對唐納德•特朗普(Donald Trump)來說,在就職后與俄羅斯總統(tǒng)弗拉基米爾•普京(Vladimir Putin)達成某種協(xié)議的吸引力又多又明顯。俄羅斯對美國全球主導地位的挑戰(zhàn)是美國外交政策議程上最尖銳的議題。
Defusing tension with a nuclear-armed rival is a laudable goal. Politically, striking a deal would go a long way towards turning Mr Trump from a tycoon, entertainer and political outsider into a statesman.
化解與一個擁有核武器的對手的緊張關系是一個值得稱贊的目標。從政治上說,與克里姆林宮達成協(xié)議將大大有助于特朗普從一個大亨、明星和政治局外人轉變成一位政治家。
The world must hope that Mr Trump also sees the huge risks inherit in any grand bargain with Russia.
全世界一定希望特朗普還能看到與俄羅斯達成的任何大妥協(xié)必然伴隨的巨大風險。
Mr Putin wants to tear down the current US-backed political order in Europe and indeed worldwide, which he sees as unfair and inimical to Russia’s interests. A softening of the international constraints that restrict his ambitions might deliver a temporary thaw in US-Russian relations. But it could also undermine long-term US and western interests and undercut security and stability elsewhere.
普京想要攪亂歐洲(更確切地說是全世界范圍內)當下由美國支撐的政治秩序,他認為這一秩序不公平,且有損俄羅斯的利益。軟化限制其野心的國際制約,可能暫時讓美俄關系解凍。但這也將損害美國和西方的長遠利益,并危及其他地區(qū)的安全與穩(wěn)定。
Multilateral co-operation, in Mr Putin’s vision, would be replaced by a world carved up into the great powers’ spheres of influence. In such a world Moscow would have a free hand in much of the former Soviet space. Mr Trump, for his part, must reject any attempt to reproduce the 1945 Yalta conference in the modern day. To do so would seem to reward Russia’s annexation of Crimea and invasion of eastern Ukraine. That could set a dangerous precedent, emboldening powerful nations elsewhere. It would undermine, too, the principle established since the fall of the Berlin Wall, and enshrined in the 1990 Paris Charter, that European countries are free to choose their policies and alliances.
按照普京的愿景,多邊合作將被一個由大國勢力范圍劃分的世界取代。在這樣一個世界,莫斯科可以在前蘇聯(lián)空間的很多地方為所欲為。從特朗普來說,他必須抵制任何再現(xiàn)1945年雅爾塔會議的企圖。因為那將被看作對俄羅斯吞并克里米亞和入侵烏克蘭東部的獎勵,進而開創(chuàng)一個危險的先例,給其他地區(qū)的強國壯膽。這還將破壞自柏林墻倒塌以來確立的、載入1990年《巴黎憲章》(Paris Charter)的原則:歐洲國家可以自由選擇各自的政策和聯(lián)盟。
Ukraine, in particular, must not be sold out. This could prompt the collapse of its pro-western government. Other nations in the Russian sphere might similarly refuse to submit. In dealings with Mr Putin, therefore, the incoming US president should follow several principles.
尤其是,絕對不能出賣烏克蘭。那樣做可能導致該國的親西方政府垮臺。處于俄羅斯勢力范圍之內的其他國家或許同樣會拒絕對其屈服。因此,在與普京打交道時,即將上任的美國總統(tǒng)應當堅持幾項原則。
First, his administration should make its commitment to Nato, a pillar of European and global security since its 1949 foundation, absolute and unequivocal. The alliance should accelerate its existing efforts to ensure all member states meet minimum defence spending targets. But the US commitment to defend even the newest and smallest Nato members must remain unconditional.
首先,特朗普政府應該對北約(NATO)作出無條件且毫不含糊的承諾;該組織自1949年成立以來一直是歐洲乃至全球安全的支柱。北約應加快現(xiàn)有努力,確保所有成員國達到最低國防支出目標。但即使對那些最新加入、面積最小的北約成員國,美國也必須承諾無條件為它們提供防衛(wèi)。
Second, Mr Trump should not, as he hinted during his campaign, drop sanctions on Russia — undermining solidarity with Europe and Japan — without progress on the issues over which they were imposed. He should not recognise Russia’s claim to Crimea, whose occupation was a blatant breach of international law.
第二,在導致對俄羅斯制裁的問題未取得進展的情況下,特朗普不應像他在競選期間暗示的那樣,取消這些制裁,否則將破壞美國與歐洲和日本的團結。他不應承認俄羅斯對克里米亞的主權主張,俄羅斯占領克里米亞是悍然違反國際法的行為。
Just as when the west refused to recognise the Soviet occupation of the Baltic states, respecting these bright lines does not rule out pursuing a new form of detente in other areas. Mr Trump should not immediately put all issues on the table, but seek to make gradual progress on specific topics, helped by confidence-building measures. Syria is one area where renewed US-Russian co-operation is a prerequisite to end the conflict, although the resumption of raids on Aleppo demonstrate Russian intractability.
就像當年西方拒絕承認蘇聯(lián)侵占波羅的海諸國那樣,尊重這些“明線”并不排除在其他領域尋求一種新形式的緩和。特朗普不應把所有問題都直接擺上桌面,而應在一些建立信任的措施的幫助下,尋求在具體問題上循序漸進。在敘利亞,美俄重啟合作是結束沖突的先決條件——盡管對阿勒頗恢復空襲展示出俄羅斯的不講道理。
In dealing with Moscow, Mr Trump should place just as much importance on the rights and interests of Russia’s neighbours as he does on those of Russia. With tension at its highest level since the 1980s, the prize of improved relations with Russia is significant. It cannot be achieved by caving in to Moscow’s terms, however. Whatever the risks today, a bad deal with Mr Putin would be worse than none at all.
在與莫斯科打交道時,特朗普應該像重視俄羅斯的權利和利益那樣,重視俄鄰國的權利和利益。在美俄關系處于自上世紀80年代以來最緊張時刻之際,改善與俄羅斯關系的好處是顯著的。但這不能通過屈從于莫斯科開出的條件來實現(xiàn)。無論當今的風險有多大,與普京達成糟糕的協(xié)議還不如根本沒有協(xié)議。