美國(guó)政要第4課

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U.S. Foreign Relations
--Interview with Former National Security Advisor Dr. Anthony Lake (April 20, 1998) 訪前總統(tǒng)國(guó)家安全事務(wù)肋理安東尼•萊克博士
MR. CHEN BOJIANG: How do you view the implications of the two triangular1 relationships, Sino-U.S.-Japan and Sino-U.S.-Taiwan, to the security situation of the Asia-Pacific region?
DR.LAKE: I’m afraid I anticipated2 again in my last question, but let me tell you what I repeatedly said when I was in Taiwan, which is that the Taiwanese have a deep security interest in the improving relationship between Washington and Beijing, because that helps produce stability and stability is in Taiwan’s interest. Stability allows economic advancement3 and social advancement for their people, however defined. And Taiwan has been doing very well in the last ten years, economically and in the reinforcement of their democracy. The Mainland is also doing very well economically and in other ways. All of this is based on stability. It is the same message for everybody, whether Japan or Russia or Beijing or Taipei. I think the future is very bright for all of Northeast Asia as long as there is stability, that’s the purpose of all of these triangular relationships.
MR. CHEN: In recent years, China and Russia have built a strategic partnership oriented towards the 21st century. At the same time, China is also making efforts to develop a constructive strategic partnership with the U.S. oriented towards the 21st century. What do you think of the Sino-U.S.-Russia relationship?
DR. LAKE: I would argue with some here in Washington who are very suspicious of the China-Russian relationship. I think all of these relationships, Moscow-Beijing, Moscow-Washington, Beijing-Washington are good. Strategic dialogues among each can help each understand the other’s purposes. It reduces the chances of miscalculations4. With the end of the Cold War, during the contemporary era at least, it is no longer necessary to calibrate5 those relationship in terms of whether any two are necessarily opposing the third. During the Cold War, there was an American and Chinese strategic interest in a closer cooperation against the polar bear6. That kind of thinking is no longer necessary. The more transparent7 each relationship is, the better, because that will reinforce confidence for each of us. Each of us sees two of the legs and doesn’t see the third. The more transparent all of this is, the less likely that suspicions about “the third leg” will get us back into a competitive triangular relationship rather than a stable one.
MR. CHEN: President Clinton announced that he would visit China in June, ahead of his original schedule. Does this mean that there are some changes to American policy towards China? How do you view the development of Sino-U.S. relations?
DR. LAKE: No, I don’t think this a reflection of any change in American policy. I think it is a reflection of the things that are going better. Moving the date up is welcome. I believe China-U.S. Summit meetings should be regular and not subject then to negotiation each year. To the degree they are respective scheduled, it takes them out of our respective politics. The summit meetings wouldn’t be seen as a barometer8 of the health of our relationship. It becomes simply a contribution to a healthy relationship.
MR. CHEN: According to media reports, France, Russia and Germany hold a summit in his month. Some believe that the symbolism of this summit is to balance the influence of the United States to Europe. What are your comments about this?
DR. LAKE: I have discussed this with a number of European diplomats, including British diplomats whose government was also not included in these meetings. Obviously we should always watch all of this very carefully, but I don’t think that Washington should see this as terribly threatening. Strategically, this is a part of a larger issue, of whether there is an American interest in a more integrated Europe. This is an issue that has been debated since the Kennedy administration first took it as American doctrine that a Europe that is coming together is essentially in American interest. At the time, largely in a Cold War context, a unified or integrated Europe would be seen as a better ally against the Soviets. But even in the wake of the Cold War, it would make Europe a bit easier for us to engage on NATO common issues, common security issues, such as Bosnia or NATO enlargement. So I think it’s to be welcomed and I do not believe that the realities of the coming decades would suggest that Europe is then going to go off on its own and sever security ties to the United States. I think those will remain strong and we should not be paranoid9 about a strengthening Europe. In fact, a Europe that is divided diplomatically is less able to make a significant contribution on issues like Bosnia. Europeans bearing more burdens rather than Washington, is in our interest.
MR. CHEN: There were two events that caught the attention of the international society last year: one was NATO enlargement in Europe and the other was the signing of the U.S.-Japanese Guidelines of Security Cooperation in Asia. Some thought that this was Cold War thinking. What is your opinion of NATO enlargement and the U.S.-Japanese Security Treaty?
DR. LAKE: Well, on NATO enlargement I think we have to be very clear about what the goal is. It is not to isolate or offend Russia, assuming that Russia continues to evolve in democratic directions and does not pose a threat to her neighbors. In fact, as the President has said, we believe that the enlargement of NATO over the course of a generation, can potentially include Russia and others, and become over time, not simply a defensive security alliance-a military alliance, but a broader security arrangement and institution that can help to integrate Russia and all of Europe: a more efficient and more powerful OSCE. On the U.S.-Japan security relationship, let me simply repeat what I said in my 1996 meetings in Beijing. It is very, very important that the PRC, and especially the Chinese military understand that the purpose of the American military presence in the Pacific is stability. And the second purpose is stability. And the third purpose is stability. That is the purpose-it is not containment. It is not to threaten anybody, it is stability. Ask yourself what would happen, for example, if there were a withdrawal of American military forces from Northeast Asia. The result almost certainly would be an arms race, possibly a nuclear arms race10, involving China, South Korea, North Korea and Japan. This would be in nobody’s interest. I think that’s an illustration of the stabilizing effect of the American presence. Or we could ask ourselves what might Japanese policies have looked like if there had not been an American security relationship with Japan fifty years ago. And I think the answer is, well we can’t know what the answer would be, but it is very likely that Japan would have developed a much greater military capacity or very different military doctrines had they not had the certainty of the American security tie. So these are illustrations of a central fact, which cannot be repeated too often: stability is the purpose of the American military presence and policy, which is good for the People’s Republic. It’s good for us. It’s good for Japan. It’s good for Taiwan. And it’s good for everybody.
MR. CHEN: How do you view the relationship between the means of diplomacy and the means of military? Some thought that the solution of the Iraqi crisis was a victory for diplomacy. Is that true?
DR. LAKE: No. It was a victory for diplomacy-but it was a victory for diplomacy because it was backed up by force. Kofi Annan said that his ability to gain that agreement in Baghdad rested on the very real threat of the use of force. Unhappily there are certain governments and leaders who only understand the use of force and that includes Saddam Hussein. It is better to succeed diplomatically through the threat of the use of force rather than through actual use. It was a good thing that Kofi Annan was able to pull that off.
MR. CHEN: Can you elaborate the relationship between the means of diplomacy and the means of military in general?
DR. LAKE: Until human nature changes there should be two rules. First, diplomacy is most effective when it is backed up by power. Rule two is that one should never use force unless one has exhausted all diplomatic avenues.

WORDS AND EXPRESSIONS 詞匯提示
1.triangular [] a. 三角形的
2.anticipate [] v. 預(yù)先提到
3.advancement [] n. 發(fā)展
4.miscalculation [] n. 誤算，估錯(cuò)
5.calibrate [] v. 校準(zhǔn)
6.polar bear n. 北極熊（指蘇聯(lián)）
7.transparent [] n.透明，透明度
8.barometer [] n. 氣壓表
9.paranoid [] a. 滿懷疑慮的，過(guò)分妄想的
10.arms race n. 軍備競(jìng)賽

QUESTIONS AFTER LISTENING聽(tīng)后答題:
1. Which two triangular relationships are there in the Asia-Pacific region?
A.Sino-Korea-Russia and Sino-U.S.-Russia.
B.Sino-U.S.-Russia and Sino-U.S.-Japan.
C.Sino-U.S.-Japan and Sino-U.S.-Taiwan.
D.Sino-Japan-Taiwan and Sino-U.S.-Japan.
2. What is vital important for the all of the triangular relationships in Dr. Lake’s view?
A.Freedom. B.Democracy.
C.Human right. D.Stability.
3. What’s the effect of strategic dialogues according to Dr. Lake’s view?
A.It can help each understand the other’s purposes and reduce the chances of miscalculations.
B.It can avoid the conflicts.
C.It can enhance the friendship.
D.It can reduce the disputes.
4. What is the meaning of the phrase “the third leg”?
A.The third leg of the stool.
B.The third leg of the dog.
C.The third leg of the triangle.
D.The third leg of the triangular relationships.
5. What is Dr. Lake’s view about China-U.S. Summit meetings?
A.It is not very important for the mutual relationship.
B.It should be regular.
C.It should be held each year.
D.It should be held twice each year.
6. What’s the meaning of the phrase “in the wake of the Cold War”?
A.In the Cold War.
B.After the end of the Cold War.
C.During the Cold War.
D.Before the Cold War.
7. How did Dr. Lake think Europe would be going to do in the coming decades?
A.It would cut down the security ties with U.S..
B.It would keep the security ties with U.S..
C.It would keep apart from U.S..
D.It would eatablish the security ties with Russia.
8. What is the purpose of the U.S. military presence in the Asia-Pacific region on Dr. Lake’s words?
A.Containment. B.Prevention.
C.Engagement. D.Stability.
9. What did he mean when he said “there are certain government and leaders who only understand the use of force.”
A.He meant they would use force to resolve disputes.
B.He meant they would not use force to resolve disputes.
C.He meant it was unnecessary for the use of force in resolving disputes.
D.It means it is harmful for the use of force in resolving disputes.
10. What kind of means should be taken in resolving Iraqi crisis in Dr. Lake’s view?
A.Diplomatic means.
B.Military means.
C.Other secret means.
D.Diplomacy backed up by power.

【參考譯文】
美國(guó)的對(duì)外關(guān)系
陳伯江：您怎樣看待“中－美－日”和“中－美－臺(tái)灣地區(qū)”兩個(gè)三角關(guān)系對(duì)亞太地區(qū)安全形勢(shì)的影響？
萊克：我想在前面我已談到這個(gè)問(wèn)題。我想告訴你我前不久在臺(tái)灣時(shí)反復(fù)說(shuō)過(guò)的觀點(diǎn)，這就是華盛頓與北京改善關(guān)系，符合臺(tái)灣的長(zhǎng)遠(yuǎn)安全利益。因?yàn)檫@將有助于穩(wěn)定，而穩(wěn)定符合臺(tái)灣的利益。不管如何定義，穩(wěn)定總是有利于經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展和人民的社會(huì)進(jìn)步。近１０年來(lái)，臺(tái)灣在經(jīng)濟(jì)上和加強(qiáng)民主方面發(fā)展良好，大陸也在經(jīng)濟(jì)上和其他方面發(fā)展良好。所有定切都是以穩(wěn)定為基礎(chǔ)。對(duì)各方，無(wú)論日本、俄羅斯、中國(guó)和臺(tái)北都是這樣。我認(rèn)為對(duì)于所有東北亞國(guó)家來(lái)說(shuō)，只要保持穩(wěn)定，前途就是光明的。穩(wěn)定是所有這些三角關(guān)系的目的。
陳：近年來(lái)，中國(guó)和俄羅斯已經(jīng)建立了面向２１世紀(jì)的戰(zhàn)略伙伴關(guān)系。在這同時(shí)，中國(guó)還在致力于發(fā)展與美國(guó)的面向２１世紀(jì)的建設(shè)性戰(zhàn)略伙伴關(guān)系，您怎樣看待中、美、俄之間的關(guān)系？
萊克：華盛頓有些人對(duì)中俄之間的關(guān)系持懷疑態(tài)度。我認(rèn)為所有這些關(guān)系即莫斯科-北京、莫斯科-華盛頓、北京－華盛頓之間的關(guān)系都是有益的。各方之間的戰(zhàn)略對(duì)話能夠有助于互相了解對(duì)方的意圖，減少誤解。
由于冷戰(zhàn)的結(jié)束，在當(dāng)今時(shí)代，已不再有必要揣摩任何兩方之間的關(guān)系是否必然針對(duì)第三方。冷戰(zhàn)期間，在密切合作對(duì)付北極熊方面，中國(guó)與美國(guó)存在著戰(zhàn)略利益，這種考慮已不再有必要。雙方之間的關(guān)系越透越明越好，因?yàn)檫@將加強(qiáng)我們每一邊之間的相互信任。我們每個(gè)國(guó)家都發(fā)展雙邊關(guān)系，而不針對(duì)第三方。三角形所有各邊的這種關(guān)系越透明，引起第三方懷疑、并把我們帶加過(guò)去那種競(jìng)爭(zhēng)而非穩(wěn)定的三角關(guān)系的可能性就越小。
陳：克林頓總統(tǒng)已宣布他將比他原定計(jì)劃提前于６月訪問(wèn)中國(guó)，這是意味著美國(guó)對(duì)中國(guó)的政策有所變化？您對(duì)中美關(guān)系的發(fā)展有何看法？
萊克：我認(rèn)為這并不反映美國(guó)的對(duì)華政策有什么變化，而是反映了情況向著更好的趨勢(shì)發(fā)展?？肆诸D提前訪華是值得歡迎的。我認(rèn)為中美首腦會(huì)談應(yīng)正?；灰Q于每年的協(xié)商。定期舉行首腦會(huì)談可使之脫離我們各自的政治的影響。首腦會(huì)談就看作促進(jìn)中美關(guān)系健康發(fā)展的動(dòng)力。
陳：據(jù)媒體報(bào)道，法國(guó)、俄羅斯和德國(guó)最近舉行了三 首腦會(huì)談。有人認(rèn)為這次三國(guó)首腦會(huì)談的象征意義是要平衡美國(guó)對(duì)歐洲的影響，您對(duì)此有何評(píng)論？
萊克：我曾經(jīng)與歐洲的一些外交官討論過(guò)此事，包括也未能參加這次首腦會(huì)談的英國(guó)的外交官。很明顯我們應(yīng)該經(jīng)常非常仔細(xì)地注意所有這類事情，但我認(rèn)為華盛頓不應(yīng)把這件事看作可怕的威脅。從戰(zhàn)略上說(shuō)，這是一個(gè)重大問(wèn)題的一部分，那就是一個(gè)更加一體化的歐洲，是否有利于美國(guó)的利益？自肯尼迪政府首次把“一個(gè)走向一體化的歐洲基本上符合美國(guó)利益”納入美國(guó)政策之后，這就一直是一個(gè)存在著爭(zhēng)議的問(wèn)題。在冷戰(zhàn)期間的大多數(shù)時(shí)間里，統(tǒng)一或一體化的歐洲被看作是對(duì)抗蘇聯(lián)的更好的同盟。但即使在冷戰(zhàn)之后，在我們處理共同的問(wèn)題、共同的安全問(wèn)題（如波斯 尼亞或北約東擴(kuò)問(wèn)題）時(shí)，一個(gè)更為統(tǒng)一的歐洲將更容易與我們合作。因此我認(rèn)為三國(guó)會(huì)談應(yīng)受到歡迎，并且我認(rèn)為，在今后幾十年的客觀條件下，歐洲不會(huì)切斷與美國(guó)的安全聯(lián)系離我們而去。我認(rèn)為美國(guó)與歐洲的聯(lián)系將會(huì)牢固地保持下去，我們也不必因歐洲的強(qiáng)大而滿懷疑慮。事實(shí)上，一個(gè)外交上的分裂的歐洲更不利于諸如波斯尼亞這類問(wèn)題的解決。歐洲人而不是華盛頓承擔(dān)更多的義務(wù)，這符合美國(guó)的利益。
陳：去年有兩件事引起了國(guó)際社會(huì)的廣泛注意:一是歐洲的北約東擴(kuò);二是在亞洲美日簽定了安全合作指導(dǎo)方針.有人認(rèn)為這是冷戰(zhàn)思維,您對(duì)約東擴(kuò)和美日簽訂安全合作指導(dǎo)方針有何看法?
萊克：關(guān)于北約東擴(kuò),我認(rèn)為必須非常明確這樣做的目的.東約東擴(kuò)不是要孤立或冒犯俄羅斯,因?yàn)槲覀冋J(rèn)為俄羅斯將繼續(xù)朝著民主的方向發(fā)展,不會(huì)給其鄰國(guó)造成威脅。事實(shí)上，正如克林頓總統(tǒng)所說(shuō)，我們認(rèn)為，北約東擴(kuò)在經(jīng)歷了一代人的時(shí)間后，有可能包括俄羅斯和其他國(guó)家。隨著時(shí)間的推移，北約將不只是一個(gè)防務(wù)安全聯(lián)盟－一種軍事聯(lián)盟，而是一種擴(kuò)大了的安全部署和有助于把俄羅斯與整個(gè)歐洲結(jié)為一體的組織：即一種更加有效和更為有力的歐安組織。關(guān)于美日安全關(guān)系，我想簡(jiǎn)單地重復(fù)１９９６年我在北京會(huì)談時(shí)所說(shuō)的觀點(diǎn)，那就是中華人民共和國(guó)特別是中國(guó)人民解放軍，應(yīng)該認(rèn)識(shí)到美軍在太平洋地區(qū)存在的目的是穩(wěn)定。第二個(gè)目的還是穩(wěn)定，第三個(gè)目的更是穩(wěn)定。目的是穩(wěn)定，而不是遏制。不是要威脅任何人。認(rèn)識(shí)這一點(diǎn)非常非常重要。例如，你們可以捫心自問(wèn)，如果美國(guó)從東北亞撤軍，將會(huì)發(fā)生什么情況。幾乎可以肯定，結(jié)果將是一場(chǎng)軍備競(jìng)賽，很可能是一場(chǎng)涉及中國(guó)、南朝鮮、北朝鮮和日本的核軍備競(jìng)賽，這將對(duì)誰(shuí)都 沒(méi)有好處。我認(rèn)為這可以說(shuō)明美軍在亞洲的軍事存在的穩(wěn)定作用?；蛘?，我們也可以問(wèn)問(wèn)我們自己，假設(shè)５０年前美國(guó)與日本沒(méi)有建立安全關(guān)系，日本的政策會(huì)是什么樣。我認(rèn)為如果沒(méi)有與美國(guó)的這種確定的安全紐帶，答案（我不知道確切的答案應(yīng)當(dāng)是什么）很可能是日本早已發(fā)展了強(qiáng)大得多的軍事能力或制定了一個(gè)重要事實(shí)，對(duì)這一事實(shí)如何重復(fù)都不為過(guò)份，即穩(wěn)定是美國(guó)軍事存在和軍事政策的目的。這對(duì)中國(guó)有好處，對(duì)我們有好處，對(duì)日本、臺(tái)灣有好處，對(duì)各方都有好處。
陳：您怎樣看待外交手段與軍事手段的關(guān)系？有人認(rèn)為伊拉克武器核查危機(jī)的解決是外交的勝利，是否如此？
萊克：伊拉克武器核查危機(jī)的解決是外交的勝利-但它之所以是外交的勝利，原因是有軍事力量為后盾。聯(lián)合國(guó)秘書(shū)長(zhǎng)安南說(shuō)，他之所以能與巴格達(dá)達(dá)成協(xié)議，是因?yàn)橛惺褂梦淞Φ姆浅，F(xiàn)實(shí)的威脅。遺憾的是有些政府和國(guó)家領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人只有靠使用武力才能說(shuō)服－這包括薩達(dá)姆•侯賽因。上策是通過(guò)威脅使用武力而非實(shí)際使用武力去爭(zhēng)取外交上的成功。安南能獲得成功是一件好事。
陳：您能概括地解釋一下外交手段與軍事手段之間的關(guān)系嗎？
萊克：除非人性改變，否則就存在著兩個(gè)規(guī)則：規(guī)則一是，以實(shí)力為后盾的外交最為有效；規(guī)則二是，在窮盡所有的外交努力之前，絕不要使用武力。

KYS TO THE QUESTIONS 參考答案：
1.c 2.d 3.a 4.d 5.b 6.b 7.b 8.d 9.a 10.d