“70歲”的印度仍在經(jīng)歷“成長的煩惱”

India is a young country. Independence came 70 years ago, making it younger than most of the major large countries: Brazil is 195 years old; the US celebrated 241 years of independence last month; and South Africa has had a 107-year independent run.

印度是一個(gè)年輕的國家。該國獨(dú)立于70年前，比大多數(shù)主要大國更年輕：巴西195歲;美國上個(gè)月慶祝獨(dú)立241周年;南非已獨(dú)立107年。

Demographically, India has one of the world’s youngest populations with a median age of 28. By contrast, China’s is 37, Russia’s 39, Canada’s 42, and Germany’s 47. India’s diplomatic disposition is, to quote the academic Kishore Mahbubani, “petulant”. Its relative immaturity in international relations is a function of its youth. Independent India is fewer than four generations old and its responses have been those of a young country still finding its place in the world.

從人口結(jié)構(gòu)上說，印度擁有世界上最年輕的人口之一，年齡中位數(shù)只有28歲。相比之下，中國人的年齡中位數(shù)是37歲，俄羅斯是39歲，加拿大是42歲，德國是47歲。援引新加坡學(xué)者馬凱碩(Kishore Mahbubani)的話，印度的外交氣質(zhì)是“任性的”。印度在國際關(guān)系中的相對(duì)不成熟，是其年輕的產(chǎn)物。印度獨(dú)立還不到四代人的時(shí)間，其國際回應(yīng)符合一個(gè)正在尋找自己在世界上位置的年輕國家的特點(diǎn)。

It was not inevitable that the country would get to where it is today. At birth, many reckoned that India’s size and diversity would make it ungovernable. Others feared that it would be swept by the wave of communism and authoritarian regimes then stalking Asia. Economists wondered whether India would be able to feed its large population.

印度發(fā)展成今天的樣子，并不是必然的。建國之初，許多人認(rèn)為，印度幅員遼闊，多樣性程度太高，將使其無法治理。也有人擔(dān)心，印度將被當(dāng)時(shí)在亞洲蔓延的共產(chǎn)黨和威權(quán)政權(quán)席卷。經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家們則揣測，印度能否養(yǎng)活本國的龐大人口。

Given that backdrop, India has actually ended up in a pretty good place. The “Hindu rate of growth” — of 3.5 per cent — that persisted until the liberalisations of the early 1990s has improved to an energetic 6.5 per cent. The savings rate, which was less than 10 per cent of gross domestic product at independence, now stands at about 30 per cent, as the ratio of dependants to workers in the population has decreased. Much of India’s economic dynamism is a result of savings being channelled into productive use.

在這樣的背景下，印度實(shí)際上發(fā)展得相當(dāng)不錯(cuò)。“印度式增長率”——到1990年代初經(jīng)濟(jì)自由化之前一直為3.5%——如今已加快至強(qiáng)勁的6.5%。儲(chǔ)蓄率——在獨(dú)立時(shí)不及國內(nèi)生產(chǎn)總值(GDP)的10%——如今已達(dá)到約30%，印度人口中受贍養(yǎng)者與勞動(dòng)者之比有所降低。印度經(jīng)濟(jì)活力的很大一部分源于儲(chǔ)蓄被引導(dǎo)至生產(chǎn)性使用。

While some of these changes have been significant, judged against India’s potential they are underwhelming. After a big spurt in manufacturing output in the 1980s, it has stagnated at 16.5 per cent of GDP. Much of this is due to infrastructure bottlenecks and inflexible labour policies. Yet, unemployment is stubbornly high. India needs to create a million new jobs a month; in the best of times it has managed to do half that. Paradoxically, surveys show that 60 per cent of Indian employers report difficulty in filling jobs.

盡管這些變化中有一些是顯著的，但從印度的潛能來衡量，它們還不到位。在1980年代的一次大幅增長之后，印度制造業(yè)產(chǎn)值占GDP的比重停滯在16.5%。很大一部分原因在于基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施瓶頸和僵化的勞動(dòng)力市場政策。然而，失業(yè)率居高不下。印度需要每月創(chuàng)造100萬個(gè)新工作崗位;在最好的時(shí)候，印度也只達(dá)到了這個(gè)目標(biāo)的一半。矛盾之處在于，調(diào)查顯示，60%的印度雇主表示遇到招工困難。

On the political front, while India has what political scientists call “input democracy”, for all practical purposes, it is weak in “output democracy”. A good test of this is the outcome when a minority or a poor or a backward caste person approaches a local police station for help. That is to say, public confidence in the machinery of government is low. This is manifested in falling turnout and tax evasion. State capacity is feeble, so reconfiguring institutions is an urgent priority.

在政治方面，盡管印度擁有政治學(xué)家所稱的“輸入民主”，但就所有實(shí)際目的而言，印度在“輸出民主”方面較為薄弱?？简?yàn)這點(diǎn)的一個(gè)很好的例子是，少數(shù)族裔、窮人或者低種姓的人找當(dāng)?shù)鼐炀智笾慕Y(jié)果。也就是說，公眾對(duì)于政府機(jī)構(gòu)的信任度很低。這表現(xiàn)在投票人數(shù)不斷減少以及逃稅方面。政府能力虛弱，因此重建制度是一項(xiàng)迫切的優(yōu)先任務(wù)。

Indian governments need stronger mechanisms for dealing with so-called wicked problems — those that are hard to describe and difficult to solve because they have multiple interdependencies.

印度政府需要更強(qiáng)有力的體制來應(yīng)對(duì)所謂的棘手問題，這些問題很難描述，也很難解決，因?yàn)樗鼈兘豢椩谝黄鹣嗷ヒ蕾嚒?/p>

Implementing policy is often like walking on a tightrope. Consider the most significant initiative of Narendra Modi’s government, the goods and services tax designed to unify India into a single market. Its short-term impact will be inflationary, and it will shift business from the unorganised part of the economy to the organised sector, with implications for jobs. If it is not handled carefully, the risk is that it will be dismissed as a pro-rich measure.

實(shí)施政策往往像是走鋼絲。例如納倫德拉•莫迪(Narendra Modi)政府出臺(tái)的最重大舉措：商品和服務(wù)稅(GST)，目的是將印度整合為一個(gè)單一市場。其短期影響將是通脹性的，并將把商業(yè)活動(dòng)從經(jīng)濟(jì)中無組織的領(lǐng)域轉(zhuǎn)向有組織的行業(yè)，這對(duì)就業(yè)有潛在影響。如果不謹(jǐn)慎處理的話，這可能被批評(píng)為一項(xiàng)有利于富人的措施。

Art and literature are leading indicators of significant social and economic change. And India’s buzzing film industry has captured the shifts in the national narrative very well. The big hits of the 1950s and 1960s tended to be about social issues and the thirst for change. In the 1970s and 1980s, we had the angry young man let down by the “system” whose disappointment was expressed through revolution. In the 1990s, popular aspirations were reflected in films about the lives of the urban middle class and the expatriate Indian community.

藝術(shù)和文學(xué)是重大社會(huì)和經(jīng)濟(jì)變化的先行指標(biāo)。印度蓬勃發(fā)展的電影行業(yè)很好地捕捉到民族敘事的變化。上世紀(jì)50年代和60年代的大片往往與社會(huì)問題和人民對(duì)改變的渴望有關(guān)。上世紀(jì)70年代和80年代，我們看到憤怒的年輕人對(duì)“體制”感到失望，他們的失望之情通過革命表達(dá)了出來。上世紀(jì)90年代，民眾的抱負(fù)反映在有關(guān)城市中產(chǎn)階級(jí)和印度外籍人士生活的電影中。

Today’s mega hits tell tales of optimism amid India’s complexity. Bollywood is recording India’s metamorphosis. To quote the 2007 blockbuster Om Shanti Om: “The movie is still unfolding, my friend!”

如今的熱門大片講述的是在印度的復(fù)雜環(huán)境下保持樂觀的故事。寶萊塢(Bollywood)正在記錄印度的蛻變。援引2007年的大片《再生緣》(Om Shanti Om)中的臺(tái)詞：“電影還沒有結(jié)束，我的朋友!”