美國(guó)政要第22課
U.S. National Security Strategies
--Interview with Former National Security Advisor Dr. Anthony Lake 訪前總統(tǒng)國(guó)家安全事務(wù)助理安東尼•萊克博士
MR.CHEN BOJIANG:I feel honored to have this opportunity to gain your insightful1 views on the issues of national security and international relations. I am researching American views of military revolution, future warfare and national defense development, which are closely related to your field. So your insights will be very helpful to my research. I really appreciate that you have given me this chance to interview you，given your full schedule.
During your appointment as the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs2, there was a major adjustment of U.S. national security strategy from ”Containment3” to ”Engagement and Enlargement4” What prompted this new strategy? What were the main points of this strategy?
DR.ANTHONY LAKE: Well, I think the strategies reflect the view of the President for many years before he became President and were developed in a number of his speeches during the campaign in 1992 in which he spoke about the importance of democracy5 and open markets for the United States—and, we believe, to the world. I would simply emphasize that the spread of democracy, which is not created by the United States, is I believe in the interest of everybody. For two reasons. One, democratic nations do tend to have better relationships in part because of the transparency of their systems. And secondly, I think that the shape of the emerging global economy and the effect of globalization6 encourages democracy. Because we have seen for example, in some of the areas in Southeast Asia, that when you lack the transparency that democracy brings, then you can get the kind of crony capitalism7 that can lead to very ill-advised economic policies. Also, to attract foreign investment it is necessary to create a rule of law，the law of contracts, etc. that can allow more regular investment practices. So I think that democratic systems both are good for security and match the requirements of the new global economy. That is why while American diplomats8 as you know raise human rights and democracy with governments around the world, I do not believe we can or should try to impose democracy on others. That is not within our power. We don't have the right to do it. And in any case democracy as a system, represented in different ways in different cultures, simply fits the requirements of the modern world. Therefore, the United States doesn't have to impose it on others.
MR.CHEN: It has been several years since the implementation of the ”Engagement and Enlargement” strategy. In your opinion, does this strategy reflect the security needs of the United States in the post-Cold War? Is there a need to make changes to the strategy in the near future?
DR. LAKE: As I said, I think it is in our security interest. I don't think we need to make changes in the strategy as a goal. But I do believe that we should always be very flexible. It should be managed in a way that gives due consideration to the importance of others' cultures and to their sovereignty9. And to make sure that we do not become so rigid10 as to be self defeating. We should not go around insisting that everybody should look like the United States.
MR. CHEN: How do you view the international situation after the Cold War? Some have argued that there will be a relatively secure interlude11 in the future. What do you think of this ”interlude?” How long will this ”interlude” last?
DR.LAKE:I hope it's not just an interlude. I hope it will last a long time. But there are two kinds of security threats, both to the United States and to international security generally. One of them，coming out of the Cold War, I would call classic security threats. The other are the more modern security threats that flow largely from or are exacerbated12 by globalization. The first includes the possibility of two nearly simultaneous regional conflicts，which obviously potentially include the Persian Gulf Area，either Iraq or Iran and North Korea. Those all remain possibilities. I think the most dangerous is North Korea. Because there we have an organic13 crisis. I think that the North Korean system will collapse14 at some point. I don't know whether it is within months, years or decades, but at some point it will collapse. It cannot manage. And at that point, there are obvious dangers that can affect South Korea, China, Japan, Russia as well as the U.S. There is also always, to be frank15, the possibility of conflict with the People's Republic of China over Taiwan. We saw the dispatch16 of two aircraft carriers in the crisis of 1996. I doubt very much that that will happen. and I think our relationship through our strategic dialogue, summit meetings, through military to military contacts with the People's Republic is much better. And that kind of communication will help to avert17 that. And also I was very encouraged by my recent visit to Taiwan at how the senior leaders that I spoke with all were emphasizing prudence18 and care as they head into a new election in the year 2000. So I am encouraged with regard to China. The other possible classic threat could come were Russia to evolve back towards a nationalist direction and the ways of the past. That could have the most severe consequences for all of us: a new Cold War. But I don't think that's going to happen either. The more interesting threats are the very modern threats. They are not new in terms of human nature，but they are new in terms of technology and instant19 communications and borders that are eroding20 .One has to do with the potential combination of a terrorism whose nature is changing towards more individual and less organized forms, as we see in the World Trade Center or Oklahoma City, with the prospect of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction21. And then the possibility for the use of computers in the hands of terrorists or criminals who can break into businesses or critical infrastructures also poses a real threat. And finally I think we have to redefine security. If you define security as the security of individuals within nations, as increasingly we should，as the world shrinks22 with the global communications revolution, then we need to take as security issues such questions as the environment or the economic welfare of great numbers of people who are not benefiting from globalization. I think that one of the great security dangers twenty years down the road or so, is that if we simply assume that growth is our object，then there will be an increasing disparity between rich and poor in a lot of nations and that will create new political problems in those nations that can affect our security. So even while exercising the necessary economic reforms that flow from globalization，we also have to work on making sure that these economic reforms are politically sustainable23 by emphasizing also employment, housing, education, social safety nets, etc.
Practise Listening to Words 詞匯聽力練習(xí):
1.insightful [] adj. 富有見解的
2.the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs 總統(tǒng)國(guó)家安全事務(wù)助理
3.Containment [ ]n. 遏制（戰(zhàn)略）
4.Engagement and Enlargement 參與與擴(kuò)展戰(zhàn)略）
5.democracy [] n. 民主
6.globalization[] n 全球化
7.capitalism [] n. 資本主義
8.diplomat [ ]n. 外交官
9.sovereignty [] n. 主權(quán)
10.rigid [ ]adj. 僵化的
11.interlude [] n. 間歇
12.exacerbate [ ] vt. 惡化
13.organic [] adj. 器官的
14.collapse [ ]vi. 崩潰
15.frank [] adj. 坦率的
16.dispatch [] vt. 派遣
17.avert [] vt. 防止
18.prudence [] n. 審慎
19.instant [] adj. 即時(shí)的
20.erode [] vt. 侵蝕，淡化
21.proliferation of weapons of mass destruction 大規(guī)模破壞性武器的擴(kuò)散
22.shrink [] vi. 收縮
23.sustainable [] adj. 可以承受的
【參考譯文】
美國(guó)的安全戰(zhàn)略
陳伯江:今天能有機(jī)會(huì)就國(guó)家安全與國(guó)際關(guān)系問題聽取你的高見，我感到非常榮幸。我正在進(jìn)行有關(guān)軍事革命、未來戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)與美國(guó)國(guó)防發(fā)展問題的研究，這都與你所從事的領(lǐng)域有著密切關(guān)系，因而你的看法會(huì)對(duì)我的研究有所幫助。非常感謝你在百忙中接受我的訪談。
在你擔(dān)任總統(tǒng)國(guó)家安全事務(wù)助理期間，美國(guó)的國(guó)家安全戰(zhàn)略進(jìn)行了重大調(diào)整，即由“遏制”戰(zhàn)略調(diào)整為“參與與擴(kuò)展”戰(zhàn)略，促成戰(zhàn)略調(diào)整的動(dòng)因是什么?新戰(zhàn)略的主要內(nèi)容是什么？
萊克:我認(rèn)為“參與與擴(kuò)展”戰(zhàn)略反映了克林頓總統(tǒng)在成為總統(tǒng)之前多年的思想。這一戰(zhàn)略形成于1992年他競(jìng)選總統(tǒng)的多次演說中。在那些演說中，他談到了民主與開放市場(chǎng)對(duì)美國(guó)及對(duì)世界的重要性。我想強(qiáng)調(diào)說明，民主的擴(kuò)展不是由美國(guó)發(fā)起的，但我認(rèn)為它符合大家的利益。原因有二:一是民主國(guó)家之間趨向于有著越來越好的關(guān)系，部分原因在于他們的體制的透明度;二是全球經(jīng)濟(jì)的出現(xiàn)和世界一體化的影響推動(dòng)著民主的發(fā)展。因?yàn)樵跂|南亞一些地區(qū)，我們已經(jīng)看到了這樣的例子，當(dāng)一個(gè)國(guó)家缺乏由民主帶來的透明度時(shí)，就會(huì)出現(xiàn)那種任人唯親的資本主義，結(jié)果導(dǎo)致采納有著嚴(yán)重錯(cuò)誤的經(jīng)濟(jì)政策建議。同樣，為了吸引外國(guó)投資，建立法律制度，如合同法等，也是必要的。這樣可更好地規(guī)范投資活動(dòng)。所以我認(rèn)為，民主制度既有利于安全，又能滿足新的全球經(jīng)濟(jì)的需要。這就是美國(guó)的外交官們向世界各國(guó)的政府提出人權(quán)和民主的原因。但是，我并不認(rèn)為我們需要、能夠或者應(yīng)該向別的國(guó)家強(qiáng)加民主。我們沒有這個(gè)能力，也沒有這樣的權(quán)力?？傊裰髯鳛橐环N制度，在不同的文化背景下有不同的表現(xiàn)方式，很容易適合現(xiàn)代社會(huì)的要求。因此，美國(guó)不必把它強(qiáng)加于其他國(guó)家。
陳:美國(guó)采取“參與與擴(kuò)展”戰(zhàn)略已有好幾年了，在你看來，這一戰(zhàn)略是否反映了冷戰(zhàn)之后美國(guó)的安全需要？在近期有無必要對(duì)這一戰(zhàn)略進(jìn)行修改?
萊克:我已說過，這一戰(zhàn)略符合我們的安全利益。我認(rèn)為我們不需要對(duì)這一戰(zhàn)略的目標(biāo)進(jìn)行修改，但我覺得我們應(yīng)當(dāng)始終保持高度的靈活性。我們?cè)谕菩羞@一戰(zhàn)略時(shí)要充分考慮到其它國(guó)家的文化及其主權(quán)的重要性，并確實(shí)注意不要變得過于僵化以致自取失敗。我們也不要堅(jiān)持讓所有的國(guó)家都像美國(guó)一樣。
陳:你怎樣看待冷戰(zhàn)后的國(guó)際形勢(shì)？有人認(rèn)為未來將會(huì)有一段相對(duì)安全的“間歇期”，你對(duì)“間歇期”的說法有何看法？這一“間歇期”將會(huì)持續(xù)多長(zhǎng)時(shí)間？
萊克:我希望它不只是一段“間歇期”，而能夠長(zhǎng)期持續(xù)下去。但是，一般來說，對(duì)美國(guó)也對(duì)國(guó)際安全的威脅有兩種:一種威脅來自于冷戰(zhàn)，我稱之為傳統(tǒng)的安全威脅;另一種威脅屬于更為現(xiàn)代的安全威脅，主要來自于世界一體化或者說被世界一體化所加重。第一種威脅包括兩場(chǎng)幾乎同時(shí)發(fā)生的地區(qū)沖突的可能性。很明顯，爆發(fā)沖突的潛在地區(qū)包括波斯灣地區(qū)（伊拉克或伊朗）和北朝鮮。這些地區(qū)都存在著危險(xiǎn)的可能性。我認(rèn)為最危險(xiǎn)的是北朝鮮。因?yàn)槟抢锩媾R的是一種機(jī)體危機(jī)。我認(rèn)為北朝鮮的社會(huì)制度在某個(gè)時(shí)候必將崩潰。我不知道它會(huì)在幾個(gè)月、幾年還是幾十年內(nèi)發(fā)生，但在某個(gè)時(shí)候，它將會(huì)走向崩潰。這不可避免。而且到那時(shí)，就有可能出現(xiàn)影響南朝鮮、中國(guó)、日本和俄羅斯以及美國(guó)的明顯危險(xiǎn)。
坦率地說，在臺(tái)灣問題上，也一直存在著與中華人民共和國(guó)發(fā)生沖突的危險(xiǎn)性。在1996年的危機(jī)中，美國(guó)曾經(jīng)派出過兩艘航空母艦。我不相信這種事還會(huì)發(fā)生。我認(rèn)為通過戰(zhàn)略對(duì)話、高級(jí)會(huì)談，通過軍方接觸，我們之間的關(guān)系已好得多。這種相互的交流將有助于消除危險(xiǎn)。我最近的臺(tái)灣之行也使我很受鼓舞。與我會(huì)談的所有高層領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人都強(qiáng)調(diào)在他們即將進(jìn)行的2000年的新一輪選舉中，將采取謹(jǐn)慎而又小心的態(tài)度。因此，我對(duì)中國(guó)問題抱有信心。
另一個(gè)可能的傳統(tǒng)威脅是俄羅斯倒退到民族主義和過去的行為方式。那樣的后果對(duì)所有人都非常嚴(yán)重:即爆發(fā)新的冷戰(zhàn)。但我認(rèn)為這種情況將不會(huì)發(fā)生。
最有意思的威脅是那些非常現(xiàn)代的威脅。這些威脅之所以新并不是因?yàn)槿诵缘淖兓?，而是因?yàn)榧夹g(shù)的發(fā)展，瞬息通信手段的出現(xiàn)和國(guó)界的淡化。威脅之一與恐怖主義活動(dòng)有關(guān)，就像紐約世貿(mào)中心或俄克拉阿馬城發(fā)生的慘案那樣，恐怖活動(dòng)會(huì)越來越趨向于個(gè)人行為而非組織行為，并帶有大規(guī)模毀傷武器擴(kuò)散的征兆。其次是恐怖主義者和犯罪分子有可能使用電子計(jì)算機(jī)，他們有可能闖入商業(yè)或關(guān)鍵的基礎(chǔ)系統(tǒng)，也會(huì)使我們面臨一種現(xiàn)實(shí)的威脅。最后，我認(rèn)為我們必須重新定義安全的概念。如果我們把安全定義為國(guó)家內(nèi)個(gè)人的安全，隨著全球通信革命的發(fā)展世界會(huì)越來越小，我們則需要把環(huán)境問題或大量未能從全球化中得到好處的人的經(jīng)濟(jì)福利問題當(dāng)作安全問題來考慮。如果我們僅把經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)作為我們的目標(biāo)，那么在許多國(guó)家都出現(xiàn)貧富差別的擴(kuò)大，并造成可能影響我們安全的新政治問題。我認(rèn)為這是今后20年左右最大的危險(xiǎn)之一。因此，既使我們?cè)谝蛉蚧M(jìn)行必要的經(jīng)濟(jì)改革的同時(shí)，我們也必須重視就業(yè)、住房、教育、社會(huì)保障網(wǎng)絡(luò)等問題，確保經(jīng)濟(jì)改革具有政治上的承受力。
