羅斯福向國(guó)會(huì)報(bào)告雅爾塔會(huì)議情況的演講

羅斯福向國(guó)會(huì)報(bào)告雅爾塔會(huì)議情況的演講 英文版

Address to Congress on the Yalta Conference

March 1, 1945

I hope that you will pardon me for the unusual posture of sitting down during the presentation of what I want to say, but I know that you will realize it makes it a lot easier for me in not having to carry about ten pounds of steel around on the bottom of my legs and also because of the fact that I have just completed a 14,000-mile trip.

First of all, I want to say that it is good to be home. It has been a long journey and I hope you all will agree that it has been, so far, a fruitful one. Speaking in all frankness, the question of whether it is entirely fruitful or not lies to a great extent in your hands. For unless you here, in the halls of the American Congress—with the support of the American people—concur in the general conclusions reached in the place called Yalta, and give them your active support, the meeting will not have produced lasting results.

And that is why I have come before you at the earliest hour I could after my return. I want to make a personal report to you, and at the same time to the people of the country. Many months of earnest work are ahead of us all, and I should like to feel that when the last stone is laid on the structure of international peace, it will be an achievement for which all of us in America have worked steadfastly and unselfishly-together.

I am returning from this trip, which took me so far, refreshed and inspired. I was well the entire time. I was not ill for a second until I arrived back in Washington. There I heard all of the rumors which occurred in my absence. Yes, I returned from the trip refreshed and inspired—the Roosevelts are not, as you may suspect, averse to travel; we seem to thrive on it.

And far away as I was, I was kept constantly informed of affairs in the United States. The modern miracle of rapid communications has made this world very small; we must always bear in mind that fact when we speak or think of international relations. I received a steady stream of messages from Washington, I might say not only from the executive branch with all its departments, but also from the legislative branch—its two departments. And, except where radio silence was necessary for security purposes, I could continuously send messages any place in the world. And, of course, in a grave emergency we could even have risked the breaking of the security rule.

I come from the Crimean Conference with a firm belief that we have made a good start on the road to a world of peace.

There were two main purposes in this Crimean Conference. The first was to bring defeat to Germany with the greatest possible speed and with the smallest possible loss of Allied men. That purpose is now being carried out in great force. The German army and the German people are feeling the ever increasing might of our fighting men and of the Allied armies and every hour gives us added pride in the heroic advance of our troops in Germany, on German soil, toward a meeting with the gallant Red Army. The second purpose was to continue to build the foundation for an international accord which would bring order and security after the chaos of the war and would give some assurance of lasting peace among the nations of the world. In that goal, toward that goal, a tremendous stride was made.

After Teheran, a little over a year ago, there were long-range military plans laid by the chiefs of staff of the three most powerful nations. Among the civilian leaders at Teheran, however, at that time, there were only exchanges of views and expressions of opinion. No political arrangements were made and none was attempted. At the Crimean Conference, however, the time had come for getting down to specific cases in the political field. There was on all sides at this conference an enthusiastic effort to reach an agreement.

Since the time of Teheran, a year ago, there had developed among all of us a—what shall I call it—a greater facility in negotiating with each other, which augurs well for the peace of the world. We know each other better. I have never for an instant-wavered in my belief that an agreement to insure world peace and security can be reached.

There are a number of things that we did at the conference that was definite. For instance, the lapses of time between Teheran and Yalta without conferences of civilian representatives of the three major powers have proved to be too long—fourteen months. During this long period local problems were permitted to become acute in places like Poland and Greece and Italy and Yugoslavia. Therefore we decided at Yalta that, even if circumstances made it impossible for the heads of the three Governments to do it, to meet more often in the future, and to make that sure by arranging that there would be frequent personal contacts for the exchange of views between the Secretaries of State, the Foreign Ministers of these three powers. We arranged for periodic meetings, at intervals of three or four months. I feel very confident that under this arrangement there will be no recurrence of the incidents which this winter disturbed the friends of world—wide cooperation and collaboration.

When we met at Yalta, in addition to laying our strategic and tactical plans for the complete, final military victory over Germany, there were other problems of vital political consequence.

For instance, there were the problems of occupational control of Germany after victory, the complete destruction of her military power, and the assurance that neither the Nazis nor Prussian militarism could again be revived to threaten the peace and civilization of the world.

Secondly, again for example, there was the settlement of the few differences which remained among us with respect to the international security organization after the Dumbarton Oaks Conference. As you remember at that time, I said afterward we had agreed 90 per cent. A pretty good percentage. I think the other 10 per cent was ironed out at Yalta.

Thirdly, there were the general political and economic problems common to all of the areas that would be in the future, or which had been, liberated from the Nazi yoke. There are special problems—we over here find it difficult to understand the ramifications of many of these problems in foreign lands. But we are trying to.

Fourth, there were the special problems created by a few instances, such as Poland and Yugoslavia.

Days were spent in discussing these momentous matters. We argued freely and frankly across the table. But at the end, on every point, unanimous agreement was reached. And more important even than the agreement of words, I may say we achieved a unity of thought and a way of getting along together.

Of course we know that it was Hitler’s hope—and German war lords’—that we would not agree, that some slight crack might appear in the solid wall of Allied unity, a crack that would give him and his fellow-gangsters one last hope of escaping their just doom. That is the objective for which his propaganda machine has been working for many months.

But Hitler has failed.

Never before have the major Allies been more closely united—not only in—their war aims but also in their peace aims. And they are determined to continue to be united—to be united with each other—and with all peace-loving nations—so that the ideal of lasting peace will become a reality.

The Soviet, British and United States Chiefs of Staff held daily meetings with each other, they conferred frequently with Marshal Stalin, with Prime Minister Churchill and with me, on the problem of coordinating the strategic and tactical efforts of the Allied powers. They completed their plans for the final knockout blow to Germany.

At the time of the Teheran Conference the Russian front, for instance, was removed so far from the American and British fronts that, while certain long-range strategic cooperation was possible, there could be no tactical, day-by-day coordination. They were too far apart. But Russian troops have now crossed Poland, they are fighting on the eastern soil of Germany herself, British and American troops are now on German soil close to the Rhine River in the west.

It is a different situation today from what it was fourteen months ago. A closer tactical liaison has become possible—for the first time in Europe, and, in the Crimean Conference, that was something else that was accomplished.Provision was made for daily exchange of information between the armies under command of General Eisenhower, on the western front, and those armies under the command of the Soviet marshals on that long eastern front, and also with our armies in Italy—without the necessity of going through the Chiefs of Staff in Washington or London, as in the past.

You have seen one result of this exchange of information in the recent bombing by American and English aircraft of points which are directly related to the Russian advance on Berlin. From now on, American and British heavy bombers will be used—in the day-by-day tactics of the war—and we have begun to realize, I think, that there is all the difference in the world between tactics on the one side and strategy on the other. Day by day tactical war, in direct support of Soviet armies, as well as in the support of our own in the Western Front. They are now engaged in bombing and strafing in order to hamper the movement of German reserves, German materials, to the Eastern and Western Fronts from other parts of Germany or from Italy.

Arrangements have been made for the most effective distribution of all available material and transportation to the places where they can best be used in the combined war effort—American, British and Russian.

Details of these plans and arrangements are military secrets. But they are going to hasten the day of the final collapse of Germany. The Nazis are learning about some of them already, to their sorrow, and I think all three of us at the conference felt that they will learn more about them tomorrow and the next day—and the day after that. There will be no respite for these attacks. We will not desist for one moment until unconditional surrender.

You know I have always felt that common sense prevails in the long run, quiet overnight thinking. I think that’s true in Germany, just as much as it is here. The German people, as well as the German soldier, must realize the sooner they give up and surrender, surrender by groups or by individuals, the sooner their present agony will be over. They must realize that only with complete surrender can they begin to re-establish themselves as people whom the world might accept as decent neighbors.

We made it clear again at Yalta, and I now repeat—that unconditional surrender does not mean the destruction or the enslavement of the German people. The Nazi leaders have deliberately withheld that part of the Yalta declaration from the German press and radio. They seek to convince the people of Germany that the Yalta declaration does mean slavery and destruction for them—they are working at it day and night—for that is how the Nazis hope to save their own skins, how to deceive their people into continued and useless resistance. We did, however, make it clear at the Conference just what unconditional surrender does mean to Germany.

It means the temporary control of Germany by Great Britain, Russia, France and the United States. Each of these nations will occupy and control a separate zone of Germany—and the administration of the four zones will be coordinated—coordinated in Berlin by a control council composed of representatives of the four nations.

Unconditional surrender means something else. It means the end of nazism and of the Nazi party—and all of its barbaric laws and institutions. It means the termination of all militaristic influence in public, private and cultural life of Germany. It means for the Nazi war criminals a punishment that is speedy and just—and severe. It means the complete disarmament of Germany, the destruction of its militarism, of its military equipment; the end of its production of armament; the dispersal of all armed forces; the permanent dismemberment of the German General Staff, which has so often shattered the peace of the world. It means that Germany will have to make reparations—reparations in kind for the damage which has been done to the innocent victims of its aggression.

By compelling reparations in kind—in plants, in machinery, in rolling stock and raw materials—we shall avoid the mistake that we and other people made after the last war, the demanding of reparations in the form of money, which Germany could never pay. We do not want the German people to starve, or to become a burden on the rest of the world. Our objective in handling Germany is simple—it is to secure the peace of the rest of the world, now and in the future. Too much experience has shown that that objective is impossible if Germany is allowed to retain any ability to wage aggressive warfare.

Now these objectives will not hurt the German people. On the contrary, it will protect them from a repetition of the fate which the General Staff and Kaiserism imposed on them before and which Hitlerism is now imposing upon them again a hundredfold. It will be removing a cancer from the German body, which for generations has produced only misery and only pain for the whole world.

During my stay in Yalta I saw the kind of reckless, senseless fury, this terrible destruction, that comes out of German militarism. Yalta, on the Black Sea, had no military significance of any kind, and no defenses. Before the last war it had been a resort, a resort for people like czars, princes and aristocracy, and their hanger-one. However, after the war, after the Red Revolution, until the attack on the Soviet Union by Hitler a few years ago, the palaces, the villas of Yalta had been used as a rest and recreation center by the Russian people.

The Nazi officers took these former palaces and villas, took them over for their own use. They are the only reasons that the so-called former palace of the Czar was still habitable when we got there. It had been given, or had thought to have been given, to a German general for his own property and his own use. And when Yalta was so destroyed he kept soldiers there to protect what he thought would become his own nice villa.

It was a useful rest and recreation center for hundreds of thousands of Russian workers, farmers and their families, up to the time it was taken again by the Germans. The Nazi officers took these places for their own use, and when the Red Army forced the Nazis out of the Crimea, just almost a year ago—last April, I think it was—all the villas were looted by the Nazis, and then nearly all of them were destroyed by bombs placed on the inside. And even the humblest of homes of Yalta were not spared. There was little left in Yalta except blank walls, ruins, destruction.

Sevastopol, that weather-fortified port, about forty or fifty miles away—there again was a scene of utter destruction—a large city with its great navy yards, its fortifications. I think less than a dozen buildings were left intact in the entire city. I had read about Warsaw and Lidice and Rotterdam and Coventry—but I saw Sevastopol and Yalta. And I know that there is not room enough on earth for both German militarism and Christian decency.

Of equal importance with the military arrangements at the Crimean Conference were the agreements reached with respect to a general international organization for lasting world peace. The foundations were laid at Dumbarton Oaks. There was one point, however, on which agreement was not reached. It involved the procedure of voting, of voting in the Security Council. I want to try to make it clear by making it simple. It took me hours and hours to get the thing straight in my own mind. At the Crimea Conference the Americans made a proposal on this subject which, after full discussion, I am glad to say, was unanimously adopted by the other two nations.

It is not yet possible to announce the terms of it publicly, but it will be in a short time. With respect to voting, I made known, I think and I hope, that you will find them a fair solution of this complicated and difficult problem. You might almost say it’s a legislative problem. They are founded in justice, and will go far to assure international cooperation in the maintenance of peace.

There is going to be held in San Francisco a meeting of all United Nations of the world, on the 25th of April, next month. There, we all hope, and confidently expect, to execute a definite charter of organization upon which the peace of the world will be preserved and the forces of aggression permanently outlawed.

This time we are not making the mistake of waiting until the end of the war to set up the machinery of peace. This time, as we fight together to win the war finally, we work together to keep it from happening again.

As you know, I have always been a believer in the document called the Constitution of the United States. I spent a good deal of time in educating two other nations of the world in the Constitution of the United States. The charter has to be, and should be, approved by the Senate of the United; States under the Constitution. I think the other nations all know it now—I am aware of that fact, and now all the other nations are, and we hope that the Senate will approve of what is set forth as Charter of the United Nations, when they all come together in San Francisco, next month.

The Senate of the United States, through its appropriate representatives; has been kept continuously advised of the program of this Government in the creation of the International Security Organization. The Senate and the House will both be represented at the San Francisco Conference. The Congressional delegates will consist of an equal number, and the Senatorial will consist of an equal number of Republicans and Democratic members. The American delegation is—in every sense of the word—bipartisan.

But I think that world peace is not exactly a party question—I think that Republicans want peace just as much as Democrats. It is not a party question any more than is military victory. When our Republic was threatened, first by the Nazi clutch for world conquest back in 1940, and then by the Japanese treachery in 1941, partisanship and politics were laid aside by nearly every American; and every resource was dedicated to our common safety. The same consecration to the cause of peace will be expected, I think, by every patriotic American, by every human soul overseas, too.

The structure of world peace cannot be the work of one man, or one party, or one nation, it cannot be just an American peace, or British peace, or a Russian, or a French or a Chinese peace. It cannot be a peace of large nations—or of small nations. It must be a peace which rests on the cooperative effort of the whole world.

It cannot be what some people think—a structure of complete perfection at first. But it can be a peace, and it will be a peace, based on the sound and just principles of the Atlantic Charter—on the concept of the dignity of the human being—and on the guarantees of tolerance and freedom of religious worship.

As the Allied Armies have marched to military victory, they have liberated peoples whose liberties had been crushed by the Nazis for four long years, whose economy had been reduced to ruins by Nazi despoilers. There have been instances of political confusion and unrest in these liberated areas—that is not unexpected—as in Greece or in Poland or in Yugoslavia, and maybe more. Worse than that, there actually began to grow in some of these places queer ideas of “spheres of influence” which were incompatible with the basic principles of international collaboration. If allowed to go on unchecked these developments might have had tragic results, in time. It is fruitless to try to place the blame for this situation on one particular nation or another. It is the kind of development which is almost inevitable unless the major powers of the world continue without interruption to work together and assume joint responsibility for the solution of problems which may arise to endanger the peace of the world.

We met in the Crimea determined to settle this matter of liberated areas. Things that might happen that we can’t see at this moment might happen suddenly, unexpected, next week or next month. And I am happy to confirm to the Congress that we did arrive at a settlement—and incidentally, a unanimous settlement.

The three most powerful nations have agreed that the political and economic problems of any area liberated from Nazi conquest, or any former Axis satellite, are a joint responsibility of all three Governments. They will join together during the temporary period of instability after hostilities, to help the people of any liberated area, or of any former satellite state, to solve their own problems through firmly established democratic processes. They will endeavor to see—to see to it that interim governing, and the people who carry on the interim government between occupation by Germany and true independence—that such an interim government will be as representative as possible of all democratic elements in the population, and that free elections are held as soon as possible thereafter.

Responsibility for political conditions thousands of miles away can no longer be avoided, I think, by this great nation. Certainly, I don’t want to live to see another war. As I have said, the world is smaller—smaller every year. The United States now exerts a tremendous influence in the cause of peace. What we people over here are thinking and talking about is in the interest of peace, because it’s known all over the world. The slightest remark in either house of the Congress is known all over the world the following day. We will continue to exert that influence only if we are willing to continue to share in the responsibility for keeping the peace. It would be our own tragic loss if we were to shirk that responsibility.

Final decisions in these areas are going to be made jointly, therefore, and therefore they will often be a result of give-and-take compromise. The United States will not always have its way 100 per cent, nor will Russia, nor Great Britain. We shall not always have ideal answers, solutions to complicated international problems, even though we are determined continuously to strive toward that ideal. But I am sure that under the agreements reached at Yalta there will be a more stable political Europe than ever before.

Of course, once there has been a true expression out of the people’s will in any country, our immediate responsibility ends, with the exception only of such action as may be agreed on by the international security organization we will set up.

The United Nations must also begin to help these liberated areas adequately to reconstruct their economy—I don’t want them starving to death—so that they are ready to resume their places in the world. The Nazi war machine has stripped them of raw materials and machine tools, and trucks and locomotives and things like that. They have left the industry of these places stagnant, and much of the agricultural areas are unproductive—the Nazis have left a complete ruin, or a partial ruin, in their wake.

To start the wheels running again is not a mere matter of relief. It is to the national interest that all of us see to it that these liberated areas are again made self-supporting and productive, so that they do not need continuous relief from us. I can say that as an argument based on plain common sense.

One outstanding example of joint action by the three major Allied powers was the solution reached on Poland. The whole Polish question was a potential source of trouble in post-war Europe, as it had been some time before, and we came to the conference determined to find a common ground for its solution, and we did. Our objective was to help create a strong, independent and prosperous nation. That’s the thing we must always remember, those words, agreed to by Russia, by Britain and by me, the objective of making Poland a strong, independent and prosperous nation, with a Government ultimately to be selected by the Polish people themselves.

To achieve that objective it is necessary to provide for the formation of a new government, much more representative than had been possible while Poland was enslaved. Accordingly, steps were taken at Yalta to reorganize the existing provisional government in Poland on a broader democratic basis, so as to include democratic leaders now in Poland and those abroad. This new reorganized government will be recognized by all of us as the temporary government of Poland.

However, the new Polish provisional government of national unity will be pledged to hold a free election as soon as possible on the basis of universal suffrage and a secret ballot.

Throughout history Poland has been the corridor through which attacks on Russia have been made. Twice in this generation Germany has struck Russia through this corridor. To insure European security and world peace a strong and independent Poland is necessary to prevent that from happening again.

The decision with respect to the boundaries of Poland was quite a compromise. I didn’t agree with all of it by any means, but we could go as far as Britain wanted in certain areas, go as far as Russia wanted in certain areas and we could go as far as I wanted in certain areas. It was a compromise. The decision was a compromise under which the Poles will receive compensation in territory in the north and west in exchange for what they lose by the Curzon Line in the east.

The limits of the western border will be permanently fixed in the final peace conference. We know roughly that it will include in the new strong Poland quite a large slice of what is now called Germany. And it was agreed also that the new Poland will have a large and long coastline and many a new harbor. Also that East Prussia, most of it, will go to Poland and the corner of it will go to Russia. Also (what shall I call it) that the“amanuensis”of the Free State of Danzig, I think Danzig would be a lot better if it were Polish.

It is well known that the people east of the Curzon Line are predominantly White Russian and Ukrainian. They are not Polish, to a very great majority. And the people west of the line are predominantly Polish, except in that part of East Prussia and East Germany which will go to new Poland. As far back as 1919 the representatives of the Allies agreed that the Curzon Line represented a fair boundary between the two peoples. You must also remember there was no Poland, there had not been any Polish Government, before 1919, for a great many generations.

I am convinced that this agreement on Poland, under the circumstances, is the most hopeful agreement possible for a free, independent and prosperous Polish state.

Now the Crimean conference was a meeting of the three major military powers on whose shoulders rest the chief responsibility and burden of the war. Although, for this reason, another nation was not included—France was not a participant in the conference—no one should detract from the recognition that was accorded there to her role in the future of Europe and the future of the world. France has been invited to accept a zone of control in Germany, and to participate as a fourth member of the Allied control council of Germany. She has been invited to join as a sponsor of the international conference at San Francisco next month. She will be a permanent member of the International Security Council together with the other four major powers. And, finally, we have asked that France be associated with us in our joint responsibility over the liberated areas of Europe.

Agreement was reached on Yugoslavia, as announced in the communique and we hope that it is in process of fulfillment. But it is not only that, but in some other places we have to remember there are a great number of prima donnas in the world, all who wish to be heard. Before anything will be done we may have a little delay while we listen to more prima donnas.

Quite naturally, this conference concerned itself only with the European war and with the political problems of Europe, and not with the Pacific war.

In Malta, however, our combined British and American staffs made their plans to increase the attack against Japan. The Japanese war lords know that they are not being overlooked. They have felt the force of our B-29’s, and our carrier planes. They have felt the naval might of the United States, and do not appear very anxious to come out and try it again. The Japs know what it means to hear that “The United States Marines have landed.” And we can add, having Iwo Jima in mind, “that the situation is well in hand”.

They also know what is in store for the homeland of Japan now that General MacArthur has completed his magnificent march back to Manila, and that Admiral Nimitz is establishing his air bases right in their own back yard. But, lest somebody else lay off work in the United States, I can repeat what I have said, even in my sleep, a short sentence, “We haven’t won the wars yet,” with an “s” on wars. It is a long tough road to Tokyo. It is longer to go to Tokyo than it is to Berlin, in every sense of the word. The defeat of Germany will not mean the end of the war against Japan. On the contrary, we must be prepared for a long and costly struggle in the Pacific.

But the unconditional surrender of Japan is as essential as the defeat of Germany. I say that advisedly, with the thought in mind that that is especially true if our plans for world peace are to succeed. For Japanese militarism must be wiped out as thoroughly as German militarism.

On the way back from the Crimea I made arrangements to meet personally King Farouk of Egypt, Haile Selassie, Emperor of Ethiopia, and King Ibn Saud of Saudi Arabia. Our conversations had to do with matters of common interest. They will be of great mutual advantage because they gave us an opportunity of meeting and talking face to face, and of exchanging views in personal conversation instead of formal correspondence. Of the problems of Arabia, I learned more about that whole problem, the Moslem problem, the Jewish problem, by talking with Ibn Saud for five minutes than I could have learned in exchange of two or three dozen letters.

On my voyage, I had the benefit of seeing our Army and Navy and Air Force at work. All Americans, I think would feel proud, as proud of our armed forces as I am, if they could see and hear what I did. Against the most efficient professional leaders, sailors and airmen of an history, our men stood and fought and won. I think that this is our chance to see to it that the sons and grandsons of these gallant fighting men do not have to do it all over again in a few years.

The conference in the Crimea was a turning point, I hope, in our history, and therefore in the history of the world. It will soon be presented to the Senate and the American people, a great decision which will determine the fate of the United States, and I think therefore of the world, for generations to come. There can be no middle ground here. We shall have to take the responsibility for world collaboration, or we shall have to bear the responsibility for another world conflict.

I know that the word “planning” is not looked upon with favor in some circles. In domestic affairs, tragic mistakes have been made by reason of lack of planning, and, on the other hand, many great improvements in living, and many benefits to the human race, have been accomplished as a result of adequate, intelligent planning—reclamations of desert areas, developments of whole river valleys, provision for adequate housing. The same will be true in relations between nations. For the second time in the lives of most of us, this generation is face to face with the objective of preventing wars. To meet that objective, the nations of the world will either have a plan or they will not.

The groundwork of a plan has now been furnished, and has been submitted to humanity for discussion and decision. No plan is perfect. Whatever is adopted at San Francisco will doubtless have to be amended time and again over the years, just as our own Constitution has been. No one can say exactly how long any plan will last.

Peace can endure only so long as humanity really insists upon it, and is willing to work for and sacrifice for it.Twenty-five years ago American fighting men looked to the statesmen of the world to finish the work of peace for which they fought and suffered. We failed them then. We cannot fail them again, and expect the world to survive again.

I think the Crimean Conference was a successful effort by the three leading nations to find a common ground of peace. It spells, it ought to spell, the end of the system of unilateral action and exclusive alliances and spheres of influence and balances of power and all the other expedients that have been tried for centuries, and have always failed. We propose to substitute for all these a universal organization in which all peace-loving nations will finally have a chance to join.

And I am confident that the Congress and the American people will accept the results of this conference as the beginning of a permanent structure of peace upon which we can begin to build, under God, that better world in which our children and grandchildren, yours and mine, the children and grandchildren of the whole world, must live and can live.

And that, my friends, is the only message I can give you, for I feel very deeply, and I know that all of you are feeling it today and are going to feel it in the future.

羅斯福向國(guó)會(huì)報(bào)告雅爾塔會(huì)議情況的演講 中文版

1945年3月1日

希望你們可以原諒，我以這種不尋常的方式坐著來(lái)發(fā)表演說(shuō)。但是我知道你們會(huì)意識(shí)到，對(duì)我而言，這遠(yuǎn)比大腿根部綁上十磅鋼筋來(lái)得輕松。另外一個(gè)原因是我剛剛結(jié)束了一次一萬(wàn)四千英里的旅程。

首先，我想說(shuō)的是，回家的感覺(jué)很好。我們已經(jīng)經(jīng)歷長(zhǎng)途跋涉，我希望你們會(huì)有同感，到目前為止，成果頗豐。說(shuō)句老實(shí)話，這次會(huì)議是否真的碩果累累，很大程度上取決于你們。因?yàn)槿舨皇悄銈冊(cè)诿绹?guó)人民的支持下，在美國(guó)議會(huì)的大廳里，同意在雅爾塔達(dá)成的諸多決議，并積極支持這些決議，這次會(huì)議不會(huì)產(chǎn)生持久的效果。

這就是為何我要返程之后第一時(shí)間來(lái)到你們面前。我想為你們做一個(gè)私人報(bào)告——同時(shí)也是為美國(guó)人民。我們面前還有許多個(gè)月的艱苦工作要去完成，我想當(dāng)國(guó)際和平結(jié)構(gòu)被放上最后一塊基石的時(shí)候，這將是我們所有美國(guó)人共同堅(jiān)定無(wú)私的工作換來(lái)的成果。

我從長(zhǎng)途旅行歸來(lái)，精神振作，信心十足。那段時(shí)間我的狀態(tài)一直都非常好。在我回到華盛頓之前我從未不舒服過(guò)?；貋?lái)之后，我聽(tīng)說(shuō)了當(dāng)我不在的時(shí)候發(fā)生的所有傳言。可我旅行回來(lái)了，精神振作，信心十足。羅斯福家族的人并不是你們想象的那樣不喜歡旅行，恰恰相反我們熱愛(ài)旅行。

盡管那時(shí)我遠(yuǎn)在他方，但我始終關(guān)注在美國(guó)所發(fā)生的一切?？焖偻ㄓ嵉默F(xiàn)代奇跡已經(jīng)讓這個(gè)世界變得非常小。當(dāng)我們談及或考慮國(guó)際關(guān)系的時(shí)候，我們必須時(shí)刻牢記這一事實(shí)。我定期從華盛頓收到各種消息——我想說(shuō)不僅是從行政機(jī)構(gòu)的各個(gè)部門收到消息，也從立法機(jī)構(gòu)收到。除了一些因?yàn)榘踩蛩囟枰帘螣o(wú)線電的地方，我可以從世界的任何一個(gè)角落不斷發(fā)送消息。當(dāng)然，如果在嚴(yán)重緊急情況下，我們甚至可以冒險(xiǎn)打破安全規(guī)定。

我從克里米亞會(huì)議回來(lái)，堅(jiān)信我們已經(jīng)在通往世界和平的道路上邁出了成功的第一步。

克里米亞會(huì)議有兩個(gè)主要目的。一是以聯(lián)軍可能的最小損失為代價(jià)，盡可能快地?fù)魯〉聡?guó)。為實(shí)現(xiàn)這一目的，現(xiàn)在已經(jīng)全力以赴。德國(guó)部隊(duì)和德國(guó)人民正在感受我們的戰(zhàn)士和聯(lián)軍日益增長(zhǎng)的實(shí)力。我們的部隊(duì)每個(gè)小時(shí)都會(huì)在德國(guó)領(lǐng)土上榮耀地英勇前進(jìn)，直至與英勇的蘇聯(lián)紅軍會(huì)師。二是繼續(xù)為恢復(fù)戰(zhàn)亂后的秩序與安全而制定的國(guó)際條約奠定基礎(chǔ)，這樣可以為全世界國(guó)家間的持久和平提供一些保障。也是為了這一目標(biāo)，我們已經(jīng)邁出了一大步。

一年多前在德黑蘭，世界上最強(qiáng)大的三國(guó)總參謀長(zhǎng)一起制訂了長(zhǎng)期的軍事計(jì)劃。然而，那時(shí)在德黑蘭的平民領(lǐng)袖之中，只能進(jìn)行想法的交流與意見(jiàn)的表達(dá)。沒(méi)有任何政治安排，也根本就沒(méi)有嘗試過(guò)。然而在克里米亞會(huì)議上，時(shí)機(jī)終于到了，大家可以坐下來(lái)談一談?wù)晤I(lǐng)域的具體事宜。這次會(huì)議在各個(gè)方面大家都積極努力達(dá)成一致。

一年前在德黑蘭的時(shí)候，我們中的所有人已經(jīng)達(dá)成了一種——怎么說(shuō)呢?一種彼此協(xié)商的良好機(jī)制，可以用來(lái)很好地保障世界和平。我們彼此也都更加了解對(duì)方了。我的信念從來(lái)沒(méi)有動(dòng)搖過(guò)。我堅(jiān)信一個(gè)保障世界和平與安全的協(xié)議是可以達(dá)成的。

我們?cè)?jīng)做的許多事情都是具體的，也是確定的。比如說(shuō)，在德黑蘭與雅爾塔會(huì)議之間的這段時(shí)間內(nèi)，沒(méi)有舉行過(guò)任何由三個(gè)大國(guó)平民代表參加的會(huì)議。事實(shí)證明會(huì)議間隔的時(shí)間太長(zhǎng)了——長(zhǎng)達(dá)十四個(gè)月。在那么長(zhǎng)的時(shí)間里，地區(qū)問(wèn)題開(kāi)始凸顯，比如波蘭、希臘、意大利和南斯拉夫。因此，我們?cè)谘艩査Q定，即使條件不允許三大國(guó)首腦將來(lái)進(jìn)行更多的會(huì)晤，我們也將保證三大國(guó)的國(guó)務(wù)卿與外交部長(zhǎng)之間會(huì)有更頻繁的私人接觸來(lái)交流看法。我們安排了每隔三四個(gè)月舉行一次定期會(huì)議。我感到非常有信心，在這樣的安排下，像今年冬天這樣打攪全世界朋友通力合作的事件不會(huì)再次發(fā)生。

我們?cè)谘艩査?huì)晤期間，除了部署我們的戰(zhàn)略戰(zhàn)術(shù)，以最終徹底擊敗德國(guó)之外，還有事關(guān)重要政治后果的其他問(wèn)題。

比如說(shuō)，首先就是勝利之后如何占領(lǐng)和控制德國(guó)的問(wèn)題。徹底摧毀德國(guó)的軍事力量，確保納粹和普魯士軍國(guó)主義都無(wú)法死灰復(fù)燃，從而威脅世界和平與文明。

第二，再舉個(gè)例子，自敦巴頓橡樹(shù)園會(huì)議以來(lái)，關(guān)于國(guó)際安全組織問(wèn)題，我們之間存在的一些分歧還有待解決。正如你們記得的，那個(gè)時(shí)候，我說(shuō)過(guò)我們達(dá)成了90%的共識(shí)。好吧，這是一個(gè)很高的比例。我想在雅爾塔解決剩下的10%。

第三，幾乎所有從納粹奴役下解放出來(lái)的地方，普遍存在政治和經(jīng)濟(jì)問(wèn)題。這是一個(gè)非常特殊的問(wèn)題。我們?cè)诖税l(fā)現(xiàn)很難理解境外諸如此類許多問(wèn)題的細(xì)枝末節(jié)，但是我們將盡力而為。

第四，在有些國(guó)家，比如波蘭和南斯拉夫產(chǎn)生了一些特殊問(wèn)題。

那時(shí)，我們每天都會(huì)討論重大事件，并在談判桌上自由坦率地爭(zhēng)辯。然而到最后各方就達(dá)成了一致意見(jiàn)而且比字面一致更重要的是，我可以說(shuō)是我們形成了一整套思想，而且學(xué)會(huì)了和睦相處的方法。

當(dāng)然我們知道，希特勒還有德國(guó)的戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)狂們希望我們不會(huì)達(dá)成一致。他們希望盟國(guó)整體的堅(jiān)固墻壁會(huì)產(chǎn)生一道細(xì)微的裂縫，而這道裂縫可以給他以及他的匪幫以逃脫他們注定下場(chǎng)的最后希望。這就是他的宣傳機(jī)器開(kāi)動(dòng)許多個(gè)月來(lái)的目的。

但是希特勒失敗了。

主要盟國(guó)從來(lái)沒(méi)有比現(xiàn)在更加團(tuán)結(jié)一致——不僅在戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)目標(biāo)方面，而且也在和平目標(biāo)方面一致。他們決心繼續(xù)團(tuán)結(jié)在一起，同時(shí)與所有熱愛(ài)和平的國(guó)家團(tuán)結(jié)在一起——這樣持久和平的理想就會(huì)成為現(xiàn)實(shí)。

蘇聯(lián)、英國(guó)和美國(guó)的總參謀長(zhǎng)每天都在一起開(kāi)會(huì)。他們經(jīng)常與斯大林元帥、丘吉爾首相還有我，一起討論盟國(guó)的戰(zhàn)略戰(zhàn)術(shù)合作問(wèn)題。他們完成了最后擊垮德國(guó)的計(jì)劃。

在德黑蘭會(huì)議的時(shí)候，俄國(guó)前線移到距離美英前線很遠(yuǎn)的地方。盡管某些長(zhǎng)期的戰(zhàn)略合作是可能的，但是一天一天的戰(zhàn)術(shù)合作則是不可能的。因?yàn)橄嗑鄬?shí)在太遠(yuǎn)了。但是現(xiàn)在俄軍已經(jīng)穿越了波蘭。他們已經(jīng)在德國(guó)東部作戰(zhàn)，英美部隊(duì)現(xiàn)在已經(jīng)在德國(guó)西部靠近萊茵河的地方。

目前的形勢(shì)與十四個(gè)月之前不可同日而語(yǔ)，歐洲戰(zhàn)場(chǎng)的更密切的戰(zhàn)術(shù)合作第一次成為可能。在克里米亞會(huì)議上，收獲了不一樣的成果。在西線作戰(zhàn)的艾森豪威爾將軍指揮的部隊(duì)，在漫長(zhǎng)東線作戰(zhàn)的蘇聯(lián)元帥們指揮的部隊(duì)，還有我們?cè)谝獯罄牟筷?duì)，他們現(xiàn)在不需要像從前那樣先通過(guò)華盛頓或倫敦的總參謀長(zhǎng)，就可以每天交流信息。

你們已經(jīng)看到這種信息交流的好處：最近的美英飛機(jī)轟炸直接配合了俄軍向柏林推進(jìn)。從現(xiàn)在開(kāi)始，每天的戰(zhàn)術(shù)運(yùn)用都要算上美英的重型轟炸機(jī)——我想，我們已經(jīng)開(kāi)始意識(shí)到，一邊是戰(zhàn)術(shù)，一邊是戰(zhàn)略，兩者到底是完全不同的。每天的戰(zhàn)術(shù)運(yùn)用直接給予了蘇軍支持，同時(shí)也是對(duì)西線我們自己部隊(duì)的支持。他們現(xiàn)在正忙于轟炸和襲擊，以阻止德軍將來(lái)自德國(guó)其他地方或意大利的儲(chǔ)備和物資運(yùn)往東線與西線。

已經(jīng)做好了安排，所有可以搜集的物資與交通工具，被最高效地分配到最需要的地方，以便美軍、英軍和俄軍用于共同的戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)努力。

這些計(jì)劃與安排的細(xì)節(jié)當(dāng)然是軍事秘密，而所有一切聯(lián)系在一起是為了加速德國(guó)的最后崩潰。讓納粹悲哀的是他們已經(jīng)吃了些苦頭。我想在大會(huì)上的三國(guó)首腦都感到納粹明天或后天會(huì)吃更多的苦頭，天天如此!他們不會(huì)得到任何喘息。除非他們無(wú)條件投降，否則我們片刻都不會(huì)停下來(lái)。

你們知道，我時(shí)常靜靜地徹夜思考，感到人還是要講常識(shí)。我想這一點(diǎn)在德國(guó)也是正確的，德國(guó)人民也包括德國(guó)軍人，必須認(rèn)識(shí)到他們集體或個(gè)人越早投降，他們現(xiàn)在的痛苦就會(huì)越早結(jié)束。他們必須認(rèn)識(shí)到，只有徹底投降他們才可以重塑他們自己，才可能被世界接受為正派的鄰居。

我們?cè)谘艩査?huì)議上又澄清一次。現(xiàn)在我還要重復(fù)一下，無(wú)條件投降并不意味著對(duì)德國(guó)人民實(shí)施屠殺或奴役。納粹領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人故意從德國(guó)出版社和電臺(tái)扣下雅爾塔宣言的那部分內(nèi)容。他們企圖讓德國(guó)人民相信，《雅爾塔宣言》確實(shí)是要奴役并屠殺他們。他們?cè)谝挂岳^日地如此宣傳，可見(jiàn)納粹如何企圖安然逃脫，企圖哄騙他們的人民繼續(xù)進(jìn)行毫無(wú)意義的抵抗。然而我們確實(shí)在大會(huì)上澄清了無(wú)條件投降對(duì)德國(guó)意味著什么。

無(wú)條件投降意味著德國(guó)將被英國(guó)、俄國(guó)、法國(guó)和美國(guó)臨時(shí)接管。每一個(gè)國(guó)家都將占據(jù)和控制德國(guó)的一塊單獨(dú)區(qū)域。這四個(gè)區(qū)域的管理將由四個(gè)國(guó)家代表在柏林組成的管控委員會(huì)來(lái)協(xié)調(diào)決定。

無(wú)條件投降還意味著別的東西。它意味著納粹主義的末日，意味著納粹黨的末日，以及所有與納粹有關(guān)的野蠻法律機(jī)構(gòu)的末日。它意味著軍國(guó)主義對(duì)德國(guó)公眾、私人和文化生活影響的終結(jié)。它意味著納粹戰(zhàn)犯?jìng)儗⒑芸鞎?huì)得到其應(yīng)有的、嚴(yán)厲的懲罰。它意味著德國(guó)將被徹底解除武裝，軍國(guó)主義以及所有軍事設(shè)施將被摧毀，軍工廠將停止生產(chǎn)，所有武裝力量將解散，不時(shí)破壞世界和平的德軍總參謀部將被永久瓦解。它意味著德國(guó)將必須對(duì)那些無(wú)辜的受害者進(jìn)行物質(zhì)賠償，他們因?yàn)榈聡?guó)的侵略遭受了嚴(yán)重的打擊。

通過(guò)強(qiáng)制以物質(zhì)形式進(jìn)行賠償，比如賠償工廠、機(jī)器、車輛、原材料等，我們會(huì)避免上一次大戰(zhàn)之后我們與其他國(guó)家犯的錯(cuò)誤。那時(shí)候我們要求德國(guó)以貨幣形式賠償，而德國(guó)根本付不起這么多錢。我們并不想讓德國(guó)人民挨餓，或者成為世界其他國(guó)家的負(fù)擔(dān)。我們處置德國(guó)的目標(biāo)很簡(jiǎn)單——就是要捍衛(wèi)世界目前與未來(lái)的和平。太多經(jīng)驗(yàn)表明如果我們?cè)试S德國(guó)保留發(fā)動(dòng)侵略戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)的能力，那么和平的目標(biāo)就無(wú)法實(shí)現(xiàn)。

這些目標(biāo)不會(huì)傷害德國(guó)人民。恰恰相反，它們會(huì)保護(hù)他們不再重復(fù)總參謀部和獨(dú)裁統(tǒng)治曾經(jīng)強(qiáng)加給他們的命運(yùn)，也不重復(fù)現(xiàn)在希特勒主義成百倍地強(qiáng)加給他們的命運(yùn)。這將會(huì)從德國(guó)政體上摘除一個(gè)惡性腫瘤。幾代人以來(lái)，這個(gè)腫瘤給整個(gè)世界帶來(lái)的只有悲慘與痛苦。

我在雅爾塔逗留期間，看到了那種魯莽的無(wú)意義的憤怒以及來(lái)自于德國(guó)軍國(guó)主義的恐怖襲擊。在黑海邊上的雅爾塔并沒(méi)有任何軍事意義，它甚至連防線都沒(méi)有。在一戰(zhàn)之前，雅爾塔是一個(gè)旅游勝地，專供如沙皇、皇子以及俄國(guó)的貴族們和隨從游玩。然而，赤色革命之后，在希特勒進(jìn)攻蘇聯(lián)之前，雅爾塔的宮殿與別墅一直被用作俄國(guó)人民的休閑娛樂(lè)中心。

納粹軍官占領(lǐng)了這些以前的宮殿和別墅，供他們自己使用。當(dāng)我們到那里的時(shí)候，這些所謂的沙皇故居還是可以住人的。那其中唯一的原因是它已經(jīng)被贈(zèng)與，或者是那個(gè)德國(guó)將軍自己認(rèn)為已經(jīng)贈(zèng)與他了，成為他的私人財(cái)產(chǎn)，供他私人使用。當(dāng)雅爾塔已經(jīng)被破壞得不成樣子的時(shí)候，德國(guó)將軍還是讓士兵去保護(hù)那棟漂亮的別墅，因?yàn)樗J(rèn)為那會(huì)是自己的東西。

在德國(guó)人再次占領(lǐng)別墅之前，它曾是一個(gè)實(shí)用的休閑娛樂(lè)中心，是為幾十萬(wàn)的俄國(guó)工人、農(nóng)民和他們的家庭建造的。納粹軍官們占領(lǐng)這些地方供他們自己使用。差不多一年之前，也就是去年四月，在紅軍將納粹趕出克里米亞之時(shí)，所有這些別墅都被納粹洗劫一空，幾乎所有的別墅都被內(nèi)部安裝的炸彈毀壞，甚至雅爾塔最窮的人家也沒(méi)有得以幸免。除了光禿禿的墻壁，幾乎什么都沒(méi)留下，到處都是廢墟，真是滿目瘡痍。

塞瓦斯托波爾，距離雅爾塔四十或五十英里以外的一個(gè)軍事港，是一個(gè)擁有大型海軍工廠和防御工事的大城市，當(dāng)時(shí)也被徹底毀壞了。我估計(jì)整個(gè)城市只有不到十棟樓房是完好無(wú)損的。我知道華沙、利迪澤、鹿特丹和考文垂，但我親眼看到了塞瓦斯托波爾和雅爾塔!我知道世界上沒(méi)有足夠的空間讓德國(guó)的軍國(guó)主義與基督教的高貴共存。

與在克里米亞會(huì)議上進(jìn)行的軍事安排同樣重要的是，我們達(dá)成了一項(xiàng)協(xié)議。此協(xié)議涉及了維持世界和平的一般性國(guó)際組織。基礎(chǔ)工作在敦巴頓橡樹(shù)園會(huì)議上已經(jīng)完成，然而在敦巴頓橡樹(shù)園會(huì)議上還有一點(diǎn)沒(méi)有達(dá)成一致，這一點(diǎn)是有關(guān)安理會(huì)的投票程序。我想盡量簡(jiǎn)單明了些。我耗費(fèi)了一個(gè)又一個(gè)小時(shí)在我自己的頭腦中，也在許多會(huì)議上試圖弄清楚這件事。在克里米亞會(huì)議上，美國(guó)人就這個(gè)議題提出了建議。我很高興地說(shuō)，經(jīng)過(guò)充分討論，為另兩個(gè)國(guó)家一致接受。

現(xiàn)在還不可能公布協(xié)議的具體條款，但是很快就會(huì)。一旦大家知道了涉及安理會(huì)投票的有關(guān)決議，我想，同時(shí)也希望你們會(huì)發(fā)現(xiàn)這個(gè)復(fù)雜且困難的問(wèn)題有了一個(gè)合理的解決方案。這些決議是公正的，它們將長(zhǎng)期保證在維持和平前提下的國(guó)際合作。

1945年4月25日將在舊金山召開(kāi)全世界范圍的聯(lián)合國(guó)大會(huì)。在那里我們希望，也自信地期望，將執(zhí)行一種確定的組織章程。在這個(gè)章程的規(guī)定下，世界和平將得以維持，而侵略武裝將永遠(yuǎn)被禁止。

這一次我們?cè)俨环稿e(cuò)，不會(huì)等到戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)結(jié)束才著手建立和平機(jī)制。這一次，既然我們一起戰(zhàn)斗來(lái)最終打贏這場(chǎng)戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)，那么就讓我們一起努力，讓這樣的戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)不要再次發(fā)生。

正如你們所知，我一直是《美國(guó)憲法》文本的信徒。我花了好多時(shí)間向世界其他兩個(gè)大國(guó)闡釋《美國(guó)憲法》。章程必須也應(yīng)該在《憲法》規(guī)定下，得到美國(guó)參議院的批準(zhǔn)。我想其他國(guó)家現(xiàn)在都已經(jīng)知道了這一情況。我意識(shí)到了這一事實(shí)，現(xiàn)在其他國(guó)家也是如此。我們希望當(dāng)過(guò)幾個(gè)月聯(lián)合國(guó)憲章在舊金山出爐的時(shí)候，參議院會(huì)予以批準(zhǔn)。

在創(chuàng)立國(guó)際安全組織方面，美國(guó)參議院的合法代表們一直在不間斷地通報(bào)參議院美國(guó)政府的計(jì)劃。美國(guó)的參議院和眾議院都將參加舊金山大會(huì)。參加舊金山大會(huì)的議會(huì)代表團(tuán)成員中共和黨人與民主黨人的人數(shù)將持平。美國(guó)代表團(tuán)可謂真正意義上的兩黨制。

世界和平不是政黨問(wèn)題。我認(rèn)為共和黨人與民主黨人一樣渴望和平。這不是政黨問(wèn)題，就像軍事上的勝利，贏得這場(chǎng)戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)也不是政黨問(wèn)題。共和國(guó)曾受到過(guò)威脅。第一次是納粹1940年瞬間發(fā)動(dòng)戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)要征服世界，再次是1941年日本人的背叛。那時(shí)，黨派斗爭(zhēng)與政治幾乎被每個(gè)美國(guó)人擱置一邊，所有資源都用以保障我們共同的安全。我認(rèn)為每一個(gè)愛(ài)國(guó)的美國(guó)人，每一個(gè)海外的人類靈魂都將為和平事業(yè)做出相同的貢獻(xiàn)。

世界和平格局的建立不會(huì)是為一個(gè)人，或者一個(gè)政黨，或者一個(gè)國(guó)家服務(wù)的任務(wù)。它不可能只是美國(guó)的和平，或者英國(guó)的和平，或者俄國(guó)的和平，或者法國(guó)的和平，或者中國(guó)的和平。它不是大國(guó)的和平，也不是小國(guó)的和平。它是要依靠全世界合作努力來(lái)實(shí)現(xiàn)的和平。

它也不可能一開(kāi)始就成為完善的結(jié)構(gòu)。但它可以也將是一種建立在《大西洋憲章》合理的公正的原則上的和平，建立在人類尊嚴(yán)概念上的和平，建立在寬容的保障和宗教信仰自由之上的和平。

隨著盟軍部隊(duì)向軍事勝利推進(jìn)，他們解放了被納粹剝奪自由長(zhǎng)達(dá)四年的人民，他們的經(jīng)濟(jì)已經(jīng)被納粹掠奪者毀滅殆盡。不曾料想，在這些解放區(qū)，比如希臘、波蘭或者南斯拉夫，或許還有更多地方，發(fā)生了政治混亂和動(dòng)蕩。比這更糟的是，有些地方還滋長(zhǎng)了古怪的念頭，比如什么“勢(shì)力范圍”，這些都不符合國(guó)際合作的基本原則。如果這樣的現(xiàn)象不能得到遏止，發(fā)展下去恐怕遲早會(huì)釀成悲劇。試圖把造成目前情況的責(zé)任推到某一個(gè)國(guó)家身上是毫無(wú)意義的。除非世界上主要大國(guó)繼續(xù)不受干擾地一起努力，共同承擔(dān)解決可能危及世界和平的難題，否則這樣的悲劇結(jié)果幾乎是無(wú)法避免的。

我們?cè)诳死锩讈喚凼?，決定解決解放區(qū)的問(wèn)題。很多我們現(xiàn)在無(wú)法預(yù)料的事情可能就會(huì)在下周或下月突然間意外地發(fā)生。我很高興能與國(guó)會(huì)保持一致，我們確實(shí)找到了解決之道，而且非常巧，又是一致通過(guò)。

三個(gè)大國(guó)已經(jīng)同意，任何從納粹鐵蹄下解放出來(lái)的地區(qū)，或者任何軸心國(guó)的前附庸地區(qū)，它們的政治和經(jīng)濟(jì)問(wèn)題將由三國(guó)共同承擔(dān)。三國(guó)政府將在戰(zhàn)后短暫的不穩(wěn)定期內(nèi)攜手合作，通過(guò)穩(wěn)固建立的民主程序，去幫助解放區(qū)人民，或者前附庸國(guó)人民，以解決他們自身的難題。他們將盡力做到，從被德國(guó)占領(lǐng)到真正獨(dú)立期間的臨時(shí)政府成員具有代表性，體現(xiàn)人民民主，此后則會(huì)盡快舉行自由競(jìng)選。

我們這個(gè)偉大的國(guó)家不能再對(duì)幾千英里之外的政治形勢(shì)不聞不問(wèn)。當(dāng)然，我不想我有生之年再看到另一場(chǎng)戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)。正如我說(shuō)過(guò)的，世界變小了，每年都在變小。美國(guó)現(xiàn)在已經(jīng)在全世界和平事業(yè)中發(fā)揮巨大的影響力。我們這里的人所思所言都是為了和平，因?yàn)榕e世皆知。在國(guó)會(huì)任何院中隨便說(shuō)上一句，第二天都會(huì)傳遍全世界。只要我們?cè)敢饫^續(xù)分擔(dān)維持和平的責(zé)任，我們就要繼續(xù)發(fā)揮這種影響。我想，如果我們逃避這樣的責(zé)任，那么這將是我們自己巨大的損失。

對(duì)這些地區(qū)的最終決定是共同制定的，所以說(shuō)這些決定常常是互相妥協(xié)的結(jié)果。美國(guó)并不總是能實(shí)現(xiàn)它的做法，俄國(guó)或者英國(guó)也是如此。盡管我們決心繼續(xù)朝著理想努力，但并不總能得到理想的答案，或者說(shuō)并不總能找到解決復(fù)雜國(guó)際問(wèn)題的方法。但是我相信，在雅爾塔所達(dá)成的協(xié)議下，歐洲政治將會(huì)比以往更加穩(wěn)定。

當(dāng)然，一旦在任何國(guó)家人民都可以自由表達(dá)意愿，我們現(xiàn)在的責(zé)任就結(jié)束了，除了那些要由我們所希望建立的國(guó)際安全組織來(lái)做決議的行動(dòng)。

聯(lián)合國(guó)也必須很快開(kāi)始行動(dòng)，充分幫助這些解放區(qū)恢復(fù)經(jīng)濟(jì)，這樣它們就可以在世界上重新恢復(fù)它們的地位。納粹戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)機(jī)器從它們身上掠奪了原材料、機(jī)床、卡車和杌車。它們所到之處，工業(yè)停滯不前，許多農(nóng)業(yè)區(qū)成了不毛之地。納粹所到之處，留下的就是一堆廢墟。

讓車輪重新開(kāi)動(dòng)起來(lái)并不僅僅是一種救援。舉國(guó)關(guān)注的是我們所有人都期盼讓這些解放區(qū)再次自立，擁有生產(chǎn)能力，這樣他們就不需要我們持續(xù)不斷的救援了。我想說(shuō)，這一觀點(diǎn)是基于常識(shí)的。

三個(gè)主要盟國(guó)對(duì)解放區(qū)采取了聯(lián)合行動(dòng)，其中一個(gè)突出例子就是對(duì)波蘭問(wèn)題的解決方案。整個(gè)波蘭問(wèn)題是戰(zhàn)后歐洲潛在麻煩的源頭，一直都是如此。我們?cè)诖髸?huì)上決定找尋共同的解決方案，顯然我們做到了，盡管不是每個(gè)人都和我們的意見(jiàn)一致。我們的目標(biāo)是幫助創(chuàng)建一個(gè)強(qiáng)大的、獨(dú)立的、繁榮的國(guó)家。我們必須始終記住俄、英、美三國(guó)曾一致同意：要將波蘭建成一個(gè)強(qiáng)大的、獨(dú)立的、繁榮的國(guó)家，波蘭政府最終應(yīng)由波蘭人民自己選舉產(chǎn)生。

為了實(shí)現(xiàn)這個(gè)目標(biāo)，有必要形成一個(gè)新的政府，比起波蘭被奴役時(shí)期，具有更廣泛的代表性。因此，在雅爾塔，我們要在更廣泛的民主基礎(chǔ)上，采取行動(dòng)來(lái)重組現(xiàn)在的波蘭臨時(shí)政府，這樣就可以將波蘭國(guó)內(nèi)外的民主領(lǐng)袖都容納進(jìn)去。我們都會(huì)將這個(gè)新重組的政府視為波蘭的臨時(shí)政府。

然而，新的統(tǒng)一的波蘭臨時(shí)政府保證將盡快以全民選舉和無(wú)記名投票的形式來(lái)舉行自由選舉。

在歷史上，波蘭一直是襲擊俄國(guó)的必經(jīng)之路。這代人以來(lái)，德國(guó)已經(jīng)兩次通過(guò)這條走廊襲擊俄國(guó)。為了保障歐洲安全和世界和平，一個(gè)強(qiáng)大和獨(dú)立的波蘭有助于避免這種事情再次發(fā)生。

坦率地說(shuō)，有關(guān)波蘭邊境的決議是妥協(xié)的產(chǎn)物。無(wú)論如何，我不是完全同意這一決議，然而在某些地方，決議與英國(guó)意見(jiàn)不同;在某些地方，決議與俄國(guó)意見(jiàn)分歧;在某些地方，決議不符合我的意愿。這就是妥協(xié)。然而，決議規(guī)定波蘭人可以在北部和西部得到領(lǐng)土上的補(bǔ)償，以交換因東部寇松線損失的領(lǐng)土。

西部邊界的界限將在最終和平大會(huì)上勘定并長(zhǎng)久保持下去。我們大概知道，新的強(qiáng)大的波蘭將會(huì)包括一大片現(xiàn)在屬于德國(guó)的領(lǐng)土，也允許新的波蘭擁有漫長(zhǎng)的海岸線和許多新建的港口。同時(shí)，大部分東普魯士會(huì)并入波蘭。東普魯士的一個(gè)角落則會(huì)并入俄國(guó)。另外，比較特殊的但澤自由國(guó)將會(huì)消失，我想對(duì)但澤而言，成為波蘭的一部分，會(huì)比現(xiàn)在好得多。

大家都知道住在寇松線東側(cè)的人民——我就舉個(gè)例子說(shuō)明為何我會(huì)妥協(xié)——大多是白俄羅斯人和烏克蘭人，他們不是波蘭人;而寇松線兩側(cè)的人民，除了東普魯士和東部德國(guó)那部分(將會(huì)并人新波蘭)之外，大部分都是波蘭人。早在1919年，盟國(guó)的代表就一致認(rèn)為寇松線很好地為兩側(cè)的人民劃定了界限。你們也必須記住，在1919年以前，很多代人以來(lái)，根本就不存在任何波蘭政府。

我相信，在目前情況下，在波蘭問(wèn)題上達(dá)成的協(xié)議對(duì)于建立一個(gè)自由、獨(dú)立和繁榮的波蘭是一個(gè)最富希望的協(xié)議。

克里米亞會(huì)議由三大軍事強(qiáng)國(guó)參加，他們承擔(dān)著戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)主要責(zé)任和負(fù)擔(dān)。盡管因?yàn)檫@一原因，法國(guó)沒(méi)有參會(huì)，但沒(méi)有人可以不承認(rèn)，她在未來(lái)的歐洲和世界會(huì)發(fā)揮應(yīng)有的作用。法國(guó)受邀接受一塊德國(guó)控制區(qū)，因而成為盟國(guó)對(duì)德控制委員會(huì)的第四個(gè)成員國(guó)。法國(guó)還受邀作為贊助國(guó)參加下個(gè)月在舊金山舉行的國(guó)際大會(huì)。法國(guó)會(huì)和其他四大國(guó)成為安理會(huì)的常任理事國(guó)。最后，我們請(qǐng)求法國(guó)與我們一同對(duì)歐洲所有解放區(qū)承擔(dān)共同責(zé)任。

正如在公報(bào)中宣布的那樣，南斯拉夫問(wèn)題達(dá)成了協(xié)議。我們希望協(xié)議會(huì)被執(zhí)行。但是，我們必須記住，不僅在那里，世界上還有其他地方有著許許多多自負(fù)的人。他們希望什么事情定下來(lái)之前都能聽(tīng)聽(tīng)他們的意見(jiàn)，所以要是聽(tīng)了更多那些人的意見(jiàn)，我們就要耽誤一些時(shí)間了。

很自然，這次大會(huì)只與歐洲戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)以及歐洲的政治問(wèn)題有關(guān)，與太平洋戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)無(wú)關(guān)。

然而在馬耳他，我們的英美聯(lián)軍在制訂加強(qiáng)對(duì)日本進(jìn)攻的計(jì)劃。日本軍閥們知道他們并沒(méi)有被忽視。他們已經(jīng)感受到我們B-29的遠(yuǎn)程轟炸，我們航空母艦的威力;他們已經(jīng)感受到美國(guó)海軍的實(shí)力，他們不那么著急再出來(lái)嘗試一次。日本人現(xiàn)在知道聽(tīng)到“美國(guó)海軍陸戰(zhàn)隊(duì)已經(jīng)登錄”意味著什么。我想我可以再加上一句，如果算上硫磺島，“形勢(shì)盡在掌握之中”。

既然麥克阿瑟將軍已經(jīng)成功反攻馬尼拉，尼米茲將軍正在日本的后院硫磺島上建立空軍基地，那么他們也知道將會(huì)對(duì)自己的祖國(guó)——日本采取什么行動(dòng)。然而，為了避免有人要終止美國(guó)的工作，我要重復(fù)我經(jīng)常說(shuō)的，甚至在夢(mèng)里會(huì)說(shuō)的那句話：“我們還沒(méi)有贏得戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)，我們還沒(méi)有在戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)上寫(xiě)上勝利。”通往東京之路仍是漫長(zhǎng)而艱辛的。從任何意義上講，通往東京的路要比通往柏林的路更加漫長(zhǎng)。打敗德國(guó)并不意味著對(duì)日戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)的結(jié)束。相反，我們必須做好在太平洋上進(jìn)行漫長(zhǎng)而又代價(jià)高昂的斗爭(zhēng)的準(zhǔn)備。

但是日本必須無(wú)條件投降，就像德國(guó)戰(zhàn)敗了，也必須無(wú)條件投降。謹(jǐn)慎點(diǎn)說(shuō)，如果我們的世界和平計(jì)劃成功的話，這一想法肯定是正確的。因?yàn)槿毡拒妵?guó)主義必須像德國(guó)軍國(guó)主義一樣被徹底摧毀。

在我從克里米亞回來(lái)的路上，我做了安排，私人會(huì)見(jiàn)埃及國(guó)王法魯克、埃塞俄比亞皇帝海爾·塞拉西和沙特阿拉伯國(guó)王伊本·沙特。我們的談話不得不涉及我們共同感興趣的話題。這些安排將會(huì)帶來(lái)巨大的共同利益，因?yàn)檫@樣的安排給予我，也給予我們?cè)S多人一個(gè)機(jī)會(huì)來(lái)見(jiàn)面并面對(duì)面交談，也可以用私交方式代替正式通信來(lái)交換看法。比如說(shuō)，對(duì)于阿拉伯問(wèn)題，通過(guò)與伊本·沙特交談五分鐘，我知道了所有的問(wèn)題，包括穆斯林的，猶太人的。這比我從二三十封書(shū)信中了解得更多。

在遠(yuǎn)航中，我看到了工作中的海陸空軍隊(duì)，我從中受益匪淺。我想，如果他們看到我所看的，聽(tīng)到我所聽(tīng)到的，所有美國(guó)人會(huì)和我一樣為我們的軍隊(duì)感到驕傲。憑借史上最高效的職業(yè)陸軍、海軍和空軍，我們的戰(zhàn)士頑強(qiáng)戰(zhàn)斗直到勝利。這是我們要把握的機(jī)會(huì)，讓這些英勇戰(zhàn)士的子孫在幾年內(nèi)不要重新卷入戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)。

我希望克里米亞會(huì)議將是我們歷史上，也是世界歷史上的轉(zhuǎn)折點(diǎn)。很快將有一個(gè)重要的決議被提交給美國(guó)參議院與美國(guó)人民，它將決定美國(guó)乃至世界未來(lái)幾代人的命運(yùn)。我們沒(méi)有中間道路可走。我們要么就承擔(dān)世界合作的責(zé)任，要么就承擔(dān)又一次世界沖突的責(zé)任。

我知道“計(jì)劃”這個(gè)詞在某些圈子里不受歡迎。在國(guó)內(nèi)事務(wù)中，正是缺乏計(jì)劃導(dǎo)致了悲劇性錯(cuò)誤;而在另一方面，充分的明智的計(jì)劃也帶來(lái)了生活水平的提高和許多利益，如對(duì)沙漠地區(qū)的開(kāi)墾，對(duì)所有河谷的開(kāi)發(fā)，以及提供足夠的住房。國(guó)際關(guān)系也是如此。我們這代人中的許多人正第二次面對(duì)著避免戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)的目標(biāo)。為了實(shí)現(xiàn)這個(gè)目標(biāo)，全世界的國(guó)家要么將制訂計(jì)劃，要么沒(méi)有計(jì)劃。

計(jì)劃的基礎(chǔ)工作現(xiàn)在已經(jīng)完成了，已經(jīng)可以讓人們討論和決定了。沒(méi)有什么計(jì)劃是完美的。毫無(wú)疑問(wèn)，無(wú)論在舊金山將采取什么計(jì)劃，此計(jì)劃必須在多年里反復(fù)地修改，就像我們自己的憲法曾被修改過(guò)多次那樣。沒(méi)有人可以確切說(shuō)出任何計(jì)劃可以維持多久。

只要人類真正堅(jiān)持和平，愿意為和平而努力，為和平而犧牲，和平就可以繼續(xù)下去。二十五年前，美國(guó)戰(zhàn)士指望全世界的政治家來(lái)結(jié)束他們?yōu)榱撕推蕉鴳?zhàn)斗和受苦的工作。那時(shí)候我們失敗了。我們不能再失敗，卻期望世界可以再次幸存。

克里米亞會(huì)議是三個(gè)主要國(guó)家尋求共同和平的一次成功努力。它將導(dǎo)致單邊行動(dòng)、排他聯(lián)盟、勢(shì)力范圍、權(quán)力平衡，以及所有其他作為權(quán)宜之計(jì)體系的終結(jié)。這些權(quán)宜之計(jì)用了幾個(gè)世紀(jì)，但都失敗了。我們建議以一個(gè)世界性組織去取代所有這些體系，讓世界上所有熱愛(ài)和平的國(guó)家最終都有機(jī)會(huì)加入進(jìn)來(lái)。

我相信國(guó)會(huì)和美國(guó)人民會(huì)將這次大會(huì)的結(jié)果作為建立永久和平機(jī)制的開(kāi)端。在這樣的機(jī)制下，我們可以開(kāi)始在上帝的指引下，建設(shè)一個(gè)更好的世界。讓我們的子孫后代，你的和我的，全世界人民的子孫后代，生活下去，也可以生活下去。

朋友們，這就是我要傳達(dá)給你們的主要信息。然而我為之深深感動(dòng)，正如我知道今天你們所有人也為之深深感動(dòng)，將來(lái)你也會(huì)為之深深感動(dòng)。