熊貓債券吃掉了點(diǎn)心債券？

Pandas do not hibernate but the dim sum market just might.

熊貓不會(huì)冬眠，但點(diǎn)心債券市場(chǎng)就可能冬眠。

Bankers’ penchant for catchy names for Asian bonds, from pandas and dim sum to kangas and masala, can invite some strained metaphors.

銀行家喜歡為亞洲債券起上各種好記的名字，從熊貓和點(diǎn)心到袋鼠(kangas)和馬薩拉(masala)，這種嗜好可能導(dǎo)致一些不那么恰當(dāng)?shù)谋扔鳌?/p>

Untangling this one into a more popular form produces this question: is China’s fast-growing panda bond market eating its counterpart, and Hong Kong delicacy, for breakfast?

比如：中國(guó)內(nèi)地快速增長(zhǎng)的熊貓債券市場(chǎng)是不是正在將精致小巧的香港點(diǎn)心債券市場(chǎng)當(dāng)早餐吃?

The rapid opening up of China’s enormous onshore bond markets has put the once-vibrant dim sum market — renminbi-denominated bonds sold in Hong Kong — into the shade.

中國(guó)迅速開(kāi)放規(guī)模龐大的在岸債券市場(chǎng)，讓一度生氣勃勃的點(diǎn)心債券市場(chǎng)黯然失色——點(diǎn)心債券是指在香港發(fā)行的人民幣計(jì)價(jià)債券。

Already this year, $5.6bn of pandas have been sold, more than three times the rate of dim sum bond issuance.

今年已經(jīng)有56億美元的熊貓債券發(fā)行，是點(diǎn)心債券發(fā)行量的三倍多。

The only significant borrower via the dim sum market this year has been the Chinese government, and the bulk of the issuance has been in the form of certificates of deposit sold by banks. HSBC recently slashed its predictions for dim sum issuance this year by at least a third, to between Rmb145bn and Rmb155bn.

今年只有中國(guó)政府通過(guò)點(diǎn)心債券市場(chǎng)大規(guī)模舉債，而一大部分點(diǎn)心債券發(fā)行是以銀行發(fā)行的存款證形式進(jìn)行的。匯豐(HSBC)最近將今年的點(diǎn)心債券發(fā)行量預(yù)測(cè)削減了至少三分之一，預(yù)計(jì)發(fā)行量在1450億元人民幣至1550億元人民幣之間。

The situation also partly reflects Bond Connect, a new trading link between Hong Kong and the mainland markets which, since July, allows international investors to trade onshore bonds more easily.

這種狀況也部分歸咎于“債券通”(Bond Connect)。“債券通”是一種新的香港和內(nèi)地市場(chǎng)債券交易互聯(lián)互通機(jī)制，它自今年7月以來(lái)讓國(guó)際投資者能夠更容易交易內(nèi)地債券。

Recently, Ford’s China operations sold Rmb3.5bn ($536m) in panda bonds backed by car finance loans through the new pipeline.

最近，福特汽車(chē)金融(中國(guó))有限公司通過(guò)這一新渠道發(fā)行了35億元人民幣(合5.36億美元)由汽車(chē)貸款支持的熊貓債券。

That comes after Hungary became the latest country to support the panda market, selling a Rmb1bn three-year bond in July.

在此之前，匈牙利成為支持熊貓債券市場(chǎng)的最新國(guó)家，它在今年7月發(fā)售了10億元人民幣的三年期債券。

It also became the first to have borrowed in renminbi onshore as well as offshore, adding to the impression that a dim sum famine was only worsening.

它也是第一個(gè)在離岸和在岸市場(chǎng)都發(fā)行了以人民幣計(jì)價(jià)債券的國(guó)家，這更加讓人覺(jué)得，點(diǎn)心債券的發(fā)行只會(huì)越來(lái)越少。

Yet bankers remain reluctant to endorse a full panda-ate-the-dim-sum view, pointing instead to factors behind the Hong Kong market’s decline other than simply the growing attraction of mainland opportunities. That could mean that the dim sum market is in a form of hibernation not terminal decline.

然而，銀行家們依然不愿認(rèn)可“熊貓吃掉點(diǎn)心”的觀點(diǎn)，而是指出除了內(nèi)地機(jī)遇越來(lái)越具吸引力以外，香港市場(chǎng)低迷背后的其他因素。這可能意味著點(diǎn)心債券市場(chǎng)進(jìn)入了某種冬眠，而非無(wú)可挽回的沒(méi)落。

“Short term, the offshore market may be struggling, but long term there are advantages to having both onshore and offshore renminbi bond markets,” said Linan Liu, Greater China macro strategist at Deutsche Bank.

德意志銀行(Deutsche Bank)大中華區(qū)宏觀策略師劉立男表示：“短期而言，離岸市場(chǎng)可能萎靡不振，但從長(zhǎng)期來(lái)說(shuō)，同時(shí)擁有在岸和離岸人民幣債券市場(chǎng)是有利的。”

“For example, the onshore panda market is bigger but the offshore dim sum market is aligned legally to other investment centres, rating agencies are active and there’s established settlement and payment standards.”

“例如，在岸熊貓債券市場(chǎng)規(guī)模更大，但離岸點(diǎn)心市場(chǎng)在法律上與其他投資中心一致，評(píng)級(jí)機(jī)構(gòu)活躍，而且還有成熟的結(jié)算和支付標(biāo)準(zhǔn)。”

Arguably the biggest factor in the dim sum market’s decline has been not Beijing’s Panda bond push, but its crackdown on capital outflows.

可以說(shuō)，點(diǎn)心債券市場(chǎng)低迷的最大原因不是中國(guó)政府對(duì)熊貓債券的推動(dòng)，而是其對(duì)資本外流的打擊。

Amid the country’s efforts to stop renminbi being exchanged for dollars, it also stopped banks shifting renminbi across the border between their units and at one point, restricted international payments in its local currency.

中國(guó)政府在努力阻止人們將人民幣換成美元的同時(shí)，也阻止銀行各機(jī)構(gòu)間跨境轉(zhuǎn)移人民幣，一度還限制用人民幣進(jìn)行國(guó)際支付。

The result has been a sharp fall in the amount of renminbi available offshore to invest in products such as bonds. While renminbi deposits in Hong Kong, by far the biggest centre, have stabilised at about Rmb520bn, they are still only about half their 2014 peak levels.

結(jié)果是離岸可投資于債券等產(chǎn)品的人民幣數(shù)量急劇下降。盡管香港人民幣存款穩(wěn)定在5200億元人民幣左右，但仍然只有2014年峰值的約一半。香港是遙遙領(lǐng)先的最大人民幣離岸中心。

Shallower liquidity has raised renminbi borrowing costs in Hong Kong. Beijing’s sale of Rmb7bn in three- and five-year notes in June was its smallest in five years — and also its most expensive.

流動(dòng)性不足提升了香港的人民幣借款成本。中國(guó)政府今年6月在香港發(fā)行了共70億元人民幣的3年期和5年期債券，這是5年來(lái)規(guī)模最小的，也是成本最高的。

The notes carried coupons of 3.99 per cent and 4.1 per cent, respectively, compared with onshore borrowing costs of 3.59 per cent and 3.63 per cent.

兩種期限的利率分別是3.99%和4.1%，而在岸借債成本分別是3.59%和3.63%。

But bankers also point to the recent stabilisation of the renminbi, both onshore and off, to suggest that the groundwork is being laid for a dim sum revival.

但銀行家也指出，人民幣在岸和離岸匯率最近企穩(wěn)，為點(diǎn)心債券復(fù)蘇奠定了基礎(chǔ)。

Dollar weakness has pushed the Chinese currency to its strongest levels in a year. Analysts have revised forecasts for a sharp weakening by the end of the year to predict that the currency will remain roughly flat, a sharp contrast following two years of depreciation fears and volatility.

美元疲弱推動(dòng)人民幣匯率升至一年來(lái)的最高水平。分析師修正了人民幣到今年年底急劇貶值的預(yù)測(cè)，轉(zhuǎn)而預(yù)測(cè)人民幣匯率將會(huì)基本持平，這與兩年來(lái)?yè)?dān)憂(yōu)貶值和波動(dòng)的觀點(diǎn)形成鮮明對(duì)比。

“Renminbi had been crazy and that scared a lot of people,” said one banker. “If it stays like this, like now, for long enough it will change sentiment.”

一位銀行家表示：“人民幣一直很瘋狂，這讓許多人感到害怕。如果它就像現(xiàn)在這樣保持足夠長(zhǎng)時(shí)間的穩(wěn)定，那就會(huì)改變情緒。”

Borrowers’ access to the panda market is not straightforward either. Companies can only present accounts under either Chinese, Hong Kong or EU accounting standards — US rules are not accepted.

借款者進(jìn)入熊貓市場(chǎng)并不簡(jiǎn)單。公司只能根據(jù)中國(guó)內(nèi)地、香港或者歐盟會(huì)計(jì)準(zhǔn)則提供賬目——不接受美國(guó)會(huì)計(jì)準(zhǔn)則。

China has not made it clear either whether funds raised can be moved offshore, meaning that borrowers will need a local use for the funds. And approval for panda issues is also still granted on a case-by-case basis.

中國(guó)也沒(méi)有明確表示籌集的資金能否被轉(zhuǎn)移到境外，這意味著借款者將需要在中國(guó)內(nèi)地使用這些資金。而且熊貓債券發(fā)行的批準(zhǔn)仍然需要“一事一議”。

“For as long as there are two markets, issuers will pick and choose based on their attractiveness,” said Justin Chan, co-head of Asia-Pacific markets at HSBC.

匯豐亞太市場(chǎng)聯(lián)席主管陳紹宗(Justin Chan)表示：“只要存在兩個(gè)市場(chǎng)，發(fā)行者就會(huì)基于它們的吸引力進(jìn)行挑選。”

“Some multinationals will be thinking about establishing an early panda presence for strategic reasons. But for many, it will be about which one is cheaper and also which is easier in terms of administration and process.”

“一些跨國(guó)公司將會(huì)出于戰(zhàn)略原因考慮盡早進(jìn)入熊貓債券市場(chǎng)，但對(duì)許多公司來(lái)說(shuō)，考慮的是哪一個(gè)成本更低，以及哪一個(gè)在管理和程序方面更便利。”