特朗普的房地產(chǎn)式豪賭不適于核談判

WASHINGTON — President Trump attempted a revolutionary approach to North Korea — a gamble that negotiating prowess and deal-making charm in a face-to-face meeting with Kim Jong-un could accomplish what no American president or diplomat had dared to attempt in the 65 years since an uneasy armistice settled over the Korean Peninsula.

華盛頓——特朗普總統(tǒng)試圖用一種革命性的方式解決朝鮮問題，寄希望于在同金正恩(Kim Jong-un)舉行面對(duì)面的會(huì)談時(shí)，談判技巧和促成交易的魔法，能夠帶來一個(gè)自65年前朝鮮半島達(dá)成臨時(shí)休戰(zhàn)協(xié)議以來，任何美國(guó)總統(tǒng)或外交官都不敢想象的成就。

It was a bold and innovative approach, and one worth trying, to take on the related goals of a peace treaty and eradicating the North’s now-substantial nuclear arsenal.

為了實(shí)現(xiàn)兩個(gè)相關(guān)的目標(biāo)——簽訂和平條約，清除如今已經(jīng)十分可觀的朝鮮核武庫(kù)——這樣的方法是大膽而創(chuàng)新的，并且值得冒險(xiǎn)嘗試。

The fact that it fell on Thursday before getting out of the starting gate, though, underscored how little the two men understood about each other, or how their words and maximalist demands were resonating in Washington and Pyongyang.

但周四，這個(gè)辦法還沒啟動(dòng)就失敗了。這個(gè)事實(shí)突顯出兩人對(duì)彼此了解甚少，并且他們的言論和極端要求在華盛頓和平壤引起了共鳴。

Mr. Trump approached the North Korean leader as if he was a competing property developer haggling over a prized asset — and assumed that, in the end, Mr. Kim would be willing to give it all up for the promise of future prosperity. So he started with threats of “fire and fury,’’ then turned to surprise initiatives, then gratuitous flattery of one of the world’s more brutal dictators.

特朗普把朝鮮領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人當(dāng)成為了一處搶手的資產(chǎn)和他競(jìng)爭(zhēng)的房地產(chǎn)開發(fā)商，以為金正恩最終會(huì)愿意完全放棄，以換取未來實(shí)現(xiàn)繁榮的承諾。因此，他一開始是發(fā)出“炮火與怒火”的威脅，之后轉(zhuǎn)向出人意料的舉動(dòng)，然后是無謂地奉承這個(gè)世界上最殘暴的獨(dú)裁者之一。

“He will be safe, he will be happy, his country will be rich,” Mr. Trump said of the North Korean leader on Tuesday, as he met again with Moon Jae-in, the over-optimistic South Korean president whose national security adviser predicted, that same day, it was “99.9 percent” sure that the summit meeting in Singapore would go ahead.

“他會(huì)安全的，會(huì)高興的，他的國(guó)家會(huì)富起來，”在周二再次會(huì)見過于樂觀的韓國(guó)總統(tǒng)文在寅(Moon Jae-in)期間，特朗普提到朝鮮領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人時(shí)說。就在同一天，文在寅的國(guó)家安全顧問還預(yù)言稱新加坡會(huì)面“99.9%”確定會(huì)如期舉行。

But it was already becoming clear to Mr. Trump and his team that the techniques involved in negotiating real estate don’t translate easily into negotiations over nuclear weapons.

但當(dāng)時(shí)，特朗普和他的團(tuán)隊(duì)已經(jīng)清楚地認(rèn)識(shí)到，把房地產(chǎn)談判中的技巧運(yùn)用到圍繞核武器展開的談判中并非易事。

Mr. Kim needs money, investment and technology for sure. But more than that, he needs to convince North Korea’s elites that he has not traded away the only form of security in his sole control — the nuclear patrimony of his father and his grandfather.

金正恩的確需要資金、投資和技術(shù)。但不僅如此，他還需要讓朝鮮的權(quán)貴相信，他沒有放棄由他獨(dú)自掌控的唯一的安全保障：他的父親和祖父留給他的核遺產(chǎn)。

“For them, ‘getting rich’ is a secondary consideration,’’ said William Perry, the former secretary of defense and one of the last people to negotiate with the North over peace treaties, nuclear disarmament and missiles — in 1999, when he was sent out as President Bill Clinton’s special envoy. “If I learned anything dealing with them, it’s that their security is pre-eminent. They know we have the capability to defeat them, and they believe we have the intent to do so.’’

“對(duì)他們來說，‘致富’是次要的考慮因素，”前國(guó)防部長(zhǎng)威廉·佩里(William Perry)說。他是上一次同朝鮮就和平條約、核裁軍和導(dǎo)彈問題舉行談判的人之一。那是1999年，他的身份是美國(guó)總統(tǒng)比爾·克林頓(Bill Clinton)的特使。“如果說我在和他們打交道的過程中學(xué)到了什么，那就是安全對(duì)他們來說是第一位的。他們知道我們有打敗他們的實(shí)力，并且他們認(rèn)為我們有這么做的打算。”

“And the only way to address that,” Mr. Perry, now 90, said this week in Palo Alto as the North Koreans were issuing their latest threats, “is with a step-by-step process, exactly the approach Trump said he did not want to take.”

本周，當(dāng)朝鮮發(fā)出最新的威脅時(shí)，現(xiàn)年90歲的佩里在帕洛阿爾托說，“對(duì)此，唯一的解決辦法是采用循序漸進(jìn)的過程，這恰恰是特朗普說他不希望采用的。”

Other complications prevented the talks from making it far enough to even discuss those issues. As the two leaders circled each other over what long-range goals they would agree to in Singapore, it became increasingly clear there were forces at work in both capitals that had a strong interest in failure.

另外一些難題導(dǎo)致談判根本無法推進(jìn)到討論這些問題的階段。兩國(guó)領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人揣測(cè)著新加坡會(huì)晤可以在什么樣的長(zhǎng)期目標(biāo)上達(dá)成共識(shí)，與此同時(shí)有一點(diǎn)越來越明顯，那就是兩國(guó)國(guó)內(nèi)強(qiáng)烈希望談判失敗的力量正在發(fā)揮作用。

The creators of North Korea’s nuclear and missile forces are the country’s true elite, celebrated as the heroes who keep America at bay. To lose their arsenal is to lose their status and influence.

朝鮮核武器和導(dǎo)彈部隊(duì)的創(chuàng)建者是該國(guó)真正的權(quán)貴，他們被認(rèn)為是讓美國(guó)不敢輕舉妄動(dòng)的英雄。對(duì)他們來說，失去武器庫(kù)就失去了地位和影響力。

When Mr. Trump sent one of his deputy national security advisers to Singapore a week ago for a prearranged meeting to work out summit logistics, the North Koreans stood him up. In the past week, they did not answer the phone, a senior administration official told reporters Thursday afternoon.

一周前，特朗普按照約定派出了一位副國(guó)家安全顧問前往新加坡，打算就峰會(huì)的細(xì)節(jié)與朝鮮展開洽談，但朝鮮并未赴約。周四下午，一位高級(jí)政府官員告訴記者，在過去的一周里，朝鮮人都沒有接聽電話。

The North has its own list of complaints. After Mr. Trump accepted Mr. Kim’s offer to meet face-to-face, he replaced his national security adviser with John R. Bolton, who just a few months ago published an essay entitled “The Legal Case for Striking North Korea First,’’ an ode to pre-empting Pyongyang — no matter what it promised about the future.

朝鮮也有自己的一系列不滿。在接受了金正恩面對(duì)面會(huì)晤的提議之后，特朗普便讓幾個(gè)月前才發(fā)表《從法律角度談率先打擊朝鮮的理由》(The Legal Case for Striking North Korea First)一文的約翰·R·博爾頓(John R. Bolton)接任國(guó)家安全顧問。文章鼓吹對(duì)平壤采取先發(fā)制人的策略——不論它對(duì)未來有何承諾。

Once he ensconced himself in the West Wing, Mr. Bolton began talking publicly about the “the Libyan model’’ of turning over nuclear weapons, a reference to a deal he helped design in 2003 in which Col. Muammar el-Qaddafi turned over a nascent nuclear program in return for exactly the kinds of economic lures Mr. Trump was talking about.

進(jìn)駐白宮西翼后，博爾頓便開始公開談?wù)撚嘘P(guān)交出核武器的“利比亞模式”，這指的是他在2003年幫助設(shè)計(jì)的一項(xiàng)協(xié)議。根據(jù)協(xié)議，穆阿邁爾·卡扎菲上校(Col. Muammar el-Qaddafi)為換取經(jīng)濟(jì)誘餌交出了剛剛建起的核項(xiàng)目。而這種經(jīng)濟(jì)誘餌和特朗普口中的那種如出一轍。

To the North Koreans, Mr. Bolton knew, the Libya example was shorthand for making a bad decision to unilaterally disarm. They have little doubt that if North Korean citizens rose to overthrow their government — as Libyan rebels did against Colonel Qaddafi in 2011 — Washington would be more than happy to help chase down the leadership.

博爾頓知道，對(duì)朝鮮來說，利比亞的例子就代表著同意單邊解除武裝是一個(gè)錯(cuò)誤決定。他們毫不懷疑，如果朝鮮公民像利比亞的叛亂者在2011年反抗卡扎菲上校時(shí)那樣站起來推翻政府，華盛頓將非常樂意幫他們追擊朝鮮領(lǐng)導(dǎo)層。

None of this means the initiatives with North Korea are entirely dead. Mr. Trump carefully left open the door for Mr. Kim to “call me or write” if he decides to cease the threats of nuclear exchanges and wants to reschedule the summit.

這一切都不意味著朝鮮完全喪失了主動(dòng)權(quán)。特朗普謹(jǐn)慎地為金正恩留了道門，讓他在決定停止核戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)威脅、想要重新安排會(huì)晤時(shí)，可以“給我打電話或?qū)懶?rdquo;。

But Mr. Trump also on Thursday could not resist echoing his tweet months ago about the size of the nuclear button on his desk: America’s nuclear capabilities “are so massive and powerful” that he should never be tempted to reach for them.

但在周四，特朗普還是忍不住重申了自己數(shù)月之前發(fā)表的、有關(guān)他辦公桌上核按鈕大小的推文：美國(guó)的核能力“是如此龐大而有力”，別引誘他出手。

It may have been intended to intimidate. But it seems more likely to spur Mr. Kim to new demonstrations of his own capabilities to reach American cities with North Korean missiles.

這可能是為了恐嚇，但似乎更有可能是刺激金正恩做出新的示威，以表現(xiàn)他有能力用導(dǎo)彈打擊美國(guó)城市。

In fact, the question about North Korea now is the same question that Washington is asking about Iran: What is their next chess move? Are they likely to escalate?

事實(shí)上，現(xiàn)在關(guān)于朝鮮的問題，與華盛頓在伊朗問題上的思考是一樣的：他們的下一步棋是什么?有惡化的可能嗎?

For now, the Iranians have indicated they are taking it slow. But history suggests that North Korea’s reaction to the end of negotiations is almost always to create a crisis — and see if that, in turn, forces the United States back to the table.

目前，伊朗已表現(xiàn)出正在緩慢行事。但歷史表明，朝鮮在談判結(jié)束時(shí)的反應(yīng)幾乎總是要制造危機(jī)——并要看看這反過來能否讓美國(guó)重回談判桌。

When the “Agreed Framework” with the Clinton administration collapsed — in part because of North Korean cheating, in part because of the United States’ lack of interest in moving toward reconciliation — Mr. Kim’s father moved to the country’s first nuclear tests.

朝鮮與克林頓政府的“框架協(xié)議”部分因朝鮮的欺騙、部分因美國(guó)缺乏和解的興趣而崩潰。之后，金正恩的父親便帶領(lǐng)朝鮮進(jìn)行了第一次核試驗(yàn)。

When accords were scuttled at the end of the Bush administration, the North tested a new president, Barack Obama, with a series of larger nuclear tests and then a race to build intercontinental missiles.

在布什政府末期，和平條約的希望已經(jīng)破滅。新總統(tǒng)貝拉克·奧巴馬(Barack Obama)面臨的考驗(yàn)，是朝鮮一系列更大規(guī)模的核試驗(yàn)，以及加緊制造洲際導(dǎo)彈。

Even before he came to office, Mr. Trump complained — accurately — that the incremental approaches pursued by his predecessors had failed.

就連特朗普都在上任之前明確批評(píng)過他的先任者們失敗的漸進(jìn)式做法。

He inherited a North Korea that had exploited America’s distraction during Iraq, Afghanistan and the Iran negotiations, and managed to build 20 to 60 nuclear weapons. The North had paid almost no price. So Mr. Trump did what he learned to do in the New York real estate market: Make maximalist demands, inflict pain and then begin a negotiation.

他接手時(shí)，朝鮮已經(jīng)利用了美國(guó)在伊拉克、阿富汗和伊朗談判期間的分心，造出了20到60件核武器，幾乎沒有付出任何代價(jià)。于是，特朗普用起了他在紐約房地產(chǎn)市場(chǎng)里學(xué)來的那一套：提出最大要求，制造痛苦，再開始談判。

But his “fire and fury’’ approach resulted in reactions he had never seen in the private market. Mr. Moon became so concerned that a new, famously volatile American president could trip into a war on the Korean Peninsula, that he raced to wrap Mr. Trump into a negotiation that would make it difficult for the United States to launch the kind of pre-emptive attack Mr. Bolton had advocated.

不過，他聲稱的“炮火與怒火”導(dǎo)致私營(yíng)市場(chǎng)產(chǎn)生了他從未見過的反應(yīng)。文在寅特別擔(dān)心，這位以喜怒無常著稱的新總統(tǒng)會(huì)在朝鮮半島上點(diǎn)燃戰(zhàn)火，所以，他急忙將特朗普拉入了談判，這樣一來美國(guó)很難發(fā)起博爾頓主張的先制打擊。

Mr. Moon then showered Mr. Trump with effusive praise, even to the point of endorsing the premature talk about Nobel Peace Prizes.

隨后，文在寅對(duì)特朗普進(jìn)行了過于熱情的贊美，甚至早早地提出了支持特朗普獲諾貝爾和平獎(jiǎng)的想法。

“Moon’s role is what is entirely new this time,’’ Mr. Perry noted, hours before the summit planning fell apart. The South Korean president saw himself as the essential go-between, the central player in coaxing both sides back on track when moments of crisis — like this one — arise.

“這一次，文在寅的作用是全新的，”佩里在峰會(huì)計(jì)劃流產(chǎn)前數(shù)小時(shí)表示。這位韓國(guó)總統(tǒng)認(rèn)為自己是關(guān)鍵的中間人，是在危機(jī)出現(xiàn)時(shí)勸說雙方回到正軌的中心角色，比如這一次的危機(jī)。

Now comes the test of his peacemaking skills.

現(xiàn)在，考驗(yàn)他和平締造能力的時(shí)刻到了。

“The denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and building a permanent peace on the peninsula is a task we cannot give up or delay,” Mr. Moon said in Seoul on Thursday, calling the cancellation of the summit “disconcerting and very regrettable.” He urged Mr. Trump and Mr. Kim to talk directly.

“朝鮮半島的無核化和永久和平是我們不能放棄或推遲的任務(wù)，”文在寅周四在首爾表示。他還表示，取消峰會(huì)“令人不安，非常遺憾”。他敦促特朗普和金正恩直接對(duì)話。

Mr. Moon’s task is to rebuild what fell apart. But first there must be a diagnosis of what went wrong.

文在寅的任務(wù)是彌合分裂。但首先要診斷哪里出了問題。

Overheated rhetoric on both sides — including unsubtle reminders of each nation’s willingness to wipe the other off the map — was part of it. But that was an occasional feature of the Cold War, too.

一個(gè)問題是雙方的言辭過于激烈，包括將對(duì)方從地圖上抹去的露骨提醒。但冷戰(zhàn)期間有時(shí)也會(huì)出現(xiàn)這種情況。

The bigger problem was that the United States and North Korea were never on the same page about what the objective of the negotiation should be. Mr. Trump, Mr. Bolton and Secretary of State Mike Pompeo had one vision: What they called “complete, verifiable, irreversible denuclearization.”

更大的問題在于美朝從未在談判目標(biāo)上達(dá)成一致。特朗普、博爾頓和美國(guó)國(guó)務(wù)卿邁克·龐皮歐(Mike Pompeo)有一個(gè)愿景：他們稱之為“完全的、可核實(shí)的、不可逆轉(zhuǎn)的無核化”。

But it was a one-sided affair — never once did they raise the likelihood that the United States would have to give something up, too.

但這個(gè)想法是單方面的，他們從來沒提到過美國(guó)也必須放棄某些東西的可能性。

Mr. Kim used the phrase “denuclearization” as well, but he seemed to be discussing something more like arms control. He was willing to give up part of the arsenal, but only as the United States pulled back its troops in South Korea and gradually surrendered its ability to threaten the North.

金正恩也用過“無核化”這個(gè)詞，但他說的似乎更像是軍備控制。他愿意放棄部分軍火庫(kù)，但前提是美國(guó)撤回駐韓軍隊(duì)，逐步放棄威脅朝鮮的能力。

Mr. Trump, of course, talked about the North giving up all of its weapons in one fell swoop — before allowing, just in the past few days, that he might be willing to try a more gradual approach.

當(dāng)然，特朗普一直以來說的是朝鮮一下子放棄所有的武器，只在過去幾天才表示可能愿意嘗試更漸進(jìn)的方式。

But that was probably too late.

但那可能已經(jīng)太遲了。

“Zero warheads was never going to be on the table,’’ said Robert S. Litwak, senior vice president of the Wilson Center for International Scholars, who wrote a detailed study of how to deal, gradually, with defanging the North Korean threat. He said Mr. Trump needs to move to something closer to the 2015 Iranian deal, which constrained but did not eliminate Tehran’s nuclear capabilities.

“零核彈頭永遠(yuǎn)不會(huì)出現(xiàn)在談判桌上，”威爾遜國(guó)際學(xué)者中心(Wilson Center for International studies)的高級(jí)副主席羅伯特·S·利特瓦克(Robert S. Litwak)說。他寫過一篇詳細(xì)的研究報(bào)告，討論如何逐步解除朝鮮的威脅。他表示，特朗普需要采取更接近2015年伊朗協(xié)議的方式，該協(xié)議限制了伊朗的核能力，但沒有將其徹底消除。

That, of course, is the deal Mr. Trump just walked away from a few weeks ago, meaning that he now has two nuclear crises on his hands at once.

當(dāng)然，它就是幾周前剛剛被特朗普放棄的協(xié)議，這意味著他現(xiàn)在同時(shí)面臨兩個(gè)核危機(jī)。