中國(guó)將引領(lǐng)全球化？

Donald Trump was elected US president on a platform of anti-globalism and, in particular, on a promise to change or withdraw from America’s existing trade agreements and kill the ones in the pipeline.

唐納德•特朗普(Donald Trump)以反對(duì)全球化、特別是承諾改變或是退出美國(guó)現(xiàn)有貿(mào)易協(xié)定、并且扼殺籌備中貿(mào)易協(xié)定的競(jìng)選綱領(lǐng)，當(dāng)選了美國(guó)總統(tǒng)。

The Trans-Pacific Partnership was already in trouble before the election; Trump’s victory seems to have given it the coup de grâce. The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, meanwhile, now looks set to be stillborn.

在大選開(kāi)始前，《跨太平洋伙伴關(guān)系協(xié)定》(TPP)已然處于困境之中;特朗普的獲勝似乎給了它致命一擊。與此同時(shí)，《跨大西洋貿(mào)易與投資伙伴關(guān)系協(xié)定》(TTIP)如今似乎也將胎死腹中。

That is, as far as US participation goes. What the American turn inwards means for the rest of the world is an open question. There are those who think the loss of US leadership on international economic integration will embolden protectionism elsewhere — especially as it comes on the heels of the protectionist vandalism that is Brexit — and sap the will of those who want to keep their economies open or even open them further. They will point to Europe, whose free-trade deal with Canada was passed by a whisker last month, and that only conditionally.

準(zhǔn)確的說(shuō)，是如果只考慮美國(guó)的參與程度的話(huà)。美國(guó)人把重心轉(zhuǎn)向國(guó)內(nèi)對(duì)世界其他地區(qū)意味著什么，目前不得而知。有人認(rèn)為，缺少美國(guó)對(duì)國(guó)際經(jīng)濟(jì)一體化的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)，將助長(zhǎng)各地保護(hù)主義——特別是在英國(guó)退歐造成保護(hù)主義破壞性影響之后——并削弱那些希望保持經(jīng)濟(jì)開(kāi)放、甚至進(jìn)一步開(kāi)放經(jīng)濟(jì)的人的意愿。他們將以歐洲為例——歐洲與加拿大的自由貿(mào)易協(xié)定上個(gè)月勉強(qiáng)通過(guò)，而且是帶有條件的。

But there is another possibility, which is that victory of anti-globalism in the US and the UK galvanises others to fight harder for the continued lowering of national barriers.

但是，還有另一種可能，美國(guó)和英國(guó)反全球化的勝利，會(huì)刺激其他人更加努力地繼續(xù)降低國(guó)家貿(mào)易壁壘。

Cue John Key, the prime minister of New Zealand. At the Apec (Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation) summit in Lima last week, he defiantly vowed to push ahead with trade integration in the Pacific. He suggested tweaking the deal to make it more attractive to the Trump administration — including, jokingly, by naming it the Trump-Pacific Partnership — but, more importantly, made clear that the other TPP partners should seriously consider going ahead with the deal even without US participation. Peru’s president, too, warned against protectionism and against giving up on the TPP.

比如新西蘭總理約翰•基(John Key)。在上周于利馬召開(kāi)的亞太經(jīng)合組織(APEC)峰會(huì)上，他公開(kāi)發(fā)誓要推進(jìn)太平洋地區(qū)的貿(mào)易一體化。他建議，調(diào)整協(xié)定內(nèi)容以增加對(duì)特朗普政府的吸引力——包括，開(kāi)玩笑地，把該協(xié)定命名為《特朗普太平洋伙伴關(guān)系協(xié)定》(Trump-Pacific Partnership)——但更重要的是，他明確表示TPP其他伙伴國(guó)應(yīng)該認(rèn)真考慮，在沒(méi)有美國(guó)參與的情況下繼續(xù)推進(jìn)該協(xié)定。秘魯總統(tǒng)也告誡不要實(shí)行保護(hù)主義和放棄TPP。

Meanwhile, Beijing has responded nimbly to Trump’s election by encouraging America’s likely-to-be-spurned TPP partners to join it in building a free-trade area including China instead. The world’s second-largest economy is already involved in several regional trade initiatives that are beginning to be touted as alternatives to TPP. Australia is showing interest in the move, which would sideline the US.

與此同時(shí)，北京方面對(duì)特朗普當(dāng)選美國(guó)總統(tǒng)作出機(jī)敏的反應(yīng)——鼓勵(lì)有可能被特朗普一腳踢開(kāi)的TPP伙伴國(guó)跟中國(guó)一道建立一個(gè)包括中國(guó)在內(nèi)的自貿(mào)區(qū)。這個(gè)世界第二大經(jīng)濟(jì)體已經(jīng)加入了多個(gè)區(qū)域貿(mào)易計(jì)劃，這些計(jì)劃正開(kāi)始被吹捧為T(mén)PP的替代品。澳大利亞對(duì)這一將美國(guó)剔除在外的舉動(dòng)表示出了興趣。

It is a strange world when China becomes the champion of global economic openness. But it is an entirely logical one, if the US does indeed decide to abdicate leadership. As the FT’s Shawn Donnan puts it, when outgoing President Barack Obama met his counterparts at the Apec summit, he may have felt “he is handing the Chinese leader the keys to the global economy”. He quotes the Peterson Institute’s Adam Posen as pointing out that: “You can’t beat something with nothing, and the Chinese are offering something.”

中國(guó)成為全球經(jīng)濟(jì)開(kāi)放的領(lǐng)頭羊，這著實(shí)是個(gè)奇怪的世界。但如果美國(guó)確實(shí)決定放棄領(lǐng)導(dǎo)權(quán)，這個(gè)世界完全符合邏輯。正如英國(guó)《金融時(shí)報(bào)》的肖恩•唐南(Shawn Donnan)指出的那樣，在即將離任的美國(guó)總統(tǒng)巴拉克•奧巴馬(Barack Obama)在APEC峰會(huì)上與其他領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人會(huì)面時(shí)，他可能覺(jué)得“他正在把全球經(jīng)濟(jì)的鑰匙交給中國(guó)領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人”。他援引彼得森國(guó)際經(jīng)濟(jì)研究所(Peterson Institute for International Economics)的亞當(dāng)•波森(Adam Posen)的話(huà)指出：“你不能兩手空空地打敗對(duì)方，而中國(guó)人在拿出一點(diǎn)東西。”

To anyone who cares to notice, this brings home the continued importance of global integration but also who, in particular, leads the integration effort. The “something” that China offers is much less ambitious than the TPP — in particular, it will not include that deal’s seminal provisions on labour and environmental standards. Moreover, trade integration led by Beijing instead of the US will mean trade integration on terms more suitable to China. That must surely be inferior — for the US and its allies — to the US-led terms and standards for Asia-Pacific economic integration to which China would eventually have to adapt, which was the big strategic prize of the TPP.

對(duì)于所有對(duì)此留心的人來(lái)說(shuō)，這不僅清楚說(shuō)明了全球一體化的持續(xù)重要性，還特別說(shuō)明了誰(shuí)在領(lǐng)導(dǎo)一體化努力。中國(guó)拿出的“那點(diǎn)東西”遠(yuǎn)沒(méi)有TPP那么有野心——特別是它不會(huì)包括TPP在勞動(dòng)力和環(huán)境標(biāo)準(zhǔn)方面具有重大影響的條款。此外，由中國(guó)代替美國(guó)領(lǐng)導(dǎo)的貿(mào)易一體化將意味著，這種貿(mào)易一體化的條款將更適合中國(guó)。對(duì)于美國(guó)及其盟友來(lái)說(shuō)，這必然不如由美國(guó)領(lǐng)導(dǎo)的亞太經(jīng)濟(jì)一體化的條款和標(biāo)準(zhǔn)(中國(guó)原本最終不得不適應(yīng)這些條款和標(biāo)準(zhǔn)，這本是TPP的一項(xiàng)重大戰(zhàn)略獎(jiǎng)品)。

That makes Pacific trade one aspect of the bigger picture of America’s interest in the rules-based global order that it has built and maintained since the second world war — which has served it and its allies better than the alternatives of international anarchy or an order designed by its big power rivals. “America first”, in global politics, could quickly reveal itself as “America last”. And, as Leonard Cohen, the late poet of an imperfect world, said in an interview a few years ago: you will not like what comes after America.

這使得太平洋貿(mào)易成了美國(guó)在基于規(guī)則的全球秩序中的整體利益的一個(gè)方面(這個(gè)全球秩序由美國(guó)自二戰(zhàn)后逐漸建立并維持，相比國(guó)際無(wú)政府狀態(tài)或由美國(guó)的強(qiáng)大對(duì)手設(shè)計(jì)的秩序等其他選擇而言，該秩序更有利于美國(guó)及其盟友)。在全球政治中，“美國(guó)領(lǐng)頭”可能會(huì)很快變成“美國(guó)最后”。同時(shí)，正如抒寫(xiě)不完美世界的已故詩(shī)人萊昂納德•科恩(Leonard Cohen)在多年前接受采訪時(shí)說(shuō)的：你不會(huì)喜歡失去美國(guó)后的樣子。

America’s choice is ultimately the most consequential. But the more immediate battles between openness and withdrawal from the global economy are taking place in Europe. Partly, of course, in the process of Brexit, where the fight is on over how much to raise trade barriers between the UK and its biggest trading partner. But also because the EU itself is actually contributing to the cause of trade openness through two substantial deals.

最終而言美國(guó)的選擇是影響最重大的。但開(kāi)放與從全球經(jīng)濟(jì)中退出之間更直接的斗爭(zhēng)正在歐洲上演。當(dāng)然，斗爭(zhēng)部分是因?yàn)橛?guó)退歐進(jìn)程，斗爭(zhēng)的焦點(diǎn)是，在英國(guó)與其最大的貿(mào)易伙伴之間應(yīng)該豎起多高的貿(mào)易壁壘。但斗爭(zhēng)也是因?yàn)闅W盟本身通過(guò)兩個(gè)重要協(xié)議推動(dòng)貿(mào)易開(kāi)放。

One is Ceta, the fraught EU-Canada trade and investment agreement that is finally passed, at least conditionally, after a Walloon hold-up. That was widely seen as an embarrassment for Europe. But we should be clear about what the final result involved: that a big trade liberalisation package was exposed to real and messy democratic scrutiny — and that it survived the exposure. In these times, where democracy is seen as antagonistic to economic openness, that is something to celebrate.

一個(gè)是命運(yùn)多舛的《綜合經(jīng)濟(jì)與貿(mào)易協(xié)定》(CETA)。該協(xié)定是歐盟與加拿大之間的貿(mào)易和投資協(xié)定，曾因比利時(shí)瓦隆地方議會(huì)的反對(duì)而擱淺，最終得以通過(guò)(至少是有條件通過(guò))。瓦隆插曲被廣泛視為歐洲的尷尬。但是我們應(yīng)該明白最終結(jié)果的含義：一項(xiàng)重大貿(mào)易自由化方案受到真正而且復(fù)雜的民主審視，并且經(jīng)受住了這種審視。在當(dāng)前這個(gè)民主被視為與經(jīng)濟(jì)開(kāi)放對(duì)立的時(shí)代，這一點(diǎn)值得慶賀。

The other, much less talked about, effort is the EU-Japan free-trade deal. Mysteriously absent from the headlines, negotiations have been taking place for three and a half years and are nearing completion. Some think that, in pure economic terms, the prospective gains are bigger than could be had from TTIP. The two sides have still to agree on phasing out protection of Europe’s car market against lower barriers in food and agriculture in Japan.

另一項(xiàng)很少被談及的努力是歐盟與日本之間的自由貿(mào)易協(xié)定。有關(guān)該協(xié)定的談判已經(jīng)進(jìn)行了三年半，目前已接近尾聲，但卻令人費(fèi)解地從未登上過(guò)頭條。一些人認(rèn)為，單純以經(jīng)濟(jì)條件來(lái)看，該協(xié)定的未來(lái)好處超過(guò)TTIP。雙方仍然需要就逐步解除歐洲汽車(chē)市場(chǎng)保護(hù)以及削減日本食品與農(nóng)業(yè)方面的壁壘達(dá)成一致。

Brexit focused minds; Trump’s victory must have focused them further. It is in Japan’s and the EU’s narrow self-interest to conclude the deal. But it is also in the broader defence of their values, and the liberal global order, that they do so with confidence and without further delay.

英國(guó)退歐引起人們高度關(guān)注;特朗普獲勝更是如此。達(dá)成該協(xié)議符合日本和歐盟的自身利益。但他們滿(mǎn)懷信心、不再遲疑地敲定該協(xié)議，也是對(duì)其價(jià)值觀以及全球自由秩序的維護(hù)。