俄國十月革命的三點教訓(xùn)
它仍是經(jīng)濟(jì)和政治史上最偉大的實驗之一。一場血腥的內(nèi)戰(zhàn)，廢除私有制，建立幾乎完全是國有的計劃經(jīng)濟(jì)，實行價格管制，取締市場。
One hundred years on from the Russian Revolution, three main lessons emerge from the 75-year Great Soviet Experiment. They are not rocket science but worth re-stating. First, industrialisation through terror is inefficient. Second, without terror the command economy eventually flags and goes bankrupt. Third, lack of political competition creates a rigid governance system unable to make necessary reforms.
俄國革命已過去100年，這場75年的“蘇維埃大實驗”告訴了我們3條主要教訓(xùn)。它們并非尖端科學(xué)，但值得重新述說。首先，通過恐怖統(tǒng)治實現(xiàn)工業(yè)化是低效的。其次，如果沒有恐怖統(tǒng)治，計劃經(jīng)濟(jì)將最終萎靡并破產(chǎn)。第三，缺乏政治競爭造成了僵化的治理體系，無法實行必要的改革。
The first is probably the least obvious. Stalin accomplished industrialisation and eventually led the Soviet Union to victory in the second world war. His method was top-down and, in the words of the writers Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson, “brutal but effective”.
第一個可能是最不明顯的。斯大林(Stalin)實現(xiàn)了工業(yè)化，并最終領(lǐng)導(dǎo)蘇聯(lián)在二戰(zhàn)中獲勝。他的方法是自上而下的，用作家達(dá)龍•阿杰姆奧盧(Daron Acemoglu)和詹姆斯•羅賓遜(James Robinson)的話來說，“殘酷但有效”。
The benefit of centralised economic control is that it allows you to move 25-30 per cent of the labour force from farm to factory within just one decade. However, a recent study I co-authored found this did not work as planned: the gains from moving resources to industry did not make up for destroying productivity within both agriculture and industry. Terror is brutal and effective in moving resources, but it is not productive in organising them efficiently.
中央控制經(jīng)濟(jì)的好處在于它讓蘇聯(lián)得以在僅僅10年的時間內(nèi)就讓25%至30%的勞動力從農(nóng)場轉(zhuǎn)移到工廠。然而，最近我作為聯(lián)合作者所做的一項研究發(fā)現(xiàn)，其效果沒有達(dá)到計劃：將資源轉(zhuǎn)向工業(yè)的好處沒有彌補(bǔ)農(nóng)業(yè)和工業(yè)生產(chǎn)率都遭到破壞的影響。在轉(zhuǎn)移資源方面，恐怖統(tǒng)治是殘酷但有效的，但在高效組織資源方面它成果低下。
The net economic benefits of Stalin’s policies were trivial — and this is not to mention millions who perished due to repression and famine. Also, the Soviet Union could not win the war alone — resources and equipment provided by the US were essential in beating Hitler.
斯大林政策給經(jīng)濟(jì)帶來的凈好處微乎其微，這還不包括數(shù)百萬人因為被鎮(zhèn)壓和饑餓而死。另外，蘇聯(lián)是不可能依靠自己贏得戰(zhàn)爭勝利的，美國提供的資源和裝備在擊敗希特勒(Hitler)方面起到了關(guān)鍵作用。
After the war, the Soviet economy recovered, Sputnik was launched and nuclear parity with the US maintained. Yet, it failed to deliver growth and innovation — proving that competitive markets are needed for efficient incentives. Also, as shown by the economist János Kornai, a collectivised system is inherently vulnerable to “soft budget constraints”. In a socialist economy, all inefficient enterprises are bailed out by the state — hence managers have no incentives to avoid bankruptcy.
二戰(zhàn)后，蘇聯(lián)經(jīng)濟(jì)復(fù)蘇，發(fā)射了斯普特尼克號(Sputnik)衛(wèi)星，并在核領(lǐng)域與美國保持了勢均力敵。然而，蘇聯(lián)未能實現(xiàn)經(jīng)濟(jì)增長和創(chuàng)新，這證明，有效激勵需要競爭性市場。另外，就像經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家雅諾什•科爾奈(János Kornai)所說的，集體制從本質(zhì)上來說在“軟性預(yù)算約束”下很脆弱。在社會主義經(jīng)濟(jì)中，所有低效的企業(yè)都會由政府紓困，因此管理者沒有避免破產(chǎn)的激勵。
Soft budget constraints also feature in market economies — as the massive bailouts since the financial crisis show. But there is a major difference: if a capitalist firm goes bankrupt, private shareholders lose their equity. If a socialist one cannot pay its debts they are taken over by the state — and eventually the whole state goes bankrupt. When Mr Kornai was writing in the late 1970s it was unthinkable that a superpower like the Soviet Union could go bankrupt. In fact its bankruptcy was not just plausible — it turned out to be inevitable.
“軟性預(yù)算約束”也出現(xiàn)在市場經(jīng)濟(jì)中，就像金融危機(jī)之后出現(xiàn)的大規(guī)模紓困所顯示的那樣。但其中存在一個巨大區(qū)別：如果資本主義企業(yè)破產(chǎn)，私人股東會血本無歸。如果社會主義企業(yè)無法償還債務(wù)，政府可以為其買單，最終整個國家破產(chǎn)。在科爾奈在上世紀(jì)70年代末撰文時，人們難以想象蘇聯(lián)這種超級大國會破產(chǎn)。實際上，蘇聯(lián)的破產(chǎn)不僅是合理的，而且事實證明是不可避免的。
With the end of Stalinist terror the government could no longer resist pressures to raise living standards. To pay for this, Moscow resorted to petrodollars and later loans. By the late 1980s the Soviet budget deficit went into double-digit percentages of gross domestic product. In its last year it was 30 per cent of GDP. Creditors stopped lending and the Soviet Union was no more.
隨著斯大林式的恐怖統(tǒng)治結(jié)束，蘇聯(lián)政府無法再抵抗提高生活水平的壓力。要為此買單，蘇聯(lián)政府求助于石油美元以及后來的貸款。到上世紀(jì)80年代末，蘇聯(lián)的預(yù)算赤字與國內(nèi)生產(chǎn)總值(GDP)之比達(dá)到兩位數(shù)。在蘇聯(lián)解體前的最后一年，這個比例達(dá)到30%。債權(quán)人停止貸款，蘇聯(lián)不復(fù)存在。
As bankruptcy loomed, why were Soviet leaders unable to recognise the problem and launch radical reforms? The answer points to the third, most painful lesson. In the absence of political competition and free debate, the USSR ended up with a leadership that was neither competent nor decisive. This was not a coincidence — it was how that system selected and promoted its leaders.
在破產(chǎn)逼近之際，蘇聯(lián)領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人為何無法意識到這個問題并推行徹底的改革呢?答案指向第三個也是最痛苦的教訓(xùn)。在缺乏政治競爭和自由辯論的情況下，蘇聯(lián)的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)層最后既無能又無決斷。這并非巧合，它是這個體制遴選和提拔領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人的方式造成的。
The Great Soviet Experiment demonstrated the deficiencies and unsustainability of the non-market model. Yet still every now and then proposals emerge for a new version of socialism — from “Bolivarian” to market varieties, from state capitalism to a new “digital Gosplan” matching algorithms to economic planning. In decades of socialist experimenting, communists tried many alternatives to the market. None of them worked. That is what we should remember 100 years later.
“蘇維埃大實驗”顯示了非市場模式的缺陷和不可持續(xù)。然而，時常會出現(xiàn)社會主義新版本的提議，從“玻利瓦爾主義”(Bolivarianism)到各種市場經(jīng)濟(jì)變體，從國家資本主義到把算法與經(jīng)濟(jì)規(guī)劃匹配的新的“數(shù)字國家計劃委員會”(digital Gosplan)。在幾十年的社會主義實驗中，共產(chǎn)主義者嘗試了很多替代市場的方案。其中沒有一個成功。這就是我們在100年后應(yīng)該記住的事情。
The writer is chief economist, European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
本文作者是歐洲復(fù)興開發(fā)銀行(European Bank for Reconstruction and Development)首席經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家
