世界需要嚴(yán)肅對待朝鮮威脅
唐納德•特朗普(Donald Trump)就職不久后，一張搞笑圖片在Twitter上被網(wǎng)友們熱轉(zhuǎn)，圖片中是頭發(fā)后梳直立、開懷大笑的金正恩(Kim Jong Un)。
“I no longer craziest leader,” screamed the headline.
圖片配的文字是：“我不再是最神經(jīng)病的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人了”。
It was brilliantly funny — for a moment. Since then, the North Korean dictator has proceeded to show that he remains unchallenged for the title. He has taunted his neighbours with new ballistic missile tests and staged an extraordinary plot to assassinate his half-brother with a nerve gas agent.
這張圖可以說是爆笑了——可惜笑感只維持了一會兒。從那以后，這位朝鮮獨(dú)裁者開始表明，他仍是這個(gè)封號無可爭辯的得主。他用新的彈道導(dǎo)彈試驗(yàn)向他的鄰居表示蔑視，還籌劃了一場用神經(jīng)毒劑暗殺他同父異母兄長的驚天陰謀。
I thought about the joke the other day while listening to a diplomat describe Mr Trump’s unpredictability as an asset in dealing with North Korea. The argument went like this: Mr Kim might be deterred if he believed that the US president was as unhinged as he was. Peace on the Korean peninsula, in other words, may hinge on whether he buys into the Twitter meme. Not exactly reassuring.
有一天我聽到一名外交官說，特朗普的不可預(yù)測性對他與朝鮮打交道是一個(gè)有利條件，在那時(shí)，我想起了上面那個(gè)笑話。這種觀點(diǎn)的邏輯是：如果金正恩相信美國總統(tǒng)像他一樣神經(jīng)病，那么這位朝鮮獨(dú)裁者或許不敢輕舉妄動(dòng)。換句話說，朝鮮半島的和平，可能取決于金正恩對Twitter上那張走紅圖片是否買賬。聽起來并不怎么令人寬慰。
That such a prospect is a topic of discussion, though, underscores an uncomfortable truth: that no one has a clue how to handle Mr Kim or contain his escalating belligerence. Is he really crazy or does he just like to behave as if he is? Is he growing increasingly confident or desperately insecure?
不過這樣一個(gè)設(shè)想成為人們討論的話題，本身就明確表明了一個(gè)令人不快的事實(shí)：沒人知道如何降住金正恩，或阻止他日益升級的好戰(zhàn)行徑。他是真的瘋了，還是只是樂意表現(xiàn)出這個(gè)樣子?他是在變得越來越自信，還是極度缺乏安全感?
Yet the clock is ticking. Singularly focused on his nuclear programme, no matter the consequences for his own population, Mr Kim’s regime will, in a matter of years, have the capability to strike US territory with nuclear weapons. Think of any kind of pressure, however, and it has been tried already, with limited impact if any at all. That includes sanctions. It also includes diplomacy. When the north was ruled by Mr Kim’s father, Kim Jong-il, the “Six Party Talks” between North Korea, the US, China, Russia, South Korea and Japan that began in 2003 produced an agreement to close nuclear facilities, but were dead two years later when Pyongyang walked out. Meanwhile, military action is not a credible threat, unless one is willing to risk a retaliation that blows up South Korea. Cyber warfare to sabotage missile test launches has been attempted too, but it is not clear whether it has been effective.
可時(shí)間不等人。金正恩政權(quán)心無旁騖地主抓他的核計(jì)劃，而不管這會對他的人民造成什么后果，照這樣下去，數(shù)年內(nèi)，金正恩政權(quán)就將有能力用核武器打擊美國領(lǐng)土。然而，任何可以想到的施壓辦法都已經(jīng)用過了，無一不是收效甚微、甚至根本無效。其中包括制裁，還包括外交。在金正恩的父親金正日(Kim Jong-il)統(tǒng)治朝鮮時(shí)，朝鮮、美國、中國、俄羅斯、韓國和日本于2003年開始的“六方會談”，曾達(dá)成了關(guān)閉朝鮮核設(shè)施的協(xié)議，但兩年后隨著平壤退出談判，該協(xié)議也作廢。此外，軍事行動(dòng)也無法形成有效威脅，除非人們愿意承擔(dān)朝鮮發(fā)起報(bào)復(fù)、將韓國炸飛的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。用網(wǎng)絡(luò)戰(zhàn)破壞導(dǎo)彈試射這一招也用過，但目前尚不清楚是否有效。
Throwing the ball into China’s court has been convenient and, to a certain extent, rational since Mr Kim’s regime is dependent on Chinese support. But China is in a bind, and it cannot handle North Korea on its own. It has tried to contain Pyongyang but does not seem able to control it. It is not in a position to provide the regime with the security guarantees it craves and is getting increasingly agitated about the expanding US military role in its neighbourhood, in particular the deployment of the Thaad anti-ballistic missile defence system in South Korea. No wonder the Chinese foreign minister, Wang Yi, warned last week that the US and North Korea were “like two accelerating trains coming towards each other with neither side willing to give way”.
把球踢給中國一向是個(gè)方便的做法，而且在一定程度上是合理的，因?yàn)榻鹫髡?quán)依賴中國的支持。但中國處于困窘境地，而且它無法憑一己之力降住朝鮮。中國已試圖阻止平壤，但似乎無法控制對方。中國不能為金正恩政權(quán)提供它所渴望的安全保障，而且對于美國擴(kuò)大對中國周邊地區(qū)的軍事滲透，尤其是在韓國部署“薩德”(Thaad)反彈道導(dǎo)彈防御系統(tǒng)，中方越來越焦慮不安。無怪乎中國外長王毅上星期警告說，美國和朝鮮“就像兩組不斷加速的列車，互不相讓”。
Mr Trump may be too busy fighting fictional wars at home to focus on such messy trouble so far away. At some point soon, though, he will no longer have a choice. His predecessor, Barack Obama, warned him as much during the transition. His lieutenants are now reviewing policy on North Korea, and US experts have produced reams of copy about how to deal with the North Korean supreme leader.
特朗普可能忙于在國內(nèi)打一場場虛構(gòu)的戰(zhàn)爭，無暇顧及遠(yuǎn)方這堆亂攤子。但過不了多久，他將別無選擇。他的前任巴拉克•奧巴馬(Barack Obama)在交接時(shí)期曾警告過他。他麾下大將們現(xiàn)在正在審查朝鮮政策，美國專家們也就如何與朝鮮最高領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人打交道炮制出大量篇章。
Some suggest an ugly, but perhaps necessary compromise: to avoid a war, the world must accept Mr Kim, giving him assurances that the US doesn’t seek to topple him. If he is more secure at home, he might miraculously turn into a semi-responsible member of the international community. Others dismiss this as appeasement and call for harsher sanctions against North Korea and China. And still others say go to war and threaten to nuke the north if it retaliates against the south.
一些人提出了一個(gè)丑陋但也許是必要的妥協(xié)：為了避免戰(zhàn)爭，這個(gè)世界必須接受金正恩，向他保證美國不會尋求推翻他。如果他在國內(nèi)感到更安全，他或許會奇跡般地變成國際社會還算負(fù)責(zé)任的成員。其他人則認(rèn)為這是綏靖，并呼吁對朝鮮和中國進(jìn)行更嚴(yán)厲的制裁。還有人說就此開戰(zhàn)，并威脅如果朝鮮敢報(bào)復(fù)韓國，就對朝鮮發(fā)動(dòng)核武攻擊。
Given the high stakes, and the risk that Mr Kim is as unstable as his image suggests, it is clearly time for serious diplomacy, backed up with the threat of even tougher sanctions. Talks may never achieve a complete nuclear disarmament but even a freeze on the nuclear programme in the short term is worth a try. It may be difficult to imagine Mr Kim standing next to Mr Trump at the White House but it is not as wild a thought as the alternatives in this crisis.
考慮到事關(guān)重大，以及金正恩可能確實(shí)像他的圖片所表現(xiàn)的那樣不穩(wěn)定，現(xiàn)在顯然應(yīng)該開始施展嚴(yán)肅外交，并輔以再次威脅實(shí)施更嚴(yán)厲制裁。談判可能永遠(yuǎn)實(shí)現(xiàn)不了完全的核裁軍，但哪怕能在短期內(nèi)凍結(jié)核計(jì)劃，也值得一試。人們或許很難想象金正恩在白宮站在特朗普身旁，但這個(gè)想法并不比解決這場危機(jī)的其他方案更瘋狂。
