This is a book you can imagine Alec Leamas, the miserable spook hero of The Spy Who Came In From the Cold, enjoying on the number 11 bus back to his dingy Hammersmith flat. “What do you think spies are: priests, saints, martyrs?” Leamas famously snarled. “They're a squalid procession of vain fools, traitors, too, yes; pansies, sadists and drunkards, people who play cowboys and Indians to brighten their rotten lives.”
Plus ca change, apparently. Curveball offers a squalid and up-to-date procession of real-life fools, traitors and game-players seeking to brighten their rotten lives. Principal among them is an Iraqi chemical engineer who pitched up in Germany without a visa in 1999. He asked for political asylum and knew that he would greatly improve his chances of getting it if he could make himself interesting to the intelligence services. Which he did. Before long he had their rapt attention, as well as his own code name, Curveball.
Bob Drogin, a reporter on the Los Angeles Times, relates how over the next couple of years Curveball impressed his interrogators with his detailed knowledge of Iraq's chemical and biological weapons programmes. He spoke at length of such things as mobile laboratories that were being used to cook up lethal bugs. The Americans were desperate to have a look at him, too. But the Germans fobbed off their rivals with transcripts and reports, blocking direct access to their prize informer.
Nevertheless, Curveball's story became an important part of the American government's case for invading Iraq. Information taken from his testimony cropped up in the National Intelligence Estimate of October 2002 (which maintained with “high confidence” that Iraq had chemical and biological weapons); in George Bush's state-of-the-union message in January 2003 (which included a reference to “mobile weapons labs designed to produce germ-warfare agents”); and in Colin Powell's presentation to the UN the following month (which featured computer-generated images of those mobile weapons labs, based on descriptions and drawings by Curveball).
But it was all rubbish. Curveball was a low-level drone and borderline nutcase with a gift for telling people what they wanted to hear. In the run-up to the war—despite the doubts expressed by some experts about Curveball's reliability—nobody bothered to check out his story properly. It was not until 2004, a year after the invasion of Iraq, that the CIA admitted that Curveball had foxed them. He “appears to be fabricating in this stream of reporting”, the burn notice read.
Mr. Drogin points out that, in the aftermath of September 11th 2001, critics lambasted American intelligence for failing to “connect the dots that might have prevented the terrorist attacks”. What makes the Curveball case so dreadful, he reckons, is that this time they simply invented the dots. “If Curveball fused fact and fiction, others twisted and magnified his account in grotesque ways,” he concludes. “Time and again, bureaucratic rivalries, tawdry ambitions and spineless leadership proved more important than professional integrity.” You can just about hear old Alec Leamas muttering “Told you so.”
1. The hero (heroes) of the book Curveball is (are) _____.
[A] Alec Leamas who severely criticizes the profession of spy
[B] a squalid procession of spies
[C] an Iraqi chemical engineer named Curveball
[D] the spies that work for CIA ahead of the Iraqi war
2. Curveball successfully got political asylum in Germany because _____.
[A] he was wanted by Americans
[B] he was the principal of Iraq's bio-chemical engineering project
[C] he boasted of his adequate knowledge on Iraq's information with full confidence
[D] he succeeded in making the Germans believe that he was a reliable and useful informer
3. Curveball's reliability was not suspected despite some experts' doubt because _____.
[A] his knowledge of Iraq's chemical and biological weapons programs sounded true
[B] he was good at providing information that catered to the demand of western governments
[C] his story has been used in many important government reports
[D] American intelligence neglected their duty
4. The word “dots” (Line 2, Paragraph 6) most probably means _____.
[A] points
[B] marks
[C] falsities
[D] evidences
5. By mentioning old Alec Leamas' muttering “Told you so.” the author implies that _____.
[A] spies are good story-teller
[B] fact is often confused with fiction
[C] people are easily trusting the spies
[D] Alec Leamas is more intelligent than Curveball
1. The hero (heroes) of the book Curveball is (are) _____.
[A] Alec Leamas who severely criticizes the profession of spy
[B] a squalid procession of spies
[C] an Iraqi chemical engineer named Curveball
[D] the spies that work for CIA ahead of the Iraqi war
1. 《詭計(jì)》一書的主人公是 _____。
[A] 嚴(yán)厲斥責(zé)間諜行業(yè)的Alec Leamas
[B] 一群卑鄙的間諜
[C] 一個名叫“詭計(jì)”的伊拉克化學(xué)工程師
[D] 伊拉克戰(zhàn)爭爆發(fā)前為中情局工作的間諜
答案:B 難度系數(shù):☆☆☆
分析:細(xì)節(jié)題。雖然文章整篇都在談?wù)?ldquo;詭計(jì)”,再加上書的名字也是這個,很容易讓人以為該書的主人公是“詭計(jì)”,但是文章第二段提到該書介紹了一群這樣的間諜,只不過其中最主要的人物是“詭計(jì)”而已。因此,答案為B。
2. Curveball successfully got political asylum in Germany because _____.
[A] he was wanted by Americans
[B] he was the principal of Iraq's bio-chemical engineering project
[C] he boasted of his adequate knowledge of Iraq's informa-tion with full confidence
[D] he succeeded in making the Germans believe that he was a reliable and useful informer
2. “詭計(jì)”在德國成功地得到了政治避難是因?yàn)?_____。
[A] 美國人想要得到他
[B] 他是伊拉克生物化學(xué)工程項(xiàng)目的主管
[C] 他滿懷信心地吹噓自己對于伊拉克高級機(jī)密信息的充分了解
[D] 他成功地讓德國人相信他是一名可靠且有用的告密者
答案:D 難度系數(shù):☆☆☆
分析:推理題。文章第二段提到,“詭計(jì)”明白,如果他能引起德方情報機(jī)構(gòu)的興趣的話,就能提高申請政治避難的成功率,最終他也的確成功了。文章第三段就提到他講述了許多伊拉克的軍事機(jī)密,讓大家認(rèn)為他很重要,但文章下面提到這些機(jī)密都是他捏造的。因此,他能成功地得到避難的原因就是讓德國相信他有價值。選項(xiàng)D最為符合題意。
3. Curveball's reliability was not suspected despite some experts' doubt because _____.
[A] his knowledge of Iraq's chemical and biological weapons programs sounded true
[B] he was good at providing information that catered to the demand of western governments
[C] his story has been used in many important government reports
[D] American intelligence neglected their duty
3. 盡管一些專家表示過懷疑,但是“詭計(jì)”的可靠性最終并沒有受到懷疑,是因?yàn)?_____。
[A] 他對伊拉克的化學(xué)和生物武器項(xiàng)目的了解聽起來很真實(shí)
[B] 他善于為西方政府提供他們想要的信息
[C] 他的故事在許多重要的政府報告中都被引用
[D] 美國情報機(jī)構(gòu)失職
答案:B 難度系數(shù):☆☆
分析:推理題。第五段提到,“詭計(jì)”的本領(lǐng)就是人們想要聽到什么他就說什么,人們總是容易輕信自己潛意識中覺得可能的事情,他就是抓住了人們的這個心理進(jìn)行欺騙的。所以雖然有一些專家表示懷疑,最終卻沒有人去調(diào)查。因此,選項(xiàng)B最為符合題意。
4. The word “dots” (Line 2, Paragraph 6) most probably means _____.
[A] points
[B] marks
[C] falsities
[D] evidences
4. dots這個詞(第六段第二行)最有可能的意思是 _____。
[A] 要點(diǎn)
[B] 記號
[C] 謊言
[D] 證據(jù)
答案:C 難度系數(shù):☆☆☆
分析:猜詞題。該詞所在的原文為:Mr. Drogin points out that, in the aftermath of September 11th 2001, critics lambasted American intelligence for failing to “connect the dots that might have prevented the terrorist attacks”.從上下文可以分析得出,“詭計(jì)”提供的信息大部分都是純粹的謊言,答案中的選項(xiàng)C比較符合題意。
5. By mentioning old Alec Leamas' muttering “Told you so.” the author implies that _____.
[A] spies are good story-teller
[B] fact is often confused with fiction
[C] people are easily trusting the spies
[D] Alec Leamas is more intelligent than Curveball
5. 作者提到老Alec Leamas嘟囔著說“告訴你吧”,這暗示了 _____。
[A] 間諜們是很會編故事的人
[B] 事實(shí)經(jīng)常和編造的故事混淆
[C] 人們?nèi)菀纵p信間諜
[D] Alec Leamas比“詭計(jì)”更加聰明
答案:A 難度系數(shù):☆☆☆☆
分析:推理題。文章最后以老Alec Leamas的這句話結(jié)束是帶有總結(jié)性意味的,“Told you so.”的意思好像就是說這些都是告訴你的,并不一定是事實(shí)。而且話從一個間諜口中說出,其實(shí)就是說間諜是最會編造事實(shí)的人,因此,選項(xiàng)A最為符合題意。
從這本書你可以想象Alec Leamas,這個《從寒冷中來的間諜》一書中幽靈式的主角坐著11路公共汽車,前往他那位于河北岸倫敦自治區(qū)Hammersmith內(nèi)的昏暗公寓。“你們覺得間諜是什么人? 牧師、圣徒還是殉教者?”Leamas咆哮著,“他們不過是一群卑鄙的傻子,是叛徒;還有娘娘腔、施虐狂和酒鬼,他們只是假扮牛仔或是印第安人,來讓他們糜爛的生活看起來光鮮一些。”
顯然,這一切都已經(jīng)變了?!对幱?jì)》呈現(xiàn)給我們的是一群真實(shí)生活中卑鄙的傻子、叛徒和游戲玩家,他們也在美化自己糜爛的生活。他們中的主角是一名伊拉克化學(xué)工程師,他于1999年在沒有簽證的情況下定居德國。他申請了政治避難,而且他明白,如果能讓情報機(jī)構(gòu)對自己感興趣的話,那么就可以增加申請成功的幾率。他也這樣做了。沒過多久,他就引起了情報機(jī)構(gòu)的高度注意,也有了自己的代號——“詭計(jì)”。
《洛杉磯時報》的記者Bob Drogin講述了在之后的兩年中,“詭計(jì)”如何通過詳細(xì)描述伊拉克的化學(xué)和生物武器項(xiàng)目,最終給審問他的人留下了深刻的印象。他詳細(xì)地描述了用來制造有毒細(xì)菌的移動實(shí)驗(yàn)室。美國人也急切地希望見到他。但是德國人用了一些轉(zhuǎn)述和報告來應(yīng)付他們的對手,這樣美國人就不能與這個金牌告密者直接取得聯(lián)系了。
但是,“詭計(jì)”的故事成為美國政府入侵伊拉克的重要理由之一。從他證詞中摘錄的信息出現(xiàn)在2002年10月的《國家情報評估》中(該評估將伊拉克擁有化學(xué)和生物武器定為“高級機(jī)密”);也出現(xiàn)在布什總統(tǒng)2003年1月的國情咨文中(該國情咨文提到了“旨在生產(chǎn)細(xì)菌戰(zhàn)藥劑的移動武器實(shí)驗(yàn)室”);還出現(xiàn)在次月鮑威爾向聯(lián)合國的陳詞中(該陳詞介紹了電腦模擬的移動武器實(shí)驗(yàn)室的圖像,這些都是基于“詭計(jì)”的描述和繪圖而制作出來的)。
但這些都是胡說八道。“詭計(jì)”是一個低級的閑人,也是一個瘋子,他的本領(lǐng)就是告訴大家他們希望聽到的東西。盡管一些專家懷疑“詭計(jì)”的可信度,但隨著戰(zhàn)爭的升溫,沒人再去費(fèi)心地查證他的故事了。直到2004年,也就是入侵伊拉克一年之后,中情局才承認(rèn)“詭計(jì)”愚弄了他們。他“好像在其報告中捏造事實(shí)”,通告這樣寫道。
Drogin先生指出,在2001年9月11日之后,批評家嚴(yán)厲地責(zé)罵美國的情報機(jī)構(gòu)沒能“把疑點(diǎn)聯(lián)系起來,本來還可以避免恐怖襲擊的”。他承認(rèn)“詭計(jì)”事件的可怕之處在于,這次是他們自己捏造了這些疑點(diǎn)。“如果‘詭計(jì)’把事實(shí)和虛構(gòu)混在了一起,那么其他人則是以奇怪的方式把這些混雜在一起的東西扭曲、放大了,”他總結(jié)道,“實(shí)踐再次證明了官僚敵對、俗氣的野心以及沒有骨氣的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)要比專業(yè)的真正品質(zhì)更為致命,”你聽,老Alec Leamas嘀咕著“告訴你吧”。