彷徨中的俄羅斯反對(duì)派
2015年2月24日，星期二。莫斯科市中心克拉斯諾普列斯年斯卡婭地鐵站外，人行道兩邊仍堆著骯臟的厚厚積雪。凍實(shí)的雪堆提醒著人們這是個(gè)漫長的冬天。積雪旁站著四名年輕男女，他們手里拿著亮綠色的氣球。其中一人邊向路人派發(fā)傳單，邊說道：“春天來了!”
The four, along with similar groups of activists elsewhere, are trying to mobilise theircompatriots to come out in Moscow, and a handful of other Russian cities, on Sunday toprotest against President Vladimir Putin in what they are calling an “anti-crisis march”.
這四名年輕人，連同俄羅斯各地類似的活動(dòng)人士群體，正努力動(dòng)員他們的同胞本周日現(xiàn)身莫斯科及俄羅斯其他幾個(gè)城市，參加抗議總統(tǒng)弗拉基米爾•普京(Vladimir Putin)的游行，他們稱之為“反危機(jī)游行”。
“After years of siphoning off the oil revenues, the current regime has led the country to astandstill and into complete bankruptcy,” the leaflets say. “Putin and his government cannot liftthe country out of crisis and must leave.”
傳單上寫道：“當(dāng)前政權(quán)經(jīng)過多年對(duì)石油收入的榨取，已將這個(gè)國家?guī)胪?，走向徹底破產(chǎn)。普京和他的政府不能帶領(lǐng)這個(gè)國家走出危機(jī)，他們必須下臺(tái)。”
A few passersby took the leaflets; most ignored them. Three years after 100,000 took part inopposition rallies across Russia, the movement is splintered: some leaders are jailed, othersare in exile while several have switched sides.
有幾個(gè)路人接過傳單，但大多數(shù)人無視他們的存在。三年前，俄羅斯全國有10萬人參加了各地的反對(duì)集會(huì)，而今這場運(yùn)動(dòng)已支離破碎，領(lǐng)導(dǎo)者中有的被監(jiān)禁，有的已倒戈，有的流亡在外。
With the economy heading into recession, conventional wisdom would suggest that Mr Putin— whose support ratings were catapulted to over 80 per cent by his annexation of Crimea ayear ago and have stayed at record highs ever since — might face political trouble.
一年前普京吞并克里米亞時(shí)，他的支持率一舉超越80%，且此后一直停留在歷史高位。但隨著俄羅斯經(jīng)濟(jì)步入衰退，人們普遍認(rèn)為普京可能會(huì)面臨政治困境。
That was the thinking behind the sanctions with which the west has been trying to punish theRussian leader for his Crimea grab. The theory goes that if the oligarchs, whom Mr Putin haskept loyal, were threatened with financial losses, they would start leaning on him to changecourse. Equally if the public started feeling economic pain, it would also turn against thepresident.
這正是西方制裁俄羅斯背后的邏輯。西方一直試圖借制裁來懲罰這位俄羅斯領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人霸占克里米亞的行為。理論上，如果俄羅斯那些對(duì)普京保持忠誠的寡頭們面臨經(jīng)濟(jì)損失的威脅，他們就會(huì)開始逼迫普京改變道路。同樣，如果俄羅斯人民開始感到經(jīng)濟(jì)陣痛，也會(huì)掉頭反對(duì)總統(tǒng)。
But the Russian leader has overturned such assumptions. A constant drumbeat ofpropaganda has portrayed the crisis as a fight for Russia’s survival — and the vast majorityof the population has rallied around Mr Putin.
但這位俄羅斯領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人推翻了上述假設(shè)。連續(xù)不斷的宣傳攻勢將這場危機(jī)描繪成一場俄羅斯的生存之戰(zhàn)，讓絕大多數(shù)俄羅斯人團(tuán)結(jié)到了普京身邊。
The economic pain has very clearly set in, although only partly as a result of the sanctions. Moresignificant has been the plummeting price of oil, which together with gas accounts for three-quarters of Russia’s exports and more than half of its budget revenues.
經(jīng)濟(jì)陣痛已經(jīng)很明顯地出現(xiàn)了，不過僅有部分是制裁造成的。更直接的原因還是油價(jià)暴跌，石油與天然氣在俄羅斯出口額里占四分之三，在其財(cái)政預(yù)算收入中占比超過一半。
Following the collapse of the rouble by more than 40 per cent against the dollar over the pastyear, consumer prices are soaring, a problem made worse by the government’s decision inAugust to ban a wide range of food products from Polish apples to French cheese in retaliationagainst western sanctions.
過去一年盧布對(duì)美元暴跌40%以上，盧布崩盤后消費(fèi)價(jià)格飛漲，政府的一項(xiàng)決策更是火上澆油——去年8月，俄羅斯政府為報(bào)復(fù)西方制裁，禁止進(jìn)口多種食品，從波蘭的蘋果到法國的奶酪全都包含在內(nèi)。
Economic shocks
經(jīng)濟(jì)沖擊
The authorities are forcing everyone to tighten their belts, freezing public sector salaries andlaying off doctors and nurses, while private companies are cutting production and workers.
俄羅斯當(dāng)局正迫使每個(gè)人勒緊褲腰帶。公共部門人員薪水凍結(jié)，醫(yī)生和護(hù)士被辭退，私營企業(yè)則在削減產(chǎn)量和裁員。
The government has said inflation might peak around 15 per cent this summer, and theeconomy is likely to contract by about 5 per cent. “It’s the biggest crisis since the collapse ofthe Soviet Union,” says Vladimir Milov, a former deputy energy minister.
俄羅斯政府表示，通脹可能在今年夏天見頂，峰值在15%左右，國內(nèi)經(jīng)濟(jì)很可能收縮約5%。俄羅斯前能源部副部長弗拉基米爾·米洛夫(Vladimir Milov)說：“這是自蘇聯(lián)解體以來最大的危機(jī)。”
Opposition activists hope to tap into the anger they believe economic hardship will eventuallytrigger.
反對(duì)派活動(dòng)人士相信經(jīng)濟(jì)困難最終將引發(fā)人民的憤怒，他們希望能利用這股情緒。
Boris Nemtsov, a veteran liberal opposition politician who briefly served as deputy primeminister under Boris Yeltsin in the 1990s, says stagnant wages and soaring inflation toppedthe agenda when he met with residents of Yaroslavl, a town northeast of Moscow, last week. “They believed that the embargo on imported foods is America’s fault, and they weresurprised when I told them no, that was not Obama, it was Putin,” he says. “This is what weneed to make people aware of: the crisis, that’s Putin.”
資深的自由主義反對(duì)派政治人士、曾在20世紀(jì)90年代鮑里斯•葉利欽(Boris Yeltsin)執(zhí)政時(shí)期短暫地?fù)?dān)任過副總理的鮑里斯•涅姆佐夫(Boris Nemtsov)表示，他在上周會(huì)見了莫斯科東北雅羅斯拉夫爾鎮(zhèn)的居民，那里人們最關(guān)注的問題是工資停滯和通脹飆升。他說：“他們認(rèn)為進(jìn)口食品禁運(yùn)是美國的錯(cuò)，當(dāng)我告訴他們這不是奧巴馬的錯(cuò)，而是普京的錯(cuò)時(shí)，他們很驚訝。這就是我們需要讓人民意識(shí)到的，這場危機(jī)的根源是普京。”
But nobody is under any illusions that grumbling over Russia’s economic woes will bring aboutswift political change.
但沒人幻想俄羅斯經(jīng)濟(jì)困境引發(fā)的抱怨會(huì)帶來迅速的政治變革。
“It hasn’t got to the point yet where economic hardship can have an impact on mass opinion,”says Dmitry Gudkov, an opposition member of parliament.
反對(duì)派國會(huì)議員德米特里•古德科夫(Dmitry Gudkov)說：“經(jīng)濟(jì)還沒有困難到會(huì)影響大眾輿論的地步。”
According to the independent Centre for Social and Labour Rights in Moscow, the number ofprotests over lay-offs and wages has risen sharply in the past year. But observers believe thesewill remain limited to towns overly dependent on single employers, and this local isolation willallow the government to deal with it. Economists in Moscow believe that only a further slide inthe oil price below $50 and continued sanctions could plunge Russia into a catastrophicfinancial crisis next year which would significantly alter the situation.
根據(jù)莫斯科獨(dú)立機(jī)構(gòu)“社會(huì)和勞動(dòng)權(quán)益中心”(Centre for Social and Labour Rights)的資料，過去一年反對(duì)裁員減薪的抗議活動(dòng)急速增加。但觀察人士認(rèn)為，這些抗議將僅限于那些過度依賴單一雇主的城鎮(zhèn)，由于它們?cè)谖恢蒙隙驾^為孤立，政府有能力解決它們。莫斯科的經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家們認(rèn)為，只有當(dāng)油價(jià)在50美元下方進(jìn)一步下滑，同時(shí)制裁持續(xù)，俄羅斯才有可能在明年陷入災(zāi)難性的金融危機(jī)，而這會(huì)造成局面重大改變。
Sunday’s rally is not seen as a test for how Mr Putin’s opponents can exploit the economiccrisis, but rather a tiny first step for an opposition reduced to a shadow of its former self. In2011 and 2012, members of the Moscow middle class mounted a real challenge to Mr Putinwhen they rallied around Alexei Navalny, the lawyer and anti-corruption blogger.
沒有人認(rèn)為周日的集會(huì)能考驗(yàn)普京的反對(duì)者利用這場經(jīng)濟(jì)危機(jī)的能力，而是將之視與之前相比力量已十分微弱的反對(duì)派邁出的微小第一步。在2011年和2012年，莫斯科的中產(chǎn)階層曾集結(jié)在律師、反腐敗博主阿列克謝•納瓦爾尼(Alexei Navalny)身邊，對(duì)普京發(fā)起了真正的挑戰(zhàn)。
But the movement has since fallen apart. “It is a problem that many activists are abroad, inprison or under house arrest. It weakens the movement,” says Pavel Elizarov, an oppositionleader who sought political asylum in Lisbon after the government crushed the 2012 protests. “But for sure it’s better to live abroad than to be in prison.”
但這場運(yùn)動(dòng)后來分崩離析。反對(duì)派領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人帕維爾•葉利扎羅夫(Pavel Elizarov)說：“許多活動(dòng)人士要么身處國外，要么被囚禁或軟禁，這是個(gè)問題。這削弱了抗議運(yùn)動(dòng)。不過住在國外肯定要比進(jìn)監(jiān)獄強(qiáng)。”2012年的抗議活動(dòng)遭到政府鎮(zhèn)壓后，葉利扎羅夫在里斯本尋求政治庇護(hù)。
Those left behind are trying to rebuild. “Three years ago, we were an opposition. Now we areno more than dissidents,” says Mr Nemtsov. “The task is to organise a real opposition again.”
留下的人正試圖恢復(fù)抗議活動(dòng)。涅姆佐夫說：“三年前我們是反對(duì)派，現(xiàn)在我們只不過是異見分子。當(dāng)前任務(wù)是再次組織起一支真正的反對(duì)派。”
Group therapy
團(tuán)體治療
Organisers say a turnout of 20,000 on Sunday — less than one-fifth of the crowds at the peakof the 2011 protests — would be a “very decent success”.
組織者們表示，周日集會(huì)的出席者如能達(dá)到2萬人，將是一次“非常像樣的成功”。這一人數(shù)還不足2011年抗議活動(dòng)高峰期人數(shù)的五分之一。
Nina Zavrieva, a 28-year-old tech entrepreneur, says she will attend, if only to reassureherself that there are still like-minded people in Moscow. “In a way it’s like group therapy,” shesays.
28歲的高科技創(chuàng)業(yè)者尼娜•扎夫里耶娃(Nina Zavrieva)表示，她會(huì)參加這場集會(huì)，哪怕只是為了安慰自己莫斯科還有與自己志同道合的人。她說：“某種意義上，這像一場團(tuán)體治療。”
The opposition is trying to create a platform for a long-term movement.
反對(duì)派正努力為一場長期運(yùn)動(dòng)創(chuàng)造一個(gè)平臺(tái)。
“The regime has generated a lot of fear. The usual pictures from protests in Russia have beendark ones, with police officers dressed like astronauts and beating people,” says Leonid Volkov,one of the rally organisers and a member of Mr Navalny’s Progress party. “We have to returnpeaceful rallies to politics as a regular tool.”
納瓦爾尼領(lǐng)導(dǎo)的進(jìn)步黨(Progress party)黨員、集會(huì)組織者之一列昂尼德•沃爾科夫(Leonid Volkov)說：“這個(gè)政權(quán)已經(jīng)造成了大量恐懼。從有關(guān)抗議的尋常照片就可看出，俄羅斯的抗議活動(dòng)場面黑暗，警察們穿得像宇航員一樣毆打群眾。我們必須回歸和平的政治集會(huì)，將此作為常規(guī)工具。”
The odds are stacked against them. Mr Navalny himself was jailed for 15 days last week forhanding out leaflets advertising Sunday’s protest. He will not be released until March 4, robbingthe rally of its main draw.
重重困難擺在他們面前。納瓦爾尼本人在上周因派發(fā)傳單宣傳周日這場抗議集會(huì)，被判監(jiān)禁15日，直到3月4日才能釋放，令這場集會(huì)喪失了主心骨。
Last month, police raided both the offices of Mr Navalny’s Anti-Corruption Foundation and thehomes of leading staff. “I think they are going to launch some criminal case against us,accusing us of having misused the donations because we paid our staff a salary,” says RomanRubanov, one of Mr Navalny’s key associates at the foundation.
上個(gè)月，警方搜查了納瓦爾尼的反腐基金會(huì)(Anti-Corruption Foundation)辦公室，以及主要職員的家。納瓦爾尼在基金會(huì)里的重要伙伴羅曼•魯巴諾夫(Roman Rubanov)說：“我想他們會(huì)對(duì)我們發(fā)起一些刑事訴訟，指控我們?yōu)E用捐款，因?yàn)槲覀兿騿T工支付薪水。”
Even if the opposition can get back on its feet, it is faced with a huge challenge: to broadenits appeal beyond the Moscow middle class and find allies.
即使反對(duì)派能重新站起來，還要面臨一個(gè)巨大挑戰(zhàn)：他們要將自己的影響力擴(kuò)大到莫斯科中產(chǎn)階層以外，同時(shí)還要尋找盟友。
“The opposition movement has to understand why 85 per cent [of the people] are still infavour of the ruling party,” says Ms Zavrieva. “Once they understand the problems of themasses, and manage to work with a greater group of people — not just the 5-10 per cent —then something big is going to happen. At this point the opposition is a little bit in a world ofits own.”
扎夫里耶娃說：“反對(duì)派運(yùn)動(dòng)必須明白，為什么85%(的人民)仍支持執(zhí)政黨。一旦他們明白了群眾的問題所在，并設(shè)法與更廣大的人群合作，而不是僅僅5%到10%的人，就將會(huì)有大事發(fā)生。在這一方面，反對(duì)派有點(diǎn)活在自己的世界里。”
Mr Gudkov exemplifies this disconnect. He half dismisses the need to engage the widerpopulation. “If, roughly speaking, 60 per cent of the population supports Putin, only 5 percent are active supporters. The other 55 per cent are zombified TV watchers who will neverdecide any sort of politics,” he argues. “You show them a different picture [on the TV]tomorrow, and they’ll think differently.”
古德科夫充分體現(xiàn)了這種脫節(jié)。他部分否定了爭取更廣泛群眾的必要。他稱：“粗略地講，如果有60%的人支持普京，那么只有5%的人是積極的支持者，其他55%的人都是‘僵尸’電視觀眾，他們永遠(yuǎn)不會(huì)決定任何政治問題。你明天(在電視上)向他們展示不同的畫面，他們就會(huì)產(chǎn)生不同的想法。”
Making new allies
結(jié)交新盟友
Not everyone is as cynical. Mr Navalny’s campaigners realise that while his focus on socialmedia allowed him to build support despite being barred from state television, it also preventedhim from reaching Russians over a certain age and outside the capital who do not use thosemedia. To address that, Mr Rubanov and his colleagues are working on what they call Russia’sfirst political tabloid, an eight-page, monthly pamphlet to publish the dirt Mr Navalny’s anti-corruption campaign digs up about the men and women who run the country.
不是每個(gè)人都這么憤世嫉俗。納瓦爾尼陣營的活動(dòng)家們認(rèn)識(shí)到，盡管在國家電視臺(tái)的封殺下，納瓦爾尼依然靠專攻社交媒體獲得了支持，然而這也阻止了他影響特定年齡層次以外、以及首都外面那些不使用社交媒體的俄羅斯人。為解決這一問題，魯巴諾夫和他的同事們正忙于出版他們所稱的俄羅斯第一份政治小報(bào)。這是一份8個(gè)版面的月刊，上面將刊載納瓦爾尼的反腐運(yùn)動(dòng)挖出來的、關(guān)于執(zhí)掌這個(gè)國家的男人和女人們的丑聞。
Mr Navalny has also started to co-operate with Mikhail Khodorkovsky, the former oligarch whomoved to Switzerland when Mr Putin released him from prison in late 2013 after 10 years behindbars, and who has since proposed himself as an alternative president.
納瓦爾尼還開始與前寡頭米哈伊爾•霍多爾科夫斯基(Mikhail Khodorkovsky)合作。2013年底，普京釋放了身陷囹圄10年的霍多爾科夫斯基。獲釋后他搬到瑞士，而且自此開始表示欲競選總統(tǒng)。
The opposition will eventually face the question of how a change of power can be broughtabout. Opposition politicians reject the possibility of a revolution, but some opponents of MrPutin hope for a palace coup, while others ponder about how the president could bepersuaded to step down.
反對(duì)派最終將面臨一個(gè)問題：權(quán)力的更迭該怎樣實(shí)現(xiàn)。反對(duì)派政治人士拒絕革命的可能性，但普京的一些反對(duì)者期待發(fā)生宮廷政變，還有人在思考如何說服總統(tǒng)主動(dòng)下臺(tái)。
Mr Gudkov claims that Alexei Kudrin, a widely respected former economic adviser to Mr Putin,has discussed with officials in western governments the idea that the Russian leader and somemembers of his closest circle could be offered retirement abroad with a promise to be left alone— an arrangement dismissed as impossible by western diplomats in Moscow.
古德科夫稱普京的前經(jīng)濟(jì)顧問、廣受尊敬的阿列克謝•庫德林(Alexei Kudrin)與西方政府官員討論過一個(gè)想法：允許普京和他核心圈子的部分成員退隱海外，并承諾不打擾他們。莫斯科的西方外交官認(rèn)為這一安排不可能實(shí)現(xiàn)，不予考慮。
Other politicians are discussing the matter in more realistic terms. “Putin’s rating will not stayat above 80 per cent forever. It will start coming down, very gradually,” says Mr Nemtsov. “Andonce it does, the fear will diminish, too, and at some point some big business will startsupporting and financing us.”
其他政客正從更現(xiàn)實(shí)的層面討論此事。涅姆佐夫說：“普京的支持率不會(huì)永遠(yuǎn)停留在80%以上，它將非常緩慢地開始下降。而一旦他的支持率下降，人民的恐懼就將減少，然后在某一時(shí)刻，一些大公司將開始支持和資助我們。”
Such scenarios are long in the future. They anticipate Mr Putin serving another six-year termafter the present one ends in 2018. At that point the constitution, which allows no more thantwo consecutive presidential terms, would force him to step aside. Says Mr Nemtsov: “We aretalking about 2024.”
這是他們對(duì)很久以后的設(shè)想。他們預(yù)計(jì)普京將在2018年當(dāng)前任期結(jié)束后，再連任下一個(gè)6年任期。然后憲法會(huì)迫使他下臺(tái)，因?yàn)閼椃ㄒ?guī)定總統(tǒng)連任不得超過兩屆。涅姆佐夫說：“我們討論的是2024年的事。”
