dá)姆•侯賽因
23.potential [] adj. 潛在的
24.ally [] n. 同盟者
【參考譯文】
信息優(yōu)勢(shì)與信息傘
陳伯江：我很高興有機(jī)會(huì)采訪你。在我尋找有關(guān)軍事革命、未來戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)和國(guó)防發(fā)展問題的訪談對(duì)象時(shí)，不少人向我極力推薦你，認(rèn)為你是美國(guó)軍事革命的主要倡導(dǎo)者和貢獻(xiàn)者之一，你所你的工作在這一具有重大影響。你在百忙之中接受我的訪談，我確實(shí)非常感謝。我已經(jīng)讀過你寫的關(guān)于軍事革命和美國(guó)國(guó)防發(fā)展的文章，我想就你文章中所談到的問題開始我們的訪談。
你的題為“美國(guó)的信息優(yōu)勢(shì)”的文章于1996年發(fā)表之后，“信息優(yōu)勢(shì)”開始成為美國(guó)的熱門話題。在信息時(shí)代，力量和力量平穩(wěn)的概念發(fā)生了哪些變化?如何運(yùn)用這些新的認(rèn)識(shí)去進(jìn)行力量和力量平衡的評(píng)估?
歐文斯:在那篇文章中，我試圖說明你可以用更少的部隊(duì)取代現(xiàn)有的軍隊(duì)，但是部隊(duì)的作戰(zhàn)能力不變。從我們的情況來說，就是一個(gè)有9000輛坦克的陸軍、340艘軍艦的海軍和20個(gè)戰(zhàn)術(shù)戰(zhàn)斗機(jī)聯(lián)隊(duì)的空軍，你可以取代所有這些力量?，F(xiàn)在，我們談?wù)摰氖遣筷?duì)的能力，即用這些部隊(duì)能做什么?說明我的觀點(diǎn)的一個(gè)例子可能是衛(wèi)星系統(tǒng)，它們己經(jīng)存在較長(zhǎng)時(shí)間了，但我們從未把它們作為作戰(zhàn)部隊(duì)的補(bǔ)充和替換。無人駕駛飛行器或商業(yè)衛(wèi)星的情況也是這樣。
所有這類東西也能取代部隊(duì)的能力，可以使那些“足夠好”的作戰(zhàn)平臺(tái)能力倍增。你可以不替換和增加新的武器系統(tǒng)而使能力倍增。這是一種新觀點(diǎn)。因?yàn)槲覀兛偸钦J(rèn)為，如果你讓一只軍艦退役，你必須要有一艘新軍艦，而我認(rèn)為不該再是這樣。你可以用一種看起來不同的以信息為基礎(chǔ)的新部隊(duì)，來取代原有部隊(duì)的能力。我認(rèn)為這就是我們的思維模式。
陳:在美國(guó)未來的國(guó)防發(fā)展中，最優(yōu)先發(fā)展的先進(jìn)技術(shù)是什么?這些先進(jìn)技術(shù)會(huì)給美國(guó)的軍事能力帶來什么影響?
歐文斯:思考這一問題的最簡(jiǎn)單的辦法，是列出各種最重要的技術(shù)。這些技術(shù)包括:讓你觀察戰(zhàn)場(chǎng)情況的傳感器技術(shù);使你能傳遞信息的通訊技術(shù);以及使你能引導(dǎo)你的精確制導(dǎo)武器的技術(shù)。這些就是一個(gè)想要變成現(xiàn)代化的軍隊(duì)所應(yīng)感興趣的技術(shù)。這些技術(shù)屬于信息技術(shù)、電信技術(shù)和系統(tǒng)一體化技術(shù)等領(lǐng)域。也就是上面談到的"系統(tǒng)集成"。所有這些意味著它們而非坦克和飛機(jī)對(duì)軍隊(duì)和未來至關(guān)重要。
陳:有人認(rèn)為，技術(shù)發(fā)展的速度已經(jīng)超過軍事理論的發(fā)展。因此，當(dāng)前這場(chǎng)軍事革命的重點(diǎn)應(yīng)當(dāng)放在軍事思想、軍隊(duì)結(jié)構(gòu)和編制上，以適應(yīng)技術(shù)的發(fā)展。在你看來，這場(chǎng)軍事革命的重點(diǎn)是什么?
歐文斯:我完全同意你所說的那種看法，變革軍事理論、作戰(zhàn)概念及文化是軍事革命所面臨的最大挑戰(zhàn)。在美國(guó)，我們有150萬士兵、水手、飛行員和海軍陸戰(zhàn)隊(duì)員。他們都是在陸軍、海軍、空軍和海軍陸戰(zhàn)隊(duì)的熔爐里成長(zhǎng)起來的。我們教給他們有關(guān)軍艦、坦克和飛機(jī)的知識(shí)以及軍隊(duì)的傳統(tǒng)。不記得我怎么談?wù)搨鹘y(tǒng)和歷史嗎?我認(rèn)為它們是重要的，但不是非常重要的。未來才是最重要的。所以從文化上來說，我們必須使自己具備新的功能，而不是停留在陸軍、海軍、空軍和海軍陸戰(zhàn)隊(duì)文化的思維模式中。我們必須改變傳統(tǒng)文化，考慮如何觀察掌握戰(zhàn)場(chǎng)情況;如何通過陸軍和海軍陸戰(zhàn)隊(duì)的主導(dǎo)性機(jī)動(dòng)在戰(zhàn)場(chǎng)上以戰(zhàn)略方式運(yùn)用兵力，而不是兵力與兵力的對(duì)抗;如何在沒有作戰(zhàn)平臺(tái)的情況下將精確武器投向目標(biāo);最后是如何保障這些作戰(zhàn)行動(dòng)。那將是非常大的變化。我認(rèn)為實(shí)現(xiàn)這一一變化將需要若干年的時(shí)間，并且我認(rèn)為需要自上而下地推行變革。這是我們能夠變革的惟一方式。從高層人員開始，說服他們，使他們認(rèn)識(shí)到必須要有一一場(chǎng)革命，并且向下推動(dòng)這場(chǎng)革命。因?yàn)檫@場(chǎng)革命不可能自下而上開始。
陳：推動(dòng)美國(guó)新軍事能力發(fā)展的信息技術(shù)能否導(dǎo)致傳統(tǒng)的威懾理論發(fā)生變化?什么是信息傘?信息傘與核武器傘有什么不同?信息傘是否能代替核武器傘?
歐文斯：我認(rèn)為軍事革命能夠?qū)е峦乩碚摰淖兓?，這是完全正確的。這意味著我們的國(guó)家可以通過信息傘來影響其它的國(guó)家。我可以對(duì)薩達(dá)姆•侯賽因說，我們有能力在伊拉克上空撐開一把信息傘，我能看到你所做的一切。如果你不遵守聯(lián)合國(guó)決議，我們能夠做到，而且也將這樣做。只要我愿意，我就可以在美國(guó)有線電視網(wǎng)上播出我通過信息傘看到的一切，這樣我就能告訴全世界?；蛘撸绻銏?jiān)持不按聯(lián)合國(guó)的要求去做，我也可以轟炸一些特定目標(biāo)。正是由于威懾理論的強(qiáng)制要素，你才敢說話。我們的國(guó)家很先進(jìn)，可以在你的國(guó)家上撐開一把信息傘，這對(duì)你的國(guó)家的影響非同小可。因此，重要的不是航空母艦的大小、空軍的多少，重要的是我擁有智慧的多少，是我思考和運(yùn)用信息傘的能力的大小。所以，對(duì)你的問題的答案應(yīng)該是肯定的。信息傘可以代替核武器傘。我認(rèn)為我們必須盡快地而不只是慢慢地減少核武器，我們必須盡可能使世界擺脫核武器的危險(xiǎn)。你可以繼續(xù)用信息傘保持威懾戰(zhàn)略。我認(rèn)為我們以往用于盟國(guó)的核武器傘并非萬無一失，現(xiàn)在我們有能力以信息傘取而代之。這是一個(gè)要好得多的“和平傘”。雖然它沒有可怕的威脅，但我相信它在對(duì)付像薩達(dá)姆•侯賽因那樣的侵略者時(shí)會(huì)同樣有效。對(duì)于我們來說，使用信息傘比使用核武器傘有更大的潛力。過去人們認(rèn)為我們不會(huì)真的使用核武器，這是對(duì)的。但對(duì)于信息傘來說，我們將會(huì)用它，耐用效果不錯(cuò)。所有想看到世界和平和安全的人和我個(gè)人都相信，我們應(yīng)當(dāng)開始考慮這種信息傘，并且與我們的盟國(guó)一起做這件事。昨天我曾作過一次有關(guān)國(guó)家間合作問題的演說。我們應(yīng)當(dāng)能夠談?wù)撨@問題。尤其是作為國(guó)際家族的一個(gè)組成部分，我們?cè)鯓硬拍芄餐刈鲞@事情，以建立起環(huán)太平洋的安全屏障。
