美國政要第11課
The Progress and the Main Trends of RMA
--Interview with Dr. Martin C. Libicki, Senior Fellow of the Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS, National Defense University) (March 3, 1998) 訪美國為防大學(xué)戰(zhàn)略研究所高級(jí)研究員馬丁•利比博士
MR. CHEN BOJIANG: Please give an overview of the progress and the main trends of the RMA.
DR. LIBICKI: To think about the history of the RMA, requires starting about twenty years ago and going thirty years into the future. Now, of course, we cannot predict the future, in that we can’t always predict what kind of innovations will come. If I were to look fifty years ago, I would be looking before the invention of the transistor. Without the transistor, we cannot imagine the computer that can sit next to my desk. No one anticipated the transistor. Yet, when it came, it led to everything else. So, to give you a practical example, how good are high energy lasers going to be? If you think that higher energy lasers will be cheap and effective, that’s going to change the conventional battlefield very greatly. If you think high energy lasers are going to be expensive and ineffective, then they’re not very important. My hunch1 is that they’re going to be ineffective and expensive. But I may be wrong. That’s one reason why it’s difficult to project out too far.
Another is more fundamental. Military equipment tends to evolve very quickly in wartime. In get four years between 1941 and 1945 military advanced greatly partly because new weapons were brought into production by 1945, and partly because we learned how to use weapons in 1945 that we didn’t know how to use in 1941. once war ends, the pressure to innovate drops off. Furthermore, without war, you have a tendency to hang on to things that don’t make much sense anymore. Colonel David Johnson (former had of academic affairs at NDU), said that the U.S. Navy’s RMA took place on December 7, 1941. Until Pearl Harbor the United States maintained battleships2, and the U.S. maintained aircraft carriers3. And it wasn’t clear which of the two were going to dominate naval warfare, as the U.S. contemplated waging war with Japan across the Pacific. But when the battleships were sunk, we were left with aircraft carriers, and the aircraft carriers were so effective in the Battle of Midway that nobody thought that battleships had much of a future and we pored our money into aircraft carriers. I suspect that most of the philosophy that we brought to war in the European Front in the 1980s was already obsolete. But we didn’t know that because we didn’t have a war and because we didn’t have a test of those concepts. So therefore we keep extending these concepts out into the future.
Should a war take place in thirty years and we get to test concepts, a lot of things will change. It will accelerate matters. By the same token4, if the U.S. finds itself in a competition with another power, it will be forced to question its own technological development. If the world stays as benign as it is today, chances in military technology will move more slowly. So, I can talk about the last twenty years, because it happened. But I can’t talk about the nest thirty years, except to speculate5.
What do we see over this fifty-year period (e.g., 1978～2028)? First is the refinement and development of precision ammunition, to where if you can get a signature on a target, you can probably kill it. Now, when you add to this the fact that the U.S. and many other advanced countries can now map the world very precisely, that means that you can now locate an object -you can also kill it. The combination of mapping and of GPS (global positioning system) means that, basically, if you can see something, you can kill it.
There are some qualifications to that statement. It doesn’t pay to kill up a $10,000 truck with a million dollar cruise missile-probably not if the U.S. does it, and certainly not if someone tries to do that to the United States. We can produce a $10,000 truck faster than anybody can produce a million dollar cruise missile. So, you have to take that equation into account. At any rate, some time in the next five to ten years, the United States will complete its evolution of PGMs (precision guided munitions).
The second half of the RMA is how do we illuminate6 the battlefield? How do we see everything worth seeing? And a lot of that answer seems to be sensors-electrooptical, microwave, imaging sensors, acoustic sensors. You name it, we have it. We can put in every medium and we can somehow fuze all this information together so we can get a real fine picture of the battlefield. Exactly what sensors, exactly how we do it, is yet to be determined.
DOD will spend a great deal of thought in the early 21st century defining a constellation7 of sensors, that can survive attack by the other side. For instance, we now put our most capable sensors on Boeing 707 platform, which are not stealthy, which are not maneuverable-which have to generate energy to get energy back. Right now we can do it safely. Can we do that safely 10, 20, 30 years from now? I don’t know. If not we’ve got to figure out a way to put these sensors on smaller platforms that do not require human beings.
That is why people are talking very excitedly about UAVs8, which (once we learn to fly them reliably) will have a considerable military effectiveness. If you take a look at Globalhawk, you’re talking a look at an extremely capable unmanned aerial vehicle that costs about $10 million. But you can also make UAVs that can be held with one hand and cost $1000-but they don’t fly as high, they don’t carry as complete a sensor package, they don’t have the endurance, and they probably crash a lot. But you use $5000 UAVs completely differently than you use $10 million UAVs. And the main thing about a $5000 UAVs is that no one’s going to shoot at it with a $100,000 missile-the result is that these things are much more survivable.
We are in a confluence9 of two trends. The first trend is toward the dispersion of things, making a lot of small things. Consider the personal computer business. Mainframe computers are dead, but personal computers are thriving. There are a lot of other analogies as well. The second thing is that we want to network everything together. One sensor may see something using one mode, and another sensor sees it using another mode-and one wants to bring these readings together to start correlating things. I hear a tank. Do you see a tank? Are we getting the radar reflection of the tank? Does it sound like a tank? Etc. When we put these things together-called data fusion10 -we can learn a good deal more about the battlefield. If we can get that kind of information very quickly, then we’ll want to take advantage of that information very quickly. We have at the same time dispersion and integration. And that’s something with which we’re going to be occupied for the next thirty years.
WORDS AND EXPRESSIONS 詞匯提示
1.hunch [] n.預(yù)感
2.battleship [] n.戰(zhàn)列艦
3.aircraft carrier 航空母艦
4.by the same token 由于同樣的原因
5.speculate [] v 推測(cè)
6.illuminate [] v.照明，透亮
7.constellation [] n.星系
8.UAV (Unmanned Aerial Vehicle) 無人駕駛航空器
9.confluence [] n.匯合
10.fusion [] n.熔合
QUESTIONS AFTER LISENING 聽后答題:
1. What did Colonel David Johnson say?
A.The U.S. Army’s RMA took place in 1951.
B.The U.S. Navy’s RMA took place on December 7, 1941.
C.The U.S. Air Force was founded on September 1,1914.
D.The U.S. military’s reform took place in 1989.
2. When did the U.S. Navy decided to pour the money into aircraft carriers instead of battleships?
A.After the Battle of Midway.
B.After the end of World War Ⅱ.
C.After the incident of Pearl Harbor.
D.After the end of World War Ⅰ.
3. What does the precision ammunitions mean?
A.It means if you can see something, you can destroy it.
B.It means if you can see something, you can locate it.
C.It means if you can see something, you can take a picture.
D.It means if you can see something, you can acquire it.
4. Why did Dr. Libicki say that you have to take the equation into account?
A.Because it doesn’t pay to use precision weapons in a border conflict.
B.Because it doesn’t pay to use a nuclear weapons in a mutual crisis.
C.Because it doesn’t pay to kill up a $10000 truck with a million dollar cruise missile.
D.Because it doesn’t pay to destroy a car with a smart missile.
5. What’s the meaning of illumination of the battlefield?
A.It means that you can see everything worth seeing in the battlefield.
B.It means that you can destroy everything in the battlefield.
C.It means that you can target everything in the battlefield.
D.It means that you can locate everything in the battlefield.
6. What will DOD do for sensors in the early 21st century?
A.It will spend a lot of money purchasing new sensors.
B.It will spend a great deal of time training a new army for the use of sensors.
C.It will spend a lot of material experimenting sensors.
D.It will spend a great deal of thought in defining a constellation of sensors that can survive attack by the other side.
7. What is Global-hawk?
A.It is a big bird.
B.It is a manned aircraft.
C.It is an extremely capable unmanned aerial vehicle that costs about $10 million.
D.It is a new satellite.
8. Why did Dr. Libicki think that a $5000 UAV was much more survivable?
A.Because it was too difficult to target it.
B.Because it was too difficult to destroy it.
C.Because it was too difficult to find it out.
D.Because it was so cheap that no one would shoot at it with a precise missile.
9. Dr. Libicki said: “we are in a confluence of two trends.” What is the first trend?
A.It is the information network.
B.It is the multipolarization.
C.It is the dispersion of things.
D.It is the globalization.
10. Along the lines of the previous question, what is the second trend?
A.It is the integrity of market.
B.It is the data fusion.
C.It is the economic group.
D.It is that we want to network everything together.
【參考譯文】
軍事革命的發(fā)展與主要趨勢(shì)
陳伯江：請(qǐng)您綜述一下這次軍事革命發(fā)展的情況以及今后的趨勢(shì)。
利比奇：談?wù)撥娛赂锩陌l(fā)展歷史需要從20年前開始并展望未來30年的情況。當(dāng)然，我們目前無法預(yù)言未來，因?yàn)槲覀儫o法完全預(yù)見會(huì)出現(xiàn)哪些技術(shù)創(chuàng)新。如果我向前追溯50年，那時(shí)晶體管還沒有發(fā)明。如果我向前追溯50年，那時(shí)晶體管還沒有發(fā)明。沒有晶體管，我們無法想象在我們桌子旁邊會(huì)有電子計(jì)算機(jī)。當(dāng)時(shí)沒有人預(yù)見到晶體管的發(fā)明，然而，它一旦發(fā)明出來，便導(dǎo)致各種其它的發(fā)明。讓我舉一個(gè)具體的例子：高能激光器的發(fā)展前景會(huì)多好？如果你認(rèn)為高能激光器將會(huì)便宜和有效，那么它將帶來常規(guī)戰(zhàn)場(chǎng)的巨大變化。如果你認(rèn)為高能激光器將會(huì)是昂貴的并且作戰(zhàn)效能不好，那么它就無足輕重。我的預(yù)感是高能激光器將會(huì)是功效不高且又昂貴，但我可能是錯(cuò)的。長遠(yuǎn)的未來很難預(yù)測(cè)，就是這個(gè)原因。
另一點(diǎn)更為重要。軍事裝備在戰(zhàn)時(shí)趨于以更快的速度發(fā)展。在1941年至1945年的四年間，軍事裝備之所以會(huì)有很大的進(jìn)步，一是因?yàn)榈?945年新武器已經(jīng)投入生產(chǎn)；二是因?yàn)槲覀冊(cè)?945年已學(xué)會(huì)如何使用1941年時(shí)尚不會(huì)使用的新武器。一旦戰(zhàn)爭結(jié)束，改進(jìn)武器的壓力就減少了。另外，沒有戰(zhàn)爭，人們趨向抓住舊東西不放，盡管舊東西已經(jīng)過時(shí)。美國國防大學(xué)前學(xué)術(shù)事務(wù)負(fù)責(zé)人戴德•約翰遜說過，美國海軍的軍事革命始于1941年12月７日。在日本轟炸珍珠港之前，美國既有戰(zhàn)列艦，也有航空母艦，當(dāng)美國設(shè)想在太平洋與日本開戰(zhàn)時(shí)，并不清楚到底是戰(zhàn)列艦還是航空母艦將在海戰(zhàn)中居主導(dǎo)地位。但當(dāng)戰(zhàn)列艦炸沉之后，我們只剩下了航空母艦。航空母艦在中途島之戰(zhàn)中是如此出色，以致再也沒有人認(rèn)為戰(zhàn)列艦會(huì)有多大的發(fā)展前途，因此我們投入巨資發(fā)展航空母艦。我認(rèn)為80年代提出的有關(guān)歐洲前線戰(zhàn)爭的多數(shù)思想已經(jīng)過時(shí)。但我們并不知道這一點(diǎn)，因?yàn)闆]有出現(xiàn)一場(chǎng)戰(zhàn)爭，那些思想也沒有得到檢驗(yàn)。因而我們?nèi)园堰@些思想用到未來。
如果今后30年內(nèi)將發(fā)生一場(chǎng)戰(zhàn)爭，使我們有機(jī)會(huì)檢驗(yàn)?zāi)切┧枷?，那么許多東西都將改變。它將使許多變革加速發(fā)展。由于同樣的原因，如果美國發(fā)現(xiàn)自己在與另一個(gè)強(qiáng)國競(jìng)爭，那么它將不得不加快技術(shù)發(fā)展。如果世界保持今天這樣的良性狀態(tài)，軍事技術(shù)的發(fā)展就會(huì)更加緩慢。所以，我可以談?wù)撨^去20年的情況，因?yàn)樗呀?jīng)發(fā)生，但我除了推測(cè)之外，無法談?wù)摻窈?0年的情況。
那么，在1998～2028年期間，我們從這場(chǎng)軍事革命中會(huì)看到什么？首先是精確攻擊彈藥的改進(jìn)和發(fā)展，已達(dá)到了相當(dāng)高的水平，只要能發(fā)現(xiàn)目標(biāo)，基本上就能擊毀它。現(xiàn)在，美國和其他一些發(fā)達(dá)國家已能非常精確地繪出全世界的地形圖，那就意味著現(xiàn)在你不僅能夠?qū)σ粋€(gè)目標(biāo)定位，而且也能擊毀它。這就是把測(cè)繪能力與全球定位系統(tǒng)相結(jié)合，只要能看到，就能擊毀。
對(duì)上述說法應(yīng)有一些限制條件。用一枚價(jià)值百萬的巡航導(dǎo)彈去擊毀一輛價(jià)值萬元的卡車是不合算的－美國這樣做也許是不合算的問題?？偠灾?，在未來５年至10年的某個(gè)時(shí)間，美國將完成其精確制導(dǎo)彈藥的改進(jìn)。
軍事革命的第二個(gè)方面，是我們?nèi)绾问箲?zhàn)場(chǎng)變得透明？我們?cè)鯓硬拍芸吹剿档每吹囊磺?？許多答案似乎都與傳感器有關(guān)：包括光電、微波、成像傳感器、聲學(xué)傳感器等。你能說出名字的，我們都有。我們可能將其放入每一種媒體，并能以某種方式將信息熔合到一起，從而獲得戰(zhàn)場(chǎng)的實(shí)時(shí)圖像。我們正在確定如何正確地選擇和使用這些傳感器。
21世紀(jì)初，國防部將花費(fèi)大量精力確定什么樣的傳感器系統(tǒng)可在對(duì)方的打擊下生存下來。例如，我們現(xiàn)在把最有用的傳感器置于波音707飛機(jī)上，該機(jī)沒有隱形性能，機(jī)動(dòng)性也不好，還必須向外發(fā)射能量才能獲得能量?，F(xiàn)我們使用波音707還是安全的。但是10年、20年、30年以后，我們繼續(xù)使用還會(huì)是安全的嗎？我不知道。如果不安全，我們就得設(shè)法將這些傳感器置于無需人員駕駛的更小的作戰(zhàn)平臺(tái)上。
這就是眼下人們正非常興奮地談?wù)摕o人駕駛航空器的原因。一旦我們掌握如何可靠地操縱它們飛行，將產(chǎn)生顯著的軍事效果。如果你看一看“全球鷹”系統(tǒng)，你會(huì)發(fā)現(xiàn)它是一個(gè)耗資上千萬美元的性能卓著的無人駕駛航空器。但你也能制造一架只花1000美元、一只手就可拿起來的無人駕駛航空器。只是這樣的航空器飛得不那么高，攜帶不了那么多種類齊全的傳感器，續(xù)航能力差，還會(huì)經(jīng)常落地墜毀。然而，你使用造價(jià)5000美元的無人駕駛航空器的方式與造價(jià)千萬美元的無人駕駛航空器截然不同。最主要的差別是不會(huì)有人愿意以造價(jià)10萬美元的導(dǎo)彈去打造價(jià)只有5000美元的無人駕駛航空器。最后廉價(jià)的無人駕駛航空器反而具有好得多的生存能力。
我們處在兩種趨勢(shì)發(fā)展的交匯點(diǎn)上。第一種趨勢(shì)是分散化，正在發(fā)展更多的小東西。以個(gè)人計(jì)算機(jī)市場(chǎng)來說，大型計(jì)算機(jī)主機(jī)已無人問津，但個(gè)人計(jì)算機(jī)卻蓬勃發(fā)展，其它類似情況也很多。第二個(gè)趨勢(shì)是我們想以網(wǎng)絡(luò)方式把所有東西聯(lián)成一體。一種傳感器使用一種模式發(fā)現(xiàn)了某種東西，另一種傳感器使用另一種模式也發(fā)現(xiàn)了某種東西，于是有人就想把這些發(fā)現(xiàn)綜合起來得到互相關(guān)聯(lián)的情況。我聽到了一輛坦克的聲音，那么你是否看到了一輛坦克？我們收到了一輛坦克的雷達(dá)反射信號(hào)，你聽到了坦克的聲音嗎？等等。當(dāng)我們把這些結(jié)果放在一起（稱之為數(shù)據(jù)融合），我們就能非常清楚地了解戰(zhàn)場(chǎng)。如果我們能很快地獲得這種信息，那么我們就想很快地利用這種信息。我們同時(shí)面臨著分散化和一體化兩種趨勢(shì)，這是未來30年我們將忙于應(yīng)付的變化。
KEYS TO THE QUESTIONS 參考答案：
1.b 2.a 3.a 4.c 5.a 6.d 7.c 8.d 9.c 10.d
