俄羅斯總統(tǒng)弗拉基米爾•普京(Vladimir Putin)在年末的感受應(yīng)該是俄羅斯度過(guò)了美好的一年,莫斯科股市是2016年表現(xiàn)最佳的股市之一。盡管制裁限制了俄羅斯銀行和石油公司到西方市場(chǎng)融資,以俄羅斯盧布計(jì)俄羅斯股市上漲約27%,以美元計(jì)漲幅更是達(dá)到了47%。
Yet this recovery is linked almost entirely to short-term external factors rather than long-term fundamentals. Oil prices, Russia’s economic lifeblood, are up about 50 per cent from a year ago. Little surprise, then, that equities and the rouble should have strengthened. Investors are also betting on a “Trump trade” — a deal between Mr Putin and the incoming US president that eases sanctions.
然而,這種復(fù)蘇幾乎完全只與短期外部因素有關(guān),無(wú)法歸功于長(zhǎng)期基本面。俄羅斯經(jīng)濟(jì)命脈——石油的價(jià)格相比一年前上漲約50%。因此,俄羅斯股票和盧布上揚(yáng)也不足為奇了。投資者也在押注“特朗普交易”——普京和即將上任的美國(guó)總統(tǒng)可能達(dá)成一項(xiàng)放松對(duì)俄制裁的協(xié)議。
The outlook remains anaemic. Russia is just pulling out of a two-year recession. Output contracted about 0.6 per cent this year. Assuming sanctions remain, international forecasters see economic growth of perhaps 1.2 per cent next year, and 1.5 per cent in 2018 and beyond. That lags behind global growth, the US, and even the EU.
俄羅斯的經(jīng)濟(jì)前景依然黯淡。該國(guó)還在努力擺脫持續(xù)2年的衰退。今年的經(jīng)濟(jì)產(chǎn)出將收縮約0.6%。假定制裁沒(méi)有解除,國(guó)際預(yù)測(cè)者認(rèn)為俄羅斯明年經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)率可能為1.2%,在2018年和以后達(dá)到1.5%左右。這落后于全球、美國(guó),甚至歐盟的預(yù)期經(jīng)濟(jì)增速。
The Russian president has boosted his popularity by seeking to restore his country’s great power status, starting with the 2014 annexation of Crimea. But the cost of sanctions and isolation — on top of weak energy prices — has been high.
俄羅斯總統(tǒng)尋求恢復(fù)俄羅斯大國(guó)地位,2014年吞并克里米亞就是開(kāi)端,這提升了他本人的支持率。但制裁和孤立的代價(jià)——尤其是在能源價(jià)格低迷的情況下——十分高昂。
Though Mr Putin promised healthy growth when he returned as president in 2012, aggregate growth over his six-year third term is set to be about 1 per cent at best — while the global economy has been expanding at well over 3 per cent a year. In a country with a freer press and more competitive politics, voters would surely judge such broken promises harshly.
盡管普京在2012年再次出任總統(tǒng)時(shí)承諾將實(shí)現(xiàn)俄羅斯經(jīng)濟(jì)健康增長(zhǎng),預(yù)計(jì)在他第三個(gè)總統(tǒng)任期的6年里俄羅斯最多只會(huì)增長(zhǎng)約1%,而全球經(jīng)濟(jì)目前保持著每年3%以上的增速。如果是在一個(gè)媒體更自由、政治競(jìng)爭(zhēng)更強(qiáng)的國(guó)家,選民必然會(huì)嚴(yán)厲評(píng)判這種未能兌現(xiàn)承諾的行為。
There are ways to boost growth. Easing sanctions might add a percentage point. A similar amount could come from expanding Mr Putin’s efforts to make Russia’s bureaucracy and state management more efficient and chisel away at endemic corruption.
有一些方法能夠提振俄羅斯的增長(zhǎng)。放松制裁或許會(huì)讓增長(zhǎng)提升1個(gè)百分點(diǎn)。普京改善俄羅斯官僚體系、提高政府管理效率以及鏟除地方腐敗的措施如果能加大力度,或許也能讓增長(zhǎng)再提升1個(gè)百分點(diǎn)。
The fundamental problem, however, is that domestic and foreign investors, uncertain about Russia’s prospects and protection of property rights, are not putting sufficient capital in new capacity or productivity improvements. Investment is running at about 20 per cent of output. Mr Putin pledged in 2012 to lift it to 27 per cent.
然而,根本問(wèn)題是國(guó)內(nèi)外投資者因?yàn)椴淮_定俄羅斯的前景和產(chǎn)權(quán)保護(hù)情況,沒(méi)有大力投資增加新產(chǎn)能或者提高生產(chǎn)率。目前投資占經(jīng)濟(jì)產(chǎn)出比重約為20%。普京在2012年承諾將這一比例提升到27%。
To address the investment problem, Russia needs not just long-delayed structural reforms, but sweeping institutional changes to boost political competition and rule of law, and to establish an independent judiciary.
要解決投資難題,俄羅斯不僅需要實(shí)施拖延已久的結(jié)構(gòu)性改革,還需要進(jìn)行徹底的制度變革,以促進(jìn)政治競(jìng)爭(zhēng)、加強(qiáng)法治,并建設(shè)獨(dú)立的司法體系。
Alexei Kudrin, the liberal former finance minister apparently still trusted by Mr Putin, has been asked to draw up reform plans to be unveiled next year. But there is little optimism that they will ever be implemented. The business community long ago concluded real reform was unlikely as long as this president and his circle remain in place. Reforms robust enough to boost the economy would threaten their hold on power.
顯然仍得普京信任的自由主義前財(cái)政部長(zhǎng)阿列克謝•庫(kù)德林(Alexei Kudrin)受命擬定明年將要公布的改革計(jì)劃。但對(duì)于這些改革最終是否能得到實(shí)施,很少有人保持樂(lè)觀。商界很久之前就得出結(jié)論,只要普京和他的圈子依然當(dāng)政,俄羅斯就不可能實(shí)施真正的改革。足以提振經(jīng)濟(jì)的強(qiáng)勁改革將會(huì)威脅他們對(duì)權(quán)力的掌控。
Will Russians accept years of stagnation? Their phlegmatic response to the belt-tightening demanded of them since 2014 suggests they might. Mr Putin’s propaganda machine is adept at distraction, and Russians see little alternative to their current leader.
俄羅斯人會(huì)接受持續(xù)數(shù)年的停滯嗎?對(duì)2014年以來(lái)被要求勒緊褲腰帶的境遇,俄羅斯人平靜以對(duì),這表明他們或許真的會(huì)接受。普京的宣傳機(jī)器擅長(zhǎng)轉(zhuǎn)移注意力,俄羅斯人也不認(rèn)為有誰(shuí)能替代他們現(xiàn)在的領(lǐng)袖。
The image of market democracy, moreover, was tarnished by the hardships and distortions of Russia’s 1990s post-communist transition. The EU and US have ceased to be seen as positive models.
此外,俄羅斯在上世紀(jì)90年代“后共產(chǎn)主義”轉(zhuǎn)型中經(jīng)歷的困境和扭曲現(xiàn)象損害了市場(chǎng)經(jīng)濟(jì)和民主體制的形象。歐洲和美國(guó)不再被視為正面榜樣。
Other world leaders may have to get used to the idea of Mr Putin being around for a long time yet — even as he slowly allows Russia’s economy to slip ever further behind.
世界其他國(guó)家的領(lǐng)袖或許必須習(xí)慣,普京還將在很長(zhǎng)一段時(shí)間里屹立政壇——即使他正慢慢讓俄羅斯經(jīng)濟(jì)進(jìn)一步落后。