中國(guó)民營(yíng)衛(wèi)星企業(yè)謹(jǐn)慎前行

Roger Zhang rejects the title of China’s Elon Musk, bestowed on him by Chinese media.

張昌武(Roger Zhang)拒絕接受中國(guó)媒體授予他的稱(chēng)號(hào)：中國(guó)的埃隆•馬斯克(Elon Musk)。

The chief executive of Landspace — one of the handful of Chinese start-ups building satellite-launching rockets — Mr Zhang prefers to operate quietly, out of the limelight.

這位藍(lán)箭(Landspace)首席執(zhí)行官更喜歡低調(diào)運(yùn)營(yíng)，遠(yuǎn)離聚光燈。該公司是中國(guó)為數(shù)不多的建造衛(wèi)星運(yùn)載火箭的初創(chuàng)企業(yè)之一。

“Building this kind of technology is slow going. We do not want to unveil anything until we are absolutely sure it can work successfully,” he says.

他表示：“這種技術(shù)的積累是緩慢的。我們不想在絕對(duì)確定它能成功之前透露任何消息。”

In 2014, China formally announced it would allow private companies to build and launch satellites, unleashing a flood of Chinese entrepreneurs looking to tap into the $420bn global satellite industry. Yet these first-movers have proceeded cautiously, a stark contrast to the glitzy coverage sought out by US space start-ups such as Mr Musk’s SpaceX.

2014年，中國(guó)正式宣布，將允許民營(yíng)企業(yè)建造和發(fā)射衛(wèi)星，這讓大量中國(guó)企業(yè)家躍躍欲試地想要進(jìn)入4200億美元的全球衛(wèi)星行業(yè)。然而，這些先行者一直謹(jǐn)慎推進(jìn)，這與馬斯克的SpaceX等美國(guó)航天初創(chuàng)企業(yè)想要的搶眼的新聞報(bào)道形成鮮明對(duì)比。

Dozens of satellite-related companies have emerged over the past three years, but they are treading carefully, according to Lan Tianyi, who operates one of the country’s first private satellite consultancies, Ultimate Blue Nebula.

據(jù)中國(guó)首批民營(yíng)衛(wèi)星咨詢公司之一北京千域空天(Ultimate Blue Nebula)的首席執(zhí)行官藍(lán)天翼介紹，過(guò)去3年出現(xiàn)了數(shù)十家衛(wèi)星相關(guān)企業(yè)，但它們都行事謹(jǐn)慎。

“The whole aerospace industry used to be very secretive, because it was dominated by the government and military. [It] was not very popular among companies because it has a high risk of failure,” says Mr Lan.

他表示：“整個(gè)航天業(yè)過(guò)去行事非常隱秘，因?yàn)樗烧蛙婈?duì)主導(dǎo)。(這一行)在企業(yè)中不是很受歡迎，因?yàn)槠飘a(chǎn)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)很高。”

Rather than seeking government or military clients, aerospace start-ups largely are vying for lucrative commercial satellite contracts. Once dominated by companies from the US and Russia, the commercial space is attracting newcomers from China and India jostling for a slice of the multibillion-dollar pie.

航天初創(chuàng)企業(yè)沒(méi)有尋求政府或軍方客戶，而是基本上在爭(zhēng)奪有利可圖的商業(yè)衛(wèi)星合約。曾經(jīng)被美國(guó)和俄羅斯公司霸占的商業(yè)航天領(lǐng)域，正吸引來(lái)自中國(guó)和印度的新進(jìn)入者，它們希望從這張巨額營(yíng)收的大餅中分得一小塊。

In China’s space sector, the number of orbital launches has increased since 2010, bringing the total number of satellites launched from the country in the past 50 years to about 190. Private companies say they plan to launch more than 20 satellites in each of the next two years. China has a 3 per cent share of the commercial space industry but is seeking to capture 10 per cent by 2020, according to state media.

在中國(guó)航天業(yè)，自2010年以來(lái)發(fā)射入軌的數(shù)量有所增多，使過(guò)去50年發(fā)射的衛(wèi)星總數(shù)達(dá)到190顆左右。民營(yíng)公司表示，它們計(jì)劃在未來(lái)兩年每年發(fā)射超過(guò)20顆衛(wèi)星。據(jù)官方媒體稱(chēng)，中國(guó)占全球商業(yè)航天業(yè)3%的份額，但希望到2020年拿下10%。

China’s space entrepreneurs are primarily launching CubeSats — tiny satellites that are comparably cheap to make and can be launched en masse. They typically are used in universities for research purposes but also can be rapidly launched to support telecoms networks and rising demand for remote sensing and imaging.

中國(guó)航天企業(yè)家主要發(fā)射“立方體衛(wèi)星”(CubeSat)，這種微型衛(wèi)星的建造成本相對(duì)低廉，而且可大批發(fā)射。它們一般用于大學(xué)的研究用途，但也可以緊急發(fā)射，以支持電信網(wǎng)絡(luò)以及對(duì)遙感和遙感成像日益增長(zhǎng)的需求。

With their lower launch costs, private satellite providers also are aiming to send up more sophisticated satellites to support telecoms systems that would rival networks run by western companies. Meanwhile, the government is developing the Beidou navigation system, pitching it as a Chinese alternative to the Global Positioning System (GPS) owned and operated by the US.

由于發(fā)射成本較低，民營(yíng)衛(wèi)星供應(yīng)商還計(jì)劃發(fā)射更高級(jí)的衛(wèi)星，以支持能夠抗衡西方公司運(yùn)行的網(wǎng)絡(luò)的電信系統(tǒng)。與此同時(shí)，中國(guó)政府正在開(kāi)發(fā)北斗導(dǎo)航系統(tǒng)，稱(chēng)其可替代美國(guó)擁有和運(yùn)行的全球定位系統(tǒng)(GPS)。

Commenting on the importance of self-contained, vertically independent communication networks, Keith Hayward, former head of research at the Royal Aeronautical Society in the UK, notes: “You’re not beholden to anybody to gain access to the system. You can configure the communication for military deployments and to encrypt upward and downward links to your satisfaction.”

英國(guó)皇家航空學(xué)會(huì)(Royal Aeronautical Society)前研究部門(mén)負(fù)責(zé)人基思•海沃德(Keith Hayward)在談到自成一體、垂直獨(dú)立的通信網(wǎng)絡(luò)的重要性時(shí)指出：“你接入這個(gè)系統(tǒng)不受制于任何人。你可以配置通信用于軍事部署并加密上行和下行鏈路，直到你滿意。”

While Chinese satellite providers have found numerous customers in the developing world, they have encountered pushback from western countries, particularly from the US government, which controls the export and import of satellites above a certain capacity.

盡管中國(guó)衛(wèi)星提供商在發(fā)展中國(guó)家找到了很多客戶，但它們?cè)庥鑫鞣絿?guó)家的阻力，尤其是美國(guó)政府，后者控制著某種能力以上的衛(wèi)星的進(jìn)出口。

In June, Canadian regulators came under fire for approving the sale of Norsat — a Canadian satellite company that provides services to many government bodies including the US defence department — to Shenzhen-based Hytera Communications.

今年6月，加拿大監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)因批準(zhǔn)將加拿大衛(wèi)星公司諾賽特(Norsat)出售給總部位于深圳的海能達(dá)(Hytera Communications)而受到批評(píng)，諾賽特向很多政府機(jī)構(gòu)提供服務(wù)，包括美國(guó)國(guó)防部。

“One thing I think outsiders get wrong is they always suspect Chinese space companies must have something to do with the military,” says Mr Yang Feng, the chief executive officer of satellite-maker Spacety. “However, we just want to make commercial technology like anyone else.” Spacety says all of its funding comes from private venture capital funds.

“我認(rèn)為外部人士搞錯(cuò)的一點(diǎn)是他們總是認(rèn)為中國(guó)航天公司肯定與軍隊(duì)有關(guān)，”衛(wèi)星制造商天儀研究院(Spacety)首席執(zhí)行官楊峰表示，“然而，我們只是希望像其他人一樣生產(chǎn)商用技術(shù)。”天儀研究院表示，其所有資金都來(lái)自民營(yíng)風(fēng)投基金。

“I don’t think you can make a clear distinction between Chinese civil and military space,” says Mr Hayward. “The emphasis on Chinese space is how it serves the Chinese state.”

“我不認(rèn)為，你能把中國(guó)民用航天和軍事航天明顯區(qū)分開(kāi)來(lái)，”海沃德表示，“中國(guó)航天事業(yè)的著重點(diǎn)是為國(guó)家服務(wù)。”

Nearly all of China’s space start-ups are run by veterans of the country’s top military-affiliated research institutes and state aerospace companies. However, China’s space entrepreneurs insist their priority is commercial, not military.

中國(guó)幾乎所有航天初創(chuàng)企業(yè)都是由國(guó)內(nèi)頂尖的軍方下屬研究所和國(guó)有航天企業(yè)的老將執(zhí)掌的。然而，中國(guó)航天企業(yè)家堅(jiān)稱(chēng)，優(yōu)先任務(wù)是商業(yè)，而非軍事。

“We took no intellectual property from the government. We brought only our minds,” says Mr Zhang of Landspace.

藍(lán)箭的張昌武表示：“我們沒(méi)有從政府那里帶走知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)。我們帶來(lái)的只有我們的頭腦。”

Space analysts point out, though, that Landspace’s rockets mirror Long March 11 rockets, designed by state-owned China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation.

然而，航天分析人士指出，藍(lán)箭的火箭與“長(zhǎng)征11號(hào)”火箭類(lèi)似，后者由國(guó)有的中國(guó)航天科技集團(tuán)公司(China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation)設(shè)計(jì)。

Moreover, the rapid development of China’s private space industry is part of the government’s push to integrate civilian and military co-operation in technology. The hope is that the more nimble private sector can develop technologies to support the country’s growing space programme, which aims to put a person on the moon by about 2030.

另外，中國(guó)民營(yíng)航天業(yè)的快速發(fā)展是政府推動(dòng)軍民兩用技術(shù)聯(lián)盟合作努力的一部分。政府希望更靈活的民營(yíng)部門(mén)能夠開(kāi)發(fā)相關(guān)技術(shù)，支持中國(guó)日益遠(yuǎn)大的航天項(xiàng)目。中國(guó)計(jì)劃在2030年左右實(shí)現(xiàn)航天員登月。

“We can develop more experimental nanosatellite technology more quickly and cheaply than state companies,” says Spacety’s Mr Yang.

藍(lán)箭的張昌武表示：“相比國(guó)有企業(yè)，我們能夠以更快且成本更低廉的方式，開(kāi)發(fā)更多試驗(yàn)性納米衛(wèi)星技術(shù)。”