期貨對(duì)比特幣意味著什么？

In recent years, bitcoin has been the wild west of the financial world. Now, however, it is being civilised — a touch. In the coming weeks, the Chicago Mercantile Exchange plans to start listing bitcoin futures, with a centralised clearing mechanism.

最近幾年，比特幣成了金融世界的狂野西部。然而，現(xiàn)在它略微被“文明化”了一些。芝加哥商品交易所(CME)計(jì)劃在未來(lái)幾周推出擁有中央清算機(jī)制的比特幣期貨。

Cboe Global Markets may follow suit. That will enable investors to bet on the coin’s future value without actually holding it — just as investors can use the Chicago exchange to bet on hog prices, say, without ever handling a pig.

芝加哥期權(quán)交易所全球市場(chǎng)(Cboe Global Markets)可能效仿。那將讓投資者能夠押注比特幣的未來(lái)價(jià)值，而無(wú)需實(shí)際擁有這種虛擬貨幣——就像投資者可以通過(guò)這家芝加哥交易所押注豬肉價(jià)格，而不用親自飼養(yǎng)生豬一樣。

Is this a good idea? Some of the CME’s members do not think so. This week Interactive Brokers, an important clearing firm in the exchange, took the extraordinary step of using a newspaper advertisement to ask for more regulatory oversight. It fears that bitcoin is potentially so volatile that these futures will create huge losses for traders, which might then undermine the health of the CME and hurt other brokers, given its part-mutualised structure.

這是一個(gè)好主意嗎?CME的一些會(huì)員不這么認(rèn)為。最近，CME的一家重要清算機(jī)構(gòu)盈透證券(Interactive Brokers)采取了非同尋常的舉措，在報(bào)紙上刊登廣告呼吁加大監(jiān)管監(jiān)督。它擔(dān)心，比特幣潛在具有如此巨大的波動(dòng)性，以至于這些期貨產(chǎn)品會(huì)給交易者帶來(lái)巨大損失，從而損害CME的健康，而且由于其部分共有架構(gòu)，還會(huì)殃及其他經(jīng)紀(jì)商。

The CME — unsurprisingly — dismisses this as poppycock: it argues that any risks will be contained by rules that allow traders to charge more so as to generate fat margins (of about 30 per cent) and thus absorb losses, and by circuit breakers that would stop a trade in the event of wild price swings.

CME不出所料地認(rèn)為這是一派胡言：它辯稱, 任何風(fēng)險(xiǎn)都將受到兩方面的遏制：一是允許交易商收取更多費(fèi)用的規(guī)則，讓交易商達(dá)到大約30%的豐厚利潤(rùn)率，從而能夠吸收虧損;二是熔斷機(jī)制，在價(jià)格劇烈波動(dòng)時(shí)暫停交易。

However, it is too early for outsiders to tell whether the naysayers are correct: there is simply not enough clarity on how big any bitcoin futures market will be, how it will operate or on the CME’s capacity to absorb any losses.

然而，對(duì)于局外人來(lái)說(shuō), 判斷反對(duì)者正確與否為時(shí)尚早：對(duì)于比特幣期貨市場(chǎng)的規(guī)模會(huì)有多大、它將如何運(yùn)行、以及CME是否有能力吸收虧損，都缺乏足夠的清晰度。

But while the regulatory debate bubbles on, there is a more immediate question facing investors: bitcoin prices. Until now, it has been an article of faith among bitcoin evangelists that if — or when — the currency became more “civilised”, this will boost the price.

但是, 盡管監(jiān)管辯論仍在繼續(xù), 投資者面臨的一個(gè)更直接的問(wèn)題是比特幣的價(jià)格。迄今為止，比特幣傳道者的信條是，如果比特幣變得更加“文明化”，那將會(huì)提振其價(jià)格。

After all, the argument goes, assimilating bitcoin into the mainstream investment world should boost its appeal and demand, making it more valuable. It is highly likely there will be an opposite effect. Until now, investors have not had an easy way to bet against bitcoin — the only “short” was to sell coins. But the CME futures contract will let investors place those negative bets. You do not need to be a conspiracy theorist to imagine that some bitcoin cynics will be doing just that.

這種觀點(diǎn)認(rèn)為, 畢竟, 將比特幣同化為主流投資, 應(yīng)該能提高其吸引力和需求，使其更有價(jià)值。但這也很有可能產(chǎn)生相反的效果。此前投資者沒(méi)有一個(gè)簡(jiǎn)單的方法來(lái)做空比特幣——唯一的“做空”是賣出比特幣。但CME的期貨合約將讓投資者能夠做空比特幣。你不需要成為一個(gè)陰謀論者就可以想象，一些比特幣懷疑者真的會(huì)做空比特幣。

And there is a second, more subtle issue too: the cultural “map” of finance, to use an anthropological term. Until now, bitcoin has essentially been perceived as a ringfenced product. The unstated assumption among investors has been that it occupied a distinctive space where normal investing rules did not apply. But as bitcoin becomes integrated into the derivatives market, that boundary may break down and investors apply for “normal” criteria in their valuations. Given the unresolved questions about how bitcoin works, that may lead to more scepticism; indeed, it is precisely what has often happened in the evolution of financial markets before.

還有第二個(gè)、更微妙的問(wèn)題：金融的文化“地圖”(借用人類學(xué)的術(shù)語(yǔ))。到目前為止，比特幣在本質(zhì)上被視為一種受到圈護(hù)的產(chǎn)品。投資者之間沒(méi)有言明的假設(shè)是，它占據(jù)了正常投資規(guī)則不適用的某個(gè)獨(dú)特空間。但是，隨著比特幣融入衍生品市場(chǎng)，這一界限可能消失，使投資者在估值的時(shí)候應(yīng)用“正常”標(biāo)準(zhǔn)。鑒于有關(guān)比特幣如何運(yùn)作的問(wèn)題懸而未決，這可能引發(fā)更多懷疑;的確，這正是過(guò)去金融市場(chǎng)發(fā)展進(jìn)程中經(jīng)常發(fā)生的情況。

Think, for example, about Japan. Before the mid-1980s, its stock market seemed to exist on a planet of its own, subject to its own valuation rules. But when Japanese equity derivative contracts were launched, and then integrated within the wider global market system as a result of financial reform, that sense of “otherness” broke down. The change in how Japan was seen through a comparative investment lens was not the only reason for the 1990 Nikkei crash, but it contributed.

比如，考慮一下日本的情況。在上世紀(jì)80年代中期之前，日本股市似乎存在于自己的星球上，遵從自己的估值規(guī)則。但是，當(dāng)日本的股票衍生品合約問(wèn)世、隨后作為金融改革的結(jié)果融入整個(gè)全球市場(chǎng)體系后，這種“差異”感就瓦解了。通過(guò)比較投資的透鏡看待日本的方式發(fā)生變化，并不是1990年日經(jīng)(Nikkei)崩盤(pán)的唯一原因，但它起到了推波助瀾的作用。

So too with US mortgages. Until 2005 or so, outsiders could not easily assess or price the risks of America’s subprime mortgages: mortgage-backed bond prices were opaque, and the only way to short the market was to sell bonds. But when mortgage derivatives, such as the ABX index, were launched, it suddenly became easy to make negative bets. Then, the ABX index was published in newspapers, such as the Financial Times, in 2007, creating a visible barometer of sentiment. That helped a sense of panic to feed on itself after 2008.

美國(guó)的抵押貸款也是如此。在差不多2005年之前，局外人無(wú)法輕易評(píng)估美國(guó)次貸風(fēng)險(xiǎn)，或?qū)ζ涔纼r(jià)：抵押貸款支持債券價(jià)格不透明，賣空該市場(chǎng)的唯一方法是拋售債券。但是，當(dāng)ABX指數(shù)等抵押貸款衍生品被推出后，賣空突然變得容易了。之后，ABX指數(shù)于2007年開(kāi)始在英國(guó)《金融時(shí)報(bào)》等報(bào)紙上刊登，創(chuàng)建了一個(gè)看得見(jiàn)的市場(chǎng)情緒晴雨表。這推動(dòng)了2008年后市場(chǎng)恐慌情緒愈演愈烈。

Of course, in the long term, this type of evolution is highly desirable. Markets exist to enable investors to express price bets. They are usually more stable in the long run if prices are transparent and there is a wide pool of players. If bitcoin futures had existed a few years ago, the prices would probably not have swung so crazily this month.

當(dāng)然，從長(zhǎng)遠(yuǎn)來(lái)看，這類演變非常可取。市場(chǎng)之所以存在，就是為了讓投資者表達(dá)他們對(duì)價(jià)格走向的押注。如果價(jià)格透明且擁有大量參與者，市場(chǎng)通常在長(zhǎng)期更加穩(wěn)定。如果比特幣期貨幾年前就已經(jīng)存在，那么本月比特幣的價(jià)格可能不會(huì)如此瘋狂波動(dòng)。

But as the tale of the ABX or Nikkei 225 futures shows, that bigger philosophical point is scant comfort when investors and their counter-parties get burnt. Which, of course, is precisely why Interactive Brokers has paid for that ad. Investors and regulators need to take note: fat margins might protect the Chicago exchange as a whole (they hope) from bitcoin shocks; they will not shield unwary punters.

但是正如ABX或日經(jīng)225指數(shù)期貨的故事所表明的那樣，當(dāng)投資者及其交易對(duì)手方遭受巨虧時(shí)，這種宏大的哲學(xué)道理并不令人滿意。當(dāng)然，這正是盈透證券花錢打廣告的原因。投資者和監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)需要注意：豐厚的利潤(rùn)率可能會(huì)保護(hù)整個(gè)芝加哥商品交易所(他們希望如此)免受比特幣的沖擊;但它們保護(hù)不了毫無(wú)警惕之心的投機(jī)者。