美國(guó)政要第20課
Overview of RMA Research
--Interview with Dr. Michael J. Mazarr, Senior Researcher at CSIS訪華盛頓戰(zhàn)略與國(guó)際問題研究中心高級(jí)研究員米切爾•馬扎爾博士
MR. CHEN BOJIANG: After the Gulf War, there has been an ongoing discussion of the Revolution in Military Affairs in the defense community. Two of the earliest research results that I read which caught my attention were a CSIS1 report on military technological revolution and an article titled “Is There Military Technological Revolution in the future of the U.S.”, published in CSIS’s, The Washington Quarterly2, Fall 1993. Based on these two publications and from references I gathered from other materials, I wrote a summary of the U.S. defense community's views on the military revolution which was published in China Military Sci¬ence, in the Spring 1995 issue3. You were the main author of the CSIS report as well as the editor of the article. Therefore, I have reason to believe that CSIS and your¬self are among the earliest to research the subject of a military revolution in the Unit¬ed States. This is also the reason I'd like to interview you today.
Could you give me an overview of your process and that of CSIS's process in researching the RMA?
MR. MICHAEL MAZARR: We did come to this subject fairly early, when the U.S. defense establishment was trying to get an early understanding of what it was all about. So our work was fairly theoretical. This was an issue that was not very well defined at the time.
And so mostly, in that initial4 report we were just trying to lay out, as the title suggested, a framework for understanding what the RMA was, how you could define it, and what future issues for research there would be. It was too early to have any final answers for ultimately what the Revolution in Military Affairs would mean in all of its details for U.S. policy. Our goal at that time was just to gather a vari¬ety of information. We worked with people in the U.S. Defense Department, and we were working on new technology to try to get a comprehensive idea of the different areas of technology, and doctrine, and strategy that were being discussed in con¬nection with the Revolution in Military Af¬fairs. We then wanted just to sort of orga¬nize them, and put out a review that would start a dialogue, not provide the final an¬swer, but begin a dialogue in the U.S. de¬fense community, which really had not started very much at that time.
MR. CHEN: I have noticed that in your report and article, the term used is “Military Technology Revolution.” But in later articles, “Revolution in Military Af¬fairs” was used instead. Is there a differ¬ence in using these two terms?
MR. MAZARR: There's not a big difference. Basically, military technological revolution was a term that U.S. analysts first borrowed from the Soviet Union. Be¬cause, as you know, a lot of these ideas originated5 in Soviet thinking about ad¬vanced maneuverable warfare6 and armored warfare7. So it was just a borrowed term.
And then eventually as the idea began to take more shape in the United States, people began to realize that there was a broader context for a more radical change in warfare than the initial Soviet analysts were talking about.
There is a difference, in that the Rev¬olution in Military Affairs is a much broad¬er term, much more encompassing8. The military technical revolution, at least early on, generally was referring to much more advanced precise ways of waging the same old kind of warfare. The Revolution in Military Affairs refers to, possibly, com¬pletely new forms of waging war that would be unrecognizable to generals of the old style.
MR. CHEN: You argued that “scien¬tists, policymakers and military leaders have been relatively poor assisting the mili¬tary implications of revolution and tech¬nologies forecasting9 their effects on future battlefields.” Why do these things hap¬pen? How do you assess the military impli¬cations of revolutionary technologies at the present time?
MR. MAZARR: Well, the biggest problem in the U.S. system in thinking about this issue has been the problem of bureaucracy10; that the Defense Depart¬ment has certain services, and offices, and soon, that are organized based on the way that the United States military has waged war for 50, 60, 70 years now.
And so when new technologies come a-long the bureaucracy tends to take them and put them into categories11, based on its traditional understanding, and to view them as ways of waging the same old kind of war more efficiently, rather than as po¬tential indications that the nature of war is changing.
So, the U.S. military has been very good at developing technology, good at pushing the technology into operational forces, and using it; but not as good at seeing the broader implications of precision technologies, or perhaps moving too slowly.
That process has begun to accelerate a little bit. Within the U.S. military there's a lot more discussion today of, for exam¬ple, changing the way military units oper¬ate on the battlefield because of new pre¬cise technologies, because of the need to have very small, decentralized12 units, those sorts of things.
So that is happening more, but for a long time, for a decade or more, these technologies would come into the U.S. bu¬reaucracy, one at a time, and would be plugged into13 the conventional14 way of do¬ing business. And the broader implications of those were not seen very well.
MR. CHEN: Could you give me a brief introduction of the process of the CSIS report on “Military Technological Revolution?” What was the influence of this report?
MR. MAZARR: Well, the process we used to come to the conclusion was, in a way, a series of meetings, really. We did some initial research here at CSIS. Then, we had somewhere around 50 or 70 people drawn from the different military ser¬vices15, from other research institutes around town, and from CSIS. We would do some initial research, get some ideas, present the ideas at these meetings, have a lot of feedback16, conversation.
And then after we had a series of ses¬sions like that, we here at CSIS drafted a rough draft report; and sent it out for commentl7. I'm not sure exactly how many people sent comments back, but quite a few18, a couple dozen at least. We did a fi¬nal draft, based on their comments, and that ultimately became the report. So all the writing was done here within the CSIS, but with a great deal of input from other folks19 around town. And this was really a group of people who were interest¬ed in the RMA, people who were following it at the time.
There's kind of a group of people within the military services who in many cases know each other fairly well, because they're part of this group that follows this issue on a regular basis. So, at that time those were the sorts of people that we were bringing together.
And as far as influence, I don't know that the report really changed any thinking about the RMA at the time, because it was still fairly early. It was too early to make sort of a comprehensive argument for changing the U.S. military in the direction of the RMA, which is something we couldn't have done anyhow.
But what I think it did do was help to organize the thinking early on, and get people talking about the same issue or is¬sues as part of the RMA. Because one of the problems at that early stage was all sorts of people had different ideas of what it was. So I think it helped to clarify20 the debate a little bit, and just push it along. But we were certainly not trying to come up with any final answers at that time. That wasn't the influence we hoped out of the report.
Practise Listening to Words 詞匯聽力練習(xí):
1.CSIS:Center for Strategic& International Studies華盛頓戰(zhàn)略與國(guó)際問題研究中心
2.Washington Quarterly《華盛頓季刊》
3.issue [] n.（報(bào)刊）期號(hào)
4.initial [] adj. 最初的
5.originate [] vt. 起源于
6.maneuverable warfare機(jī)動(dòng)戰(zhàn)
7.armored warfare裝甲戰(zhàn)
8.encompass [] vt. 包含
9.forecast [] vt. 預(yù)見
10.bureaucracy [] n. 官僚主義
11.category [] n. 分類
12.decentralize [] vt. 分散
13.plugged into納入
14.conventional [] adj. 常規(guī)的
15.military service軍種
16.feedback [] n. 反饋
17.comment [] n. 評(píng)論
18.quite a few 相當(dāng)多
19.folk [] n. 人們
20.clarify [] vt. 澄清
【參考譯文】
軍事革命研究簡(jiǎn)況
陳伯江：海灣戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)之后，美國(guó)防務(wù)界就軍事革命展開了持續(xù)的討論。我讀到并關(guān)注的最早的兩個(gè)研究成果，是華盛頓戰(zhàn)略與國(guó)際問題研究中心于1993年出版的《關(guān)于軍事技術(shù)革命的研究報(bào)告》和1993年秋季號(hào)《華盛頓季刊》刊登的一篇題為“美國(guó)的未來(lái)是否面臨一場(chǎng)軍事技術(shù)革命”的文章?；谶@些報(bào)告和文章，并參考其它材料，我曾寫過(guò)一篇關(guān)于美國(guó)軍事技術(shù)革命討論的觀點(diǎn)綜述的文章，刊登在《中國(guó)軍事科學(xué)》1995年春季號(hào)上。你是《關(guān)于軍事技術(shù)革命的研究報(bào)告》的主要作者，又是“美國(guó)的未來(lái)是否面臨一場(chǎng)軍事技術(shù)革命”文章的編輯，因此，我有理由認(rèn)為華盛頓戰(zhàn)略與國(guó)際問題研究中心和你本人是在美國(guó)較早從事軍事革命問題研究的機(jī)構(gòu)和學(xué)者，這也是我今天采訪你的原因。
首先，我想請(qǐng)你談一談華盛頓戰(zhàn)略與國(guó)際問題研究中心與你本人研究軍事革命的簡(jiǎn)要情況。
馬扎爾：我們確實(shí)較早開始了這一問題的研究，當(dāng)時(shí)美國(guó)防務(wù)界正試圖展開對(duì)這一問題的初步研究，我們的研究完全是理論性的。這是一個(gè)在那時(shí)尚未很好界定的問題。
所以，在那個(gè)最初的報(bào)告中，我們只是試圖提出一個(gè)理解軍事革命的框架：什么是軍事革命？怎樣定義軍事革命?以及有哪些將來(lái)要研究的問題？那時(shí)要想就軍事革命對(duì)于美國(guó)政策的詳盡意義提出最后答案還為時(shí)過(guò)早，當(dāng)時(shí)的目標(biāo)只是收集各方面的信息。我們與國(guó)防部的人在一起進(jìn)行研究，我們研究新技術(shù)，力求全面了解當(dāng)時(shí)正在討論的與軍事革命有關(guān)的技術(shù)、軍事理論和戰(zhàn)略的不同領(lǐng)域。然后，我們只是對(duì)材料進(jìn)行整理，并提出了一種全面的看法，以期引起討論。我們?cè)趫?bào)告中沒有提供最后的答案，而只是想在美國(guó)防務(wù)圈引起討論。這一討論在那時(shí)確實(shí)尚未很好開展起來(lái)。
陳：我注意到在你們的報(bào)告和文章中，使用的術(shù)語(yǔ)是“軍事技術(shù)革命”。但在后來(lái)的文章中卻代之以“軍事革命”。這兩個(gè)術(shù)語(yǔ)有什么區(qū)別？
馬扎爾：沒有大的區(qū)別。軍事技術(shù)革命是美國(guó)分析人員早先從蘇聯(lián)借用的術(shù)語(yǔ)。如你所知，這類觀點(diǎn)大量源自蘇聯(lián)當(dāng)時(shí)對(duì)于先進(jìn)的機(jī)動(dòng)戰(zhàn)和裝甲戰(zhàn)的思考。所以說(shuō)“軍事技術(shù)革命”只是一個(gè)借用的術(shù)語(yǔ)。
隨著這一術(shù)語(yǔ)在美國(guó)越來(lái)越頻繁地出現(xiàn)，人們開始認(rèn)識(shí)到，應(yīng)該有一個(gè)比原先蘇聯(lián)分析人員所用的“軍事技術(shù)革命”涵義更廣的術(shù)語(yǔ)，來(lái)說(shuō)明戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)所發(fā)生的巨大變化。
“軍事革命”與“軍事技術(shù)革命”的區(qū)別在于，軍事革命是一個(gè)寬泛得多、內(nèi)涵大得多的術(shù)語(yǔ)。軍事技術(shù)革命，至少在早期一般是指以先進(jìn)得多的精確方式，進(jìn)行的與老式戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)相同的戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)，而軍事革命指的是以全新的方式進(jìn)行的與老式的戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)完全不同的戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)。舊式的將軍們可能根本認(rèn)不出這樣的戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)。
陳：你在文章中指出：“科學(xué)家們、政策制訂者和軍事領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人總是相對(duì)消極地看待革命性技術(shù)的軍事意義，并缺乏對(duì)它們對(duì)未來(lái)戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)影響的預(yù)見”。為什么會(huì)出現(xiàn)這種情況?你怎樣評(píng)價(jià)當(dāng)今時(shí)代革命性技術(shù)的軍事意義?
馬扎爾：從這個(gè)問題看，美國(guó)體制上的最大問題是官僚主義。國(guó)防部有不同的軍種、有各種辦公室等等，這些機(jī)構(gòu)是以美國(guó)軍隊(duì)50、60、70年來(lái)所進(jìn)行戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)的方式建立起來(lái)的。因此當(dāng)新技術(shù)出現(xiàn)時(shí)，官僚機(jī)構(gòu)傾向于按照傳統(tǒng)的理解接受它們并對(duì)其分門別類，把它們看作能更加有效地進(jìn)行與老式戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)相同的戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)的方式，而不是看作戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)的性質(zhì)要發(fā)生變化的標(biāo)志。
所以，美國(guó)軍隊(duì)一直非常善于發(fā)展技術(shù)，善于促進(jìn)技術(shù)在作戰(zhàn)部隊(duì)的運(yùn)用，但卻不善于發(fā)現(xiàn)各種精確技術(shù)的更加廣泛的影響，或者說(shuō)這方面進(jìn)展太慢。
現(xiàn)在進(jìn)展已開始加快了一點(diǎn)。在美軍內(nèi)，目前有許多討論。例如，由于新的精確技術(shù)的發(fā)展，由于對(duì)非常小而分散的部隊(duì)的需要，進(jìn)行了改變部隊(duì)?wèi)?zhàn)場(chǎng)作戰(zhàn)方式的討論，以及諸如此類的事情。這種討論開始多了起來(lái)。但長(zhǎng)時(shí)間以來(lái)，10年或10多年來(lái)，這些新技術(shù)每次進(jìn)入美國(guó)的官僚機(jī)構(gòu)，都被納人常規(guī)的使用方式，而不能很充分地看到這些技術(shù)的更為廣泛的影響。
陳：請(qǐng)你介紹一下華盛頓戰(zhàn)略與國(guó)際問題研究中心《關(guān)于軍事技術(shù)革命的研究報(bào)告》研究的過(guò)程，以及這一報(bào)告發(fā)表后的影響。
馬扎爾：在研究過(guò)程中，我們召開了一系列會(huì)議，以這種方式得出結(jié)論。我們?cè)谌A盛頓戰(zhàn)略與國(guó)際問題研究中心進(jìn)行了一些初步的研究，然后，我們從各軍種、其它的研究機(jī)構(gòu)以及我們中心請(qǐng)了50或70人左右參與討論。我們將初步研究得出的觀點(diǎn)提交會(huì)議討論，得到了很多反饋意見。
在經(jīng)過(guò)一系列如上所述的討論之后，我們起草了一個(gè)報(bào)告的初稿，然后又寄出去征求意見。我不能確切地說(shuō)有多少人寄回了他們的評(píng)論意見，但相當(dāng)多，至少有幾十人。基于這些看法，我們寫出了最后的稿子并最終形成了這個(gè)報(bào)告。因此，盡管這一報(bào)告的所有撰稿工作都是在華盛頓戰(zhàn)略與國(guó)際問題研究中心進(jìn)行的，但它吸收了許多其他人的意見，這些人確實(shí)對(duì)軍事革命很感興趣，并在那時(shí)就開始跟蹤研究這一問題。
現(xiàn)在各軍種都有一批人，他們定期參加對(duì)這一問題的討論，所以彼此非常熟悉。他們就是在那時(shí)被我們的討論帶到一起的。
就這一報(bào)告的影響來(lái)說(shuō)，我不知道這一報(bào)告在當(dāng)時(shí)是否真的改變了人們對(duì)軍事革命的想法，要全面說(shuō)服美國(guó)軍隊(duì)朝著軍事革命的方向變化當(dāng)時(shí)還為時(shí)過(guò)早。不管怎樣，我們當(dāng)時(shí)也不可能做到這一點(diǎn)。
但我認(rèn)為它確實(shí)有助于使人們從一開始就對(duì)軍事革命的想法條理化，使人們開始談?wù)撓嗤脑掝}或成為軍事革命組成部分的各個(gè)問題。因?yàn)樵谲娛赂锩懻摰某跗陔A段，各種各樣的人對(duì)什么是軍事革命有各不相同的觀點(diǎn)。因此，我認(rèn)為該報(bào)告有助于澄清爭(zhēng)論中的思路，并推動(dòng)進(jìn)一步展開討論。當(dāng)然在那時(shí)，我們也并沒想拿出最后的答案，那也不是我們期待該報(bào)告會(huì)有的影響。
