金融時(shí)報(bào):高負(fù)債危害經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)沒錯(cuò)

高負(fù)債危害經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)沒錯(cuò)

Excel表中出現(xiàn)的公式錯(cuò)誤，可以威脅到著名的“90%規(guī)律”嗎？最近，學(xué)界和政界正在熱議這個(gè)話題。“當(dāng)一國(guó)公共債務(wù)超過GDP的90%時(shí)，增長(zhǎng)會(huì)顯著下降”，成為美國(guó)共和黨副總統(tǒng)候選人保羅·瑞安等歐美政策制定者支持預(yù)算緊縮的武器。Rogoff和Reinhart兩位經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家撰文為自己的研究辯護(hù)，強(qiáng)調(diào)高負(fù)債危害增長(zhǎng)的結(jié)論堅(jiān)實(shí)無(wú)誤。

測(cè)試中可能遇到的詞匯和知識(shí)：

contingent liabilities 或有債務(wù)。企業(yè)或政府由于過去的交易或事項(xiàng)形成的潛在義務(wù)，如未決訴訟，為他人提供的債務(wù)擔(dān)保，巨額福利承諾等

entrenched [?n'tren(t)?t; en-] 根深蒂固的，確立的

throws···to the wind 把……拋到九霄云外

blasé about/dismissive of 對(duì)……無(wú)動(dòng)于衷、不屑一顧

How to Pay for the War 凱恩斯1940年的名作，提出了戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)融資的多種手段，包括強(qiáng)制儲(chǔ)蓄，定量配給，增稅，動(dòng)用外匯、黃金儲(chǔ)備和海外資產(chǎn)，以及通貨膨脹

periphery [p?'r?f(?)r?] 外圍，邊緣

financial repression 金融壓抑。是指市場(chǎng)機(jī)制未充分發(fā)揮的發(fā)展中國(guó)家所存在的金融管制過多、利率限制、信貸配額及金融資產(chǎn)單調(diào)等現(xiàn)象。

cram…into 塞滿，填鴨

rote [r??t] 死記硬背，教條

take the edge off 削弱，使變鈍

keep yields low 一點(diǎn)金融知識(shí)：資產(chǎn)的價(jià)格與其收益率成反比，購(gòu)買越踴躍，則出售者就可以越低的收益率借錢。如國(guó)債這種較安全的資產(chǎn)，當(dāng)投資者認(rèn)為股票太危險(xiǎn)時(shí)，會(huì)被積極搶購(gòu)。

Austerity is not the only answer to a debt problem （787 words）

By Kenneth Rogoff and Carmen Reinhart, both are Harvard professors

The recent debate about the global economy has taken a distressingly simplistic turn. Some now argue that just because one cannot definitely prove very high debt is bad for growth (though the weight of the results still say it is), then high debt is not a problem. Looking beyond therecent public debate – we have already discussed our results on debt and growth(https://www.carmenreinhart.com/response-to-critics/) in that context – the debate needs to be reconnected to the facts.

Let us start with one: the ratios of debt to GDP are at historically high levels in many countries, many rising above previous wartime peaks. This is before adding in concerns over contingent liabilities on private sector balance sheets and underfunded old-age security and pension programmes. In the case of Germany, there is also the likely need to further cushion the debt loads of eurozone partners.

To be clear, no one should be arguing to stabilise debt, much less bring it down, until growth is more solidly entrenched. Faced with high borrowing costs, periphery countries in Europe face more limited alternatives.

Nevertheless, given current debt levels, enhanced stimulus should only be taken selectively and with due caution. Borrowing to finance productive infrastructure raises long-run potential growth, ultimately pulling debt ratios lower. We have argued this consistently since the outset of the crisis.

Ultra-Keynesians would go further and abandon any pretence of concern about longer-term debt reduction. It throws caution to the wind on debt. The basic rationale is that low interest rates make borrowing a free lunch.

Unfortunately, ultra-Keynesians are too dismissive of the risk of a rise in real interest rates. No one fully understands why rates have fallen so far so fast, and therefore no one can be sure for how long their current low level will be sustained.

John Maynard Keynes himself wrote How to Pay for the War in 1940 precisely because he was not blasé about large deficits – even in support of a cause as noble as a war of survival. Debt is a slow-moving variable that cannot be brought down too quickly. But interest rates can change rapidly.

True, research has identified factors that might combine to explain the sharp decline in rates. Greater concern over potentially devastating future events such as fresh financial meltdowns may be depressing rates. Similarly, the negative correlation between returns on stocks and long-term bonds, also makes bonds a better hedge. Emerging Asia's central banks have been great customers for advanced economy debt. But can these same factors be relied on to keep yields low indefinitely?

Economists simply have little idea how long it will be until rates begin to rise. If one accepts that maybe, just maybe, a significant rise in interest rates in the next decade might be a possibility, then plans for an unlimited open-ended surge in debt should give one pause.

What, then, can be done? We must remember that the choice is not simply betweentight-fisted austerity and freewheeling spending. Governments have used a wide range of options over the ages.

First and foremost, governments must be prepared to write down debts rather than continuing to absorb them. This principle applies to the senior debt of insolvent financial institutions, to peripheral eurozone debt and to mortgage debt in the US. For Europe, in particular, any reasonable endgame will require a large transfer from Germany to the periphery.

There are other tools. So-called “financial repression”, a non-transparent form of tax, may be coming to an institution near you. In its simplest form, governments cram debt into domestic pension funds, insurance companies and banks. How to Pay for the War was, in part, about creating “captive audiences” for government debt. Read the real Keynes, not rote Keynes, to understand our future.

One of us attracted considerable fire for suggesting moderately elevated inflation (say, 4-6% for a few years) at the outset of the crisis. However, a once-in-75-year crisis is precisely the time when central banks should expend some credibility to take the edge off public and private debts.

Structural reform always has to be part of the mix. In the US, for example, the bipartisan blueprint of the Simpson-Bowles commission had some very promising ideas for simplifying the tax codes.

There is a scholarly debate about the risks of high debt. We remain confident in the prevailing view in this field that high debt is associated with lower growth. Certainly, let's not fall into the trap of concluding that today's high debts are a non-issue. Keynes was not dismissive of debt. Why should we be?

請(qǐng)根據(jù)你所讀到的文章內(nèi)容，完成以下自測(cè)題目：

1.Why high debt/GDP ratios are dangerous, according to the article?

A.The ratios are at historically high levels in many countries.

B.This is before adding contingent liabilities.

C.It is likely that Germany has to further pay for euro partners' debts.

D.All of above.

答案(1)

2.What is the writers's opinion on interest rates?

A.The higher the rates, the better.

B.US and EU enjoy low rates partly because Asians are buying their bonds.

C.Higher interest rates in the future will encourage government borrowing.

D.A high level of debt inevitably pushes up interest rates.

答案(2)

3.What is the writers' suggestion to crisis-hit countries?

A.They should immediately bring the debt down.

B.They should take advantage of low borrowing cost.

C.They should invest in productive infrastructure that raises long-run growth.

D.They need not care about long-term debt reduction, just borrow and spend.

答案(3)

4.Why mention Keynes's How to Pay for the War (and twice)?

A.Because “austerity is not the only answer to a debt problem”.

B.Because Keynes was dismissive of debt.

C.Because Keynes's idea was exactly the reason why we get into the mess.

D.Just to appear high-class, in style and with high quality.

答案(4)

* * *

(1)答案：D.All of above.

解釋：ABC都是正確的。由于第一段只是介紹背景，那么以Let us start with one開頭的第二段，有足夠經(jīng)驗(yàn)的話，你就可以判斷這是比較重要的總括性的內(nèi)容。

(2)答案：B.US and EU enjoy low rates partly because Asians are buying their bonds.

解釋：A顯然不對(duì)，高利率意味著政府和企業(yè)都必須勒緊褲腰帶過苦日子，C也不對(duì)。 D更不對(duì)，作者沒有下此斷言。

(3)答案：C.They should invest in productive infrastructure that raises long-run growth.

解釋：作者在第一段就說(shuō)，自己的失誤令人苦惱地讓極端凱恩斯主義者利用來(lái)鼓吹“把謹(jǐn)慎借貸拋到九霄云外”。作者強(qiáng)調(diào)，自己在危機(jī)之初就強(qiáng)調(diào)，歐債危機(jī)襲擊的國(guó)家在經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)穩(wěn)定下來(lái)之前，不必急著“吃猛藥”把債務(wù)率迅速將下來(lái)。所以AD不對(duì)。陷入危機(jī)的國(guó)家借貸成本很高，除了推行一定的緊縮，它們并沒有太多選擇。所以B也不對(duì)。

(4)答案：A.Because “austerity is not the only answer to a debt problem”.

解釋：這是文章標(biāo)題。通讀全文我們可知作者一直在批判ultra-Keynesians不把債務(wù)當(dāng)回事。而凱宗師當(dāng)年寫《如何為戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)付款》一文，提出很多種籌資方式，正是因?yàn)樗褌鶆?wù)當(dāng)回事——即便為衛(wèi)國(guó)戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)也不愿累高債務(wù)。事實(shí)上文中還有多次提到，如Governments have used a wide range of options over the ages.如果一件事被反復(fù)強(qiáng)調(diào)，那一定很重要。至于D為了顯得高端大氣上檔次……本篇速讀專業(yè)性較強(qiáng)，不過可以很好地訓(xùn)練我們?cè)谳^難的題材中抓出關(guān)鍵觀點(diǎn)的能力。做完一篇后，你可以仔細(xì)回讀和總結(jié)，長(zhǎng)期練習(xí)下去，閱讀能力一定有提高。