2020考研英語閱讀理解精讀100篇：Unit 34

Unit 34

It is a devastating prospect. Terrorists electronically break into the computers that control the water supply of a large American city, open and close valves to contaminate the water with untreated sewage or toxic chemicals, and then release it in a devastating flood. As the emergency services struggle to respond, the terrorists strike again, shutting down the telephone network and electrical power grid with just a few mouse clicks. Businesses are paralysed, hospitals are overwhelmed and roads are gridlocked as people try to flee.

This kind of scenario is invoked by doom-mongers who insist that stepping up physical security since the September 11th attacks is not enough. Road-blocks and soldiers around power stations cannot prevent digital terrorism. “Until we secure our cyber-infrastructure, a few keystrokes and an Internet connection is all one needs to disable the economy and endanger lives,” Lamar Smith, a Texas congressman, told a judiciary committee in February. He ended with his catchphrase: “A mouse can be just as dangerous as a bullet or a bomb.” Is he right?

It is true that utility companies and other operators of critical infrastructure are increasingly connected to the Internet. But just because an electricity company’s customers can pay their bills online, it does not necessarily follow that the company’s critical control systems are vulnerable to attack. Control systems are usually kept entirely separate from other systems, for good reason. They tend to be obscure, old-fashioned systems that are incompatible with Internet technology anyhow. Even authorised users require specialist knowledge to operate them. And telecoms firms, hospitals and businesses usually have contingency plans to deal with power failures or flooding.

A simulation carried out in August by the United States Naval War College in conjunction with Gartner, a consultancy, concluded that an “electronic Pearl Harbour” attack on America’s critical infrastructure could indeed cause serious disruption, but would first need five years of preparation and $200m of funding. There are far simpler and less costly ways to attack critical infrastructure, from hoax phone calls to truck bombs and hijacked airliners.

On September 18th Richard Clarke, America’s cyber-security tsar, unveiled his long-awaited blueprint for securing critical infrastructure from digital attacks. It was a bit of a damp squib, making no firm recommendations and proposing no new regulation or legislation. But its lily-livered approach might, in fact, be the right one. When a risk has been overstated, inaction may be the best policy.

It is difficult to avoid comparisons with the “millennium bug” and the predictions of widespread computer chaos arising from the change of date to the year 2000. Then, as now, the alarm was sounded by technology vendors and consultants, who stood to gain from scare-mongering. But Ross Anderson, a computer scientist at Cambridge University, prefers to draw an analogy with the environmental lobby. Like eco-warriors, he observes, those in the security industry—be they vendors trying to boost sales, academics chasing grants, or politicians looking for bigger budgets—have a built-in incentive to overstate the risks.

注（1）：本文選自Economist；

注（2）：本文習(xí)題命題模仿對象：第1、5題模仿2015年真題Text 3第1題，第2題模仿2010年真題Text 3第1題，第3題模仿2011年真題Text 4第1題，第4題模仿2001年真題Text 5第3題。

1. We learn from the first paragraph that ______.

A) terrorists could plunge a large American city into chaos through electronic attack

B) American people have no experience in dealing with terrorists

C) the computer systems of utility companies are rather vulnerable

D) the response from emergency services is far from satisfactory

2. Speaking of the doom-mongers, the author implies that ______.

A) their worries are quite reasonable

B) their warnings should be taken seriously

C) they exaggerate the threat utility companies are facing

D) they are familiar with the way terrorists strike

3. In the view of Gartner consultant, ______.

A) terrorists may launch another “Pearl Harbor” attack

B) terrorists have ample capital and time to prepare a stunning strike

C) it is very costly and time-consuming to attack critical infrastructure

D) it is unlikely that terrorists would resort to electronic means to attack critical infrastructure

4. “Lily-livered approach”（Line 3, Paragraph 5）probably means an approach characterized by ______.

A) flexibility

B) boldness

C) cowardice

D) conservatism

5. We learn from the last paragraph that ______.

A) the computer industry suffered heavy loss due to the “millennium bug”

B) doom-mongers care more about their own interests than national security

C) computer scientists have better judgment than doom-mongers

D) environmentalists are criticized for their efforts of protecting environment

篇章剖析

本篇文章是一篇議論文，駁斥了恐怖分子會利用電子手段襲擊公用事業(yè)公司和關(guān)鍵基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施的觀點。文章第一段是散布恐怖威脅論者所描繪的恐怖分子用電子手段進行恐怖襲擊的場景；第二段介紹了他們所宣揚的觀點；第三段反駁了對公用事業(yè)公司發(fā)動電子恐怖襲擊的可能性；第四段以一次模擬演習(xí)的結(jié)論進一步佐證了恐怖分子不可能用電子手段對關(guān)鍵基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施進行恐怖襲擊的觀點；第五段分析了散布恐怖威脅論的人的動機。

詞匯注釋

valve /v?lv/ n. 閥門

contaminate /k?n?t?m?ne?t/ vt. 弄臟；污染

sewage /?sju(?)?d?/ n. 下水道，污水

paralyse /?p?r?la?z/ vt. 使無力（無效）；使不活動

gridlocked /?gr?dl?kt/ adj. 交通擁堵的

scenario /s??nɑ?r???/ n. 預(yù)料或期望的一系列事件的梗概或模式；場景

invoke /?n?v??k/ vt. 借助，求助于；使用，應(yīng)用

doom-monger /?du?m?m??g?/ n. 末世論者；散布恐怖威脅論的人

cyber /?sa?b?/ prefix. 網(wǎng)絡(luò)的

infrastructure /??nfr?str?kt??(r)/ n. 基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施

catchphrase /?k?t?fre?z/ n. （政治宣傳中的）標語；醒目的廣告用語

utility /ju??t?l?ti/ n. 公用事業(yè)

obscure /?b?skj??/ adj. 難懂的

incompatible /??nk?m?p?t?bl/ adj. （常與with連用）不相容的，矛盾的

authorise /???θ?ra?z/ vt. 授權(quán)；批準；認可

contingency /k?n?t?nd??nsi/ n. 偶然；可能性；意外事故，可能發(fā)生的附帶事件

conjunction /k?n?d??nk??n/ n. 聯(lián)合

consultancy /k?n?s?lt?nsi/ n. 顧問（工作）

disruption /d?s?r?p??n/ n. 破壞

hoax /h??ks/ n. 惡作??；騙局

tsar /zɑ?(r)/ n. =czar沙皇；〈口〉權(quán)威領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人

squib /skw?b/ n. 爆竹

millennium /m??len??m/ n. 千禧年；太平盛世

vendor /?vend??; -d?/ n. 小販

analogy /??n?l?d?i/ n. 類推；類比

難句突破

Like eco-warriors, he observes, those in the security industry—be they vendors trying to boost sales, academics chasing grants, or politicians looking for bigger budgets—have a built-in incentive to overstate the risks.

主體句式：He observes those have a built-in incentive.

結(jié)構(gòu)分析：本句有一個較長的插入語，而且這個插入語本身是一個省略了should并采用倒裝結(jié)構(gòu)的虛擬條件句，所以整個句子理解起來有一定難度。

句子譯文：他發(fā)現(xiàn)，就像那些環(huán)保衛(wèi)士一樣，從事安全工作的人——不論是想要促銷產(chǎn)品的商人，還是渴望得到補助金的學(xué)者，抑或是期望更多預(yù)算的政客——都有一種內(nèi)在的動機促使他們夸大危險。

題目分析

1. A 推理題。文章開頭用了prospect一詞，可見所描述的場景只是想象中未來可能發(fā)生的情景。這一段描述了恐怖分子用電子手段發(fā)動對美國大城市襲擊后的混亂場景：企業(yè)癱瘓、醫(yī)院爆滿、道路堵塞等等。可見，如果這種襲擊發(fā)生的話，一座美國的大城市就會陷入混亂。

2. C 推理題。Monger這個詞本身就是一個貶義詞，指一個持悲觀論調(diào)、散布末世論的人。再看文章第三段，作者針對這種人散布的恐怖威脅論進行了分析，認為所謂公用事業(yè)公司的關(guān)鍵控制系統(tǒng)易受攻擊的說法站不住腳。第四段作者引用一次模擬演習(xí)的結(jié)論，說電子恐怖襲擊可能造成巨大破壞，但襲擊的成本非常高，耗時也非常長，有遠比這簡單有效的辦法。在文章末尾，作者引用計算機專家的話“those（people）...overstate the risk”?？梢?，作者雖然也承認這種威脅有可能存在，但認為這些doom-mongers夸大了威脅的程度。

3. D 細節(jié)題。文章第四段分析了電子恐怖襲擊關(guān)鍵基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施的說法站不住腳的另一個理由：通過模擬演習(xí)得出結(jié)論，這種襲擊耗資巨大、耗時太長，恐怖分子完全可以采取更加簡單有效成本低廉的襲擊手段?？梢?，恐怖分子不太可能借助電子手段襲擊關(guān)鍵基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施。

4. C 語義題。根據(jù)上下文，Richard Clarke針對如何保護關(guān)鍵基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施免遭數(shù)字化襲擊提出了人們期待已久的計劃，但這個計劃就好像一個受潮的爆竹，既沒有給出明確的建議，也沒有提出新的規(guī)章或者法規(guī)。然后作者對這種做法用“l(fā)ily-livered”一詞加以總結(jié)，顯然只有“膽小”一詞最為貼切。

5. B 推理題。本文末段將現(xiàn)在的恐怖威脅論和“千年蟲”恐慌加以對比，認為這種人為制造恐慌的做法只是為了讓那些散布恐慌的人“stood to gain”。接著，作者引用一位專家的話，認為所有這些人都有一種內(nèi)在的動機促使他們夸大危險?！庇纱丝梢?，散布恐怖威脅論的人與其說是關(guān)心國家安全，不如說是關(guān)心自己的利益。

參考譯文

這是一幅毀滅性的景象?？植婪肿佑秒娮邮侄侮J入了控制一座美國大城市供水系統(tǒng)的電腦，他們把閥門打開又關(guān)上，用未經(jīng)處理的污水或者有毒的化學(xué)物質(zhì)來污染水源，然后把水放出來，形成一股極具破壞力的洪水。當應(yīng)急服務(wù)正忙于做出反應(yīng)時，恐怖分子再次出擊，只見他們輕點幾下鼠標，就關(guān)閉了電話網(wǎng)和電網(wǎng)。一時間，商業(yè)陷入癱瘓，醫(yī)院人滿為患，人們爭相逃離，道路擁堵不堪。

這種情景是那些散布恐怖威脅論的人描繪的場景。他們堅持認為911襲擊之后僅采取實體安全措施是不夠的。攔截道路、派兵把守電站都不能防止數(shù)字化恐怖主義。“除非我們對網(wǎng)絡(luò)基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施加以保護，否則只需要幾個按鍵和一個互聯(lián)網(wǎng)連接就能讓經(jīng)濟陷入癱瘓并危及人們的生命，”得克薩斯州議員拉馬爾·史密斯在2月向一個司法委員會發(fā)言時如此說道。他用一句標語結(jié)束了自己的發(fā)言：“一個鼠標可以變得和一顆子彈或者炸彈一樣危險?！彼f得對嗎？

的確，現(xiàn)在越來越多的公用事業(yè)公司和其他重要的基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施運營商連接到互聯(lián)網(wǎng)上。但那僅僅是為了讓一家電力公司的客戶可以在網(wǎng)上支付賬單，并不一定意味著這家公司的關(guān)鍵控制系統(tǒng)容易受到攻擊。出于安全，控制系統(tǒng)通常都和其他系統(tǒng)完全分開。再說它們一般都是老式的復(fù)雜系統(tǒng)，和互聯(lián)網(wǎng)技術(shù)并不兼容。即使是授權(quán)用戶也需要有專業(yè)知識才能操作它們。而電信公司、醫(yī)院和商業(yè)企業(yè)通常都有應(yīng)急預(yù)案來應(yīng)付停電或者洪水等突發(fā)事件。

8月，美國海軍軍事學(xué)院聯(lián)合加特納咨詢公司進行了一次模擬演習(xí)，最后得出結(jié)論，對美國關(guān)鍵基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施發(fā)動一次“珍珠港電子”襲擊的確能夠帶來嚴重破壞，但這樣的襲擊首先需要5年的準備時間以及2億美元的資金。而襲擊關(guān)鍵基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施有遠比這簡單廉價的方法，從恐嚇電話到汽車炸彈以及劫持飛機等不一而足。

9月18日，負責美國網(wǎng)絡(luò)安全事務(wù)的權(quán)威領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人理查德·克拉克公布了人們期待已久的保護關(guān)鍵基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施免遭數(shù)字化襲擊的計劃。不過它就像一個受潮了的爆竹，既沒有給出明確的建議，也沒有提出新的規(guī)章或者法規(guī)。但實際上這種膽小的做法也許是正確的。如果某種危險被夸大，那么不采取行動也許就是上策。

人們難免會從它聯(lián)想到“千年蟲”以及由于把日期調(diào)整到2000年所引發(fā)的電腦癱瘓的預(yù)言。當時的情況和現(xiàn)在一樣，那些技術(shù)販子和咨詢師們發(fā)出警報，然后通過散布恐慌坐收漁利。不過，劍橋大學(xué)的計算機科學(xué)家羅斯·安德森更傾向于將其與環(huán)境游說團體加以類比。他發(fā)現(xiàn)，就像那些環(huán)保衛(wèi)士一樣，從事安全工作的人——不論是想要促銷產(chǎn)品的商人，還是渴望得到補助金的學(xué)者，抑或是期望更多預(yù)算的政客——都有一種內(nèi)在的動機促使他們夸大危險。