中國(guó)接過金融全球化接力棒

A major shift in the global banking landscape is under way, with European and US banks focusing more on domestic activity and Chinese and other developing country banks expanding abroad.

全球銀行業(yè)版圖正在發(fā)生一場(chǎng)重大變化，歐美銀行開始更關(guān)注國(guó)內(nèi)活動(dòng)，而中國(guó)等發(fā)展中國(guó)家的同行開始向海外擴(kuò)張。

Global cross-border capital flows have declined 65 per cent since 2007, and half of that is explained by a drop in cross-border lending flows. The largest global European banks, and some US ones too, are in retreat from foreign markets. But financial globalisation is far from finished — rather it is broadening and becoming more inclusive as developing economies, most notably China, step into the breach.

自2007年以來，全球跨境資本流動(dòng)減少了65%，其中半數(shù)是由跨境貸款額下降造成的。歐洲各大銀行以及部分美國(guó)銀行也在從外國(guó)市場(chǎng)撤退。但金融全球化遠(yuǎn)遠(yuǎn)沒有告終——相反，它正在拓寬廣度，變得更具包容性，發(fā)展中經(jīng)濟(jì)體——尤其是中國(guó)——正在填補(bǔ)空缺。

The eurozone has been at the forefront of the retreat from foreign markets among banks in advanced economies. The foreign claims of eurozone banks have fallen by $7.2tn, or 45 per cent, since 2007, and nearly half of that has been claims on other borrowers in the eurozone — particularly other banks, new MGI research finds. UK and Swiss banks have sharply reduced foreign assets since the crisis as well. US banks, which have always been less global than their European counterparts, have re-focused on growth at home.

在從外國(guó)市場(chǎng)撤退的發(fā)達(dá)經(jīng)濟(jì)體銀行中，歐元區(qū)走在了前面。麥肯錫全球研究院(MGI)的最新研究發(fā)現(xiàn)，自2007年以來，歐元區(qū)銀行持有的外國(guó)債權(quán)已減少了7.2萬億美元(減幅為45%)，其中近一半是對(duì)歐元區(qū)其他借款方(尤其是其他銀行)的債權(quán)。自危機(jī)以來，英國(guó)和瑞士的銀行也大幅減持了外國(guó)資產(chǎn)。全球化程度一直不如歐洲同行的美國(guó)銀行，開始重新關(guān)注國(guó)內(nèi)業(yè)務(wù)的增長(zhǎng)。

In contrast, China’s four largest commercial banks have seen their foreign assets grow 12-fold since 2007 to more than $1tn. And that’s still only 9 per cent of their total assets. Foreign assets make up 20 per cent or more of the total assets in the largest banks in all advanced economies; if China’s largest banks follow that path, they could see tremendous growth in foreign lending ahead.

相比之下，自2007年以來，中國(guó)四大商業(yè)銀行所持的外國(guó)資產(chǎn)增加了11倍，至逾1萬億美元。而這仍只相當(dāng)于其總資產(chǎn)的9%。對(duì)于所有發(fā)達(dá)經(jīng)濟(jì)體的各大銀行，外國(guó)資產(chǎn)占總資產(chǎn)的比例為20%。如果中國(guó)大銀行走上跟發(fā)達(dá)經(jīng)濟(jì)體同行類似的道路，它們未來的海外放貸將出現(xiàn)極大增長(zhǎng)。

Most of China’s foreign lending to date has accompanied Chinese corporate investments abroad. Banks have stepped in to finance green field new investments, purchases of foreign businesses, and to build the infrastructure to make those investments work. From 2005 to 2016, Chinese foreign direct investment abroad increased more than tenfold, to $1.4tn. Some $32bn has been invested in Africa, where China is currently the fourth-largest but fastest-growing source of FDI. An estimated 10,000 Chinese companies have set up shop in Africa, according to McKinsey. In 2016, China passed a new threshold: its foreign direct investment, lending, and portfolio investment assets now exceed its massive central bank reserve assets, at $3.4tn and $3.2tn, respectively.

迄今，中國(guó)的大部分對(duì)外貸款一直與中國(guó)企業(yè)對(duì)外投資相伴而行。銀行介入的目的是資助新的綠地投資項(xiàng)目，收購(gòu)海外企業(yè)，以及建造基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施以使那些投資項(xiàng)目運(yùn)轉(zhuǎn)起來。從2005年至2016年，中國(guó)對(duì)海外的直接投資增加了逾9倍，至1.4萬億美元。大約320億美元投向了非洲。目前，中國(guó)是非洲地區(qū)規(guī)模第4大、但增速最快的外國(guó)直接投資(FDI)來源國(guó)。麥肯錫數(shù)據(jù)顯示，大約1萬家中國(guó)企業(yè)已在非洲開辦了業(yè)務(wù)。2016年，中國(guó)跨過了一個(gè)新門檻：對(duì)外直接投資、貸款和組合投資資產(chǎn)如今已達(dá)3.4萬億美元，超過了3.2萬億美元的龐大央行儲(chǔ)備資產(chǎn)。

But whether China’s foreign lending and investment will prove to be profitable and sustainable remains to be seen. China’s domestic credit has grown at double-digit rates for the last decade, with debt of households, corporations and government entities increasing fivefold. New reports suggest that non-performing loans are rising. Even without sparking a financial crisis, this could create a wave of losses that hit their balance sheets and slow growth abroad. Indeed, many of the large global European and US banks now in retreat found that the margins and profits on their foreign business were lower than returns on their domestic business.

但是，中國(guó)的對(duì)外貸款和投資會(huì)不會(huì)盈利并且可持續(xù)，仍是一個(gè)需拭目以待的問題。過去10年，中國(guó)的國(guó)內(nèi)信貸一直在以兩位數(shù)的速度增長(zhǎng)，家庭、企業(yè)和政府實(shí)體的總債務(wù)增加了4倍。最新報(bào)告似乎表明，不良貸款開始增多。即便不會(huì)觸發(fā)金融危機(jī)，這也可能造成一波虧損，傷及銀行的資產(chǎn)負(fù)債表并放緩在國(guó)外的增長(zhǎng)。的確，目前在撤退的許多歐美大型全球性銀行發(fā)現(xiàn)，其外國(guó)業(yè)務(wù)的利潤(rùn)率和利潤(rùn)低于國(guó)內(nèi)業(yè)務(wù)。

Beyond banks, China also has formidable players in the next wave of disruption now hitting global finance: digitisation. The value of China’s mobile payments related to consumption by individuals, for instance, was $790bn in 2016, 11 times that of the US. Fintech peer-to-peer (P2P) start-ups, many of them operating across borders, are proliferating. China’s biggest P2P lending and microfinance platform CreditEase in 2016 had plans to buy loan portfolios from two leading US online lenders. New players can build positions extremely quickly. Alibaba built a loan portfolio of $16bn in less than three years, becoming China’s largest seller of money-market funds in just seven months.

除了銀行，在數(shù)字化這一沖擊全球金融的下一波顛覆浪潮中，中國(guó)也涌現(xiàn)出令人敬畏的企業(yè)。比如說，2016年中國(guó)與個(gè)人消費(fèi)相關(guān)的移動(dòng)支付總額達(dá)到了7900億美元，為美國(guó)的11倍。金融科技類的個(gè)人對(duì)個(gè)人(P2P)初創(chuàng)企業(yè)——許多這類公司在跨境經(jīng)營(yíng)——在大量涌現(xiàn)。2016年，中國(guó)最大的P2P放貸和小額貸款平臺(tái)宜信(CreditEase)曾有過向美國(guó)兩家主要在線貸款機(jī)構(gòu)購(gòu)買貸款組合的計(jì)劃。新進(jìn)入者可以非?？斓卣紦?jù)一席之地。阿里巴巴(Alibaba)不到3年便建立起160億美元的貸款組合，僅用7個(gè)月就成了中國(guó)最大的貨幣市場(chǎng)基金銷售方。

Advanced economies still hold the lion’s share of the global stock of foreign investments, at 85 per cent. But developing economies are making inroads. Their share of total foreign investment assets has risen from 8 per cent to 14 per cent over the past 10 years. On the McKinsey Global Institute’s new Financial Connectedness Ranking, China rose from 16th place in 2005 to eighth in 2015. Apart from China, no developing economy as yet has made foreign investments that exceed 1 per cent of the global total stock.

發(fā)達(dá)經(jīng)濟(jì)體在全球?qū)ν馔顿Y量中仍占主導(dǎo)地位，目前份額為85%。但是，發(fā)展中國(guó)家開始取得進(jìn)步。過去10年，發(fā)展中國(guó)家在對(duì)外投資資產(chǎn)總量中的份額從8%上升至14%。在麥肯錫全球研究院最新的金融連通性指數(shù)金融連通性排名(Financial Connectedness Ranking)中，中國(guó)從2005年的第16位上升至2015年的第8位。除中國(guó)之外，目前還沒有任何一個(gè)發(fā)展中經(jīng)濟(jì)體占全球?qū)ν馔顿Y總量的比例超過1%。

China’s rise in global finance looks set to continue. Regulators continue to ease restrictions on investing abroad and open the door to foreign investors. The number of qualified foreign institutional investors approved to participate in local stock and bond markets has grown ten-fold since 2005, to more than 300. In July 2017, the Chinese government launched its Bond Connect programme enabling foreign fund managers to buy and sell China’s $9tn of government, agency and corporate bonds without setting up an onshore account. The People’s Bank of China, meanwhile, has established swap lines with other 30 other countries since the crisis, totalling nearly $500bn in value, that can be drawn on to settle trade and other payments and promote financial stability. Call it “monetary diplomacy”.

中國(guó)在全球金融領(lǐng)域的崛起看來會(huì)延續(xù)下去。監(jiān)管層繼續(xù)放寬對(duì)投資海外的限制，并對(duì)海外投資者打開大門。自2005年以來，獲準(zhǔn)參與國(guó)內(nèi)股市和債市的合格境外機(jī)構(gòu)投資者(QFII)的數(shù)量增加了9倍，至逾300家。2017年7月，中國(guó)政府啟動(dòng)了債券通(Bond Connect)機(jī)制，使得海外基金管理公司不必先設(shè)立境內(nèi)賬戶，就可以在中國(guó)9萬億美元的政府、機(jī)構(gòu)和公司債券市場(chǎng)上進(jìn)行交易。另一方面，自金融危機(jī)以來，中國(guó)央行(PBoC)已與30多個(gè)國(guó)家建立了價(jià)值近5000億美元的貨幣互換額度，可以用來結(jié)算貿(mào)易和其他支付項(xiàng)目，提升金融穩(wěn)定性。不妨稱之為“貨幣外交”。

Ten years on from the global financial crisis, there are indications that global finance is becoming more inclusive. Developing countries are becoming more prominent cross-border players, and the inexorable spread of digitised finance can only reinforce that trend. We must hope that China’s increasing prominence in global finance does not create global spillovers for countries least prepared to deal with them if its domestic debt challenges end badly. In this ever more connected financial system, a Chinese crisis could all too easily turn into a global crisis.

全球金融危機(jī)過去10年了，眼下有跡象表明，全球金融正變得更具包容性。發(fā)展中國(guó)家變成更重要的跨境玩家，數(shù)字金融不可阻擋地普及，只會(huì)強(qiáng)化這一趨勢(shì)。我們只能企盼，如果中國(guó)國(guó)內(nèi)的債務(wù)挑戰(zhàn)變得不可收拾的話，中國(guó)在全球金融中日益吃重的地位，不致給那些準(zhǔn)備最不充分的國(guó)家?guī)砣蛞绯鲂?yīng)。在連通性日益提高的金融體系中，中國(guó)的一場(chǎng)危機(jī)可能很容易演變成一場(chǎng)全球危機(jī)。

Susan Lund is a partner with the McKinsey Global Institute based in Washington, DC. Jonathan Woetzel is a McKinsey senior partner and a director of the McKinsey Global Institute based in Shanghai

蘇珊•倫德(Susan Lund)為駐美國(guó)華盛頓特區(qū)的麥肯錫全球研究院(MGI)合伙人。華強(qiáng)森(Jonathan Woetzel)為麥肯錫(McKinsey)高級(jí)合伙人、駐上海的麥肯錫全球研究院院長(zhǎng)