中國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)放緩，急壞了拉美國(guó)家

Slowdown in China Bruises Economy in Latin America

中國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)放緩，急壞了拉美國(guó)家

SANTIAGO, Chile — Few people are as intensely worried about the slowing Chinese economy as Latin Americans.

智利圣地亞哥——對(duì)于中國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)放緩，很少有人比拉丁美洲人更加憂心忡忡。

China not only buys nearly 40 percent of Chile’s copper, but its once-insatiable demand helped push copper prices from $1 to $4 a pound.

中國(guó)不僅購(gòu)買了智利近40%的銅，而且曾經(jīng)有段時(shí)間，它對(duì)銅的需求仿佛無(wú)窮無(wú)盡，幫助把銅價(jià)從每磅1美元推高到了4美元。

Meanwhile, Beijing plowed billions into Peruvian mines and fisheries and spent billions more buying soybeans from Argentina and Brazil. And it propped up the Venezuelan government to the tune of $50 billion in loans, to be paid in shipments of oil.

與此同時(shí)，北京在秘魯?shù)牡V山和漁場(chǎng)撒下了數(shù)以十億計(jì)的美元，而且又花了另外數(shù)十億的美元來(lái)購(gòu)買阿根廷和巴西的大豆。它還力撐委內(nèi)瑞拉政府，為其提供了500億美元的貸款，讓其用石油償還。

China’s voracious hunger for Latin America’s raw materials fueled the region’s most prosperous decade since the 1970s. It filled government coffers and helped halve the region’s poverty rate.

中國(guó)對(duì)拉丁美洲原材料的巨大需求，幫助該地區(qū)經(jīng)歷了上世紀(jì)70年代以來(lái)最為繁榮的10年。拉美國(guó)家的國(guó)庫(kù)因此而充實(shí)，該地區(qū)的貧困率也減少了一半。

That era is over. For policy makers gathered here last week for the International Monetary Fund’s conference on challenges to Latin America’s prosperity, there seemed to be no more clear and present danger than China’s slowdown.

但那個(gè)時(shí)代已經(jīng)結(jié)束了。上周，國(guó)際貨幣基金組織(IMF)召開會(huì)議，討論拉丁美洲的經(jīng)濟(jì)繁榮所面臨的挑戰(zhàn)，與會(huì)者是該地區(qū)的政策制定者。在他們看來(lái)，最明確、最緊迫的危險(xiǎn)，就是中國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)的放緩。

“The commodity boom allowed governments and companies to avoid hard choices,” Andrés Velasco, Chile’s finance minister from 2006 to 2010, told me. “For goodness’ sake even Argentina grew by 5 to 6 percent per year for almost a decade.”

“由于大宗商品市場(chǎng)的繁榮，政府和企業(yè)無(wú)需做出艱難的選擇，”安德烈斯·貝拉斯科(Andrés Velasco)對(duì)我說(shuō)，“天啊，就連阿根廷的經(jīng)濟(jì)，都在將近10年的時(shí)間里每年增長(zhǎng)了5%到6%。”貝拉斯科曾在2006至2010年擔(dān)任智利財(cái)政部長(zhǎng)。

Copper is back under $3. As commodity prices continue to swoon, driven in large part by China’s weaker demand, the going will get much tougher.

銅價(jià)回調(diào)到3美元以下。中國(guó)的需求減少，在很大程度上導(dǎo)致了大宗商品的價(jià)格持續(xù)走低，而接下來(lái)的形勢(shì)會(huì)更加艱難。

That’s especially true in the major oil exporters, clobbered by a collapse of oil prices driven by a combination of faltering global demand and increased supplies from the United States and elsewhere.

對(duì)于主要的石油出口國(guó)而言，情況尤為嚴(yán)重。這是因?yàn)槿蚴袌?chǎng)的石油需求不旺，加之美國(guó)和其他地方的石油供應(yīng)增加，導(dǎo)致了油價(jià)崩盤。

Venezuela, notably, is in free fall. The I.M.F. expects the Venezuelan economy to contract both this year and next. And it has been forced to limit its promised oil shipments to China, in effect defaulting on its Chinese debt.

值得注意的是，委內(nèi)瑞拉經(jīng)濟(jì)急劇惡化。據(jù)IMF預(yù)計(jì)，今明兩年，委內(nèi)瑞拉經(jīng)濟(jì)都會(huì)出現(xiàn)負(fù)增長(zhǎng)。它不得不違背承諾，限制輸送到中國(guó)的石油，這實(shí)際上是對(duì)中國(guó)的債務(wù)違約。

But the commodity decline isn’t sparing many. “Growth in Latin America should move back to pre-commodity boom rates,” said Alejandro Werner, who leads the Western hemisphere division at the I.M.F. Indeed, the fund expects the region to grow barely 1.3 percent in 2014, a third of its pace just three years ago.

但沒有多少國(guó)家能擺脫大宗商品價(jià)格走低的影響。“拉丁美洲的增長(zhǎng)率，應(yīng)該回歸到大宗商品繁榮之前的水平，”IMF西半球部門負(fù)責(zé)人亞歷杭德羅·維爾納(Alejandro Werner)說(shuō)。確實(shí)如此，IMF預(yù)計(jì)該地區(qū)2014年的增長(zhǎng)率只能達(dá)到1.3%，只有三年前的三分之一。

The bust underlines how Latin American economies have failed to overcome the existential weakness that has plagued them throughout history: a dependence on raw materials that has shackled the region’s development to an incessant sequence of booms and busts.

這樣的不景氣狀況，突顯了拉丁美洲經(jīng)濟(jì)未能克服一直以來(lái)的弱點(diǎn)：對(duì)出口原材料的依賴束縛了該地區(qū)的發(fā)展，使之陷入繁榮和衰退不斷交替的怪圈。

From Brazil and Argentina in the southern tip of the region to Mexico in the north, officials across Latin America fretted for years that China undermined their decadeslong efforts to build the manufacturing industries that, they hoped, would provide a ticket into the developed world.

從南部的巴西和阿根廷，到北部的墨西哥，拉美各國(guó)的官員多年來(lái)感到焦慮不安，因?yàn)樗麄兓耸嗄陼r(shí)間努力發(fā)展制造業(yè)，希望以此躋身發(fā)達(dá)國(guó)家的行列，但中國(guó)卻破壞了這番努力。

Not only did China’s cheap labor outcompete Latin American industry and draw the lion’s share of global manufacturing investment. Its appetite for Latin America’s minerals, oil and agricultural products raised the value of currencies around the region, making their manufactured goods even less competitive.

不僅因?yàn)橹袊?guó)的廉價(jià)勞動(dòng)力擊敗了拉美工業(yè)，吸引了全球制造業(yè)投資中的很大一部分，而且中國(guó)對(duì)拉美礦產(chǎn)、石油和農(nóng)產(chǎn)品的巨大胃口，也提高了拉美國(guó)家貨幣的匯率，進(jìn)一步削弱了拉美制造業(yè)產(chǎn)品的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)力。

Manufacturing’s share in Latin America’s economic output has declined steadily for more than a decade, ever since China inserted itself aggressively into the global economy by entering the World Trade Organization.

自從中國(guó)加入世貿(mào)組織(WTO)，大舉進(jìn)軍全球經(jīng)濟(jì)以來(lái)，這十多年的時(shí)間里，制造業(yè)在拉美地區(qū)經(jīng)濟(jì)產(chǎn)出中所占的份額節(jié)節(jié)下滑。

At the same time, the share of raw materials in Latin America’s exports, which had fallen to a low of 27 percent in the late 1990s, from about 52 percent in the early 1980s, surged back to more than 50 percent on the eve of the global financial crisis.

與此同時(shí)，拉美原材料出口的占比，本來(lái)已經(jīng)從上世紀(jì)80年代初的大約52%，下降到了90年代末27%的低點(diǎn)，結(jié)果到全球金融危機(jī)爆發(fā)前夕，又提升到了50%以上。

China’s footprint on Latin America is contributing to what the Harvard development expert Dani Rodrik would call its “premature de-industrialization,” shutting off the standard path of economic development followed by pretty much everybody since the industrial revolution.

用哈佛大學(xué)(Harvard)發(fā)展專家達(dá)尼·羅德里克(Dani Rodrik)的話說(shuō)，中國(guó)對(duì)拉美的影響是“過(guò)早去工業(yè)化”，阻斷了它發(fā)展經(jīng)濟(jì)的常規(guī)路徑。自工業(yè)革命以來(lái)，幾乎每個(gè)國(guó)家都遵循了這樣的常規(guī)路徑。

Mr. Velasco, 54, recalled when a 23-year-old student in Antofagasta asked him what the Chilean government would do with the nation’s copper riches. By the time the student was his age, Mr. Velasco responded, Chile would have no more copper.

現(xiàn)年54歲的貝拉斯科談到，安托法加斯塔一名23歲的學(xué)生曾經(jīng)問他，智利政府打算怎么利用該國(guó)豐富的銅資源。貝拉斯科回答，當(dāng)這名學(xué)生到了自己這把年紀(jì)時(shí)，智利的銅資源就已經(jīng)開采光了。

“The question,” he said, “isn’t what should we do with copper but what will we do without it.”

“現(xiàn)在的問題，”他說(shuō)，“不是我們應(yīng)該怎么利用銅資源，而是如果沒有銅，我們?cè)撛趺崔k。”

China’s diplomats emphasize that it is a developing country, not an advanced, “imperialist” power like the United States or the European colonial powers who ruled for centuries and served as the first foreign exploiters of Latin America’s mineral wealth. To many in Latin America, the difference hardly seems relevant.

中國(guó)的外交官?gòu)?qiáng)調(diào)，它是一個(gè)發(fā)展中的國(guó)家，而不是發(fā)達(dá)國(guó)家。像美國(guó)和歐洲殖民列強(qiáng)那種發(fā)達(dá)的“帝國(guó)主義”國(guó)家，在拉美統(tǒng)治了幾百年，是最早攫取拉美礦產(chǎn)財(cái)富的外來(lái)勢(shì)力。但對(duì)于很多拉美人而言，這種差別似乎并不重要。

Take San Juan de Marcona, a remote village on the edge of the Pacific Ocean in the Nazca region of Peru. Built in the 1950s to house workers at the vast open-top American-owned iron mine, the town no longer houses managers from the United States. In the 1970s, General Juan Velasco Alvarado, then Peru’s military dictator, booted them out.

舉例來(lái)說(shuō)，圣胡安馬爾科納(San Juan de Marcona)是太平洋邊上的一個(gè)偏遠(yuǎn)村鎮(zhèn)，位于秘魯?shù)募{斯卡地區(qū)。該鎮(zhèn)建于上世紀(jì)50年代，居民是在露天鐵礦工作的礦工。這片廣闊的鐵礦原本屬于美國(guó)公司，但現(xiàn)在該鎮(zhèn)已經(jīng)不再有來(lái)自美國(guó)的經(jīng)理，因?yàn)樵谏鲜兰o(jì)70年代，秘魯?shù)能娛陋?dú)裁者胡安·貝拉斯科·阿爾瓦拉多(Juan Velasco Alvarado)把他們趕走了。

Today, Marcona’s managers come from China’s Shougang, which bought it from the Peruvian government in the 1990s.

如今，馬爾科納的管理者來(lái)自中國(guó)首鋼。上世紀(jì)90年代，首鋼從秘魯政府手中把這里買了下來(lái)。

“A growing China was very important to bring Peru along in the last 10 years,” said Cynthia Sanborn, who leads the Research Center at the Universidad del Pacífico in Lima.

“中國(guó)的經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)非常重要，它帶動(dòng)了秘魯過(guò)去10年的發(fā)展，”辛西婭·桑伯恩(Cynthia Sanborn)說(shuō)。她是利馬太平洋大學(xué)(Universidad del Pacífico)研究中心的負(fù)責(zé)人。

North of Marcona, Chinalco built a town to relocate 5,000 inhabitants of Morococha, where it will blast open a new copper mine. This year, China’s MMG, Guoxin International Investment and Citic Metal bought the Las Bambas copper mine from the Anglo-Swiss conglomerate Glencore.

中鋁公司準(zhǔn)備炸掉莫羅科查(Morococha)，開辟一座新銅礦。于是在馬爾科納以北修建了一座小鎮(zhèn)，打算將莫羅科查的5000名居民搬遷過(guò)來(lái)。今年，中國(guó)的五礦資源、國(guó)新國(guó)際投資有限公司和中信金屬，還從英國(guó)瑞士合資的企業(yè)集團(tuán)嘉能可(Glencore)手中收購(gòu)了拉斯邦巴斯銅礦。

Chinese companies are interested not only in raw materials but also in vast public works to transport the raw materials, including rail links across Brazil and a proposed $50 billion, 171-mile canal across Nicaragua.

中國(guó)企業(yè)感興趣的不僅是原材料，還有用來(lái)運(yùn)輸原材料的大型公共工程，其中包括連接巴西各地的鐵路線，以及擬建的一條橫貫?zāi)峒永系倪\(yùn)河，它總長(zhǎng)171英里(約合275公里)，預(yù)計(jì)耗資500億美元。

In 2010, Chinese lending to Latin America roughly equaled that of the World Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank and the U.S. Eximbank combined. (It has since slowed.) Carmen Reinhardt of Harvard forecasts that China could become Latin America’s main source of financing.

2010年，中國(guó)對(duì)拉丁美洲的貸款大約相當(dāng)于世界銀行(World Bank)、美洲開發(fā)銀行(Inter-American Development Bank)和美國(guó)進(jìn)出口銀行(U.S. Eximbank)的總和(之后有所下降)。哈佛大學(xué)的卡門·萊因哈特(Carmen Reinhart)預(yù)測(cè)，中國(guó)有可能成為拉美地區(qū)的主要融資來(lái)源。

Perhaps Latin America should just count its blessings. “The concerns of dependency are there, but if China weren’t there, Peru would be seeking other markets for its minerals,” Professor Sanborn told me.

或許，拉丁美洲應(yīng)該多想想好的一面。“人們對(duì)依賴中國(guó)感到擔(dān)憂，但如果沒有中國(guó)，秘魯就要為自己的礦產(chǎn)資源尋求其他市場(chǎng)，”桑伯恩教授告訴我。

Mr. Werner of the I.M.F. argues that the case for deindustrialization is overblown. “From a medium-term perspective, China is a plus, plus, plus for Latin America,” he said.

IMF的維爾納認(rèn)為，“去工業(yè)化”的問題被夸大了。“從中期來(lái)看，中國(guó)對(duì)拉丁美洲有非常、非常大的幫助，”他說(shuō)。

In agriculture, for instance, exports to China are leading to lots of innovation and efficiency improvements. Demand for Brazil and Argentina’s soy — a principal source of animal feed — is unlikely to wane as the Chinese become richer and eat more meat.

例如，在農(nóng)業(yè)方面，向中國(guó)出口產(chǎn)品催生了大量創(chuàng)新，促進(jìn)了效率的提高。而且巴西和阿根廷大豆的需求應(yīng)該不會(huì)減少，因?yàn)殡S著中國(guó)人變得更加富裕，他們也會(huì)消耗更多肉類，大豆是動(dòng)物飼料的主要來(lái)源。

“Don’t bet against nature,” Mr. Werner urged policy makers in the region. “Play to your comparative advantage.”

“不要逆勢(shì)而為，”維爾納勸告該地區(qū)政策制定者。“要發(fā)揮自己的比較優(yōu)勢(shì)。”

In some bits of the region, however, China has inspired a nostalgic reinterpretation of its economic history and a re-examination of the policy choices of its past.

但是，在拉美地區(qū)的某些地方，中國(guó)促使人們以懷舊的心態(tài)，對(duì)本地的經(jīng)濟(jì)史加以重新解釋，并讓人們反省以往的政策選擇。

Remember “Dependency Theory”?

還記得“依附理論”嗎?

The doctrine, which spread across Latin America from the 1950s through the 1970s, proposed that the region, or any developing country for that matter, could never advance simply by selling natural resources to the rich North, using the money to import the North’s industrial goods. Import substitution, behind a wall of trade barriers, was the path to prosperity.

上世紀(jì)50年代至70年代，該理論在拉丁美洲相當(dāng)流行。它認(rèn)為，拉美地區(qū)，或任何一個(gè)發(fā)展中國(guó)家，僅僅通過(guò)出售自然資源給富裕的北美，并用這些錢來(lái)進(jìn)口北美工業(yè)品的方式，都不可能走向發(fā)達(dá)。用本國(guó)產(chǎn)品替代進(jìn)口品，用貿(mào)易壁壘保護(hù)自己，才是走向繁榮的路徑。

The theory fell into disrepute during Latin America’s “lost decade” of the 1980s – blamed by a new crop of market-oriented, United States-trained leaders in the 1990s for turning the region into an uncompetitive backwater.

在上世紀(jì)80年代拉美“失去的10年”期間，這個(gè)理論變得聲名掃地——90年代，受過(guò)美國(guó)教育、以市場(chǎng)為導(dǎo)向的新一代領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人指責(zé)，這一理論讓拉美變成了一潭沒有競(jìng)爭(zhēng)力的死水。

Courtesy of China, it’s back, fine-tuned to adapt to a more integrated global economy.

由于中國(guó)的原因，這個(gè)理論卷土重來(lái)，人們對(duì)它進(jìn)行了微調(diào)，以適應(yīng)更加一體化的全球經(jīng)濟(jì)。

“We’re not calling for more protectionism, but to substitute imports within competitive open economies,” said Alicia Bárcena, who leads the United Nations’ Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean. “We must think of creating regional production chains to serve regional markets.”

“我們呼吁的不是推出更多保護(hù)主義措施，而是通過(guò)具有競(jìng)爭(zhēng)力的開放型經(jīng)濟(jì)體系，來(lái)替代進(jìn)口，”聯(lián)合國(guó)拉丁美洲和加勒比經(jīng)濟(jì)委員會(huì)(Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean)負(fù)責(zé)人艾麗西亞·巴爾塞納(Alicia Bárcena)說(shuō)。“我們必須考慮建立區(qū)域生產(chǎn)鏈，來(lái)滿足區(qū)域市場(chǎng)。”

Ms. Bárcena suggests that while China should still be invited to participate in Latin America’s development, this should happen on different terms: “You want our commodities? O.K. But also invest in solar panels here,” she proposed.

巴爾塞納指出，雖然拉丁美洲仍然應(yīng)該邀請(qǐng)中國(guó)參與當(dāng)?shù)氐陌l(fā)展，但前提條件應(yīng)該有所改變：“你想要我們的大宗商品?行。但你同時(shí)也需要在這里投資太陽(yáng)能組件，”她建議道。

Yet for all the hopes in Latin America that a new kind of deal can be had, the symbiotic relationship between the largest importer of commodities and one of the biggest commodity-exporting regions of the world is unlikely to change in any substantial way.

盡管拉丁美洲想要達(dá)成一種新型交易，但是，一方是全球最大的大宗商品進(jìn)口國(guó)，另一方是世界領(lǐng)先的大宗商品出口地區(qū)，它們之間的共生關(guān)系不大可能有任何實(shí)質(zhì)性的改變。

“Without this complementarity, the Chinese don’t have much to go on,” said Matt Ferchen, who runs the China and the Developing World program at the Carnegie-Tsinghua Center for Global Policy in Beijing. “It’s working out quite well for China.”

“如果去掉這種互補(bǔ)性，中國(guó)也就沒有多少興趣了，”在北京的清華-卡內(nèi)基全球政策中心(Carnegie-Tsinghua Center for Global Policy)負(fù)責(zé)“中國(guó)與發(fā)展中國(guó)家”課題的陳懋修(Matt Ferchen)表示。“對(duì)于中國(guó)來(lái)說(shuō)，這種關(guān)系非常有益。”

And the symbiosis could survive for a long time. As Huang Haizhou, the managing director of China’s International Capital Corporation, told the nervous Latin Americans at the I.M.F.'s conference here, despite any slowdown in growth, China’s long-term demand for commodities remained voracious.

這樣的共生關(guān)系可能會(huì)長(zhǎng)期存在。在這次IMF會(huì)議上，中國(guó)國(guó)際金融有限公司的董事總經(jīng)理黃海洲對(duì)不安的拉丁美洲聽眾說(shuō)，不管中國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)出現(xiàn)了何種放緩，它對(duì)大宗商品的長(zhǎng)期需求依然十分旺盛。

China’s income per person is still only about one-third that of Chile. Every year for the next 30 years, it plans to move 1.3 percent of its population from the countryside to cities. That will require a lot of construction.

中國(guó)的人均收入仍然只有智利的大約三分之一。它計(jì)劃在未來(lái)30年里，每年讓其1.3%的人口實(shí)現(xiàn)城鎮(zhèn)化。這需要進(jìn)行大量的基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施建設(shè)。