FT社評(píng)：“美國(guó)優(yōu)先”的貿(mào)易保護(hù)主義謬論
甚至尚未入主白宮橢圓形辦公室(Oval Office)，唐納德•特朗普(Donald Trump)就已經(jīng)讓美國(guó)企業(yè)開始慌忙地避免激起他反復(fù)無常的暴怒了。本周輪到福特(Ford)了，該公司取消了斥資16億美元在墨西哥建設(shè)新汽車廠的計(jì)劃，取而代之的是在密歇根擴(kuò)大生產(chǎn)。
The announcement, which followed a tweet from Mr Trump on Tuesday threatening Ford’s rival GM with a “big border tax” for manufacturing abroad, may have been good public relations. Yet it is profoundly wrong-headed that the US president-elect, armed with a protectionist mindset, appears to be conducting industrial policy by bullying individual companies on Twitter.
此前，特朗普于周二在Twitter上發(fā)文威脅福特的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)對(duì)手通用汽車(GM)稱，將對(duì)海外生產(chǎn)征收“高額的邊境稅”。福特此次聲明可能有利于公共關(guān)系。不過，擁有保護(hù)主義思維的美國(guó)當(dāng)選總統(tǒng)似乎是在通過在Twitter上欺凌個(gè)別企業(yè)來實(shí)施產(chǎn)業(yè)政策，這種做法大錯(cuò)特錯(cuò)。
If he persists with this kind of intervention, Mr Trump will not help to boost employment in America. Instead, he will instil a fear of political meddling among business leaders, disrupt efficient international supply chains and risk stoking a protectionist and populist backlash among America’s trading partners.
如果特朗普?qǐng)?jiān)持這種干預(yù)，他將無助于促進(jìn)美國(guó)就業(yè)。相反，他將在商業(yè)領(lǐng)袖中灌輸對(duì)政治干預(yù)的恐懼心理，擾亂高效的國(guó)際供應(yīng)鏈，并可能激起美國(guó)貿(mào)易伙伴的保護(hù)主義和民粹主義反彈。
Mr Trump has frequently threatened to impose hefty tariffs on specific companies that move production overseas and sell their products back into the US. Such taxes would be illegal under just about any trade deal imaginable, including World Trade Organisation law and within the North American Free Trade Agreement, but Ford has evidently decided that prudence dictates a change in plans.
特朗普頻繁威脅要向把生產(chǎn)遷往海外、再把產(chǎn)品銷往國(guó)內(nèi)的特定企業(yè)征收高額關(guān)稅。幾乎在任何可以想象的貿(mào)易協(xié)定下——包括在世界貿(mào)易組織(WTO)法規(guī)和《北美自由貿(mào)易協(xié)定》(NAFTA)框架下——此類關(guān)稅都是不合法的，但福特顯然決定，出于審慎最好還是改變計(jì)劃。
Whether Mr Trump’s interventions on trade become more systematic, or stay at this somewhat piecemeal level, remains to be seen. Certainly, he is promising a far-reaching assault on the framework of trade governance as we know it, threatening a renegotiation of Nafta and huge tariffs on imports from China if he perceives its currency to be undervalued. Robert Lighthizer, Mr Trump’s choice for US trade representative, though an accomplished trade attorney and former deputy USTR under Ronald Reagan, is on the protectionist end of the spectrum.
特朗普對(duì)貿(mào)易的干預(yù)是會(huì)變得更加系統(tǒng)化、還是維持在目前這種零敲碎打的水平，仍有待觀察。當(dāng)然，他很可能對(duì)我們所熟知的貿(mào)易治理框架發(fā)起廣泛攻擊，他威脅要對(duì)NAFTA進(jìn)行重新談判，同時(shí)威脅如果他認(rèn)為人民幣被低估，就要對(duì)中國(guó)商品征收高額進(jìn)口關(guān)稅。特朗普選擇的美國(guó)貿(mào)易代表羅伯特•萊特希澤(Robert Lighthizer)是極端的保護(hù)主義者，盡管他是一名資深的貿(mào)易律師并曾在羅納德•里根(Ronald Reagan)政府內(nèi)擔(dān)任美國(guó)副貿(mào)易代表。
But it is also possible that Mr Trump will not follow through such policies to their conclusion. His strategy may simply be to bounce individual businesses into making eye-catching investment decisions that will win the White House a news cycle.
但特朗普也可能不會(huì)從始至終地貫徹這類政策。他的策略或許只是迫使個(gè)別企業(yè)做出引人注目的投資決定，讓白宮占據(jù)新聞報(bào)道的頭條。
That would at least be preferable to starting an all-out global trade war. Yet apart from the gross inefficiency and unfairness of singling out companies and subjecting them to the business strategy equivalent of a shakedown, such a campaign will undoubtedly shroud business decisions across America in uncertainty, spreading fear of sudden subjection to threats and ultimatums from the White House.
這至少好過發(fā)動(dòng)一場(chǎng)全面的全球貿(mào)易戰(zhàn)。不過，暫且不說挑出個(gè)別企業(yè)并如勒索一般迫使其調(diào)整商業(yè)戰(zhàn)略的無效率和不公平，這類行動(dòng)無疑將使整個(gè)美國(guó)的商業(yè)決策籠罩在不確定性的陰云下，使得人們對(duì)突然遭受白宮威脅和最后通牒的恐懼蔓延。
It will also encourage other countries to follow suit. As it happens, Mexico has built up a world-class car export industry, much of which would probably survive a campaign of protectionism from north of the border. But mercantilist meddling from the US will amplify voices of populist economic policies in Mexico and elsewhere.
這也將鼓勵(lì)其他國(guó)家效仿。恰巧，墨西哥已經(jīng)建立起了世界一流的汽車出口行業(yè)，其中的大部分可能會(huì)熬過來自邊境北方的保護(hù)主義運(yùn)動(dòng)。但美國(guó)的重商主義干涉，將在墨西哥及其他地區(qū)擴(kuò)大民粹主義經(jīng)濟(jì)政策的聲音。
Car manufacturers, along with many other industries, have built up complex supply chains snaking across different economies. Forcing a particular part of such a process to take place in one country will make little long-term difference to employment there. Instead, it will decrease efficiency and give that country a reputation as a fickle trading partner, discouraging investment.
和其他很多行業(yè)一樣，汽車制造商已經(jīng)建立起分散在各個(gè)不同經(jīng)濟(jì)體中的復(fù)雜供應(yīng)鏈。強(qiáng)迫將此類供應(yīng)鏈的特定環(huán)節(jié)限制在某個(gè)國(guó)家，不會(huì)對(duì)那里的就業(yè)帶來多少長(zhǎng)期影響。相反，這會(huì)降低效率，并使那個(gè)國(guó)家得到善變的貿(mào)易伙伴的名聲，從而抑制投資。
With Ford’s decision this week, Mr Trump has scored a public relations victory. But his approach is sure, if not actually to provoke trade conflicts, to introduce random and destructive political risk into the US economy. An America First trade policy that blindly follows zero-sum mercantilism will leave all countries worse off.
通過福特本周作出的決定，特朗普實(shí)現(xiàn)了一次公共關(guān)系方面的勝利。但就算不真的引發(fā)貿(mào)易沖突，他的做法也必然會(huì)給美國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)引入隨機(jī)并具有破壞性的政治風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。盲目遵循零和博弈重商主義的“美國(guó)優(yōu)先”(America First)貿(mào)易政策，將對(duì)所有國(guó)家造成損害。
