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雙語(yǔ)·股票大作手回憶錄 第五章

所屬教程:譯林版·股票大作手回憶錄

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2022年04月24日

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THE average ticker hound—or,as they used to call him,tape-worm—goes wrong,I suspect,as much from as from anything else.It means a highly expensive inelasticity.After all,the game of speculation isn't all mathematics or set rules,however rigid the main laws may be.Even in my tape reading something enters that is more than mere arithmetic.There is what I call the behavior of a stock,actions that enable you to judge whether or not it is going to proceed in accordance with the precedents that your observation has noted.If a stock doesn't act right don't touch it;because,being unable to tell precisely what is wrong,you cannot tell which way it is going.No diagnosis,no prognosis.No prognosis,no profit.

It is a very old thing,this of noting the behavior of a stock and studying its past performances.When I first came to New York there was a broker's office where a Frenchman used to talk about his chart.At first I thought he was a sort of pet freak kept by the firm because they were good-natured.Then I learned that he was a persuasive and most impressive talker.He said that the only thing that didn't lie because it simply couldn't was mathematics.By means of his curves he could forecast market movements.Also he could analyse them,and tell,for instance,why Keene did the right thing in his famous Atchison preferred bull manipulation,and later why he went wrong in his Southern Pacific pool.At various times one or another of the professional traders tried the Frenchman's system—and then went back to their old unscientific methods of making a living.Their hit-or-miss system was cheaper,they said.I heard that the Frenchman said Keene admitted that the chart was 100 per cent right but claimed that the method was too slow for practical use in an active market.

Then there was one office where a chart of the daily movement of prices was kept.It showed at a glance just what each stock had done for months.By comparing individual curves with the general market curve and keeping in mind certain rules the customers could tell whether the stock on which they got an unscientific tip to buy was fairly entitled to a rise.They used the chart as a sort of complementary tipster.Today there are scores of commission houses when you find trading charts.They come ready-made from the offices of statistical experts and include not only stocks but also commodities.

“I should say that a chart helps those who can read it or rather who can assimilate what they read.The average chart reader,however,is apt to become obsessed with the notion that the dips and peaks and primary and secondary movements are all there is to stock speculation.If he pushes his confidence to its logical limit he is bound to go broke.There is an extremely able man,a former partner of a well-known Stock Exchange house,who is really a trained mathematician.He is a graduate of a famous technical school.He devised charts based upon a very careful and minute study of the behavior of prices in many markets—stocks,bonds,grain,cotton,money,and so on.He went back years and years and traced the correlations and seasonal movements—oh,everything.He used his charts in his stock trading for years.What he really did was to take advantage of some highly intelligent averaging.They tell me he won regularly—until the World War knocked all precedents into a cocked hat.I heard that he and his large following lost millions before they desisted.But not even a world war can keep the stock market from being a bull market when conditions are bullish,or a bear market when conditions are bearish.And all a man needs to know to make money is to appraise conditions.

I didn't mean to get off the track like that,but I can't help it when I think of my first few years in Wall Street.I know now what I did not know then,and I think of the mistakes of my ignorance because those are the very mistakes that the average stock speculator makes year in and year out.

After I got back to New York to try for the third time to beat the market in a Stock Exchange house I traded quite actively.I didn't expect to do as well as I did in the bucket shops,but I thought that after a while I would do much better because I would be able to swing a much heavier line.Yet,I can see now that my main trouble was my failure to grasp the vital difference between stock gambling and stock speculation.Still,by reason of my seven years' experience in reading the tape and a certain natural aptitude for the game,my stake was earning not indeed a fortune but a very high rate of interest.I won and lost as before,but I was winning on balance.The more I made the more I spent.This is the usual experience with most men.No,not necessarily with easy-money pickers,but with every human being who is not a slave of the hoarding instinct.Some men,like old Russell Sage,have the money-making and the money-hoarding instinct equally well developed,and of course they die disgustingly rich.

The game of beating the market exclusively interested me from ten to three every day,and after three,the game of living my life.Don't misunderstand me.I never allowed pleasure to interfere with business.When I lost it was because I was wrong and not because I was suffering from dissipation or excesses.There never were any shattered nerves or rum-shaken limbs to spoil my game.I couldn't afford anything that kept me from feeling physically and mentally fit.Even now I am usually in bed by ten.As a young man I never kept late hours,because I could not do business properly on insufficient sleep.I was doing better than breaking even and that is why I didn't think there was any need to deprive myself of the good things of life.The market was always there to supply them.I was acquiring the confidence that comes to a man from a professionally dispassionate attitude toward his own method of providing bread and butter for himself.

The first change I made in my play was in the matter of time.I couldn't wait for the sure thing to come along and then take a point or two out of it as I could in the bucket shops.I had to start much earlier if I wanted to catch the move in Fullerton's office.In other words,I had to study what was going to happen;to anticipate stock movements.That sounds asininely commonplace,but you know what I mean.It was the change in my own attitude toward the game that was of supreme importance to me.It taught me,little by little,the essential difference between betting on fluctuations and anticipating inevitable advances and declines,between gambling and speculating.

I had to go further back than an hour in my studies of the market—which was something I never would have learned to do in the biggest bucket shop in the world.I interested myself in trade reports and railroad earnings and financial and commercial statistic.Of course I loved to trade heavily and they called me the Boy Plunger;but I also liked to study the moves.I never thought that anything was irksome if it helped me to trade more intelligently.Before I can solve a problem I must state it to myself.When I think I have found the solution I must prove I am right.I know of only one way to prove it;and that is,with my own money.

Slow as my progress seems now,I suppose I learned as fast as I possibly could,considering that I was making money on balance.If I had lost oftener perhaps it might have spurred me to more continuous study.I certainly would have had more mistakes to spot.But I am not sure of the exact value of losing,for if I had lost more I would have lacked the money to test out the improvements in my methods of trading.

Studying my winning plays in Fullerton's office I discovered that although I often was 100 per cent right on the market—that is,in my diagnosis of conditions and general trend—I was not making as much money as my market“rightness”entitled me to.Why wasn't I?

There was as much to learn from partial victory as from defeat.

For instance,I had been bullish from the very start of a bull market,and I had backed my opinion by buying stocks.An advance followed,as I had clearly foreseen.So far,all very well.But what else did I do?Why,I listened to the elder statesmen and curbed my youthful impetuousness.I made up my mind to be wise and play carefully,conservatively.Everybody knew that the way to do that was to take profits and buy back your stocks on reactions.And that is precisely what I did,or rather what I tried to do;for I often took profits and waited for a reaction that never came.And I saw my stock go kiting up ten points more and I sitting there with my four-point profit safe in my conservative pocket.They say you never grow poor taking profits.No,you don't.But neither do you grow rich taking a four-point profit in a bull market.

Where I should have made twenty thousand dollars I made two thousand.That was what my conservatism did for me.About the time I discovered what a small percentage of what I should have made I was getting I discovered something else,and that is that suckers differ among themselves according to the degree of experience.

The tyro knows nothing,and everybody,including himself,knows it.But the next,or second,grade thinks he knows a great deal and makes others feel that way too.He is the experienced sucker,who has studied—not the market itself but a few remarks about the market made by a still higher grade of suckers.The second-grade sucker knows how to keep from losing his money in some of the ways that get the raw beginner.It is this semisucker rather than the 100 per cent article who is the real all-the-year-round support of the commission houses.He lasts about three and a half years on an average,as compared with a single season of from three to thirty weeks—which is the usual Wall Street life of a first offender.It is naturally the semisucker who is always quoting the famous trading aphorisms and the various rules of the game.He knows all the don'ts that ever fell from the oracular lips of the old stagers—excepting the principal one,which is:Don't be a sucker!

This semisucker is the type that thinks he has cut his wisdom teeth because he loves to buy on declines.He waits for them.He measures his bargains by the number of points it has sold off from the top.In big bull markets the plain unadulterated sucker,utterly ignorant of rules and precedents,buys blindly because he hopes blindly.He makes most of the money—until one of the healthy reactions takes it away from him at one fell swoop.But the Careful Mike sucker does what I did when I thought I was playing the game intelligently—according to the intelligence of others.I knew I needed to change my bucket-shop methods and I thought I was solving my problem with any change,particularly one that assayed high gold values according to the experienced traders among the customers.

Most—let us call'em customers—are alike.You find very few who can truthfully say that Wall Street doesn't owe them money.In Fullerton's there were the usual crowd.All grades!Well,there was one old chap who was not like the others.To begin with,he was a much older man.Another thing was that he never volunteered advice and never bragged of his winnings.He was a great hand for listening very attentively to the others.He did not seem very keen to get tips—that is,he never asked the talkers what they'd heard or what they knew.But when somebody gave him one he always thanked the tipster very politely.Sometimes he thanked the tipster again—when the tip turned out O.K.But if it went wrong he never whined,so that nobody could tell whether he followed it or let it slide by.It was a legend of the office that the old jigger was rich and could swing quite a line.But he wasn't donating much to the firm in the way of commissions;at least not that anyone could see.His name was Partridge,but they nicknamed him Turkey behind his back,because he was so thick-chested and had a habit of strutting about the various rooms,with the point of his chin resting on his breast.

The customers,who were all eager to be shoved and forced into doing things so as to lay the blame for failure on others,used to go to old Partridge and tell him what some friend of a friend of an insider had advised them to do in a certain stock.They would tell him what they had not done with the tip so he would tell them what they ought to do.But whether the tip they had was to buy or to sell,the old chap's answer was always the same.

The customer would finish the tale of his perplexity and then ask:“What do you think I ought to do?”

Old Turkey would cock his head to one side,contemplate his fellow customer with a fatherly smile,and finally he would say very impressively,“You know,it's a bull market!”

Time and again I heard him say,“Well,this is a bull market,you know!”as though he were giving to you a priceless talisman wrapped up in a million-dollar accident-insurance policy.And of course I did not get his meaning.

One day a fellow named Elmer Harwood rushed into the office,wrote out an order and gave it to the clerk.Then he rushed over to where Mr.Partridge was listening politely to John Fanning's story of the time he overheard Keene give an order to one of his brokers and all that John made was a measly three points on a hundred shares and of course the stock had to go up twenty-four points in three days right after John sold out.It was at least the fourth time that John had told him that tale of woe,but old Turkey was smiling as sympathetically as if it was the first time he heard it.

Well,Elmer made for the old man and,without a word of apology to John Fanning,told Turkey,“Mr.Partridge,I have just sold my Climax Motors.My people say the market is entitled to a reaction and that I'll be able to buy it back cheaper.So you'd better do likewise.That is,if you've still got yours.”

Elmer looked suspiciously at the man to whom he had given the original tip to buy.The amateur,or gratuitous,tipster always thinks he owns the receiver of his tip body and soul,even before he knows how the tip is going to turn out.

“Yes,Mr.Harwood,I still have it.Of course!”said Turkey gratefully.It was nice of Elmer to think of the old chap.

“Well,now is the time to take your profit and get in again on the next dip,”said Elmer,as if he had just made out the deposit slip for the old man.Failing to perceive enthusiastic gratitude in the beneficiary's face Elmer went on:“I have just sold every share I owned!”

From his voice and manner you would have conservatively estimated it at ten thousand shares.

But Mr.Partridge shook his head regretfully and whined,“No!No!I can't do that!”

“What?”yelled Elmer.

“I simply can't!”said Mr.Partridge.He was in great trouble.

“Didn't I give you the tip to buy it?”

“You did,Mr.Harwood,and I am very grateful to you.Indeed,I am,sir.But—”

“Hold on!Let me talk!And didn't that stock go up seven points in ten days?Didn't it?”

“It did,and I am much obliged to you,my dear boy.But I couldn't think of selling that stock.”

“You couldn't?”asked Elmer,beginning to look doubtful himself.It is a habit with most tip givers to be tip takers.

“No,I couldn't.”

“Why not?”And Elmer drew nearer.

“Why,this is a bull market!”The old fellow said it as though he had given a long and detailed explanation.

“That's all right,”said Elmer,looking angry because of his disappointment.“I know this is a bull market as well as you do.But you'd better slip them that stock of yours and buy it back on the reaction.You might as well reduce the cost to yourself.”

“My dear boy,”said old Partridge,in great distress—“my dear boy,if I sold that stock now I'd lose my position;and then where would I be?”

Elmer Harwood threw up his hands,shook his head and walked over to me to get sympathy:“Can you beat it?”he asked me in a stage whisper.“I ask you!”

I didn't say anything.So he went on:“I give him a tip on Climax Motors.He buys five hundred shares.He's got seven points' profit and I advise him to get out and buy 'em back on the reaction that's overdue even now.And what does he say when I tell him?He says that if he sells he'll lose his job.What do you know about that?”

“I beg your pardon,Mr.Harwood;I didn't say I'd lose my job,”cut in old Turkey.“I said I'd lose my position.And when you are as old as I am and you've been through as many booms and panics as I have,you'll know that to lose your position is something nobody can afford;not even John D.Rockefeller.I hope the stock reacts and that you will be able to repurchase your line at a substantial concession,sir.But I myself can only trade in accordance with the experience of many years.I paid a high price for it and I don't feel like throwing away a second tuition fee.But I am as much obliged to you as if I had the money in the bank.It's a bull market,you know.”And he strutted away,leaving Elmer dazed.

What old Mr.Partridge said did not mean much to me until I began to think about my own numerous failures to make as much money as I ought to when I was so right on the general market.The more I studied the more I realized how wise that old chap was.He had evidently suffered from the same defect in his young days and knew his own human weaknesses.He would not lay himself open to a temptation that experience had taught him was hard to resist and had always proved expensive to him,as it was to me.

I think it was a long step forward in my trading education when I realized at last that when old Mr.Partridge kept on telling the other customers,“Well,you know this is a bull market!”he really meant to tell them that the big money was not in the individual fluctuations but in the main movements—that is,not in reading the tape but in sizing up the entire market and its trend.

And right here let me say one thing:After spending many years in Wall Street and after making and losing millions of dollars I want to tell you this:It never was my thinking that made the big money for me.It always was my sitting.Got that?My sitting tight!It is no trick at all to be right on the market.You always find lots of early bulls in bull markets and early bears in bear markets.I've known many men who were right at exactly the right time,and began buying or selling stocks when prices were at the very level which should show the greatest profit.And their experience invariably matched mine—that is,they made no real money out of it.Men who can both be right and sit tight are uncommon.I found it one of the hardest things to learn.But it is only after a stock operator has firmly grasped this that he can make big money.It is literally true that millions come easier to a trader after he knows how to trade than hundreds did in the days of his ignorance.

The reason is that a man may see straight and clearly and yet become impatient or doubtful when the market takes its time about doing as he figured it must do.That is why so many men in Wall Street,who are not at all in the sucker class,not even in the third grade,nevertheless lose money.The market does not beat them.They beat themselves,because though they have brains they cannot sit tight.Old Turkey was dead right in doing and saying what he did.He had not only the courage of his convictions but the intelligent patience to sit tight.

Disregarding the big swing and trying to jump in and out was fatal to me.Nobody can catch all the fluctuations.In a bull market your game is to buy and hold until you believe that the bull market is near its end.To do this you must study general conditions and not tips or special factors affecting individual stocks.Then get out of all your stocks;get out for keeps!Wait until you see—or if you prefer,until you think you see—the turn of the market;the beginning of a reversal of general conditions.You have to use your brains and your vision to do this;otherwise my advice would be as idiotic as to tell you to buy cheap and sell dear.One of the most helpful things that anybody can learn is to give up trying to catch the last eighth—or the first.These two are the most expensive eighths in the world.They have cost stock traders,in the aggregate,enough millions of dollars to build a concrete highway across the continent.

Another thing I noticed in studying my plays in Fullerton's office after I began to trade less unintelligently was that my initial operations seldom showed me a loss.That naturally made me decide to start big.It gave me confidence in my own judgment before I allowed it to be vitiated by the advice of others or even by my own impatience at times.Without faith in his own judgment no man can go very far in this game.That is about all I have learned—to study general conditions,to take a position and stick to it.I can wait without a twinge of impatience.I can see a setback without being shaken,knowing that it is only temporary.I have been short one hundred thousand shares and I have seen a big rally coming.I have figured—and figured correctly—that such a rally as I felt was inevitable,and even wholesome,would make a difference of one million dollars in my paper profits.And I nevertheless have stood pat and seen half my paper profit wiped out,without once considering the advisability of covering my shorts to put them out again on the rally.I knew that if I did I might lose my position and with it the certainty of a big killing.It is the big swing that makes the big money for you.

If I learned all this so slowly it was because I learned by my mistakes,and some time always elapses between making a mistake and realizing it,and more time between realizing it and exactly determining it.But at the same time I was faring pretty comfortably and was very young,so that I made up in other ways.Most of my winnings were still made in part through my tape reading because the kind of markets we were having lent themselves fairly well to my method.I was not losing either as often or as irritatingly as in the beginning of my New York experiences.It wasn't anything to be proud of,when you think that I had been broke three times in less than two years.And as I told you,being broke is a very efficient educational agency.

I was not increasing my stake very fast because I lived up to the handle all the time.I did not deprive myself of many of the things that a fellow of my age and tastes would want.I had my own automobile and I could not see any sense in skimping on living when I was taking it out of the market.The ticker only stopped Sundays and holidays,which was as it should be.Every time I found the reason for a loss or the why and how of another mistake,I added a brand-new Don't!to my schedule of assets.And the nicest way to capitalize my increasing assets was by not cutting down on my living expenses.Of course I had some amusing experiences and some that were not so amusing,but if I told them all in detail I'd never finish.As a matter of fact,the only incidents that I remember without special effort are those that taught me something of definite value to me in my trading;something that added to my store of knowledge of the game—and of myself!

特別癡迷于股市的人會(huì)出錯(cuò),我覺(jué)得這就像是太過(guò)專(zhuān)業(yè)化后就容易走入死胡同一樣,少了靈活的東西就會(huì)得不償失。不能只把投資看成是單靠數(shù)學(xué)或一些定律就能做好的事情。不管主要的法則多嚴(yán)格,就算我在看股市行情的時(shí)候,也不光是玩點(diǎn)計(jì)算題,其中有我稱(chēng)之為股票行為的東西,就是股票的動(dòng)作,能夠讓我根據(jù)我所觀察到的前例,判斷股票是否會(huì)這樣運(yùn)動(dòng)。如果一只股票不能盡如人意,就不能亂動(dòng)。如果連其中的原因都搞不清,也就無(wú)法預(yù)估市場(chǎng)行情,沒(méi)辦法判斷,就無(wú)法預(yù)測(cè)股票,也就賺不到錢(qián)。

觀察股票走勢(shì),研究過(guò)去的變化走向,這是一門(mén)古老的學(xué)問(wèn)。剛來(lái)紐約時(shí),我就在一家股票公司聽(tīng)到一個(gè)法國(guó)人賣(mài)弄他的圖表,當(dāng)時(shí)我以為他是公司的一個(gè)弄臣。但是后來(lái)我發(fā)現(xiàn)他說(shuō)的話都經(jīng)得起驗(yàn)證,富有感染力。他說(shuō)股市圖表是唯一不騙人的東西,靠著圖表就可以預(yù)估股票走勢(shì),以此分析股市。比如為什么凱恩可以操縱股票,在炒作凱奇遜股票的時(shí)候大賺特賺,而在投資南太平洋股票的時(shí)候卻一敗涂地。有的職業(yè)股民也嘗試過(guò)這個(gè)法國(guó)人的方法,可不久就走回了老路,他們覺(jué)得靠運(yùn)氣投機(jī)的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)沒(méi)那么大。那個(gè)法國(guó)人說(shuō)過(guò),凱恩也確信他的圖表是完全沒(méi)錯(cuò)的,可是在變幻多端的股市中,這個(gè)方法太慢了。

那時(shí)候,有一家股票公司保存了股價(jià)走勢(shì)圖,它能顯示出幾個(gè)月內(nèi)每只股票的走勢(shì)情形,通過(guò)比較個(gè)別股票和總的變化趨勢(shì),記住一些規(guī)律,股民們就能判斷出他們靠不科學(xué)的消息買(mǎi)的股票是不是真的要上漲。他們把這張圖當(dāng)成了一種輔助性的資料來(lái)源。如今很多股票公司都有這樣的圖表,是統(tǒng)計(jì)專(zhuān)家們專(zhuān)門(mén)統(tǒng)計(jì)繪制的,除了股票走勢(shì)外,還有商品期貨的走勢(shì)圖。

或者我可以這樣說(shuō),圖表只對(duì)能看懂圖表的人起作用,準(zhǔn)確點(diǎn)說(shuō),只對(duì)能吸收?qǐng)D表信息的人有所幫助。一般的人看圖容易變得執(zhí)迷不悟,認(rèn)定底部和頭部,主要和次要波動(dòng),就是股票投機(jī)的一切。要是他把這種信心推展到理智的極限,他注定會(huì)破產(chǎn)。有個(gè)腦瓜子好使的人,他做過(guò)一家著名交易所的合伙人,還是位有實(shí)力的數(shù)學(xué)家。他從知名技校畢業(yè),發(fā)明了各種圖表,他專(zhuān)門(mén)研究過(guò)大量市場(chǎng)——股票、債券、谷物、棉花、貨幣等各種東西的價(jià)格形勢(shì),還追溯它們過(guò)去幾年的關(guān)聯(lián)和變化的所有方面。很多年里,他都在使用圖表,他所做的事情其實(shí)是利用一些極為高明的平均法。聽(tīng)說(shuō)他是常勝將軍,一直到世界大戰(zhàn)改變了市場(chǎng)性質(zhì)才作罷。他說(shuō)他和手下人在退出市場(chǎng)之前,賠掉了幾百萬(wàn)??梢磺卸嫉每葱蝿?shì),牛市就是牛市,熊市也只能是熊市,誰(shuí)都沒(méi)辦法阻止。想賺錢(qián)的人,都必須要正確地預(yù)估形勢(shì),確定是不是具備條件。

我無(wú)意這樣談?wù)摰秒x題太遠(yuǎn),但是一想到自己在華爾街的最初幾年,就忍不住這樣。現(xiàn)在我弄懂了當(dāng)時(shí)的很多事情,那時(shí)候犯的錯(cuò)都是一個(gè)普通投資人一直在犯的錯(cuò)。

第三次到達(dá)紐約后,我干得很積極,就為了能在交易所出一條道,我不指望能像在對(duì)賭行一樣厲害,但我想過(guò)一陣子,我應(yīng)該能夠用很多很多的資金操作,我應(yīng)該會(huì)有更好的表現(xiàn)。我明白我最大的問(wèn)題是沒(méi)弄懂股票賭博與股票投機(jī)的差別,不過(guò)我畢竟有天賦和七年研究股市行情變化的經(jīng)驗(yàn),我不只是賺錢(qián)了,而且賺了很多。我像以前有贏有輸,但大致上都能贏錢(qián)。我賺得多,消費(fèi)得也多,大家都這樣,不見(jiàn)得是所有賺了容易錢(qián)的人才這樣,而是不愿意攢錢(qián)的人才大手大腳。羅素·塞奇就是如此,他能賺也能攢,到入土的時(shí)候錢(qián)多得驚人。

每天,我都會(huì)從上午十點(diǎn)忙乎到下午三點(diǎn),沉浸其中。三點(diǎn)以后,才是我享受生活的時(shí)刻。請(qǐng)別搞錯(cuò),我不會(huì)讓享受影響賺錢(qián),我賠錢(qián)是因?yàn)榕袛喑鲥e(cuò),不是生活無(wú)度造成的。我從來(lái)不讓精神恍惚或喝酒喝到手足酸麻妨礙我的游戲。任何事情都別想損害我的健康。就連現(xiàn)在我也常在十點(diǎn)前就入睡。即使年輕我也不熬夜,因?yàn)樗缓镁透刹缓谩N业谋憩F(xiàn)比打平還好,這就是我認(rèn)為不必剝奪生活中美好事物的原因。股市能滿(mǎn)足你的所有需求,講得職業(yè)一點(diǎn)兒,炒股是為了生活,所以要端正態(tài)度,自信心也就隨之而來(lái)了。

我在炒股中的第一個(gè)改變是時(shí)間因素。我不像在對(duì)賭行里等塵埃落定了再出手,賺個(gè)一兩點(diǎn),我現(xiàn)在想在富勒頓公司順勢(shì)而為,就要早出手、迅速,也就是說(shuō),我必須要鉆研市場(chǎng),預(yù)測(cè)形勢(shì)。這聽(tīng)起來(lái)沒(méi)什么意思,但你應(yīng)該明白,在炒股上轉(zhuǎn)變態(tài)度對(duì)我是非常重要的。我慢慢懂得了在股價(jià)不穩(wěn)時(shí)賭一把和提前預(yù)估股價(jià)的跌漲,以及賭博與投機(jī),它們之間有著根本的差異。

我需要提前一小時(shí)以上的時(shí)間開(kāi)始研究市場(chǎng),就算在世界上最牛的對(duì)賭行,我也不可能明白這個(gè)。我對(duì)產(chǎn)業(yè)報(bào)告、鐵路盈余、金融財(cái)務(wù)和商業(yè)統(tǒng)計(jì)都興趣盎然。當(dāng)然了,我喜歡玩大手筆,所以人們才送外號(hào)“投機(jī)分子”。我也愛(ài)研究股市行情,所有能幫助我去玩一把的事情,我都非常熱心。在處理事情之前,我會(huì)仔細(xì)分析,只要覺(jué)得自己已經(jīng)明白該從哪里入手了,就會(huì)去實(shí)際驗(yàn)證一番。自然,要證明只有一個(gè)辦法,那就是用我的錢(qián)去證明。

現(xiàn)在看來(lái)我的進(jìn)步似乎比較慢,可是于我而言已經(jīng)很快了,因?yàn)檎w來(lái)看我還是賺了錢(qián),如果一直賠錢(qián)的話,可能會(huì)刺激著我花更多精力去研究股市。我必然也有很多問(wèn)題沒(méi)察覺(jué)。但是我不敢肯定虧錢(qián)的真正價(jià)值,如果虧得太多,我就沒(méi)錢(qián)驗(yàn)證我的那些改變是否有效了。

研究我在富勒頓公司賺錢(qián)的操作方法之后我明白了,雖然我對(duì)股市行情和走勢(shì)的預(yù)估一直是絕對(duì)正確的,但是我賺到的錢(qián)還是不多,原因何在?

沒(méi)有徹底勝利,就跟失敗了一樣,也需要研究一番才行。

比如,在多頭市場(chǎng)股價(jià)剛漲的時(shí)候,我就買(mǎi)進(jìn),它也按照我的預(yù)估在持續(xù)上漲,這就證明我的方法有效,到現(xiàn)在為止,一切都很順利。那么我還需要做些什么呢?我聽(tīng)了老手們的話,不讓年輕人莽撞亂竄,下決心小心謹(jǐn)慎地玩。誰(shuí)都知道,要這樣做,唯一的辦法是獲利落袋,然后在回調(diào)時(shí)買(mǎi)回你的股票。我就這么做了,確切點(diǎn)說(shuō),我盡量這么做著。我經(jīng)常在獲利落袋之后,等待從來(lái)沒(méi)有出現(xiàn)的回調(diào)。我謹(jǐn)慎地懷揣著只有4個(gè)點(diǎn)的利潤(rùn),可拋掉的股票還會(huì)繼續(xù)上漲10個(gè)點(diǎn),我只能眼睜睜地看著。大家都說(shuō)錢(qián)能裝到口袋就算有錢(qián),是的,你是有點(diǎn)錢(qián),可是在多頭市場(chǎng)中只賺了4個(gè)點(diǎn)就收手,你也不會(huì)富有。

本來(lái)能賺2萬(wàn),而我只賺了2000,這是力求穩(wěn)妥造成的。當(dāng)我發(fā)現(xiàn)自己其實(shí)只賺到了本來(lái)該賺的那些錢(qián)的一小部分時(shí),我也明白了一些其他道理:根據(jù)經(jīng)驗(yàn)的多少,傻瓜也分不同的等級(jí)。

新手一無(wú)所知,每一個(gè)人,包括他自己,都知道這一點(diǎn)。但是下一級(jí)或是下下一級(jí)的人認(rèn)為他知道很多,而且讓別人覺(jué)得他確實(shí)是這樣。他是有經(jīng)驗(yàn)的傻瓜,他做過(guò)研究,不是研究市場(chǎng)本身,而是研究更傻的人所說(shuō)的一些市場(chǎng)評(píng)論。第二級(jí)傻瓜知道如何避免完全新手所犯的某些錯(cuò)誤,避免虧損。就是這種半桶水,而不是百分之百的學(xué)徒,才是證券經(jīng)紀(jì)商真正全年無(wú)憂的衣食父母。平均起來(lái),這種人可以熬大約三年半,相比之下,通常第一次攻擊華爾街的人只能熬3周到30周不等。那種半桶水的人,經(jīng)常引述著名的交易格言以及各種游戲規(guī)則,他們對(duì)能言善辯的老手們所說(shuō)的所有禁忌事項(xiàng)都一清二楚——只是不知道最重要的一條禁忌,就是不要當(dāng)傻瓜。

半桶水的這種人認(rèn)為自己已經(jīng)懂事了,他喜歡在下跌時(shí)買(mǎi)進(jìn)。他等待股價(jià)下跌,他根據(jù)股價(jià)從頭部跌下多少錢(qián)來(lái)判定是否撿到便宜。在牛市,純粹的傻瓜完全不知道規(guī)則和前例,會(huì)盲目地買(mǎi)進(jìn),因?yàn)樗忻つ康南MK嵉阶疃嗟腻X(qián),一直到一次正常的調(diào)整把他所有的利潤(rùn)都拿走為止。但是謹(jǐn)慎的二級(jí)傻瓜——就像我自以為是地玩這個(gè)游戲時(shí)一樣——所做的事情是根據(jù)別人的智慧操作。我知道我必須改變自己在對(duì)賭行交易的方法,也認(rèn)為我正在解決自己的問(wèn)題,用的是備受交易老手們推崇、具有極高價(jià)值的方法。

大多數(shù)人都一樣,你很難找到幾個(gè)人能夠誠(chéng)實(shí)地說(shuō)華爾街沒(méi)有欠他們錢(qián)。富勒頓公司里也常有這樣一群傻瓜,各種級(jí)別的都有。不過(guò),有個(gè)老手顯得很是鶴立雞群。首先,他年齡比較大,其次,他沒(méi)有好為人師的特點(diǎn),也不賣(mài)弄賺了多少錢(qián),他最擅長(zhǎng)的是探聽(tīng)別人嘴里互傳的各種內(nèi)幕消息,而對(duì)市場(chǎng)本身的內(nèi)幕不太熱衷——也就是說(shuō),他從來(lái)不問(wèn)說(shuō)話的人聽(tīng)到什么或知道什么。要有人對(duì)他說(shuō)了內(nèi)幕消息,他會(huì)很感激,而且那些內(nèi)幕消息如果確實(shí)起到了作用,他會(huì)更加感激,如果不準(zhǔn)確,他也沒(méi)什么怨言,所以別人不會(huì)知道他是不是真的受這些消息影響了。據(jù)說(shuō)這人有很多錢(qián),玩得也很大,只不過(guò)交易頻率不是很高,至少別人所知的是這樣。他叫帕特里奇,因?yàn)樾丶『馨l(fā)達(dá),總把下巴托在胸前在各個(gè)屋子來(lái)回亂竄,所以人們偷偷給他起個(gè)“火雞”的外號(hào)。

這些客戶(hù)全都樂(lè)于在別人催促下,被迫做一些事情,好把失敗歸咎到別人身上,他們經(jīng)常去向帕特里奇請(qǐng)教,對(duì)他說(shuō)有內(nèi)幕消息的人建議他們買(mǎi)哪只股票,在出手之前希望能請(qǐng)帕特里奇指教一二。不過(guò)他們所說(shuō)的內(nèi)幕,無(wú)論是讓他們拋掉的還是買(mǎi)進(jìn)的,在帕特里奇那里得到的建議都是一樣的。

顧客們?cè)谡f(shuō)完困惑后總會(huì)問(wèn):“您覺(jué)得我該怎么做更好?”

老火雞腦袋一歪,滿(mǎn)臉慈父般的笑容,盯著提問(wèn)的人,富含深情地說(shuō):“你知道,這是牛市?!?/p>

我就常聽(tīng)到他這么說(shuō):“嗯,你知道的,是牛市。”就好像他給你一個(gè)無(wú)價(jià)的護(hù)身符,用100萬(wàn)美元的保險(xiǎn)單包起來(lái)一般,我確實(shí)聽(tīng)不明白他的意思到底是什么。

有一天,一個(gè)叫艾爾默·哈伍德的人匆忙跑進(jìn)來(lái),填了一張單子交給辦事的人后就去找帕特里奇。帕特里奇這時(shí)候正在聽(tīng)一個(gè)叫約翰·范寧的人在倒苦水:有次他聽(tīng)到凱恩填了張交易單給經(jīng)紀(jì)人,也就跟著做了100股,賣(mài)掉后只賺了3個(gè)點(diǎn),但是當(dāng)他賣(mài)出后三天,這只股票就上漲了24個(gè)點(diǎn)。這個(gè)故事約翰對(duì)帕特里奇至少說(shuō)過(guò)四次,可老火雞總是微笑著點(diǎn)點(diǎn)頭,就像剛聽(tīng)到一樣。

艾爾默直接打斷了約翰,也沒(méi)致歉,就走過(guò)去對(duì)老火雞說(shuō):“帕特里奇先生,我剛賣(mài)了克萊曼汽車(chē)公司的股票,有知情人說(shuō)市場(chǎng)應(yīng)該會(huì)回調(diào),到時(shí)候我再低價(jià)買(mǎi)回來(lái),一定能賺的。你最好也一起玩吧,如果你還抱著這只股票的話,不會(huì)賠的。”

艾爾默疑惑地看著老火雞,像其他提供內(nèi)幕消息的那些人一樣,消息未得到證實(shí),就認(rèn)為他們擁有接受他們內(nèi)幕消息的人的身心。

老火雞也是一副感激樣兒:“是啊,哈伍德先生,我仍然抱著這只股票,當(dāng)然抱著?!笨磥?lái)他非常感謝艾爾默心里還想著他這個(gè)老家伙。

艾爾默說(shuō):“喏,這是你賺錢(qián)的機(jī)會(huì),下一輪的時(shí)候再買(mǎi)進(jìn)。”他像剛剛替老火雞填寫(xiě)了存款單一樣??床坏嚼匣痣u臉上有什么感激神色,艾爾默繼續(xù)說(shuō):“我剛才把我手里的都賣(mài)了?!睆乃穆曇艉蜆幼觼?lái)判斷,你就是保守估計(jì),也會(huì)認(rèn)為他賣(mài)了100股。

但是帕特里奇很遺憾地?fù)u著頭說(shuō):“不,不行,我不會(huì)賣(mài)的?!?/p>

艾爾默大喊:“什么?”

“我不能賣(mài)?!迸撂乩锲婧芸鄲赖卣f(shuō)。

“我這不給你提供內(nèi)幕消息讓你賣(mài)嗎?”

“是啊,艾爾默先生,特別感激你,確實(shí)是,可是……”

“慢著,你聽(tīng)我說(shuō)完!難道這個(gè)股票不是十天漲了7個(gè)點(diǎn)嗎?”

“是這樣,非常感謝,老弟,但我是不會(huì)賣(mài)的?!?/p>

艾爾默很不理解:“你真不賣(mài)?”他一臉疑惑。人們?cè)谔峁﹥?nèi)幕消息給別人時(shí)就是這個(gè)樣子。

“不,我不賣(mài)?!?/p>

艾爾默踏前了一步問(wèn):“為什么不賣(mài)???”

“不為什么,現(xiàn)在是牛市。”一說(shuō)這句話,就好像他的解釋已經(jīng)很到位了。

艾爾默很失望,生氣地說(shuō):“好吧,我也知道是牛市,可是你還是賣(mài)了吧,在跌落的時(shí)候再買(mǎi)回來(lái),不是就可以降低成本了嗎?”

老火雞很無(wú)奈地說(shuō):“小伙子啊,我現(xiàn)在要是賣(mài)掉,就會(huì)失去我的頭寸,我以后怎么辦?”

艾爾默揮了一下手,搖著頭走向我,很關(guān)心地悄悄問(wèn):“你聽(tīng)清了沒(méi)?”他用演戲般的語(yǔ)氣低聲問(wèn)我,“我問(wèn)你?!?/p>

我沒(méi)說(shuō)話,他又接著說(shuō):“我對(duì)他講了克萊曼公司的內(nèi)幕消息,他買(mǎi)了500股,賺了7個(gè)點(diǎn),我現(xiàn)在讓他賣(mài)掉,等股價(jià)跌的時(shí)候再買(mǎi)回來(lái)。他怎么回答我的?他說(shuō)賣(mài)掉就沒(méi)活可干了,你明白這話嗎?”

老火雞插話道:“請(qǐng)你原諒,哈伍德先生,我沒(méi)說(shuō)沒(méi)活可干了,我說(shuō)的是就會(huì)失去我的頭寸。等你到我這把年紀(jì)的時(shí)候,千錘百煉過(guò)了,就會(huì)知道失去頭寸是任何人都承受不起的,連洛克菲勒都承受不起。我期盼這只股票回調(diào),好讓你能用低價(jià)買(mǎi)回來(lái)你的那些股票。可我只能根據(jù)自己多年的經(jīng)驗(yàn)進(jìn)行交易,我為這些經(jīng)驗(yàn)付過(guò)昂貴的學(xué)費(fèi),不想再重蹈覆轍。我仍然像已經(jīng)賺錢(qián)了一樣地感激你。你知道的,這是牛市。”老火雞說(shuō)完走了,留下艾爾默一臉納悶。

那時(shí)候我對(duì)帕特里奇的話沒(méi)多大感覺(jué)。想到以前股市好的時(shí)候,經(jīng)常沒(méi)賺到該賺的錢(qián),我猛然意識(shí)到帕特里奇那些話中的道理,越想越覺(jué)得他很聰明。他年輕時(shí)也做過(guò)傻事,必定明白自己的人性弱點(diǎn)。過(guò)去的慘痛讓他學(xué)會(huì)了不再受誘惑,因?yàn)橐冻龊艽蟮拇鷥r(jià),對(duì)于我也是一樣。

帕特里奇最后總要對(duì)其他人說(shuō):“嗯,你懂的,這是牛市。”其實(shí)他的言外之意是,要賺錢(qián)就得看整個(gè)股市行情,而不是單個(gè)股價(jià)波動(dòng)。也就是說(shuō),不能光看交易所的報(bào)價(jià)器上的數(shù)字,要研究整個(gè)股市行情和走向。明白了這個(gè),我就覺(jué)得自己又長(zhǎng)進(jìn)了不少。

在華爾街闖蕩這么多年,輸輸贏贏了幾百萬(wàn)美元,我想告訴你一點(diǎn):我能賺那么多錢(qián),跟我的想法沒(méi)什么關(guān)系,重要的是我能夠堅(jiān)持不動(dòng),懂了嗎?是我堅(jiān)持不動(dòng)啊。能判斷出股價(jià)走勢(shì)不算什么本事。在牛市,有很多早早就做多的投資人,在熊市也有很多早早就做空的投資人。我認(rèn)識(shí)很多看盤(pán)的厲害角色,他們也能瞅準(zhǔn)最佳時(shí)間買(mǎi)賣(mài)股票,他們的經(jīng)驗(yàn)跟我也差不離??墒悄兀麄儏s沒(méi)賺到多少錢(qián)。能夠同時(shí)判斷準(zhǔn)確又堅(jiān)持不動(dòng)的人并不多,我覺(jué)得這才是最難學(xué)習(xí)的地方。股民們只有徹底理解了這點(diǎn),才會(huì)賺大錢(qián)。搞懂了怎么樣去交易而賺幾百萬(wàn),比不懂交易時(shí)賺幾百美元還容易。

因?yàn)槟馨压墒凶呦蚩吹煤苊靼椎墓擅裨诳吹焦墒行星楦麄冾A(yù)估的一樣時(shí),總會(huì)表現(xiàn)得焦慮不安,就是這樣。華爾街的很多投資人都不是傻蛋,但是最終還是賠了,道理就在這里。不是股市讓他們損兵折將,而恰恰是他們戰(zhàn)勝不了自己。他們的聰明不能保證他們會(huì)堅(jiān)持不動(dòng)。老火雞恰恰在這方面做得很好,他是那樣說(shuō)的,也是那樣做的,他有堅(jiān)持的勇氣,也有堅(jiān)忍的耐力。

不理會(huì)股市大的波動(dòng),光想著搶進(jìn)搶出,是我的病灶所在。沒(méi)人能夠抓住所有的波動(dòng),在牛市,你要做的就是買(mǎi)進(jìn)和攥在手里,堅(jiān)持到你相信漲勢(shì)快停的時(shí)候。想做到這一點(diǎn),必須要搞清楚整體形勢(shì),并非只抓內(nèi)幕消息和影響個(gè)股的特殊因素。你要忘掉你所有的股票,永遠(yuǎn)忘掉!一直到股市逆轉(zhuǎn),新一輪的走勢(shì)就要到了為止。你必須要讓你的頭腦和觀察判斷能力發(fā)揮作用,不然我告訴你的這些就像低買(mǎi)高賣(mài)一樣無(wú)意義。誰(shuí)都該學(xué)會(huì)不要試圖最后一刻賣(mài)出或第一時(shí)間買(mǎi)進(jìn),這兩個(gè)時(shí)段太貴了,它們讓很多股友的千百萬(wàn)美元葬送在了股海里,這些錢(qián)多到能建造一條橫跨美洲的公路了。

我分析了一下在富勒頓公司的炒股情況,發(fā)現(xiàn)我一開(kāi)始的那些交易大都賺了錢(qián),這樣自然使我決定一開(kāi)始就玩大的。這讓我對(duì)自己的判斷很有信心,但是有很多次,我都被別人的建議甚至自己的不耐煩破壞掉了。一個(gè)人如果沒(méi)有自信,就不會(huì)在這一行干出多少成績(jī)來(lái)。我總結(jié)的經(jīng)驗(yàn)是,全面研究行情,堅(jiān)守住頭寸。我耐心安分地堅(jiān)持著,遇到了挫折也不慌亂,我明白這些都會(huì)過(guò)去。我一度放空過(guò)10萬(wàn)股,看出大反彈即將來(lái)臨,這種反彈是不可避免的,甚至是健全的,在我的賬面利潤(rùn)上會(huì)造成100萬(wàn)美元的差別,我預(yù)估到了這個(gè)結(jié)果,但是我還是紋絲不動(dòng),讓一半的賬面利潤(rùn)溜走,我根本沒(méi)想著去把賣(mài)空的股票買(mǎi)回來(lái),等到股價(jià)漲高了再拋掉。因?yàn)榧偃缥夷菢幼龅脑挘赡軙?huì)失掉頭寸,從而失去確定賺大錢(qián)的機(jī)會(huì)。只有大的波動(dòng)才能夠賺大錢(qián)。

若說(shuō)我學(xué)會(huì)這些花的時(shí)間太長(zhǎng),那是因?yàn)檫@些都來(lái)自我從失敗中總結(jié)的經(jīng)驗(yàn)。從失敗到了解失敗,這期間需要花很多時(shí)間;從了解失敗到正確判定失敗,這中間花費(fèi)的時(shí)間更多。但同時(shí),我干得還不錯(cuò)。我年齡還小,一切都還來(lái)得及。我賺錢(qián)的方式仍然有一部分還是靠研究那些股票記錄單,因?yàn)檫@個(gè)方法適合當(dāng)時(shí)的股市狀況。我也不像更早一些時(shí)候那樣經(jīng)常賠錢(qián),也不會(huì)賠得那么生氣。回想一下,在一年多時(shí)間里,我破產(chǎn)了三次,所以沒(méi)什么值得我驕傲的。我告訴你,破產(chǎn)是很好的教育機(jī)構(gòu)。

我的資金并沒(méi)有增加得很快,因?yàn)槲乙恢北M量享受生活。其實(shí)我并沒(méi)有有意識(shí)地阻止自己去享受我這個(gè)歲數(shù)和級(jí)別的人該有的生活,我有自己的轎車(chē),能夠從股市賺錢(qián)的時(shí)候,讓自己的生活太拮據(jù)沒(méi)什么意思。只有在周日和公休日,股市才不會(huì)開(kāi)盤(pán),情形本來(lái)就是如此。當(dāng)我知道自己哪里出錯(cuò)的時(shí)候,我就會(huì)給自己新設(shè)置一條不該觸碰的紅線。享受我不斷增長(zhǎng)的財(cái)富的最好辦法,就是不要削減生活開(kāi)支。我當(dāng)然有一些有趣的經(jīng)驗(yàn),其中一些并非這么有趣,但是如果我全部說(shuō)出來(lái)一定說(shuō)不完。事實(shí)上,那些在炒股中很重要的教訓(xùn)也很容易讓我記憶猶新,正是這些教訓(xùn)督促著我對(duì)市場(chǎng)和自己更加了解。

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