哪些行業(yè)會(huì)在中美貿(mào)易戰(zhàn)中受到?jīng)_擊？
對(duì)制造發(fā)光二極管(LED)的馬來西亞工廠來說，這是一個(gè)機(jī)會(huì)。對(duì)美國的船用舷外發(fā)動(dòng)機(jī)制造商來說，這是一個(gè)威脅。對(duì)于平板電視的主要銷售商來說，就是個(gè)大麻煩了。
The emerging trade war between the United States and China has prompted predictions of severe economic and geopolitical disruption. But for any given industry, the impact of tariffs depends on the microeconomics of its products: How much does demand change when its prices rise? Are substitutes readily available? How much extra productive capacity is there around the world, and how long would it take to get new manufacturing facilities up and running?
正在成形的美中貿(mào)易戰(zhàn)使人猜測經(jīng)濟(jì)和地緣政治將受嚴(yán)重干擾。但對(duì)任何一個(gè)特定行業(yè)來說，關(guān)稅的影響取決于其產(chǎn)品的微觀經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)：產(chǎn)品價(jià)格上升會(huì)使需求產(chǎn)生多大變化?是否已有現(xiàn)成替代品?全世界還有多少額外生產(chǎn)力，以及在新的生產(chǎn)設(shè)施建成并投入使用需花費(fèi)多長時(shí)間?
“How this will play out is idiosyncratic to any given product and unique to each supply chain,” said Daniel Rosen, partner at the economic research firm Rhodium Group. “Nobody can honestly claim high confidence that they understand what the overall impact will be. You may as well project the weather on a Tuesday afternoon a year from now.”
“結(jié)果如何會(huì)根據(jù)不同產(chǎn)品而異，是不同供應(yīng)鏈特有的，”經(jīng)濟(jì)研究公司榮鼎咨詢(Rhodium Group)合伙人榮大聶(Daniel H. Rosen)說。“沒人能完全自信地宣稱自己知道會(huì)有什么總體影響。這跟預(yù)報(bào)一年以后的周二的天氣沒什么區(qū)別。”
The United States imposed its first wave of tariffs over the spring, and each of the 1,102 goods that may be affected will end up with its own list of winners and losers. To see how this may unfold, it’s helpful to examine the different trade patterns for those goods, along with some of the thousands of comment letters that companies and industry groups have submitted to the U.S. Trade Representative. And executives and other experts have their own sense of exactly how supply chains might be rerouted and prices might swing for particular goods.
美國在春季加征了第一輪關(guān)稅，受影響的1102種商品可能最終還會(huì)各有輸贏。要了解這將如何發(fā)展，可以觀察這些商品的不同貿(mào)易模式，以及企業(yè)和行業(yè)組織向美國貿(mào)易代表遞交的數(shù)千封意見函中的一部分。企管及其他專家對(duì)于供應(yīng)鏈將會(huì)如何轉(zhuǎn)向，以及某些產(chǎn)品的價(jià)格會(huì)如何波動(dòng)，都有各自的理解。
The lesson that emerges: Be skeptical of predictions of radical disruption to major industries in the near term. For now, companies have options to avoid some of the most severe risks.
從中得到的經(jīng)驗(yàn)是：對(duì)近期主要行業(yè)將受根本性干擾的預(yù)測保持懷疑。目前，公司仍有辦法避免最嚴(yán)重的一些風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。
But the longer the trade dispute lasts, the more products will get pulled into it. And the more the United States finds itself at odds not just with one other major economy but the entire world, the more it makes sense to worry. The workarounds that companies are using so far wouldn’t succeed in an open-ended, indefinite trade war.
但貿(mào)易爭端持續(xù)時(shí)間越長，就會(huì)有越多的產(chǎn)品被牽扯其中。美國越能意識(shí)到自己不僅是與另一個(gè)主要經(jīng)濟(jì)體發(fā)生沖突，而是與整個(gè)世界發(fā)生沖突時(shí)，就越有理由擔(dān)心。企業(yè)目前使用的變通辦法，在不確定且無期限的貿(mào)易戰(zhàn)中是維持不下去的。
In LEDs, a Gap Other Countries Can Fill
LED，他國可以填補(bǔ)的空白
China has the world’s second-largest economy and is a major supplier of many of the products lining store shelves in the United States. The Trump administration’s first round of tariffs is devised to focus on goods for which there are many other suppliers.
中國是世界第二大經(jīng)濟(jì)體，并且是美國的商店貨架上擺著的許多產(chǎn)品的主要供應(yīng)商。特朗普政府設(shè)計(jì)的第一輪關(guān)稅針對(duì)的便是仍有其他許多供應(yīng)商的商品。
For about half the items, the share of American imports coming from China was less than 10 percent, based on a new analysis of government data on the sources of the affected products conducted by the Peterson Institute for International Economics. That figure was higher for some of the products that account for the larger share of imports, so China had a 23 percent market share if you use a weighted average. Either way these are not markets where China has a monopoly or anything close to it.
根據(jù)彼得森國際經(jīng)濟(jì)研究所(Peterson Institute for International Economics)對(duì)受影響產(chǎn)品來源的政府?dāng)?shù)據(jù)的新分析，對(duì)于其中大約半數(shù)的產(chǎn)品，美國從中國進(jìn)口的占比不到10%，在進(jìn)口產(chǎn)品中占比較大的產(chǎn)品有更高數(shù)字。因此如果使用加權(quán)平均數(shù)，中國所占市場份額則為23%。不論以哪種算法，這些都不是中國壟斷或接近壟斷的市場。
Consider light-emitting diodes, the tiny part that makes LED light bulbs illuminate and are used in many industrial settings. The United States imported $637 million worth of them from China last year, more than any other country. But that doesn’t mean China is the only supplier. Japan and Malaysia exported an additional $593 million in LEDs in the United States combined.
試想發(fā)光二極管，也就是使LED燈泡發(fā)光并被用于許多工業(yè)環(huán)境的微小部件。美國去年從中國進(jìn)口了價(jià)值6.37億美元的發(fā)光二極管，多于其他任何國家。但這并不意味著中國就是唯一供應(yīng)商。日本和馬來西亞總共還向美國額外出口了價(jià)值5.93億美元的該類產(chǎn)品。
So for American companies that import the diodes and incorporate them in their products, such as solar-powered streetlamps, China isn’t the only option. The question is whether other countries not subject to the 25 percent tariff can accommodate a potential surge of demand.
因此，對(duì)進(jìn)口二極管并將其用于太陽能路燈等產(chǎn)品的美國公司而言，中國并非唯一選擇。問題在于，沒有受制于25%關(guān)稅的其他國家能否承受需求激增的可能。
In Malaysia, the LED industry senses opportunity.
馬來西亞的LED行業(yè)看見了機(jī)遇。
“The trade war, I would say it will benefit us if it really keeps going in the direction of tariffs,” said Daniel Fong, senior regional manager of Oversea Lighting and Electric, located 40 minutes from Kuala Lumpur. “The U.S. market is cutting off all ties to China, and in that sense we have a bigger opportunity to benefit the U.S. market with Malaysia-made products.”
“我可以說，這場貿(mào)易戰(zhàn)如果繼續(xù)往關(guān)稅方向發(fā)展，我們就能從中得益，”距離吉隆坡40分鐘車程的海外照明和電力公司(Oversea Lighting and Electric)高級(jí)區(qū)域經(jīng)理丹尼爾·方(Daniel Fong)說。“美國市場正在切斷與中國的所有聯(lián)系，從這個(gè)意義上說，我們有更大的機(jī)會(huì)讓馬來西亞制造的產(chǎn)品在美國市場獲益。”
The industry in Malaysia has struggled to make inroads in the American market, in part, said Jamie Fox, a lighting components analyst with IHS Markit, because China subsidizes its LED industry. A crucial machine needed for the manufacture of the diodes can cost $2 million, but regional subsidies in China make them available for half as much, putting competitors outside China at a price disadvantage.
IHS Markit照明元件分析師杰米·福克斯(Jamie Fox)表示，馬來西亞的企業(yè)一直很難進(jìn)入美國市場，部分是因?yàn)橹袊谘a(bǔ)貼自己的LED產(chǎn)業(yè)。一臺(tái)制造二極管所需的關(guān)鍵機(jī)器需要200萬美元，但中國的地區(qū)性補(bǔ)貼讓企業(yè)只用一半的錢就能買到，使中國以外的競爭對(duì)手處于價(jià)格劣勢。
If tariffs make Chinese exporters less competitive, the balance may shift. John See, chief executive of QAV Technologies, said his company’s two LED factories in Penang could quickly increase production by 300 to 400 percent, if demand were there. Malaysia, he suggested, might no longer have to play “second fiddle” to China in business with the United States.
如果關(guān)稅使中國的出口商競爭力下降，這樣的平衡可能會(huì)發(fā)生變化。QAV科技(QAV Technologies)的首席執(zhí)行官約翰·西(John See)表示，若有需求，他的公司在檳城的兩個(gè)LED工廠可以迅速增產(chǎn)300%至400%。他認(rèn)為，馬來西亞或許不需在對(duì)美貿(mào)易中再扮演中國的“二把手”。
A Looming Threat for Boat Makers
造船廠商的威脅迫近
It’s easy for American importers to replace Chinese LED supplies with those made elsewhere because the parts are relatively standard; the issues are mostly price and availability.
美國進(jìn)口商可以輕易使用別處生產(chǎn)的產(chǎn)品換掉中國的LED供應(yīng)，因?yàn)檫@些部件相對(duì)較為標(biāo)準(zhǔn)，問題主要在于價(jià)格和供應(yīng)。
But other Chinese products covered by tariffs aren’t so easy for their importers to substitute.
但要進(jìn)口商換掉關(guān)稅覆蓋的其他中國產(chǎn)品，對(duì)他們來說并不容易。
Ray Electric Outboards in Cape Coral, Fla., imports its powerheads — the electric motors that turn the propeller for a small boat — from China. Shifting to a different supplier is no small matter.
位于佛羅里達(dá)州開普科勒爾的雷伊舷外電動(dòng)發(fā)動(dòng)機(jī)公司(Ray Electric Outboards)的潛水泵——使小型船只螺旋槳轉(zhuǎn)動(dòng)的電機(jī)——便是從中國進(jìn)口。更換至不同供應(yīng)商非同小可。
“Have I tried different companies to get a different motor?” said Joy Hurley, business manager at Ray Electric. “Yes, but it’s just not as readily available. There is nothing else that will work in our system.” The company has molds that are already made to fit the company’s current suppliers’ products, and it costs thousands of dollars to change them.
“我試過其他公司的其他發(fā)動(dòng)機(jī)嗎?”雷伊公司的商務(wù)經(jīng)理喬伊·赫爾利(Joy Hurley)說。“試過，但是沒有現(xiàn)成可用的。其他東西在我們系統(tǒng)里都用不了。”該公司的模具是根據(jù)它目前供應(yīng)商的產(chǎn)品制作的，修改模具要花成千上萬美元。
“The motors that I have as options in the United States don’t fit in our housing,” Ms. Hurley said. Meanwhile, the company’s profit margins are too thin to absorb the cost of 25 percent tariffs. In the short run, she said, the company will need to raise prices to pass the tax through to customers.
“我在美國可以找到的發(fā)動(dòng)機(jī)不適合我們的外殼，”赫爾利說。與此同時(shí)，該公司的利潤空間非常小，消化不了25%的關(guān)稅成本。她說，在短期內(nèi)，公司必須提價(jià)，將關(guān)稅轉(zhuǎn)移給消費(fèi)者。
The American boating industry has complained of many elements of the tariffs. Mercury Marine, for example, of Fond du Lac, Wis., said in a letter to the U.S. Trade Representative that it employs 4,800 American workers, but that the manufacture of 40-to-60-horsepower boat engines in Suzhou, China, is crucial to the enterprise.
美國船舶業(yè)對(duì)關(guān)稅的很多內(nèi)容頗有抱怨。比如，威斯康辛州豐迪拉克的水星船舶(Mercury Marine)在寫給美國貿(mào)易代表的一封信中說，自己雇傭了4800名美國員工，但中國蘇州生產(chǎn)的40至60馬力輪船發(fā)動(dòng)機(jī)對(duì)公司至關(guān)重要。
“It’s very difficult for some of these companies to absorb these costs entirely,” said Nicole Vasilaros, senior vice president at the National Marine Manufacturers Association. Motors are one of 300 frequently used boat parts facing the tariff, she said, which cumulatively could mean a $2,000 price increase on 14- to 16-foot vessels that generally cost in the low five figures.
“有些這樣的公司很難徹底吸收這些成本，”船舶制造企業(yè)協(xié)會(huì)(National Marine Manufacturers Association)高級(jí)副會(huì)長妮科爾·瓦西拉羅斯(Nicole Vasilaros)說。電動(dòng)發(fā)動(dòng)機(jī)是300種面臨關(guān)稅的常用船舶零部件之一，她說，這些零部件累積起來可能意味著14英尺(約合4.3米)到16英尺的船價(jià)格上漲2000美元。這種尺寸的船售價(jià)通常在一兩萬美元。
Because boats are often bought for recreational purposes, their demand tends to be elastic — highly responsive to price changes. That means those higher prices may well translate into fewer people enjoying their summer in a new motorboat.
因?yàn)橘I船通常是為了娛樂，它們的需求往往有彈性，也就是說，對(duì)價(jià)格變化非常敏感。這意味著漲價(jià)很可能會(huì)演變?yōu)橘徺I新摩托艇消夏的人數(shù)減少。
A Display of Flexibility With Flat-Screen TVs
平板電視顯示出的靈活性
Outboard boat motors and LEDs were both on the list for tariffs the Trump administration released this month. There is also something to learn from a product that wasn’t.
在特朗普政府本月公布的征收關(guān)稅產(chǎn)品名單中，船用舷外發(fā)動(dòng)機(jī)和LED都榜上有名。一種不在該名單上的產(chǎn)品也能帶給我們一些啟發(fā)。
Flat-screen televisions were on an earlier list of products targeted, before being spared after weeks of jockeying. But the supply chain for these devices illuminates the options all types of companies have for navigating around Chinese tariffs, and the ways that a trade war on all fronts carries greater risks for American consumers than one narrowly focused on China.
在早前的征收關(guān)稅產(chǎn)品名單中，平板電視名列其中。經(jīng)過數(shù)周斡旋后，平板電視被免征關(guān)稅。但這些設(shè)備的供應(yīng)鏈清楚地表明各種公司為避開針對(duì)中國的關(guān)稅可采取的選擇，以及全面爆發(fā)的貿(mào)易戰(zhàn)對(duì)美國消費(fèi)者的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)，比只針對(duì)中國的貿(mào)易戰(zhàn)更大。
It will become particularly relevant if the dispute with China escalates and televisions again find themselves targeted — which, in recent days, has appeared more likely than not.
如果與中國的爭端升級(jí)，電視再次成為關(guān)稅目標(biāo)——最近幾天，這種情況看上去似乎很有可能發(fā)生——這一點(diǎn)會(huì)變得尤其意義重大。
The manufacture of liquid crystal display televisions takes place in several steps. The liquid crystal is made in sophisticated factories that can cost billions to build. Those displays are then combined with other parts to make the backlight assembly, the innards of a TV.
液晶電視的生產(chǎn)分多個(gè)步驟完成。液晶顯示屏先在建廠成本可能高達(dá)數(shù)十億的精密工廠里完成生產(chǎn)。然后，這些顯示屏和其他零部件組裝在一起，形成背光組件，這是電視的內(nèi)部結(jié)構(gòu)。
The last step is the simplest and most labor-intensive: packing the backlight assembly into the plastic shell of a TV, along with other parts like speakers and buttons, and putting it all into a box where it can be shipped to store shelves.
最后一步是最簡單也是最勞動(dòng)密集型的一步：把背光組件以及揚(yáng)聲器和按鈕等部件裝進(jìn)電視的塑料外殼里，然后把它們都裝進(jìn)一個(gè)盒子里，運(yùn)到商店的貨架上。
The liquid crystals are made mainly in Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and China. The final assembly is done in many more places; many larger TVs sold in the United States are assembled in Mexico.
液晶屏主要由日本、韓國、臺(tái)灣和中國制造。最后的組裝則是在更多的地方完成，美國銷售的許多大電視機(jī)都是在墨西哥組裝的。
That shows the ways that savvy companies — which the giants of the TV business like LG, Sony and Samsung are — can avoid having the Chinese tariffs pinch. Shifting even more of their assembly to Mexico could allow them to avoid the tax even if it is expanded to encompass their products.
這表明，與LG、索尼(Sony)和三星(Samsung)等電視機(jī)巨頭一樣，精明的公司可以避免承受對(duì)中國增加關(guān)稅的不利后果。它們可以將更多的組裝業(yè)務(wù)轉(zhuǎn)移到墨西哥，以避免繳稅，即使征稅范圍擴(kuò)大到它們的產(chǎn)品。
For example, LG has a facility in Reynosa, Mexico. Bob O’Brien, the president of Display Supply Chain Consultants, said he suspected the company could expand production there to shift assembly work from China.
例如，LG在墨西哥雷諾薩有一家工廠。顯示器供應(yīng)鏈咨詢公司(Display Supply Chain Consultants)的總裁鮑勃·奧布賴恩(Bob O’Brien)表示，他覺得該公司可以擴(kuò)大那里的生產(chǎn)，把組裝工作從中國轉(zhuǎn)移到那里。
“It would be disruptive in the sense that they would have to change their plans, but they could hire more people in Reynosa, add additional shifts, maybe change production lines, relatively easily,” Mr. O’Brien said.
“由于他們需要被迫改變計(jì)劃，這可能會(huì)引起混亂，但他們可以在雷諾薩雇用更多工人，增加更多班次，或許還可以相對(duì)容易地改變生產(chǎn)線，”奧布賴恩說。
Even if the company needed to open up new production lines, six months or so might be enough.
即使該公司需要建設(shè)新的生產(chǎn)線，六個(gè)月左右的時(shí)間也足夠了。
Imagine similar efforts across the TV manufacturing industry, and you can see that where the labor-intensive final assembly takes place might shift if Chinese tariffs were implemented, even if the highest-tech parts of televisions stay where they are. The good news is that strategy would spare American consumers a 25 percent tax; the bad news is it wouldn’t do much to punish China and force it to the table to negotiate over broader American complaints.
想象一下整個(gè)電視制造業(yè)都在做類似的努力，你可以看到，如果開始對(duì)中國增加關(guān)稅，那么，電視機(jī)生產(chǎn)過程中，勞動(dòng)密集的最終組裝工作的地點(diǎn)可能發(fā)生變化，而技術(shù)含量最高的的生產(chǎn)環(huán)節(jié)可能留在原地。好消息是，美國消費(fèi)者不必承受25%的關(guān)稅;壞消息是，它對(duì)中國的懲罰力度不夠，不足以迫使中國就美國更廣泛的抗議進(jìn)行談判。
Moreover, the strategy of moving television assembly from China to Mexico would be a way to avoid any Chinese tariffs only so long as the North American Free Trade Agreement keeps American imports from Mexico tax-free.
此外，只有當(dāng)《北美自由貿(mào)易協(xié)定》(North American Free Trade Agreement)讓美國可以從墨西哥免稅進(jìn)口產(chǎn)品的時(shí)候，將電視機(jī)組裝從中國轉(zhuǎn)移到墨西哥這一策略才可以令電視制造業(yè)避免承受針對(duì)中國的關(guān)稅。
That points to one of the risks of the Trump administration’s strategy of waging trade wars on multiple fronts. When only one country — even a big, important one like China — faces punitive tariffs, companies can find ways to mitigate the damage to their own profits and to consumers.
這指出了特朗普政府在多個(gè)領(lǐng)域發(fā)動(dòng)貿(mào)易戰(zhàn)這一戰(zhàn)略的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。如果只有一個(gè)國家——甚至是像中國這樣重要的國家——面臨懲罰性關(guān)稅，企業(yè)還可以找到方法，減輕它對(duì)自身利潤和消費(fèi)者的傷害。
But if the United States simultaneously raises tariffs on much of the world, corporate strategists have less room to maneuver.
但如果美國同時(shí)提高對(duì)世界很多地區(qū)的關(guān)稅，那么企業(yè)策略師就沒有多少回旋余地了。
“Companies will try to find ways to reduce the cost of trade barriers,” said Mary Lovely, a nonresident senior fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics. “If you take away all their options, it’s going to be much more detrimental to American corporations and American workers.”
“公司會(huì)努力尋找方法降低貿(mào)易壁壘的成本，”彼得森國際經(jīng)濟(jì)研究所(Peterson Institute for International Economics)的非常駐高級(jí)研究員瑪麗·洛夫利(Mary Lovely)說，“如果你剝奪了他們所有的選擇，那么會(huì)對(duì)美國公司和美國工人造成更大的傷害。”
In other words, the impact of this first wave of China tariffs, while it will vary across different products for all sorts of reasons, may be manageable. A trade war with much of the world would be a different story entirely.
換句話說，第一輪中國關(guān)稅的影響也許是可控的，盡管由于各種原因，關(guān)稅對(duì)不同產(chǎn)品的影響會(huì)有所不同。與世界很多地區(qū)的貿(mào)易戰(zhàn)則完全會(huì)是另一回事。
