特朗普會(huì)打破全球秩序嗎？
“基于規(guī)則的全球秩序”雖然是個(gè)乏味的短語，但它在某些方面意義重大。世界上所有國(guó)家(除了少數(shù)流氓國(guó)家)按照一套公認(rèn)的法律、經(jīng)濟(jì)和軍事規(guī)則相互交往。
Ignore or overturn them and confusion and conflict break out. Some non-western countries have long believed that the phrase is little more than a cloak for US global domination. Since America effectively wrote the rules, it was assumed that the whole system must be biased in favour of the US.
無視或推翻這些規(guī)則，就會(huì)爆發(fā)混亂和沖突。有些非西方國(guó)家一直認(rèn)為，這個(gè)短語不過是美國(guó)在全球占據(jù)支配地位的幌子。既然這些規(guī)則實(shí)際上是美國(guó)擬定的，人們想當(dāng)然地認(rèn)為整個(gè)體系必然偏袒美國(guó)。
But Donald Trump does not see it that way. The US president thinks that clever foreigners have manipulated the international system, so that America now trades at a massive disadvantage and is forced to accept hostile rulings by international tribunals. When it comes to security, Mr Trump complains that America spends billions giving cheap protection to ungrateful allies. He is demanding change.
但唐納德•特朗普(Donald Trump)不這么看。美國(guó)總統(tǒng)認(rèn)為，聰明的外國(guó)人操縱了這個(gè)國(guó)際體系，以至于讓美國(guó)如今在貿(mào)易方面處于巨大劣勢(shì)，被迫接受國(guó)際法庭作出的敵意裁決。在安全問題上，特朗普抱怨美國(guó)花費(fèi)巨資為那些不懂得感恩的盟友提供廉價(jià)保護(hù)。他要求改變這一切。
“You break it, you own it,” runs the pottery shop slogan. But when it comes to the global rules-based order, the Trump administration’s view seems to be, “We no longer own it, so we are going to break it.” America is turning against the world it made — and the consequences are unpredictable and potentially dangerous.
“打破了就歸你，”瓷器店這樣宣稱。但當(dāng)談到基于規(guī)則的全球秩序時(shí)，特朗普政府的觀點(diǎn)似乎是：“既然它不再屬于我們所有，我們就打破它。”美國(guó)正與自己塑造的世界“反目”——其后果不可預(yù)料，且具有潛在危險(xiǎn)性。
The coming year will be a big test of how far the Trump administration is willing to go with the US potentially launching a multi-pronged assault on the international trading system: demanding radical changes to the North American Free Trade Agreement, hobbling the World Trade Organization and slapping tariffs on Chinese goods. Tension between the US and South Korea, or within the Nato alliance, could easily surface this year — raising questions about America’s commitment to the rules that govern world security.
未來一年是一個(gè)重要關(guān)頭，美國(guó)將有可能對(duì)國(guó)際貿(mào)易體系發(fā)起多管齊下的攻擊，從中將可以看出，特朗普政府愿意朝著這個(gè)方向走多遠(yuǎn)?？赡艿墓舭ǎ阂髲氐仔薷摹侗泵雷杂少Q(mào)易協(xié)定》(NAFTA)、掣肘世界貿(mào)易組織(WTO)，以及對(duì)中國(guó)商品加征關(guān)稅。美韓之間的緊張關(guān)系，或者北約(Nato)內(nèi)部的緊張關(guān)系，很有可能在今年浮出水面——令人對(duì)美國(guó)是否會(huì)致力于奉行那些維持世界安全的規(guī)則產(chǎn)生疑問。
The underlying question is what the world will look like, after a few years of a US administration committed to radical change in the international system.
更深層次的問題是，在美國(guó)政府致力于對(duì)國(guó)際體系進(jìn)行根本變革的情況下，幾年之后，世界將會(huì)變成什么樣子。
Broadly speaking, there are four possibilities. The first is that America succeeds in getting the changes it wants and the system survives, in a modified form, with the US still the clear global leader.
大致說來，有四種可能。第一種，美國(guó)成功地推動(dòng)了它想要的變革，當(dāng)前的國(guó)際體系以一種修正的形式存續(xù)，美國(guó)仍是明確的全球領(lǐng)袖。
Option two is that a new system emerges, with the rest of the world operating under multilateral rules and ignoring unilateralist America, as far as possible.
第二種可能是出現(xiàn)一個(gè)新體系，世界其他國(guó)家在多邊規(guī)則下運(yùn)作，盡可能無視奉行單邊主義的美國(guó)。
The third possibility is that the withdrawal of US leads to a collapse in the rules-based order — and general chaos.
第三種可能是，美國(guó)的退出導(dǎo)致基于規(guī)則的秩序崩潰——和普遍的混亂。
Option four is that the US is satisfied with essentially cosmetic changes, and the system continues much as it is now.
第四種可能是，美國(guó)滿足于基本上流于表面的變革，國(guó)際體系大體保持現(xiàn)狀。
It is too early to say which of these scenarios will prevail. The Trump administration would argue that option one: a changed system — still led by America — is already in the making. Canada and Mexico have entered into negotiations about a revised Nafta. The European members of Nato are increasing their military spending. China will probably make trade concessions, if enough pressure is applied.
現(xiàn)在說哪種情景會(huì)成真還為時(shí)過早。特朗普政府會(huì)辯稱，第一種可能——一個(gè)仍由美國(guó)領(lǐng)導(dǎo)的、變革了的體系——已在醞釀之中。加拿大和墨西哥已經(jīng)參加了重新修訂《北美自由貿(mào)易協(xié)定》的談判。北約的歐洲成員國(guó)正在增加各自的軍費(fèi)支出。如果施加足夠的壓力，中國(guó)很可能將在貿(mào)易方面作出讓步。
Set against that, there are also elements of option two — a world without America — emerging. When the US withdrew from the Trans-Pacific Partnership trade deal, the other 11 members decided to go ahead without America. Last week, Mr Trump signalled that the US might rejoin a revised TPP — but it is probably too late for that. Meanwhile, the EU has been energised by Mr Trump’s anti-trade rhetoric and is now close to concluding trade deals with Japan and with the Mercosur group of South American nations. And China is forging ahead with its Belt and Road initiative, co-operating with other nations to create infrastructure across the Eurasian landmass and the Pacific.
在這種背景下來看，也有推動(dòng)第二種可能——一個(gè)沒有美國(guó)參與的世界——的因素在顯現(xiàn)。美國(guó)退出《跨太平洋伙伴關(guān)系協(xié)定》(TPP)時(shí)，其他11個(gè)成員國(guó)決定在沒有美國(guó)的情況下繼續(xù)推進(jìn)TPP。上周特朗普發(fā)出信號(hào)，稱美國(guó)可能重新加入修訂后的TPP——但這可能為時(shí)已晚。與此同時(shí)，受到特朗普反貿(mào)易言論刺激的歐盟，如今正接近與日本以及由南美國(guó)家組成的南方共同市場(chǎng)(Mercosur)分別達(dá)成貿(mào)易協(xié)定。而中國(guó)正大力推進(jìn)其“一帶一路”(Belt and Road)倡議，在亞歐大陸和太平洋地區(qū)與其他國(guó)家合作建設(shè)基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施。
However, the US is too important for an effective new world order to be constructed without American participation. That is why there are also strong arguments for option three — chaos.
然而，美國(guó)太過重要了，一個(gè)有效的世界新秩序不太可能在沒有美國(guó)參與的情況下構(gòu)建起來。這就是為什么說出現(xiàn)第三種可能——混亂——也有強(qiáng)有力的依據(jù)。
If the Trump administration continues to block the appointment of judges to the WTO’s appellate court, then the entire world trading system will pay a price. There are also certain functions that America performs — in particular, providing military muscle and the world’s reserve currency — that are impossible to replicate under current circumstances.
如果特朗普政府繼續(xù)阻撓WTO上訴機(jī)構(gòu)法官的任命，那整個(gè)世界貿(mào)易體系將為此付出代價(jià)。美國(guó)還發(fā)揮了一些特定作用——尤其是在提供軍事力量和世界儲(chǔ)備貨幣方面——這些作用在當(dāng)前形勢(shì)下是不可復(fù)制的。
If the US withdrew its security guarantees in the Pacific, for example, the combined efforts of Japan, India and Australia would not fill the gap. And neither the euro nor the renminbi is ready to serve as the world’s reserve currency, even if America’s management of the dollar becomes irresponsible.
例如，如果美國(guó)撤銷其對(duì)太平洋地區(qū)的安全保障，以日本、印度和澳大利亞聯(lián)合之力是無法填補(bǔ)空白的。而且，即便美國(guó)對(duì)美元的管理變得不負(fù)責(zé)任，歐元和人民幣都未準(zhǔn)備好充當(dāng)世界儲(chǔ)備貨幣。
But the fact that nothing very serious has yet happened also supplies some evidence for option four — in which the US contents itself with cosmetic changes that allows Mr Trump to claim some “wins”. Big business in America might revolt if the Trump administration does try to break up Nafta. And, whatever Mr Trump says, the US gains security and political advantages from playing the role of “world policeman” and will not abandon those lightly.
但目前還沒有發(fā)生非常嚴(yán)重的事件，這也為第四種可能提供了些許依據(jù)——美國(guó)讓自身滿足于表面上的變革，這可以讓特朗普宣稱取得了一些“勝利”。如果特朗普政府真的試圖撕毀《北美自由貿(mào)易協(xié)定》，美國(guó)的大企業(yè)可能出面反對(duì)。而且，無論特朗普怎么說，美國(guó)都從扮演“世界警察”的角色中獲得了安全和政治上的種種優(yōu)勢(shì)，所以不會(huì)輕易放棄這一切。
Those factors make me think that cosmetic change is the likeliest outcome of the Trump administration’s assault on the global rules-based order. But the US is playing a high-risk game. Nationalistic gestures are always likely to provoke nationalistic responses, particularly from a rising power, such as China. Mr Trump may not really intend to break the current global order. But he could still do it by accident.
這些因素讓我覺得，流于表面的變革是特朗普政府攻擊“基于規(guī)則的全球秩序”最有可能出現(xiàn)的結(jié)果。但美國(guó)正在玩一場(chǎng)高風(fēng)險(xiǎn)游戲。民族主義的姿態(tài)常常可能激起民族主義的回應(yīng)，尤其當(dāng)對(duì)方是一個(gè)崛起中的大國(guó)時(shí)，譬如中國(guó)。特朗普或許并非真的想要打破當(dāng)前的全球秩序。但他也有可能意外地造成這種結(jié)果。
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