中國(guó)人工智能趕超美國(guó)不是夢(mèng)話

Robert O. Work, the veteran defense official retained as deputy secretary by President Trump, calls them his “A.I. dudes.” The breezy moniker belies their serious task: The dudes have been a kitchen cabinet of sorts, and have advised Mr. Work as he has sought to reshape warfare by bringing artificial intelligence to the battlefield.

被特朗普總統(tǒng)留下來(lái)?yè)?dān)任國(guó)防部常務(wù)副部長(zhǎng)的資深國(guó)防官員羅伯特·O·沃克(Robert O. Work)稱它們是他的“人工智能(artificial intelligence，簡(jiǎn)稱AI)伙計(jì)”。這個(gè)輕松的稱謂下是嚴(yán)肅的任務(wù)：這些伙計(jì)類似于一個(gè)櫥柜，在沃克尋求通過(guò)把人工智能引入戰(zhàn)場(chǎng)來(lái)重塑戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)時(shí)為他提供建議。

Last spring, he asked, “O.K., you guys are the smartest guys in A.I., right?”

去年，他問(wèn)，“那么，你們這些家伙是AI領(lǐng)域最智能的，對(duì)吧?”

No, the dudes told him, “the smartest guys are at Facebook and Google,” Mr. Work recalled in an interview.

不是，它們告訴他，“最聰明的在Facebook和谷歌(Google)，”沃克在接受采訪時(shí)回憶說(shuō)。

Now, increasingly, they’re also in China. The United States no longer has a strategic monopoly on the technology, which is widely seen as the key factor in the next generation of warfare.

現(xiàn)在，它們也越來(lái)越多地出現(xiàn)在中國(guó)。在被廣泛視為下一代戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)關(guān)鍵因素的這項(xiàng)技術(shù)上，美國(guó)不再占據(jù)戰(zhàn)略壟斷地位。

The Pentagon’s plan to bring A.I. to the military is taking shape as Chinese researchers assert themselves in the nascent technology field. And that shift is reflected in surprising commercial advances in artificial intelligence among Chinese companies.

在五角大樓正醞釀把AI引入軍隊(duì)的計(jì)劃時(shí)，中國(guó)的研究人員也正在這個(gè)新興科技領(lǐng)域大步前進(jìn)。這種轉(zhuǎn)變反映在了中國(guó)公司在人工智能領(lǐng)域出人意料的商業(yè)發(fā)展中。

Last year, for example, Microsoft researchers proclaimed that the company had created software capable of matching human skills in understanding speech.

比如在去年，微軟(Microsoft)的研究人員宣布該公司開(kāi)發(fā)出的軟件，具備了能夠與人類匹敵的語(yǔ)音理解能力。

Although they boasted that they had outperformed their United States competitors, a well-known A.I. researcher who leads a Silicon Valley laboratory for the Chinese web services company Baidu gently taunted Microsoft, noting that Baidu had achieved similar accuracy with the Chinese language two years earlier.

盡管他們夸耀超過(guò)了美國(guó)國(guó)內(nèi)的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)對(duì)手，但著名的AI研究人員、中國(guó)網(wǎng)絡(luò)服務(wù)公司百度的硅谷實(shí)驗(yàn)室負(fù)責(zé)人溫和地奚落了微軟，指出百度兩年前就在中文上達(dá)到了類似的準(zhǔn)確度。

That, in a nutshell, is the challenge the United States faces as it embarks on a new military strategy founded on the assumption of its continued superiority in technologies such as robotics and artificial intelligence.

簡(jiǎn)而言之，這是美國(guó)在開(kāi)始實(shí)施一項(xiàng)新的軍事戰(zhàn)略之際面臨的挑戰(zhàn)。該戰(zhàn)略正是基于美國(guó)繼續(xù)在機(jī)器人和人工智能這類技術(shù)上占據(jù)優(yōu)勢(shì)這個(gè)假設(shè)。

First announced last year by Ashton B. Carter, President Barack Obama’s defense secretary, the “Third Offset” strategy provides a formula for maintaining a military advantage in the face of a renewed rivalry with China and Russia.

去年，貝拉克·奧巴馬(Barack Obama)總統(tǒng)的國(guó)防部長(zhǎng)阿什頓·B·卡特(Ashton B. Carter)首次宣布了這個(gè)名為“第三個(gè)抵消”(Third Offset)的戰(zhàn)略。它提供了一個(gè)在面對(duì)與中國(guó)和俄羅斯的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)重新興起時(shí)保持軍事優(yōu)勢(shì)的方案。

Well into the 1960s, the United States held a military advantage based on technological leadership in nuclear weapons. In the 1970s, that perceived lead shifted to smart weapons, based on brand-new Silicon Valley technologies like computer chips. Now, the nation’s leaders plan on retaining that military advantage with a significant commitment to artificial intelligence and robotic weapons.

進(jìn)入60年代后，美國(guó)憑借在核武器技術(shù)上的領(lǐng)先地位占據(jù)了軍事優(yōu)勢(shì)。到了70年代，在計(jì)算機(jī)芯片等全新硅谷技術(shù)的基礎(chǔ)上，這種為人所知的領(lǐng)先地位轉(zhuǎn)移到了智能武器領(lǐng)域?，F(xiàn)在，美國(guó)領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人計(jì)劃通過(guò)大力發(fā)展人工智能和自動(dòng)控制武器來(lái)保持這種軍事優(yōu)勢(shì)。

But the global technology balance of power is shifting. From the 1950s through the 1980s, the United States carefully guarded its advantage. It led the world in computer and material science technology, and it jealously hoarded its leadership with military secrecy and export controls.

但全球科技均勢(shì)正在發(fā)生變化。從50年代到80年代，美國(guó)謹(jǐn)慎地保護(hù)著自己的優(yōu)勢(shì)。它在計(jì)算機(jī)和材料科學(xué)技術(shù)領(lǐng)域走在全球的前列，通過(guò)軍事機(jī)密和出口控制小心地保持著自己的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)地位。

In the late 1980s, the emergence of the inexpensive and universally available microchip upended the Pentagon’s ability to control technological progress. Now, rather than trickling down from military and advanced corporate laboratories, today’s new technologies increasingly come from consumer electronics firms. Put simply, the companies that make the fastest computers are the same ones that put things under our Christmas trees.

80年代末，廉價(jià)且普遍可獲得的微芯片的出現(xiàn)顛覆了五角大樓控制技術(shù)進(jìn)步的能力?，F(xiàn)如今的新技術(shù)越來(lái)越多地出自消費(fèi)類電子企業(yè)，而非軍方和先進(jìn)的企業(yè)實(shí)驗(yàn)室的擴(kuò)散效應(yīng)。簡(jiǎn)而言之，一些公司既生產(chǎn)速度最快的計(jì)算機(jī)，也生產(chǎn)放在圣誕樹(shù)下面的產(chǎn)品。

As consumer electronics manufacturing has moved to Asia, both Chinese companies and the nation’s government laboratories are making major investments in artificial intelligence.

隨著消費(fèi)類電子產(chǎn)品制造轉(zhuǎn)移至亞洲，中國(guó)的公司和政府的實(shí)驗(yàn)室都對(duì)人工智能大舉投資。

The advance of the Chinese was underscored last month when Qi Lu, a veteran Microsoft artificial intelligence specialist, left the company to become chief operating officer at Baidu, where he will oversee the company’s ambitious plan to become a global leader in A.I.

上月，當(dāng)微軟資深的人工智能專家陸奇離開(kāi)微軟，出任百度首席運(yùn)營(yíng)官時(shí)，再次突顯了中國(guó)在這方面的進(jìn)步。陸奇將負(fù)責(zé)該公司成為全球AI領(lǐng)導(dǎo)者的宏偉計(jì)劃。

And last year, Tencent, developer of the mobile app WeChat, a Facebook competitor, created an artificial intelligence research laboratory and began investing in United States-based A.I. companies.

去年，開(kāi)發(fā)出了Facebook的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)對(duì)手、移動(dòng)應(yīng)用微信的騰訊公司成立了一個(gè)人工智能研究實(shí)驗(yàn)室，并開(kāi)始投資美國(guó)的AI公司。

Rapid Chinese progress has touched off a debate in the United States between military strategists and technologists over whether the Chinese are merely imitating advances or are engaged in independent innovation that will soon overtake the United States in the field.

中國(guó)進(jìn)步迅速，使美國(guó)的軍事戰(zhàn)略專家和科技專家圍繞中國(guó)究竟只是在模仿進(jìn)步，還是在進(jìn)行很快便會(huì)在該領(lǐng)域超過(guò)美國(guó)的獨(dú)立創(chuàng)新展開(kāi)了一場(chǎng)爭(zhēng)論。

“The Chinese leadership is increasingly thinking about how to ensure they are competitive in the next wave of technologies,” said Adam Segal, a specialist in emerging technologies and national security at the Council on Foreign Relations.

“中國(guó)領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人正在越來(lái)越多地思考如何確保自己在下一波科技浪潮中具備競(jìng)爭(zhēng)力，”對(duì)外關(guān)系委員會(huì)(Council on Foreign Relations)新興技術(shù)和國(guó)家安全問(wèn)題專家亞當(dāng)·謝加爾(Adam Segal)說(shuō)。

In August, the state-run China Daily reported that the country had embarked on the development of a cruise missile system with a “high level” of artificial intelligence. The new system appears to be a response to a missile the United States Navy is expected to deploy in 2018 to counter growing Chinese military influence in the Pacific.

8月，官方報(bào)紙《中國(guó)日?qǐng)?bào)》報(bào)道稱中國(guó)已開(kāi)始研發(fā)具備“高水平”人工智能的巡航導(dǎo)彈系統(tǒng)。新系統(tǒng)似乎是對(duì)美國(guó)海軍為了抗衡中國(guó)在太平洋地區(qū)日漸增加的軍事影響力，預(yù)計(jì)在2018年部署的一種導(dǎo)彈的回應(yīng)。

Known as the Long Range Anti-Ship Missile, or L.R.A.S.M., it is described as a “semiautonomous” weapon. According to the Pentagon, this means that though targets are chosen by human soldiers, the missile uses artificial intelligence technology to avoid defenses and make final targeting decisions.

該導(dǎo)彈被稱作遠(yuǎn)程反艦導(dǎo)彈，或LRASM。對(duì)它的描述是“半自動(dòng)”武器。據(jù)五角大樓稱，這意味著盡管攻擊目標(biāo)由士兵人為選取，但導(dǎo)彈會(huì)利用人工智能技術(shù)避開(kāi)防御，并做出最終的確定攻擊目標(biāo)決定。

The new Chinese weapon typifies a strategy known as “remote warfare,” said John Arquilla, a military strategist at the Naval Post Graduate School in Monterey, Calif. The idea is to build large fleets of small ships that deploy missiles, to attack an enemy with larger ships, like aircraft carriers.

加利福尼亞州蒙特雷海軍研究生院(Naval Postgraduate School)的軍事戰(zhàn)略專家約翰·阿爾奎拉(John Arquilla)說(shuō)，中國(guó)的新武器體現(xiàn)了一種名為“遠(yuǎn)程戰(zhàn)”的戰(zhàn)略。該戰(zhàn)略的理念是，通過(guò)打造由部署導(dǎo)彈的小型船只組成的大艦隊(duì)，來(lái)攻擊配備更大船只的敵人，如航母。

“They are making their machines more creative,” he said. “A little bit of automation gives the machines a tremendous boost.”

“他們發(fā)明機(jī)器時(shí)更有創(chuàng)意，”他說(shuō)。“少量自動(dòng)化就能讓那些機(jī)器得到巨大的提升。”

Whether or not the Chinese will quickly catch the United States in artificial intelligence and robotics technologies is a matter of intense discussion and disagreement in the United States.

在美國(guó)，中國(guó)會(huì)不會(huì)在人工智能和機(jī)器人技術(shù)上迅速趕上美國(guó)這個(gè)問(wèn)題被熱烈討論，各方分歧嚴(yán)重。

Andrew Ng, chief scientist at Baidu, said the United States may be too myopic and self-confident to understand the speed of the Chinese competition.

百度首席科學(xué)家吳恩達(dá)(Andrew Ng)稱，美國(guó)可能有些過(guò)于目光短淺和自信，理解不了中國(guó)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)的速度。

“There are many occasions of something being simultaneously invented in China and elsewhere, or being invented first in China and then later making it overseas,” he said. “But then U.S. media reports only on the U.S. version. This leads to a misperception of those ideas having been first invented in the U.S.”

“很多時(shí)候，中國(guó)和其他地方都在同時(shí)發(fā)明某樣?xùn)|西，或是先在中國(guó)發(fā)明出來(lái)了，后來(lái)傳到了海外，”他說(shuō)。“但美國(guó)媒體只報(bào)道美國(guó)的版本。這導(dǎo)致外界誤以為那些想法是現(xiàn)在美國(guó)發(fā)明出來(lái)的。”

A key example of Chinese progress that goes largely unreported in the United States is Iflytek, an artificial intelligence company that has focused on speech recognition and understanding natural language. The company has won international competitions both in speech synthesis and in translation between Chinese- and English-language texts.

科大訊飛就是中國(guó)的進(jìn)步在美國(guó)基本未獲報(bào)道的一個(gè)重要例子。這家人工智能公司側(cè)重語(yǔ)音識(shí)別和自然語(yǔ)言理解，在多項(xiàng)國(guó)際語(yǔ)音合成和中英文文本互譯比賽中獲獎(jiǎng)。

The company, which Chinese technologists said has a close relationship with the government for development of surveillance technology, said it is working with the Ministry of Science and Technology on a “Humanoid Answering Robot.”

該公司自稱正在與科技部合作，研發(fā)一款“人形應(yīng)答機(jī)器人”。中國(guó)的科技工作者則表示，該公司在監(jiān)控技術(shù)的研發(fā)上同政府關(guān)系密切。

“Our goal is to send the machine to attend the college entrance examination, and to be admitted by key national universities in the near future,” said Qingfeng Liu, Iflytek’s chief executive.

“我們的目標(biāo)是在不久的將來(lái)讓它去參加高考，被重點(diǎn)大學(xué)錄取，”科大訊飛董事長(zhǎng)劉慶峰說(shuō)。

The speed of the Chinese technologists, compared to United States and European artificial intelligence developers, is noteworthy. Last April, Gansha Wu, then the director of Intel’s laboratory in China, left his post and began assembling a team of researchers from Intel and Google to build a self-driving car company. Last month, the company, Uisee Technology, met its goal — taking a demonstration to the International Consumer Electronics Show in Las Vegas — after just nine months of work.

相比于美國(guó)和歐洲的人工智能研發(fā)人員，中國(guó)科技工作者的速度值得關(guān)注。去年4月，為了創(chuàng)建一個(gè)自動(dòng)駕駛汽車公司，時(shí)任英特爾(Intel)中國(guó)研究院院長(zhǎng)的吳甘沙離職，并開(kāi)始組建一個(gè)由來(lái)自英特爾和谷歌的研究人員組成的團(tuán)隊(duì)。上月，這家名為馭勢(shì)科技(Uisee Technology)的公司在工作近九個(gè)月后便實(shí)現(xiàn)了自己的目標(biāo)：在拉斯維加斯的國(guó)際消費(fèi)類電子產(chǎn)品展覽會(huì)(International Consumer Electronics Show)上進(jìn)行了概念車的展示。

“The A.I. technologies, including machine vision, sensor fusion, planning and control, on our car are completely home-brewed,” Mr. Wu said. “We wrote every line by ourselves.”

“在我們的汽車上的AI技術(shù)，包括機(jī)器視覺(jué)、傳感器融合、計(jì)劃與控制，全都是自家開(kāi)發(fā)，”吳甘沙說(shuō)。“每一行代碼都是我們自己寫(xiě)的。”

Their first vehicle is intended for controlled environments like college and corporate campuses, with the ultimate goal of designing a shared fleet of autonomous taxis.

他們的第一款車面向的是大學(xué)和企業(yè)園區(qū)這樣的受控環(huán)境，最終的目標(biāo)是設(shè)計(jì)一個(gè)共享的自動(dòng)出租車隊(duì)。

The United States’ view of China’s advance may be starting to change. Last October, a White House report on artificial intelligence included several footnotes suggesting that China is now publishing more research than scholars here.

美國(guó)對(duì)中國(guó)的發(fā)展也許正在建立新的認(rèn)識(shí)。去年10月，一份關(guān)于人工智能的白宮報(bào)告有多個(gè)腳注提到，中國(guó)發(fā)表的研究論文數(shù)量已經(jīng)超過(guò)了美國(guó)學(xué)者。

Still, some scientists say the quantity of academic papers does not tell us much about innovation. And there are indications that China has only recently begun to make A.I. a priority in its military systems.

然而一些科學(xué)家說(shuō)，學(xué)術(shù)論文的數(shù)量對(duì)我們了解創(chuàng)新?tīng)顩r并沒(méi)有太多幫助。而且有跡象表明，中國(guó)只是最近才開(kāi)始將AI列為其軍事系統(tǒng)的一個(gè)重點(diǎn)。

“I think while China is definitely making progress in A.I. systems, it is nowhere close to matching the U.S.,” said Abhijit Singh, a former Indian military officer who is now a naval weapons analyst at the Observer Research Foundation in New Delhi.

“我認(rèn)為中國(guó)在AI系統(tǒng)上絕對(duì)是在進(jìn)步的，但跟美國(guó)還差得很遠(yuǎn)，”新德里觀察家研究基金會(huì)(Observer Research Foundation)海軍武器分析師、曾在印度軍方任職的阿皮季德·辛格(Abhijit Singh)說(shuō)。

Chinese researchers who are directly involved in artificial intelligence work in China have a very different view.

在中國(guó)親身參與了人工智能工作的中國(guó)研究人員卻有著不同看法。

“It is indisputable that Chinese authors are a significant force in A.I., and their position has been increasing drastically in the past five years,” said Kai-Fu Lee, a Taiwanese-born artificial intelligence researcher who played a key role in establishing both Microsoft’s and Google’s China-based research laboratories.

“中國(guó)論文作者是AI領(lǐng)域的一股強(qiáng)大力量，并且他們的地位在過(guò)去五年有大幅提高，這一點(diǎn)毋庸置疑，”臺(tái)灣出生的人工智能研究者李開(kāi)復(fù)說(shuō)，他曾在微軟和谷歌的中國(guó)研究實(shí)驗(yàn)室的創(chuàng)建上發(fā)揮了關(guān)鍵作用。

Mr. Lee, now a venture capitalist who invests in both China and the United States, acknowledged that the United States is still the global leader but believes that the gap has drastically narrowed. His firm, Sinovation Ventures, has recently raised $675 million to invest in A.I. both in the United States and in China.

李開(kāi)復(fù)如今是一名風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資者，在中國(guó)和美國(guó)都有投資項(xiàng)目，他承認(rèn)美國(guó)依然是全球領(lǐng)導(dǎo)者，但他相信，兩者之間的距離已經(jīng)大幅縮小了。他的公司創(chuàng)新工場(chǎng)最近在美國(guó)和中國(guó)的人工智能領(lǐng)域投入了6.75億美元。

“Using a chess analogy,” he said, “we might say that grandmasters are still largely North American, but Chinese occupy increasingly greater portions of the master-level A.I. scientists.”

“用國(guó)際象棋打個(gè)比方，”他說(shuō)，“我們也許會(huì)說(shuō)，特級(jí)大師大部分仍在北美，但中國(guó)擁有越來(lái)越多的大師級(jí)AI科學(xué)家。”

What is not in dispute is that the close ties between Silicon Valley and China both in terms of investment and research, and the open nature of much of the American A.I. research community, has made the most advanced technology easily available to China.

有一點(diǎn)是沒(méi)有爭(zhēng)議的，硅谷和中國(guó)在投資和研究上有著緊密聯(lián)系，而美國(guó)AI研究社區(qū)的開(kāi)放性也意味著，最尖端的技術(shù)可以輕易為中國(guó)所用。

In addition to setting up research outposts such as Baidu’s Silicon Valley A.I. Laboratory, Chinese citizens, including government employees, routinely audit Stanford University artificial intelligence courses.

除了像百度這樣在硅谷創(chuàng)設(shè)人工智能實(shí)驗(yàn)室，包括政府雇員在內(nèi)的中國(guó)公民頻頻出現(xiàn)在斯坦福大學(xué)的人工智能課堂上。

One Stanford professor, Richard Socher, said it was easy to spot the Chinese nationals because after the first few weeks, his students would often skip class, choosing instead to view videos of the lectures. The Chinese auditors, on the other hand, would continue to attend, taking their seats at the front of the classroom.

斯坦福教授理查德·索科爾(Richard Socher)說(shuō)，中國(guó)人很容易分辨，因?yàn)樵谧畛鯉字苓^(guò)后，他的學(xué)生往往會(huì)逃課，選擇看授課視頻。而中國(guó)的旁聽(tīng)生會(huì)繼續(xù)來(lái)上課，坐在教室前排。

Artificial intelligence is only one part of the tech frontier where China is advancing rapidly.

中國(guó)在尖端技術(shù)領(lǐng)域突飛猛進(jìn)，人工智能只是其中一項(xiàng)。

Last year, China also brought the world’s fastest supercomputer, the Sunway TaihuLight, online, supplanting another Chinese model that had been the world’s fastest. The new supercomputer is thought to be part of a broader Chinese push to begin driving innovation, a shift from its role as a manufacturing hub for components and devices designed in the United States and elsewhere.

去年，中國(guó)還啟用了世界上最快的超級(jí)計(jì)算機(jī)“神威·太湖之光”，取代了另一個(gè)曾經(jīng)是世界最快的中國(guó)機(jī)型。這臺(tái)新超級(jí)計(jì)算機(jī)被認(rèn)為是中國(guó)開(kāi)始推動(dòng)創(chuàng)新的廣泛行動(dòng)的一部分，他們要擺脫原來(lái)的角色，即作為一個(gè)制造中心，去生產(chǎn)美國(guó)等其他國(guó)家設(shè)計(jì)的設(shè)備和零部件。

In a reflection of the desire to become a center of innovation, the processors in the new computer are of a native Chinese design. The earlier supercomputer, the Tianhe 2, was powered by Intel’s Xeon processors; after it came online, the United States banned further export of the chips to China, in hopes of limiting the Chinese push into supercomputing.

新計(jì)算機(jī)的處理器是由中國(guó)自主設(shè)計(jì)的，從中可以看到要成為創(chuàng)新中心的意愿。此前的超級(jí)計(jì)算機(jī)“天河二號(hào)”使用的是英特爾的至強(qiáng)處理器;在該計(jì)算機(jī)上線后，美國(guó)禁止了針對(duì)中國(guó)的相關(guān)芯片出口，以期限制中國(guó)在超級(jí)計(jì)算機(jī)領(lǐng)域的發(fā)展。

The new supercomputer, like similar machines anywhere in the world, has a variety of uses, and does not by itself represent a direct military challenge. It can be used to model climate change situations, for instance, or to perform analysis of large data sets.

和世界上的其他超級(jí)計(jì)算機(jī)一樣，這臺(tái)計(jì)算機(jī)有多種用途，本身并非一種直接的軍事挑戰(zhàn)。例如它可以用于氣候變化狀況的建模，或進(jìn)行大型數(shù)據(jù)集分析。

But similar advances in high-performance computing being made by the Chinese could be used to push ahead with machine-learning research, which would have military applications, along with more typical defense functions, such as simulating nuclear weapons tests or breaking the encryption used by adversaries.

但是中國(guó)在高性能計(jì)算領(lǐng)域的類似進(jìn)步可能會(huì)用于推動(dòng)機(jī)器學(xué)習(xí)研究，那將是可以用于軍事的，此外還有一些典型的防務(wù)功能，比如模擬核武器測(cè)試，或破解敵方的加密。

Moreover, while there appear to be relatively cozy relationships between the Chinese government and commercial technology efforts, the same cannot be said about the United States. The Pentagon recently restarted its beachhead in Silicon Valley, known as the Defense Innovation Unit Experimental facility, or DIUx. It is an attempt to rethink bureaucratic United States government contracting practices in terms of the faster and more fluid style of Silicon Valley.

另外，中國(guó)政府和商業(yè)技術(shù)項(xiàng)目之間有著相對(duì)融洽的關(guān)系，美國(guó)則不然。五角大樓近來(lái)重啟了自己在硅谷的灘頭陣地國(guó)防創(chuàng)新實(shí)驗(yàn)小組(Defense Innovation Unit Experimental，簡(jiǎn)稱DIUx)。此舉意在針對(duì)硅谷更迅速、更多變的風(fēng)格，反思美國(guó)政府官僚機(jī)構(gòu)的外包實(shí)踐。

The government has not yet undone the damage to its relationship with the Valley brought about by Edward J. Snowden’s revelations about the National Security Agency’s surveillance practices. Many Silicon Valley firms remain hesitant to be seen as working too closely with the Pentagon out of fear of losing access to China’s market.

愛(ài)德華·J·斯諾登(Edward J. Snowden)對(duì)國(guó)家安全局(National Security Agency)監(jiān)控措施的揭露，給硅谷和政府的關(guān)系造成了至今尚未修復(fù)的損害。許多硅谷公司仍然不太愿意與五角大樓走得太近，擔(dān)心那樣會(huì)讓自己失去進(jìn)入中國(guó)市場(chǎng)的資格。

“There are smaller companies, the companies who sort of decided that they’re going to be in the defense business, like a Palantir,” said Peter W. Singer, an expert in the future of war at New America, a think tank in Washington, referring to the Palo Alto, Calif., start-up founded in part by the venture capitalist Peter Thiel. “But if you’re thinking about the big, iconic tech companies, they can’t become defense contractors and still expect to get access to the Chinese market.”

“有一些比較小的公司，算是決定了要涉足國(guó)防業(yè)務(wù)，比如Palantir，”華盛頓智庫(kù)“新美利堅(jiān)”(New America)未來(lái)戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)專家彼得·W·辛格(Peter W. Singer)說(shuō)，他所提到的是一家由風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資者彼得·蒂爾(Peter Thiel)參與創(chuàng)辦的加州帕洛阿爾托創(chuàng)業(yè)公司。“但是如果你去看那些大型的、著名的科技公司，它們?nèi)绻恿藝?guó)防合同，就別指望進(jìn)入中國(guó)市場(chǎng)了。”

Those concerns are real for Silicon Valley.

這種擔(dān)憂在硅谷是很真實(shí)存在的。

“No one sort of overtly says that, because the Pentagon can’t say it’s about China, and the tech companies can’t,” Mr. Singer said. “But it’s there in the background.”

“沒(méi)人會(huì)公開(kāi)說(shuō)這些，因?yàn)槲褰谴髽遣荒苓@么說(shuō)中國(guó)，科技公司也不能，”辛格說(shuō)。“但是在背后就是有這個(gè)問(wèn)題。”