為什么通脹危機(jī)對民粹主義強(qiáng)人來說是個壞消息
對任何政府來說，通貨膨脹危機(jī)都是壞消息，就像土耳其即將發(fā)生的那種;但對于某種類型的威權(quán)主義者，也就是民粹主義強(qiáng)人來說，這種危機(jī)尤其危險。
They are unusually prone to creating this sort of crisis, unusually inhibited from fixing it and unusually slow to recover. They have, on average, higher rates of inflation and more artificially undervalued currencies. Their central banks are less independent, making them less capable of intervening.
他們特別容易造成這種往往難以修復(fù)，而且恢復(fù)速度異常緩慢的危機(jī)。總體來說，他們國家的通貨膨脹率會更高，貨幣被人為低估的程度更嚴(yán)重。他們的央行不是那么獨(dú)立，減弱了它們的干預(yù)能力。
Potentially catastrophic on their own, these are symptoms of a set of weaknesses and liabilities that go beyond monetary policy to the core of populist strongman rule.
這些表現(xiàn)本身就有可能是災(zāi)難性的，它們是一系列直抵民粹強(qiáng)人統(tǒng)治核心的弱點(diǎn)和不利，遠(yuǎn)不僅限于貨幣政策。
Before Turkey, there was Venezuela’s Nicolás Maduro and his predecessor, Hugo Chávez, who oversaw their country’s plunge from prosperity to ruin, partly by plowing into an inflationary crisis.
在土耳其之前，有委內(nèi)瑞拉的尼古拉斯·馬杜羅(Nicolas Maduro)及其前任烏戈·查韋斯(Hugo Chavez)，該國在他們的執(zhí)掌下從繁榮走向毀滅，部分原因正是因為國家陷入通脹危機(jī)。
When this happens in democracies, elected leaders are typically replaced with new ones who eventually rein in inflation. It happened many times in Latin America alone: in Nicaragua, Chile, Peru and Argentina. Other sorts of authoritarianism, run by a party, military or monarchy, may collapse, as happened in Brazil, but often they have the will and flexibility to impose some sort of reform.
當(dāng)這種情況發(fā)生在民主國家時，民選領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人通常會被新領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人所取代，他們將最終控制通貨膨脹。僅在拉丁美洲，這樣的事情就發(fā)生過多次：尼加拉瓜、智利、秘魯和阿根廷。由政黨、軍隊或君主管理的其他各種威權(quán)主義，則有可能崩潰，就像在巴西發(fā)生的那樣，但他們往往有推行某種改革的意愿和適應(yīng)力。
Populist strongmen — because of their relationships to their citizens, their fellow elites and to their own policymaking apparatus — tend to be different. Maduro printed more money, worsening the crisis dramatically. A decade earlier, Zimbabwe’s Robert Mugabe did much the same thing to much the same effect.
因為與其公民、權(quán)貴階層和自己的決策機(jī)構(gòu)的關(guān)系緣故，民粹強(qiáng)人往往是不同的。馬杜羅印了更多鈔票，導(dǎo)致危機(jī)加劇。十年前，津巴布韋的羅伯特·穆加貝(Robert G. Mugabe)也做了幾乎一樣的事情，效果差不多。
Whether Turkey’s president, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, ultimately follows the same path, he already is repeating the familiar patterns of a ruler constrained and guided by his system in ways not always in the country’s long-term interests.
不管土耳其總統(tǒng)雷杰普·塔伊普·埃爾多安(Recep Tayyip Erdogan)最終是否也會走上同樣的道路，他眼下已經(jīng)在重復(fù)著人們所熟悉的統(tǒng)治模式，受到一個對國家長遠(yuǎn)利益不見得有幫助的體制的桎梏和導(dǎo)引。
Turkey’s meltdown, more than just a product of Erdogan’s powergrabs, is a microcosm of the pathologies inherent in his style of governing, and that of other populist strongmen. And it is a reminder that, although their system seems to be rising in the world, it comes with special risks that make it, on average, more likely to collapse.
土耳其的崩潰不僅僅是埃爾多安集權(quán)的產(chǎn)物，還集中體現(xiàn)了他和其他一些民粹強(qiáng)人的執(zhí)政風(fēng)格中所固有的沉疴。它也提醒著人們，雖然他們的體制似乎正在世界崛起，但也帶來了特殊的風(fēng)險，通常，這令其更易崩潰。
What Inflation Threatens 通脹的威脅
Any dictator knows that inflation — which erodes legitimacy with the public and angers powerful elites who expect payouts — can pose existential risks. Elected leaders will merely lose office (most of the time), but an authoritarian state can more easily collapse outright.
每個獨(dú)裁者都知道，通貨膨脹可能會帶來生存危機(jī)，它會侵蝕其面對公眾的執(zhí)政合法性，激怒期待得到回報的權(quán)貴階層。經(jīng)選舉產(chǎn)生的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人只是下臺而已(大多數(shù)時候)，但專制國家卻更有可能出現(xiàn)徹底崩潰。
In 1989, workers angered by inflation in China joined idealistic students in protests that the government answered with one of the modern era’s bloodiest crackdowns.
1989年，被通脹激怒的中國工人加入了理想主義學(xué)生的抗議行列，政府的回應(yīng)行動，則是現(xiàn)代最為血腥的一次鎮(zhèn)壓。
Inflation can be so dangerous for authoritarians that it can also prompt otherwise unthinkable reforms.
對于威權(quán)主義者來說，通脹可能非常危險，甚至可能帶來之前難以想象的改革。
Vietnamese leaders, worried that a run of inflation in the 1980s could bring down the communist system, shifted to a more market-based economy.
在上世紀(jì)80年代，越南領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人擔(dān)心通貨膨脹可能會導(dǎo)致共產(chǎn)主義制度的垮臺，于是轉(zhuǎn)向了更加市場化的經(jīng)濟(jì)。
Iran’s inflation surge, in 2013, fed into public dissatisfaction deep enough that the hard-line supreme leader stood by as voters ushered a relative moderate into the presidency.
2013年，伊朗通脹飆升引發(fā)了公眾的強(qiáng)烈不滿，以至于在選民選擇了一個相對溫和的總統(tǒng)時，立場強(qiáng)硬的最高精神領(lǐng)袖也未加干預(yù)。
All forms of authoritarianism are susceptible: one-party states (think China or Cuba), monarchies (Saudi Arabia) or military dictatorships (Thailand today, others in the recent past).
所有形式的威權(quán)主義都容易受到影響：一黨制國家(比如中國或古巴)、君主制國家(比如沙特阿拉伯)或軍事獨(dú)裁(比如今天的泰國，以及近代的其他例子)。
But a strongman — a charismatic leader, consolidating power for himself and smashing institutions that might challenge him — can make such crises easier to spark and harder to contain.
但作為富有魅力的領(lǐng)袖，強(qiáng)人鞏固自己的權(quán)力并粉碎可能挑戰(zhàn)自己的攔路虎，這會導(dǎo)致這類危機(jī)更有可能滋生，也更難以控制。
When Growth Becomes Dangerous 當(dāng)增長變得危險
Much of that has to do with how strongmen typically come to power: by rising within a flawed democracy or, in some cases, a military or one-party regime. This leads them to dismantle the old system, which they see as a threat. That is often where the trouble starts.
這種情況很大程度上與強(qiáng)人得到權(quán)力的典型方式有關(guān)：在一個有缺陷的民主國家內(nèi)部崛起，或者在某些情況下，在一個軍政府或一黨制政體中崛起。這令他們需要拆除被他們視為威脅的舊系統(tǒng)。麻煩通常就是從這里開始的。
“Insecurity over their futures can incentivize them to make choices that are bad in the long term,” said Erica Frantz, a scholar of authoritarianism who teaches at Michigan State University.
“對自身未來的不安全感會刺激他們做出從長遠(yuǎn)來看很糟糕的選擇，”任教于密歇根州立大學(xué)的專制主義研究學(xué)者埃里卡·弗蘭茲(Erica Frantz)說。
As they slash away at institutions and rivals, undermining their own legitimacy, they are more desperate for growth and more panicky about seeing it slide.
隨著他們削減制度和競爭對手，破壞自身的合法性，他們更加渴望經(jīng)濟(jì)增長，并且看到它出現(xiàn)下滑會感到更加恐慌。
This often prompts dangerous overspending or, in Erdogan’s case, overborrowing. His government encouraged firms to spend wildly on foreign currency loans, driving tremendous economic growth, which protected Erdogan’s popularity even as he restricted political rights. But the debt set up a now-exploding currency crisis.
這通常會引發(fā)危險的超支或過度借貸，埃爾多安的情況就是后者。他的政府鼓勵公司瘋狂投資外幣貸款，推動驚人的經(jīng)濟(jì)增長，這讓埃爾多安在限制政治權(quán)利的同時可以保住支持率。但債務(wù)導(dǎo)致了現(xiàn)在爆發(fā)的貨幣危機(jī)。
China has seen its share of boondoggle infrastructure projects and overinvestment. But dictatorships run by an entrenched royal, military or party bureaucracy have something that strongmen often feel compelled to destroy: institutions.
中國已經(jīng)看到了它在基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施項目和過度投資方面的風(fēng)險。但是，那些由根深蒂固的貴族、軍隊或政黨官僚機(jī)構(gòu)管理的獨(dú)裁國家，有一種強(qiáng)人統(tǒng)治者常常覺得需要摧毀的東西：制度。
Even if authoritarian institutions are hardly fair or just, they are at least predictable and can be, within limits, independent. That makes them better able to manage or forestall problems. Particularly the central bank.
威權(quán)制度盡管不公平或公正，但至少是可預(yù)測的，并且可以在一定限度內(nèi)保持獨(dú)立。這使得它們能夠更好地管理或預(yù)防問題。特別是中央銀行。
If a dictatorship’s central bank is seen as credible and independent, research finds, inflation is easier to restrain. But if the central bank is seen as susceptible to arbitrary or erratic political meddling — as often happens with institutions in strongmen-dominated systems — then inflation can rise out of control.
研究發(fā)現(xiàn)，如果獨(dú)裁政權(quán)的央行被視為可信和獨(dú)立的，通脹就更容易受到限制。但如果央行被視為容易受到任意或不穩(wěn)定的政治干預(yù)——強(qiáng)人統(tǒng)治體系中的制度經(jīng)常發(fā)生這種情況——那么通貨膨脹可能會失控。
Strongmen like Chávez or Erdogan, who installed his son-in-law as finance minister, tend to meddle with their central banks, both to juice short-term growth and out of a tendency to see independent institutions as threats rather than partners. Inflation rises, a precursor of worse to come.
像查韋斯或埃爾多安這樣的強(qiáng)人統(tǒng)治者(后者安排他的女婿擔(dān)任財政部長)傾向于干涉央行，既是為了實現(xiàn)繁榮的短期增長，也是出于將獨(dú)立機(jī)構(gòu)視為威脅而不是合作伙伴的傾向。通貨膨脹的上升是惡化的前兆。
How Strongmen Create Crises 強(qiáng)人統(tǒng)治者是如何制造危機(jī)的
Such leaders undermine their economies in other ways. When a country’s legal system erodes, according to a 2008 study, inflation tends to surge.
這些領(lǐng)導(dǎo)者還以其他方式破壞經(jīng)濟(jì)。根據(jù)2008年的一項研究，當(dāng)一個國家的法律體系受到侵蝕時，容易出現(xiàn)通貨膨脹的急升。
Even if rule of law is only weakened in a few sectors, this eventually catches up with central bankers, who come to act less as independent stewards than as loyal, or fearful, cronies.
即使法治只在少數(shù)幾個部門被削弱，這最終會波及央行的管理者，他們的行為將不再像是獨(dú)立的管理者，而是忠誠或恐懼的親信。
Bureaucratic dictatorships like China’s often try to bolster their legal systems as a way to cement their rule, even if those legal systems remain deeply flawed. But a leader like Erdogan, who purged swathes of his country’s judges, tends to see the judiciary as a threat.
像中國這樣的官僚獨(dú)裁經(jīng)常試圖加強(qiáng)法律體系，以鞏固自己的統(tǒng)治，即使這些法律制度仍然存在嚴(yán)重缺陷。但像埃爾多安這樣清洗其國家法官的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人，傾向于將司法機(jī)構(gòu)視為威脅。
Under strongmen, economic management tends to be less competent, and therefore likelier to fuel a bubble or debt rather than growth. Lower-level officials know their first duty is to please and glorify the leader, so are more prone to overpromising or covering up. Loyalty trumps competence.
在強(qiáng)人統(tǒng)治之下，經(jīng)濟(jì)管理的能力往往不足，因此更有可能助長泡沫或債務(wù)，而不是增長。較低級別的官員知道他們的首要任務(wù)是取悅和贊美領(lǐng)導(dǎo)者，因此更容易做出過度的承諾或掩蓋問題。對他們來說，忠誠勝過了能力。
The result is often that strongmen do not just overspend or overborrow — they do so unwisely, erratically and with little sanity imposed from central banks or other institutions. They can careen into crises that other countries would at least try to steer around.
結(jié)果往往是強(qiáng)人統(tǒng)治者不僅過度支出或過度借貸——而且這樣做的過程還是盲目而忙亂的，并且沒有來自央行或其他機(jī)構(gòu)的任何理性。他們會一頭沖進(jìn)其他國家至少會試圖避免的危機(jī)。
A High-Risk Political System 高風(fēng)險的政治體系
The strongman’s relationship to powerful elites may make things worse. Maduro, for instance, grew more fearful of a coup as the economy declined, so he siphoned off resources to military leaders and the handful of other powerful insiders he could count on.
強(qiáng)人統(tǒng)治者與權(quán)貴階層的關(guān)系可能會讓事情變得更糟。例如，隨著經(jīng)濟(jì)下滑，馬杜羅越來越害怕發(fā)生政變，因此他從軍事領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人以及他可以指望的少數(shù)權(quán)勢人物手中抽走了資源。
Strongmen, dedicated as they are to crushing rivals, tend to enjoy the support of only some members of their country’s elite, so need to keep them happy. That can distort the economy, as those members often belong to sectors that were lucrative when they came up but may have grown outdated. Erdogan’s zeal for construction, where much of the overborrowing took place, may be instructive.
致力于打擊競爭對手的強(qiáng)人統(tǒng)治者往往只得到一部分權(quán)貴的支持，所以需要討好他們。這可能會扭曲經(jīng)濟(jì)，因為這些成員所在的行業(yè)往往在他們剛崛起時是有利可圖的，但漸漸已經(jīng)過時。埃爾多安對大興土木的熱情可能很說明問題，過度借貸大部分就是這樣來的。
For years, analysts thought this pattern might doom China. Its most powerful figures controlled vast steel and construction empires, which benefited from policies at odds with the consumer industries the country needed to transition its economy. Many assumed the old industrialists would block such changes.
多年來，分析人士認(rèn)為這種模式可能會毀滅中國。在中國，最有權(quán)力的人物控制著龐大的鋼鐵和建筑帝國，它們所受益的政策與該國經(jīng)濟(jì)轉(zhuǎn)型所需的消費(fèi)產(chǎn)業(yè)是矛盾的。許多人認(rèn)為舊工業(yè)勢力會阻撓中國的經(jīng)濟(jì)轉(zhuǎn)型。
Instead, the steel barons were brought to heel — something more easily done by a vast authoritarian bureaucracy than a lone strongman who needs to worry about his inner circle. Even Saudi Arabia, a monarchy with its own collectives and institutions, though deeply troubled, has forced through changes that disfavor a certain old elite.
然而鋼鐵大亨們最終被迫就范——一個龐大的專制官僚體制，比一個需要擔(dān)心自己內(nèi)部圈子的孤獨(dú)強(qiáng)人統(tǒng)治者更容易做到這一點(diǎn)。即使是沙特阿拉伯——一個擁有自己的集體企業(yè)和機(jī)構(gòu)的君主政權(quán)——雖然深受困擾，也依然能夠艱難地實行一些不利于舊權(quán)貴的變革。
