英國面臨退歐談判殘酷現(xiàn)實
英國正在滑向退歐災(zāi)難——沒有可行的外交、經(jīng)濟(jì)或政治戰(zhàn)略來確保成功退歐。
The central problem is that the British government is stuck between an implacable EU and an unrealistic Conservative party. The EU will not offer anything like the deal that Britain’s Brexiters still dream of. But Theresa May’s Conservative colleagues are still unprepared to accept this unpleasant reality.
核心問題在于，英國政府現(xiàn)在被困在不愿妥協(xié)的歐盟和不現(xiàn)實的保守黨之間。歐盟不會提出英國退歐派仍在夢想的那種方案。但特里薩•梅(Theresa May)的保守黨同僚仍然沒有準(zhǔn)備好接受這個不愉快的現(xiàn)實。
In this paralysing situation, it seems increasingly likely the UK government will simply be politically and technically incapable of delivering a negotiated Brexit. As a result, the likeliest outcome is that, late in the day — perhaps in January 2019 — the EU will present Britain with a “take it or leave it” deal.
在這種一籌莫展的局面中，英國政府在政治和技術(shù)上無法實現(xiàn)談判退歐的可能性似乎越來越高。其結(jié)果是，最有可能的結(jié)局是，歐盟將在最后時刻(可能是2019年1月)向英國提出一份“要么接受、要么離開”的協(xié)議。
That deal will involve Britain making wholesale concessions on a range of issues, from money to migration and markets. The alternative to acceptance would be for Britain to go over the cliff edge of a “no deal” Brexit in March 2019, with chaotic implications for trade, travel and security. Faced with that imminent prospect, it is likely, but by no means certain, that Britain would take the EU’s deal.
那樣的協(xié)議將涉及英國在一系列問題上(從金錢到移民和市場)作出全盤讓步。不接受該協(xié)議的替代選擇是，英國將在2019年3月滑下“無協(xié)議”退歐的懸崖邊緣，承受貿(mào)易、旅行和安全方面的混亂后果。面對那種迫在眉睫的前景，英國很可能(但不能肯定)會接受歐盟的協(xié)議。
The unpleasant reality for Britain is that both the structure of the negotiations, and the relative strengths of both sides, ensure it is in the EU’s interests to indulge in brinkmanship. There are EU countries, particularly Ireland, that would suffer badly from a “no deal” Brexit. But in general, the EU seems to have decided that it can absorb the direct costs of Britain leaving without a deal.
對英國來說，令人不快的現(xiàn)實是，談判架構(gòu)和雙方的相對實力都確保了，玩一場懸崖游戲是符合歐盟利益的。有些歐盟國家(特別是愛爾蘭)會因英國“無協(xié)議”退歐而遭受嚴(yán)重?fù)p失。但總的來說，歐盟似乎已經(jīng)決定，它能夠承受英國無協(xié)議退歐帶來的直接代價。
When, at a recent closed-doors event, a senior British politician argued that, in the event of a “no deal”, the EU will be left with a €10bn hole in its budget, the Europeans in the audience seemed unimpressed. As one of them put it to me afterwards: “There are 27 of us. I think we can manage that.”
在最近的一次閉門會議上，英國一位資深政客提出，在英國“無協(xié)議”退歐的情況下，歐盟將面對100億歐元的預(yù)算漏洞，然而聽眾中的歐洲人似乎不以為意。正如其中一人在會后對我所說的：“我們有27個成員國。我想我們能對付。”
The Europeans also know that the more that times passes, the more the pressure will mount on Britain. It is widely anticipated that if there is no clear Brexit breakthrough at next month’s EU summit, big banks and businesses will start to make announcements about shifting jobs out of Britain. If that happens, the May government’s negotiating position will get steadily weaker.
歐洲人也知道，越往后，英國承受的壓力就會越大。各方普遍預(yù)計，如果下月舉行的歐盟峰會沒有在英國退歐問題上取得明顯突破，大型銀行和企業(yè)將開始宣布把工作崗位遷出英國。如果發(fā)生這種情況，梅政府的談判地位將會越來越弱。
The EU side can also credibly argue that the political disarray in Britain is such that making a deal with the May government could turn out to be pointless. On the surface, the British government has a clear position on most of the key issues. The May government has offered to pay the EU €20bn as part of the divorce settlement. It has also said that Britain plans eventually to leave both the EU’s internal market and the customs union, but that there should be a transition arrangement of about two years, during which a new free trade deal is put into place.
歐盟方面還能夠可信地提出，英國政局如此混亂，以至于與梅政府達(dá)成協(xié)議最終可能毫無意義。表面上，英國政府在大部分關(guān)鍵問題上都有明確立場。梅政府已經(jīng)提出支付200億歐元作為“離婚協(xié)議”的一部分。梅政府還已表示，英國計劃最終退出歐盟內(nèi)部市場和關(guān)稅同盟，但是應(yīng)該有一項為期兩年左右的過渡安排，其間會達(dá)成一份新的自由貿(mào)易協(xié)定。
But these positions could still change radically in response to events. If, as seems likely, Mrs May is forced to increase considerably the UK’s financial offer to the EU, it is possible that she will face a revolt from within her own party — and could lose her House of Commons majority, and possibly her job. On the other hand, if she hangs tough on the money and allows negotiations to break down, then she may face a similarly dangerous revolt from appalled Remainers.
但是，隨著事態(tài)發(fā)展，這些立場仍然可能發(fā)生根本性的變化。如果梅被迫大幅增加英國對歐盟作出的財務(wù)貢獻(xiàn)，她可能面臨黨內(nèi)反彈——并可能失去她在下議院(House of Commons)的多數(shù)席位，甚至可能下臺。另一方面，如果她在“離婚”款項的金額上死不讓步，任由談判破裂，那么她可能面臨不滿的留歐派同樣危險的造反。
Beyond the money, there is still an unresolved dispute over whether Britain will indeed leave the EU’s internal market. For while that is currently the official UK position, it is also clear that there are senior figures within the government — including Philip Hammond, the chancellor — who would dearly like to shift policy.
除了金錢以外，關(guān)于英國是否真的會退出歐盟內(nèi)部市場，仍然存在懸而未決的爭議。因為盡管那是英國目前的官方立場，但同樣顯而易見的是，政府內(nèi)部一些高層人物(包括財政大臣菲利普•哈蒙德(Philip Hammond))非常愿意轉(zhuǎn)變政策。
This unresolved conflict between Remainers and Leavers means that Britain’s negotiating position cannot be assumed to be final. Even if Mrs May stays and manages to negotiate a deal, she might be unable to get it through parliament. But if Mrs May falls, then her carefully-crafted compromises will fall with her.
留歐派和退歐派之間的沖突懸而未決意味著，英國的談判立場不能被視為最終立場。即使梅得以撐下去，并設(shè)法談判達(dá)成協(xié)議，她也可能無法說服議會通過該協(xié)議。但是，如果梅下臺了，那么她精心策劃的妥協(xié)方案將會隨之泡湯。
What happened next would depend on whether she was replaced by a Remainer or a Leaver. Alternatively, there could be a general election, with the Tories replaced by Labour. But the real attitude of Jeremy Corbyn, the Labour leader, to Brexit remains mysterious. And Mr Corbyn’s positions would anyway be shaped by the economic and political circumstances he inherited, and by whether he had to govern in coalition with the Scottish Nationalists and the Liberal Democrats.
接下來的事情將取決于她是被留歐派還是退歐派取代。再或者，英國可能舉行一場大選，導(dǎo)致保守黨下臺，被工黨取而代之。但工黨領(lǐng)袖杰里米•科爾賓(Jeremy Corbyn)在退歐問題上仍然諱莫如深，不肯表明真實態(tài)度。無論如何，科爾賓的立場都會受到他接手的經(jīng)濟(jì)和政治環(huán)境、以及他是否不得不與蘇格蘭民族黨(SNP)和英國自由民主黨(Liberal Democrats)聯(lián)合執(zhí)政的影響。
Observing all these uncertainties, the EU might well conclude that there is no point in making significant moves now. Some Europeans may even nurture hopes that the eventual outcome of all this chaos is that Britain reconsiders its decision to leave the EU altogether. One outside possibility is that the EU’s last minute offer would be aimed not at crafting a Brexit deal, but at persuading Britain to reconsider the whole notion of Brexit.
在看到所有這些不確定因素后，歐盟很可能會得出結(jié)論：現(xiàn)在做出重大舉措毫無意義。一些歐洲人甚至可能希望，這一切混亂的最終結(jié)局是英國重新考慮退出歐盟的決定。有一種不大的可能性是，歐盟在最后時刻提出的協(xié)議，將不是為了設(shè)計英國退歐協(xié)議，而是旨在說服英國重新考慮整個退歐念頭。
But such brinkmanship also inevitably carries risks for the EU. The economic consequences of pushing the British over the cliff edge, by accident or design, may be containable for the EU. Imposing a humiliating settlement on Britain might even seem economically advantageous. But the long term political and strategic consequences of a bitter Brexit are much harder to calculate.
但這種懸崖游戲也不可避免地給歐盟帶來風(fēng)險。把英國推下懸崖(無論是無意還是有意)的經(jīng)濟(jì)后果或許是歐盟可以承受的。迫使英國接受羞辱性的解決方案，在經(jīng)濟(jì)上甚至可能具有優(yōu)勢。但是，英國不愉快退歐帶來的長期政治和戰(zhàn)略后果將會更難估量。
