金融時報:當心“金磚”失色

當心“金磚”失色

“金磚國家正在重蹈歐洲的覆轍”，美國外交關系委員會高級研究員，F(xiàn)T特約編輯塞巴斯蒂安·馬拉貝(Sebastian Mallaby)說。

測試中可能遇到的詞匯和知識：

debt denominated in domestic currency 內債

quiescent [kw?'es(?)nt] 靜止的

sclerotic labour market 僵化的勞動力市場：勞動力難自由流動、擇業(yè)和雇傭限制過多、社會保障成本過高。比如曾有一英國人在法國開雪橇出租店被拘捕，因為他沒有法國雪橇教師資格證——只有英國的資格證。

resilience [r?'z?l??ns] n.恢復力；彈力

blizzard ['bl?z?d] n.暴風雪

epitomize [?'p?t?ma?z; e-] 摘要；概括；成為…的縮影

525 basis points 一個基點為萬分之一，525個基點也就是5.25%

pervasive [p?'ve?s?v] adj.普遍的，到處滲透的

macroeconomic and microeconomic n./adj.宏觀經(jīng)濟與微觀經(jīng)濟，前者關注的是GDP、物價水平、就業(yè)、進出口與政府債務等，后者研究的是單個生產(chǎn)者或消費者的生產(chǎn)和消費行為等。

Beware membership of this elite club (823 words)

A year ago, Brazil, Russia, India and China were the darlings of the world economy. Today, Brazil is barely growing, Russia is struggling and India and China are on course for their lowest growth in a decade. Although they are as different as they are similar, all four of the original Bric countries have contrived to stumble simultaneously. The lessons are that microeconomics can matter as much as macroeconomics – and that belonging to a prestigious economic club is hazardous.

The Brics, and emerging economies generally, deserve enormous credit for their macroeconomic management. In the 1970s and 1980s, one in two emerging and developing economies had double-digit inflation. Today, fewer than one in five do. As recently as the 1990s, the median emerging economy had public debt to gross domestic product of more than 65 per cent. In the past two years, the median has been below 40 per cent. Add in bulging foreign exchange reserves, debt denominated in domestic currency rather than dollars and (with China the big exception) flexible exchange rates, and the hype surrounding emerging economies seems almost reasonable.

Since the emerging market crises of 1997-2002, these strong macro foundations have delivered extraordinary performance.

When the global financial crisis hit, emerging economies’ budget deficits were small so the fiscal counterattack could be forceful. Inflation was quiescent so credit could be eased safely. In the 1990s, emerging economies that cut interest rates were punished with capital flight and currency collapse, triggering the bankruptcy of businesses with debts in dollars. This time, ample foreign exchange reserves offset capital flight and the shift away from dollar borrowing insured companies against depreciation.

That is the good news. But, as the rich world discovered in the wake of its own “Great Moderation”, resilient growth encourages complacency. In the US, households borrowed too much and regulators grew indulgent. In Europe, this pattern was amplified by the “club effect” of euro membership. Countries that had tightened their belts to meet the criteria for accession went soft once they were admitted. With cheap foreign capital buoying living standards, there was no will to fix microeconomic problems such as sclerotic labour markets.

The Brics are following a version of this playbook. Macroeconomic management remains credible. China, in particular, has dramatically cut export dependence without suffering a hard landing. But macro success has bred micro complacency. Governments have permitted themselves to meddle destructively in markets. State companies have been allowed to stifle innovative competitors. The upshot is that the resilience of the Brics in the face of the 2008 financial shock has not been matched by resilience to an extended period of weak global demand.

Consider Brazil. It boasts moderate inflation, sober public finances and a partially flexible exchange rate. Its central bank has tried to revive growth by reducing its lending rate by 525 basis points over the past 16 months. But growth this year will come in at barely more than 1 per cent because a blizzard of micro meddling has damaged business confidence. Petrobras, the state oil company that accounts for a 10th of the economy, epitomises this malady. Despite the discovery in 2007 of lucrative offshore oil, it is losing money because of local content rules and irrational fixed prices.

The story is similar in Russia. The current account is in surplus, inflation is modest and the budget is in balance. But microeconomic policy is lousy. Corruption deters investors. State companies elbow out private ones. Plans to diversify the economy have been a failure. Instead of building manufacturing exports, Russia is exporting skilled workers.

In some ways India is the odd one out: it runs a chronic budget deficit but shares the microeconomic weaknesses of its brethren. Corruption is pervasive and dysfunctional regulation inflicted blackouts on 600m consumers in the summer. Supply side rigidities handicap India’s economy so thoroughly that stimulus quickly causes inflation, which is close to 10 per cent. Last year the IMF projected India could sustain growth of 8.1 per cent per year. This year that has been revised to 6.9 percent.

The IMF’s estimate of trend growth in China has come down from 9.5 per cent to 8.5 per cent. As elsewhere, corruption and distorted prices are the key challenges. State-owned companies account for more than half the capitalisation of the stock market. They hog subsidised credit, hire the best graduates and lobby fiercely against deregulation. Li Keqiang, the incoming premier, recently said that China had used up its “demographic dividend” of plentiful labour and would now have to rely on a “reform dividend”. But China has yet to act accordingly.

For all their macroeconomic resilience, the business climate in the Brics is unreliable. In the World Bank’s Doing Business rankings, China comes in a shameful 91st, Russia 112th, Brazil 130th and India 132nd. By contrast, Rwanda, Oman, Colombia and Kazakhstan are all in the top 60. The Rocks could teach the Brics how to regain momentum.

請根據(jù)你所讀到的文章內容，完成以下自測題目：

1."The Brics···deserve enormous credit for their macroeconomic management".This can be supported by?

A. Inflation went down.

B. Public debt to GDP ratio went down.

C. Foreign exchange reserves grew.

D. All of above.

答案(1)

2.For some european countries, the "club effect" is harmful in what way?

A. Fosters economic growth and standard of living.

B. Encourages foreign capital inflows.

C. They are less willing to reform their labour market.

D. Their once prudent fiscal policies became extravagant.

答案(2)

3.What are the similarities of the four BRIC countries?

A. Government's meddling destructively in markets.

B. Corruption deters investors.

C. Skilled workers fleeing out of the country.

D. Having used up “demographic dividend”.

答案(3)

4.What is true about the state companies in BRIC?

A. Brazil's state oil company accounts for 1/10 of the economy.

B. Russian state companies elbow out private ones.

C. Chinese state companies enjoy privileges of all kinds and lobby for maintaining them.

D. All of above.

答案(4)

* * *

(1) 答案：D.All of above.

解釋： ABC三項都是正確的。文章第二段介紹了最近二三十年來以金磚國家為代表的新興市場國家在宏觀經(jīng)濟上取得了 不小的成就。除此三項之外，還有公共債務不再以外債為主，而是主要是內債；以及浮動利率制度——這一點中國除外。

(2) 答案：C.They are less willing to reform their labour market.

解釋：C項是正確的。這四項在事實上都是正確的：加入歐盟后，利用一體化的市場和資本，“歐豬”等國家經(jīng)濟得到發(fā)展。 但是，加入歐盟前它們整頓財政，以達到入盟標準，但是加入后就不是這樣了。 Countries that had tightened their belts to meet the criteria for accession went soft once they were admitted. 因此，“俱樂部效應”的一個壞處就是讓這些國家不再積極fix microeconomic problems such as sclerotic labour markets.

(3) 答案：A.Government's meddling destructively in markets.

解釋：嚴重的腐敗阻礙了外國投資這事兒主要發(fā)生在俄羅斯和印度，至少目前中國和巴西還在吸引外資最多的國家之列。 技術人才流失主要發(fā)生在俄羅斯。人口紅利被用完是李克強發(fā)出的警告，這個威脅出現(xiàn)在中國。 作者說金磚四國正重復那些歐洲國家的錯誤，也就是resilient growth encourages complacency. 要害就在政府干預太多，而國企勢力太強大。

(4) 答案：D.All of above.、

解釋：把歐元交易拉回歐陸的想法顯然在歐陸國家得到了支持，而英國則奮力反擊，向歐洲法院控告這不合法，侵犯了統(tǒng)一市場原則。 The policy has yet to come into effect only because the UK Treasury has challenged its validity at the European Court of Justice…