美國(guó)貿(mào)易問題的源頭在哪里？

Here’s a statistic that tells you much of what you need to know about the US trade debate — only 1 per cent of US companies export. It’s a figure that I uncovered recently in a McKinsey Global Institute report on the state of US manufacturing, which confirmed much of what my own reporting has informed me about US trade problems.

有個(gè)統(tǒng)計(jì)數(shù)字可以在很大程度上揭示美國(guó)貿(mào)易辯論的概況：只有1%的美國(guó)公司對(duì)外出口產(chǎn)品。我最近在麥肯錫全球研究所(McKinsey Global Institute)一份有關(guān)美國(guó)制造業(yè)狀況的報(bào)告中看到了這個(gè)數(shù)字，它在很大程度上印證了我在撰寫美國(guó)貿(mào)易問題相關(guān)報(bào)道時(shí)得到的感想。

They begin at home, not abroad. That is not a line you will hear over the next few days, as negotiators meet in Mexico for the latest round of North American Free Trade Agreement talks.

美國(guó)貿(mào)易問題發(fā)端于國(guó)內(nèi)，而不是國(guó)外。近日有關(guān)談判代表們?cè)谀鞲绯鱿钚乱惠啽泵雷再Q(mào)協(xié)定(Nafta)談判時(shí)，你絕不會(huì)聽到諸如此類的話語(yǔ)。

The Trump administration is likely to point fingers and threaten again to pull out of the whole agreement. But if the White House wants to fix trade, it would do better to look at three crucial mistakes that have been made at home — and then compare them with opposite strategies in China, the world’s biggest manufacturing country.

特朗普(Trump)政府可能對(duì)別人橫加指責(zé)，再次威脅要徹底退出北美自貿(mào)協(xié)定。但是，如果白宮想解決貿(mào)易問題，最好看看本國(guó)所犯的三個(gè)重大錯(cuò)誤，再拿來和世界最大制造業(yè)國(guó)家中國(guó)所采取的相反戰(zhàn)略對(duì)比一下。

The first mistake was to starve manufacturing of investment. Private sector investment in the sector in the US is at 30-year lows; the ages of the average factory and piece of machinery are 25 and nine years, respectively. The McKinsey Global Institute report estimates that about $115bn of investment would be required annually over the next decade to fix this problem.

第一個(gè)錯(cuò)誤是讓制造業(yè)得不到投資。美國(guó)制造業(yè)的私營(yíng)部門投資正處于30年低點(diǎn);工廠和機(jī)械平均已投入使用25年和9年。麥肯錫全球研究所的報(bào)告估計(jì)，要解決這個(gè)問題，未來十年每年將需要投資約1150億美元。

But trade and tax policy in the US does almost nothing to provide an incentive for that investment. Companies talk a good game about repatriation, but privately admit that the bulk of any money brought home will go into share buybacks and dividend payments. Gary Cohn, President Donald Trump’s economic adviser, last week appeared surprised (or perhaps feigned surprise) as three hands went up when, at a conference, chief executives were asked how many would invest at home if tax reform were passed. Why should they, when there are no quid pro quos of repatriation in exchange for equipment investment, training or the funding of an infrastructure bank?

然而，美國(guó)的貿(mào)易和稅收政策幾乎完全不能為此類投資提供激勵(lì)。企業(yè)嘴上大談將海外資金匯回國(guó)內(nèi)，私底下卻承認(rèn)，大部分匯回資金將用于回購(gòu)股票和派發(fā)股息。在近日一次會(huì)議上，當(dāng)首席執(zhí)行官們被問到假如稅改通過有多少人會(huì)在國(guó)內(nèi)投資，只有三個(gè)人舉手，當(dāng)時(shí)唐納德•特朗普總統(tǒng)(Donald Trump)的經(jīng)濟(jì)顧問加里•科恩(Gary Cohn)顯得很驚訝(也許只是假裝驚訝)。當(dāng)匯回資金用于設(shè)備投資、培訓(xùn)人員和向基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施銀行注資卻不能獲得補(bǔ)償時(shí)，誰(shuí)會(huì)投資呢?

As the past two decades have shown, supply side economics alone does not result in a productive use of capital, particularly when it comes to global multinationals; sometimes, you have to push investment to the areas where it is needed. That’s exactly what China is doing with its $1tn infrastructure investment plan.

過去20年的情形已經(jīng)證明，單純靠供給側(cè)經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)手段并不能促成資本的有效使用，尤其是涉及到全球性跨國(guó)企業(yè)的時(shí)候;有時(shí)候，你必須推動(dòng)投資流入需要資金的領(lǐng)域。這正是中國(guó)的1萬(wàn)億美元基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施投資計(jì)劃所做的事情。

Second, the US trade debate has focused far too much on the largest domestic companies, which are doing quite well, in terms of share price, profit margins and sales growth. Yet the vast majority of the 250,000 manufacturing groups in the US employ fewer than 100 people.

第二，美國(guó)貿(mào)易辯論過多地關(guān)注國(guó)內(nèi)大公司，這些公司在股價(jià)、利潤(rùn)率和銷售增長(zhǎng)方面都很出色。然而全美25萬(wàn)家制造業(yè)公司中，絕大多數(shù)公司的雇員在100人以下。

The current zero-sum game global trade debate hardly applies to them at all. Most do not export, not because they cannot but because access to capital has been tighter for them relative to their rich country peers since the Great Recession (that lack of investment creates a 40 per cent productivity gap between small and large businesses). Reconnecting the dots between the largest exporters and the supply chain could fix that.

當(dāng)前零和游戲式的全球貿(mào)易辯論對(duì)它們根本不適用。它們大多數(shù)并不出口產(chǎn)品，并非因?yàn)樗鼈冏霾坏?，而是因?yàn)椋源笏ネ?Great Recession)以來，相對(duì)于財(cái)力雄厚的國(guó)內(nèi)同行，它們獲得資金的渠道收緊得更厲害(投資不足造成了小公司和大公司之間的生產(chǎn)率差距達(dá)到40%)。把大型出口商和供應(yīng)鏈之間的點(diǎn)重新連接起來，可能會(huì)解決這一問題。

Regionalisation is the new globalisation — the largest firms in the US should be given explicit government incentives to work with local suppliers, which would do much to address the president’s trade deficit obsession, since 70-80 per cent of the value of a finished product is in the supply chain.

地區(qū)化是新的全球化——美國(guó)政府應(yīng)為國(guó)內(nèi)大公司提供明確激勵(lì)措施，推動(dòng)它們與當(dāng)?shù)毓?yīng)商合作，這對(duì)于解決總統(tǒng)一直糾結(jié)的貿(mào)易逆差問題大有裨益，因?yàn)橐患瞥善返膬r(jià)值有70%至80%來自供應(yīng)鏈。

Again, this is something that China has prioritised in its 2025 development plan, which states explicitly that the country wants to minimise dependence on foreign markets and technologies.

這同樣是中國(guó)2025發(fā)展規(guī)劃中列為重點(diǎn)的內(nèi)容。該規(guī)劃明確指出，中國(guó)要把對(duì)外國(guó)市場(chǎng)和技術(shù)的依賴降到最低程度。

Finally, the US desperately needs to connect Silicon Valley and the rust belt. High-tech manufacturing — 3D printing, the internet of things, sensors in products that create business opportunities in data analytics and services, rather than just goods — may well be the future. Yet, shockingly, roughly half of US manufacturing companies have no digital strategy whatsoever, according to an MGI survey.

最后，美國(guó)迫切需要把硅谷和“銹帶”連接起來。高科技制造業(yè)——3D打印、物聯(lián)網(wǎng)、應(yīng)用于可在數(shù)據(jù)分析領(lǐng)域創(chuàng)造商業(yè)機(jī)遇的產(chǎn)品中的傳感器，以及服務(wù)，而不僅僅是商品——很可能是未來發(fā)展方向。但令人震驚的是，麥肯錫全球研究所的一份調(diào)查報(bào)告顯示，大約一半的美國(guó)制造業(yè)公司沒有制定任何數(shù)字戰(zhàn)略。

Meanwhile, the technocrats in the Chinese Communist party are giving speeches about the integration of the physical and digital worlds that would leave many people in US boardrooms scratching their heads.

與此同時(shí)，中國(guó)共產(chǎn)黨的技術(shù)官員們紛紛發(fā)表關(guān)于實(shí)體和數(shù)字世界相融合的演講，這種講話內(nèi)容會(huì)讓美國(guó)企業(yè)董事會(huì)的許多人摸不著頭腦。

Of course, it’s easier to do economic-dot connecting in an autocracy. No one is arguing for that, but it does speak to the core problem — the Trump administration is trying to push “America First” without any clear and coherent plan of what that means, or how to make an industrial strategy happen.

當(dāng)然，要將經(jīng)濟(jì)中的點(diǎn)連接起來，在一個(gè)專制體制中會(huì)更容易做到。沒人提倡這種體制，但它確實(shí)揭示一個(gè)核心問題——特朗普政府正在努力推動(dòng)“美國(guó)優(yōu)先”政策，卻沒有制定明確而連貫的計(jì)劃來闡明這一政策的含義或者解釋如何成功實(shí)施一項(xiàng)產(chǎn)業(yè)政策。

“You look at the current trade debate and you just think, ‘What a lost opportunity’,” says MGI director James Manyika.

“看著當(dāng)前的貿(mào)易辯論，你只會(huì)想，‘我們錯(cuò)失了一個(gè)怎樣的機(jī)會(huì)啊’，”麥肯錫全球研究所所長(zhǎng)詹姆斯•馬尼卡(James Manyika)說。

The countries that the US left behind when the administration pulled out of the Trans-Pacific Partnership — high-growth emerging market nations with expanding middle classes that are engaged in major infrastructure building works — are exactly those with the largest demand for the US’s most valuable exports, such as high-tech products, pharmaceuticals and heavy machinery.

美國(guó)政府退出《跨太平洋伙伴關(guān)系協(xié)定》(TPP)時(shí)拋在身后的那些國(guó)家——高速增長(zhǎng)的擁有不斷壯大的中產(chǎn)階層的新興市場(chǎng)國(guó)家，它們正在參與一些重大的基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施建設(shè)工程——恰恰是對(duì)美國(guó)最有價(jià)值的出口產(chǎn)品(比如高科技產(chǎn)品、藥品和重型機(jī)械)需求最大的國(guó)家。

Pulling out of Nafta, particularly without any kind of homegrown industrial policy, would be an equally big mistake. Economic nationalism with no economic plan will not make America great again. In fact, it may be worse than the laissez-faire alternative.

退出北美自貿(mào)協(xié)定——尤其是在缺乏任何一種形式的本土產(chǎn)業(yè)政策的情況下——將是同等嚴(yán)重的錯(cuò)誤。沒有經(jīng)濟(jì)計(jì)劃的經(jīng)濟(jì)民族主義將不會(huì)讓美國(guó)再次變得偉大。事實(shí)上，這也許比自由放任的政策還要糟糕得多。