信用違約互換正在為中國銀行業(yè)“擋槍”

Credit default swaps are a Wall Street invention. During the crisis of 2008, they crippled a number of significant financial companies. But where in the world are such instruments most popular? Not in the US, despite what you might think, but in China.

信用違約互換(CDS)是華爾街的一項發(fā)明。2008年金融危機期間，CDS重創(chuàng)了許多重要的金融公司。但如今此類工具在哪里最受歡迎?不是美國(盡管你可能會這樣認(rèn)為)，而是中國。

The China Financing Guarantee Association, a quasi-governmental body that regulates the guarantee companies (in other words, the issuers of the swaps), says it has 194 member institutions, though their ranks have thinned in recent years. Many guarantee companies have simply not bothered to become members of this club.

擔(dān)保公司(即CDS發(fā)行方)的準(zhǔn)官方監(jiān)管機構(gòu)——中國融資擔(dān)保業(yè)協(xié)會(CFGA)稱旗下?lián)碛?94家會員單位，盡管近年來隊伍有所收縮。還有許多擔(dān)保公司只是懶得申請成為該協(xié)會會員。

In a parallel with the American obsession with home ownership that led to the formation of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the federal housing finance agencies, the Chinese government has in the past few decades done its best to promote small and medium-sized enterprises by providing them with credit guarantees. Tens of thousands of state-owned, private and hybrid guarantee companies have come into being.

中國政府過去幾十年一直致力于通過提供信用擔(dān)保促進中小企業(yè)的發(fā)展，這與美國人對自有住房的癡迷類似，這種癡迷導(dǎo)致了聯(lián)邦住房融資機構(gòu)——房利美(Fannie Mae)和房地美(Freddie Mac)的成立。因此，成千上萬的國有、民營及混合所有制擔(dān)保公司在中國應(yīng)運而生。

And just like Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, China’s guarantee companies are all thinly capitalised. This is due partly to the misconception that a third-party guarantee is sufficient for SMEs to tap commercial credit.

就像房利美和房地美一樣，中國的擔(dān)保公司普遍資本不充足。這部分源于一種誤解，即認(rèn)為第三方擔(dān)保足以讓中小企業(yè)獲得商業(yè)貸款。

Mispricing in China’s CDS market is severe and chronic. The guarantee companies typically charge only 2-3 per cent to the borrowers, but assume the full risk of their loan delinquency. When the economy was growing fast, from the 1980s through to the early 2010s, these guarantee fees seemed like manna from heaven — so much free money. But when the economy began to slow from 2012 onwards, default rates rose, and many guarantee companies disappeared.

中國CDS市場中的錯誤定價很嚴(yán)重，且由來已久。擔(dān)保公司通常只向借款人收取貸款額2%至3%的服務(wù)費用，但要承擔(dān)貸款違約的全部風(fēng)險。當(dāng)經(jīng)濟快速增長時(從1980年代到2010年代早期)，這些擔(dān)保費用就像天上掉下的餡餅——如此多的白得之財。但自中國經(jīng)濟2012年開始放緩以來，違約率開始上升，許多擔(dān)保公司也銷聲匿跡。

Only then did people begin to question the business model and the pricing of guarantees. However, nobody seems to know how to correct the problem of mispricing.

直到那時，人們才開始質(zhì)疑這種商業(yè)模式和擔(dān)保的定價。然而，似乎沒人知道如何糾正錯誤定價的問題。

Unlike CDS in the US, credit guarantees in China have the following deficiency: usually, they cannot be traded. Some observers argue this is probably an advantage for the industry because it forces deal originators to “eat what they cook”, minimising irresponsibility and recklessness in their origination process.

與美國的CDS不同，中國的信用擔(dān)保有以下缺陷：通常，它們無法交易。一些觀察人士辯稱，這或許是該行業(yè)的一個優(yōu)勢，因為它迫使擔(dān)保交易發(fā)起方“自產(chǎn)自食”，最大限度減少交易發(fā)起過程中的不負(fù)責(zé)任和魯莽。

It is estimated that the total size of China’s market for such instruments is more than $500bn, excluding the credit enhancement these guarantee companies provide to SMEs’ bond sales and asset-backed securities. But no one knows the size of the market for sure.

據(jù)估計，中國此類金融工具的市場總規(guī)模超過5000億美元，還不包括這些擔(dān)保公司為中小企業(yè)的債券發(fā)行及資產(chǎn)支持證券提供的信用增級。但沒人知道確切的規(guī)模。

The number of guarantee companies still operating has reduced significantly since the peak in 2011. Today, their main mission is to unwind their long-duration guarantees and liquidate the collaterals they have repossessed — dubious equity stakes here and there, land or real estate. There are some healthy operators, but they are few and far between.

自2011年達(dá)到峰值以來，仍在運營的擔(dān)保公司的數(shù)量已大幅減少。如今，他們的主要任務(wù)是解除各種長期擔(dān)保，變賣收回的抵押物——分散于各地的問題股權(quán)、土地或房產(chǎn)。有一些運轉(zhuǎn)良好的擔(dān)保公司，但數(shù)量極少。

Why should this story be of interest to the Chinese public and, indeed, to outside observers? Because it is key to understanding the strange longevity of China’s credit bubble.

為什么中國公眾以及外部觀察者應(yīng)對這些感興趣呢?因為這是理解中國信貸泡沫長期不破裂這一奇怪現(xiàn)象的關(guān)鍵。

It is true that the country’s credit market is far too big, but against the doomsday scenarios some analysts have painted, it has refused to burst because of the many non-bank financial institutions that have served as plumbers for the banks.

沒錯，中國的信貸市場太大了，但與一些分析師描繪的末日景象相反的是，中國的信貸市場并未崩盤，因為許多非銀行金融機構(gòu)為銀行充當(dāng)了“管道工”。

China’s economic slowdown in the past five years has decimated its microcredit sector and, to a lesser extent, the trust companies. Their destruction has also helped shield the commercial banks.

中國經(jīng)濟過去5年增長放緩已經(jīng)導(dǎo)致小額信貸行業(yè)大幅萎縮，同時萎縮的還有信托公司，但程度較小。它們遭受重創(chuàng)也幫助保護了商業(yè)銀行。

As one grateful commercial banker recently remarked to me, CDS, bridge loans and wealth management products have served as the banks’ sewage pipes. Half-jokingly, he described the CDS issuers as “selfless and heroic”.

正如一位對此心存感激的商業(yè)銀行家最近對我所言，CDS、過橋貸款、理財產(chǎn)品充當(dāng)了銀行的排污管。他半開玩笑地形容說，CDS發(fā)行方“無私而且英勇”。