歐佩克的末路

The deal agreed by Opec members this week will come to symbolise the passing of one of the world’s most powerful cartels. After 50 years in control of the oil price, Opec has submitted to the economic power of a much-changed global market. The deal represents the recognition of their own impotence by a group of countries that once held unchallenged power.

石油輸出國組織(Opec，簡稱歐佩克)的成員國在11月30日達(dá)成的減產(chǎn)協(xié)議，預(yù)示著這個(gè)全球最強(qiáng)大的卡特爾組織之一即將成為過去。在控制油價(jià)50年后，歐佩克屈服于已經(jīng)大變樣的世界石油市場的經(jīng)濟(jì)力量。該協(xié)議代表著，這些曾經(jīng)在石油市場上呼風(fēng)喚雨的國家不得不承認(rèn)自己無能為力。

The agreement to cut production from January by 1.2m barrels a day raised prices on the world market by almost 10 per cent. The net result was a global price for Brent crude, the international benchmark, of $52 a barrel — up a few dollars from the previous day but still down almost 50 per cent from two years ago.

歐佩克決定從明年1月起每天減產(chǎn)120萬桶，該協(xié)議推動國際油價(jià)飆升近10%。全球油價(jià)基準(zhǔn)——布倫特原油價(jià)格(Brent)升至每桶52美元，較前一個(gè)交易日上漲幾美元，但仍較兩年前的水平低了近一半。

What should investors and consumers make of all this? First, consider the modesty of the increase in prices. This is not a deal capable of lifting prices to the level of $60 or $70 a barrel that is supposed to be Opec’s target. The market is obviously sceptical about delivery. Will Iran limit its production when it desperately needs increased output and revenue to sustain its economy? Will Russia actually cut output by 300,000 b/d? When did Russia last participate in an Opec quota exercise? Answer: never.

投資者和消費(fèi)者如何理解當(dāng)前形勢?首先，考慮一下油價(jià)有限的漲幅。這項(xiàng)協(xié)議無法將油價(jià)提升到每桶60美元至70美元的水平，這想必是歐佩克的目標(biāo)水平。市場顯然懷疑協(xié)議能否得到履行。伊朗在亟需擴(kuò)大石油產(chǎn)量和收入以維持國內(nèi)經(jīng)濟(jì)的情況下會限產(chǎn)嗎?俄羅斯真的會每天減產(chǎn)30萬桶?俄羅斯上一次參與歐佩克的配額管理是什么時(shí)候?答案是從來沒有過。

Second, take stocks — which, according to the International Energy Agency and every other independent organisation that follows the oil market, will take at least a year (probably more) to run down. If the Opec production cut were considered in isolation, this surplus might be expected to fall. But there is a surge of production coming in the next 12 months from new fields in countries outside Opec, such as Brazil, Canada and Kazakhstan. It is perfectly possible that total global production — from Opec and non-Opec states combined — will be higher next year than in 2016.

第二，考慮一下庫存，根據(jù)國際能源署(International Energy Agency)以及其他所有追蹤石油市場的獨(dú)立組織的數(shù)據(jù)，全球石油庫存需要至少一年(可能更長時(shí)間)才能降下來。如果只考慮歐佩克減產(chǎn)的話，過剩庫存也許會下降。但未來12個(gè)月，歐佩克以外國家新油田的產(chǎn)量將出現(xiàn)飆升，例如巴西、加拿大和哈薩克斯坦。因此明年全球石油總產(chǎn)量(歐佩克成員國以及非歐佩克國家的總和)很有可能會高于2016年。

Third, consider the US shale business, which has every incentive to use the price rises to maintain and increase production. Contrary to the prophets of doom, the industry has been remarkably resilient in the past two years. There has been no collapse. Costs have been cut radically. Some companies have shut down production but they will use every opportunity to bring it back on.

第三，考慮一下美國的頁巖油產(chǎn)業(yè)。該行業(yè)完全有動力利用油價(jià)上漲的機(jī)會維持并擴(kuò)大產(chǎn)量。過去兩年中，與悲觀預(yù)測相反，該行業(yè)保持了驚人的韌性，不但沒有崩潰，還大幅削減了成本。一些公司停產(chǎn)，但它們會抓住一切機(jī)會恢復(fù)生產(chǎn)。

And the advances made in technology and productivity will spread across the world, further increasing output.

技術(shù)和生產(chǎn)率方面的進(jìn)步將被推廣到全球，這將進(jìn)一步擴(kuò)大產(chǎn)量。

Finally, there is the view from Riyadh. The strategy of swamping the market with extra supplies to squeeze out production from competitors and to maintain Saudi Arabia’s share of the world market has failed.

最后，站在沙特的角度考慮。利用過量供應(yīng)將競爭對手的石油擠出市場、以維持沙特市場份額的戰(zhàn)略已經(jīng)失敗。

What next? For all these reasons, the current deal is inadequate and will fail. The cuts will not be implemented when they are supposed to come into effect in January. Too many of the promises, especially from the non-Opec states, are too vague and the incentive to cheat is too high. Opec has no enforcement mechanism against those who break the agreement. The price will fall back, perhaps quite quickly.

接下來會怎樣?出于上述原因，當(dāng)前的減產(chǎn)協(xié)議是不夠的，必將失敗。減產(chǎn)協(xié)議要等到明年1月生效，可能不會得到切實(shí)執(zhí)行。太多的承諾(特別是非歐佩克國家的承諾)過于含糊，欺騙的動機(jī)太強(qiáng)。歐佩克對于那些違反協(xié)議的國家沒有任何執(zhí)行機(jī)制。油價(jià)將回落，而且可能會很快。

Then the real choice comes for Khalid al-Falih, the new Saudi oil minister, who is much more realistic than his predecessors. To lift prices to anything close to $70 a barrel, Saudi Arabia, and Saudi Arabia alone, will have to cut production dramatically — by another 1m to 1.5m b/d, and to hold it down at that level for a year or more.

到那時(shí)，沙特新任石油部長哈立德•法立赫(Khalid al-Falih)將面臨真正的選擇，他比前任們都務(wù)實(shí)得多。要讓油價(jià)升至接近每桶70美元的水平，沙特——單單沙特自己——就必須大幅減產(chǎn)，將日產(chǎn)量再削減100萬桶，達(dá)到150萬桶，并維持在這個(gè)水平一年以上。

Cartels need a swing producer that has the capacity to vary production to the degree necessary to control the market and which can absorb the pain of such a move. That is what they would have done in the past, but it may now be impossible, economically and politically. Saudi Arabia cannot sustain such a sacrifice, particularly given its weak security situation and its failure to diversify its economy. If that is true, the $50 price we have today is a ceiling. Opec as a cartel is over and everyone will have to get used to the new reality.

卡特爾組織需要一個(gè)機(jī)動的生產(chǎn)者(swing producer)，它要有能力以控制市場所需的力度對產(chǎn)量進(jìn)行調(diào)節(jié)，并且能夠承受這樣做所帶來的痛苦。放在過去它們就這樣做了，但現(xiàn)在從經(jīng)濟(jì)、政治角度來看或許做不到這一點(diǎn)了。沙特?zé)o法承受這種犧牲，尤其是在該國安全形勢薄弱以及未能實(shí)現(xiàn)經(jīng)濟(jì)多樣性的情況下。若果真如此，當(dāng)前的每桶50美元價(jià)格就是油價(jià)能夠達(dá)到的最高水平了。歐佩克作為一個(gè)卡特爾組織的時(shí)代結(jié)束了，所有人必須適應(yīng)這個(gè)新的現(xiàn)實(shí)。