現(xiàn)代版“羅斯福新政”會(huì)是什么樣子？

A most striking fact about the global financial crisis and its aftermath is how far from striking the policy response has been. That is a change from earlier economic history. For the past century and more, the deepest political and economic crises have produced transformational reforms. This time is different.

講到全球金融危機(jī)及其余波，一個(gè)最為引人注目的事實(shí)是，政策反應(yīng)是多么不起眼。這與此前的經(jīng)濟(jì)史存在明顯不同。在過去一個(gè)多世紀(jì)里，最深層的政治和經(jīng)濟(jì)危機(jī)都帶來了變革性的改革。這一次與以往不同。

Franklin D Roosevelt’s New Deal was the epitome of crisis turned into opportunity. Within months of taking office in 1933, Roosevelt had taken the dollar off gold to reflate the economy, shut down and reopened the banking system after equipping it with deposit insurance, launched large public works programmes, radically regulated Wall Street and introduced a minimum wage. Social security, trade liberalisation, and housing policy reform soon followed.

富蘭克林•D•羅斯福(Franklin D. Roosevelt)的新政(New Deal)是把危機(jī)變?yōu)闄C(jī)遇的典型例子。1933年上任后短短幾個(gè)月內(nèi)，羅斯福把美元與黃金脫鉤、實(shí)現(xiàn)了通貨再膨脹，先是關(guān)閉銀行系統(tǒng)、在出臺(tái)存款保險(xiǎn)制度后重新啟動(dòng)，推出了大型公共建設(shè)項(xiàng)目，對(duì)華爾街實(shí)施徹底的監(jiān)管，并引入了最低工資標(biāo)準(zhǔn)。隨后他又很快推出了社會(huì)保障、貿(mào)易自由化、以及住房政策改革。

The New Deal was exceptional in its hyperactivity, but other crises, too, have seen large-scale efforts to recast our economic systems. In the late-19th century, endemic financial instability and increasingly concentrated wealth and market power in the US led to a permanent income tax, a central bank, and an earlier (Theodore) Roosevelt’s trustbusting. After the second world war, a consensus in all western countries created the social democratic mixed economies many now seem to long for.

羅斯福新政異常積極活躍，但在其他危機(jī)中，政府也都大刀闊斧地改革經(jīng)濟(jì)體系。19世紀(jì)末美國(guó)常見的金融不穩(wěn)定以及財(cái)富和市場(chǎng)力量的日益集中，催生了常態(tài)化的收入所得稅、央行，還有老羅斯福——西奧多•羅斯福(Theodore Roosevelt)的反壟斷法。在二戰(zhàn)后，所有西方國(guó)家達(dá)成一種共識(shí)，由此創(chuàng)建了社會(huì)民主主義混合式經(jīng)濟(jì)——如今這似乎是很多人所渴望的經(jīng)濟(jì)制度。

Compared to any of this, the past decade’s policies have been pusillanimous. The 2008 financial crisis was the most violent economic shock to hit most of the rich world in a lifetime. Yet hardly any policy effort has emerged to match the magnitude of the challenge.

與上述任何一次舉措相比，過去十年的政策都可謂軟弱無力。2008年金融危機(jī)是幾十年來最強(qiáng)烈的波及大多數(shù)富裕國(guó)家的經(jīng)濟(jì)沖擊。然而，幾乎沒有任何政策努力的力度能與這種挑戰(zhàn)的艱巨程度相提并論。

True, governments have reined in financial markets. True, too, the 2009 co-ordinated fiscal stimulus arrested the downturn. But the financial system has undergone much less change than in the 1930s, and the stimulus was far too quickly withdrawn. Europe’s banking union may in time bring radical change — though fierce resistance makes it too soon to say.

沒錯(cuò)，政府控制住了金融市場(chǎng)。2009年的協(xié)同財(cái)政刺激舉措也確實(shí)遏制了衰退。但金融系統(tǒng)的改革遠(yuǎn)遠(yuǎn)少于上世紀(jì)30年代，而且財(cái)政刺激措施很快就撤銷了。歐洲的銀行業(yè)聯(lián)盟或許及時(shí)帶來了根本性變革——但是鑒于其遭遇的強(qiáng)烈抵制，現(xiàn)在下定論為時(shí)尚早。

Monetary policy seems superficially to have stepped up to the plate. But even the “unprecedented” actions of central banks have amounted mostly to using well-tried tools — open-market securities purchases, interest rate cuts — at greater scale than before. There has been no revolution.

貨幣政策表面上似乎具有主動(dòng)性。但即便是各央行采取的“前所未有的”舉措，基本上也不過是使用舊的工具，比如在公開市場(chǎng)購(gòu)買證券和降息，只是規(guī)模大于以往。沒有任何變革性舉措。

All in all, our generation of leaders has failed to show the boldness mustered in previous showdowns with history. If a politician with FDR’s mettle had appeared in 2008, or indeed today, what might he or she do? Here are three proposals a committed reformer should contemplate. Like the New Deal, they are radical but realistic.

總而言之，我們這一代的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人未能展現(xiàn)出以往在歷史緊要關(guān)頭總會(huì)激發(fā)出的那種勇氣。如果2008年、或者今天有一位政治家有著像富蘭克林•D•羅斯福那樣的魄力，他或她可能會(huì)怎么做?以下是堅(jiān)定的改革者應(yīng)該考慮的三條建議。正如羅斯福新政一樣，這些建議激進(jìn)但切合實(shí)際。

A latter-day Roosevelt must, like the original, look at monetary reform. Now as then, the problem is how to avoid too much liquidity in the boom and too little in the bust. But this may be impossible so long as money creation — and destruction — remains in the hands of private, profitmaking banks. Only a tiny fraction of the money supply consists of physical cash minted by central banks. The bulk is bank deposits, claims on private financial institutions created when those institutions issue loans.

現(xiàn)代版的羅斯福必須像羅斯福本人一樣聚焦貨幣改革。像當(dāng)時(shí)一樣，如今的問題是如何避免繁榮時(shí)期流動(dòng)性過高而在泡沫破滅時(shí)流動(dòng)性過少的問題。但是只要以營(yíng)利為目的的私有銀行仍然掌握著創(chuàng)造(和毀滅)貨幣的大權(quán)，這或許就無法避免。只有很小一部分貨幣供應(yīng)是由央行創(chuàng)造的實(shí)物現(xiàn)金構(gòu)成的。大部分貨幣供應(yīng)是銀行存款，在私人金融機(jī)構(gòu)發(fā)放貸款時(shí)，存款就是對(duì)這些機(jī)構(gòu)的債權(quán)。

So in exuberant times, the money supply expands too fast, causing resource misallocation and impossible expectations about future incomes. When the mood changes, banks create too little money to keep activity buoyant, credit issued in the boom goes bad, and debt deflation sets in. Central banks’ “unprecedented” money creation has only partially offset this.

因此在經(jīng)濟(jì)繁榮期，貨幣供應(yīng)擴(kuò)張速度太快，造成了資源配置不當(dāng)和對(duì)未來收入不切實(shí)際的預(yù)期。當(dāng)市場(chǎng)情緒轉(zhuǎn)變，銀行創(chuàng)造的貨幣過少，不足以讓經(jīng)濟(jì)活動(dòng)保持活躍，繁榮期發(fā)放的信貸變成壞賬，債務(wù)通縮期開始。央行“史無前例的”印鈔規(guī)模只能抵消部分影響。

If private management of the money supply is a recipe for instability, the radical alternative is to nationalise the money supply. This is do-able today: central banks can offer accounts to all members of the public (or make central bank reserves available to everyone). Banks could be restricted to allocating existing savings to investments, rather than creating new credit.

如果說貨幣供應(yīng)的私人管理是造成經(jīng)濟(jì)不穩(wěn)定的根源，那么根本的替代辦法就是貨幣供應(yīng)國(guó)有化。眼下這是一個(gè)可行辦法：所有社會(huì)成員都可以在央行開設(shè)賬戶(或者央行準(zhǔn)備金可以向每一個(gè)人開放)。銀行只能把現(xiàn)有存款配置給投資，而不是創(chuàng)造新信貸。

Another imperative is that of economic security. Previous radicals created safety nets where none existed. Today we have ample welfare states, but they still leave large groups in precarious conditions. Sometimes they trap them there, as generous benefits for low earners are withdrawn with rising incomes, creating prohibitive effective marginal tax rates for the modestly paid. The radical solution is a universal basic income, the proposal to pay an unconditional benefit to all citizens, financed by tax rises. The idea is rediscovered by every other generation; the time to put it into practice may now have come.

另一項(xiàng)重要建議有關(guān)經(jīng)濟(jì)安全。之前激進(jìn)派創(chuàng)建的安全網(wǎng)已不復(fù)存在。如今我們有大批福利國(guó)家，但它們?nèi)匀蛔尨笈颂幱谖ｋU(xiǎn)境地。有時(shí)他們會(huì)落入福利的圈套，比如面向低收入者的慷慨福利會(huì)在他們收入增加時(shí)被取消，讓那些收入不高者面臨難以承受的實(shí)際邊際稅率。根本解決辦法是發(fā)放統(tǒng)一的基本收入，無條件向所有公民提供福利，資金來自增稅。每隔一代都會(huì)重新提出這一想法;現(xiàn)在或許是時(shí)候把該想法付諸實(shí)踐了。

Finally, revisit the US antitrust policies of the turn of the previous century, when leaders channelled popular resistance to the stranglehold of large oil, industrial and railway companies. Today, internet giants enjoy a similar dominance.

最后一點(diǎn)，回顧美國(guó)在20世紀(jì)初的反壟斷政策——當(dāng)時(shí)的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人對(duì)公眾抵制大型石油、工業(yè)和鐵路公司壟斷的情緒加以因勢(shì)利導(dǎo)。如今，互聯(lián)網(wǎng)巨頭正享受著類似的主導(dǎo)地位。

A brave politician would seek to end internet platforms’ ability to skew our markets — and our politics. Internet services with economic functions similar to public utilities should be regulated as such so as to make them behave in the public interest.

有膽識(shí)的政治家會(huì)尋求終結(jié)互聯(lián)網(wǎng)平臺(tái)扭曲市場(chǎng)和政治的能力。有著與公共事業(yè)部門類似經(jīng)濟(jì)職能的互聯(lián)網(wǎng)服務(wù)應(yīng)該受到監(jiān)管，使之為公眾利益服務(wù)。

Many sensible people will hesitate to embrace these ideas. But what if the alternative is not the status quo, but the nativist authoritarianism now on the rise? The deepest lesson from the Roosevelt era is that liberal centrists should wield their own radicalism lest they have radical illiberalism thrust upon them.

很多明智之人會(huì)有所遲疑，不敢立即接受這些想法。但如果情況不是像現(xiàn)在這樣，而是本土威權(quán)主義正在崛起呢?羅斯福時(shí)代留下的最深刻的教訓(xùn)是，奉行自由主義的中間派應(yīng)該高舉自己的激進(jìn)主義旗幟，以免激進(jìn)的非自由主義大行其道。

[email protected] 譯者/馬柯斯