為與朝鮮達(dá)成協(xié)議，特朗普或降低無(wú)核化目標(biāo)

HANOI, Vietnam — When he vowed to “solve” the North Korea problem just before his inauguration two years ago, President Donald Trump made clear he meant eliminating its nuclear arsenal.
越南河內(nèi)——就在兩年前，唐納德·特朗普總統(tǒng)在就職典禮前發(fā)誓要“解決”朝鮮問(wèn)題，他明確表示，他的意思是消除朝鮮的核武庫(kù)。
But on the eve of a second meeting with the North Korean leader, Kim Jong-un, the president sounds prepared to accept much less, at least for the foreseeable future.
但在與朝鮮領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人金正恩(Kim Jong-un)第二次會(huì)晤前夕，總統(tǒng)似乎準(zhǔn)備接受更少的條件，至少在可預(yù)見(jiàn)的未來(lái)是這樣。
“I don’t want to rush anybody,” he said this past weekend. “As long as there is no testing, we’re happy,” he added, pointing to the North’s suspension of nuclear and missile tests.
他在上周末說(shuō)：“我不想催促任何人。”他還說(shuō)：“只要沒(méi)有核試驗(yàn)，我們就很高興，”他是指朝鮮暫停核試驗(yàn)和導(dǎo)彈試驗(yàn)。
Even to some of Trump’s national security aides, that sounded like a significant retreat at a critical moment.
甚至特朗普的一些國(guó)家安全助理也覺(jué)得，總統(tǒng)的話聽(tīng)上去像是關(guān)鍵時(shí)刻的重大撤退。
As he landed in Hanoi late Tuesday, Trump appeared determined to change America’s relationship with a nation that has been a bitter and brutal adversary for nearly 70 years — and willing to shift his administration’s goals to do so, from immediate dismantlement of the North’s arsenal to limits on its size and reach.
特朗普于周二晚間抵達(dá)河內(nèi)，他似乎決心改變美國(guó)與一個(gè)敵國(guó)之間的關(guān)系，70年來(lái)，這個(gè)國(guó)家一直保持著惡毒和殘酷的敵對(duì)姿態(tài)；他似乎也愿意改變其政府的目標(biāo)——從推動(dòng)朝鮮立即解除核武器，變?yōu)橄拗破湟?guī)模和范圍。
It is unclear whether the two men will emerge in the coming days with any of the breakthroughs that appear in the mix for discussion: a freeze on nuclear production, a peace agreement aimed at formally ending the Korean War, or a schedule for dismantling the North’s arsenal.
目前還不清楚，未來(lái)幾天，兩人是否能夠取得曾經(jīng)談及的那些突破性進(jìn)展：凍結(jié)核生產(chǎn)，達(dá)成旨在正式結(jié)束朝鮮戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)的和平協(xié)議，以及制定解除朝鮮武器庫(kù)的時(shí)間表。
But they chose Vietnam for obvious reasons: It is a bustling symbol of how a country that once fought the United States can become a fast-growing economy even while retaining a heavy dose of authoritarian rule.
但他們選擇越南的原因很明顯：它是繁榮的象征，表明曾經(jīng)與美國(guó)作戰(zhàn)的國(guó)家也可以成為快速增長(zhǎng)的經(jīng)濟(jì)體，同時(shí)又保持很大程度的威權(quán)統(tǒng)治。
And for both leaders, it is a moment of critical choices. Kim needs to make good on promises to nurture the North Korean economy and maintain the military might to ensure his country’s survival, while Trump faces the biggest opportunity of his presidency yet for a diplomatic breakthrough — and the stark risks of underdelivering on a signature issue after threatening “fire and fury” only months ago.
對(duì)于兩位領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人來(lái)說(shuō)，這是做出關(guān)鍵抉擇的時(shí)刻。金正恩需要兌現(xiàn)承諾，發(fā)展朝鮮經(jīng)濟(jì)和維護(hù)軍事力量，以確保朝鮮的生存，而特朗普面臨其任期內(nèi)取得外交突破的最佳機(jī)會(huì)——同時(shí)也面對(duì)在一個(gè)標(biāo)志性問(wèn)題上反應(yīng)遲鈍的重大風(fēng)險(xiǎn)，幾個(gè)月前，他還威脅要以“炮火與怒火”來(lái)解決這個(gè)問(wèn)題。
Trump has an even higher hurdle to clear: his dismissal of the 2015 nuclear agreement with Iran, a “terrible” and naive deal, in his telling, that was guaranteed to eventually pave the way for the country to obtain a nuclear weapon.
特朗普還有一個(gè)更大的障礙需要清除：他拒絕接受2015年與伊朗達(dá)成的核協(xié)議，用他的話說(shuō)，這是一項(xiàng)“可怕”而且幼稚的協(xié)議，最終肯定會(huì)為伊朗獲得核武器鋪平道路。
What the world may learn when he meets with Kim for the second time in a year is whether he is willing to accept a weaker deal with North Korea — and whether he can sell it.
當(dāng)他一年內(nèi)第二次與金正恩會(huì)晤之際，整個(gè)世界可能會(huì)得知，他是否愿意接受與朝鮮達(dá)成一項(xiàng)更弱的協(xié)議——以及他是否能讓人們接受它。
North Korea presents a far more difficult case than Iran. It already has an arsenal of as many as 30 nuclear weapons, as well as missiles that can reach the United States. Its devotion to that national project is so intense that Trump’s director of national intelligence, Dan Coats, angered him by saying last month that the North was “unlikely to completely give up its nuclear weapons and production capabilities” because they are “critical to regime survival.”
朝鮮的情況要比伊朗困難得多。它已經(jīng)擁有多達(dá)30件核武器，以及能夠打擊美國(guó)的導(dǎo)彈。朝鮮對(duì)這個(gè)國(guó)家項(xiàng)目的投入是巨大的，因此特朗普的國(guó)家情報(bào)總監(jiān)丹·科茨(Dan Coats)上個(gè)月說(shuō)，朝鮮“不太可能完全放棄核武器和生產(chǎn)能力”，因?yàn)檫@“對(duì)政權(quán)的生存至關(guān)重要”，這番話令特朗普非常生氣。
If Coats is right, the president’s warm embrace of Kim could encourage other countries to make a sprint for the nuclear finish line, convinced that in the end, the United States will learn to live with yet another nuclear power.
如果科茨是對(duì)的，總統(tǒng)對(duì)金正恩的熱情接納可能會(huì)促使其他國(guó)家相信，美國(guó)終將學(xué)會(huì)接受又一個(gè)核大國(guó)，因此也紛紛向核終點(diǎn)沖刺。
Trump hopes to be remembered in history for bringing peace to the Korean Peninsula. But he also risks becoming the president on whose watch North Korea demonstrated an ability both to hit the United States with a missile and to detonate a hydrogen bomb — and who then gave it such a good deal that others decided to build nuclear arsenals, too.
特朗普希望因?yàn)榻o朝鮮半島帶來(lái)和平而被載入史冊(cè)。但他也有可能和以前的總統(tǒng)們一樣，眼睜睜地看著朝鮮展示以導(dǎo)彈襲擊美國(guó)和引爆氫彈的能力，并且簽下一份對(duì)朝鮮非常有利，令其他國(guó)家也決心發(fā)展核武庫(kù)的協(xié)議。
Even some hard-liners in Washington, though, see the potential of Trump’s gamble. “The stars have kind of lined up,” said Andy Kim, a former head of the CIA’s Korea mission center, and the man who last year ran messages between the two leaders.
就連華盛頓的一些強(qiáng)硬派也看到了特朗普賭博的潛在可能性。“各種條件已經(jīng)差不多具備了，”中央情報(bào)局朝鮮任務(wù)中心前負(fù)責(zé)人安迪·金(Andy Kim)說(shuō)，去年他曾在兩位領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人之間傳遞消息。
Speaking at Stanford University last week, he recalled that the young North Korean leader told Secretary of State Mike Pompeo in Pyongyang that he was thinking of the future: “I’m a father and a husband. And I have children. And I don’t want my children to carry the nuclear weapon on their back their whole life.”
他上周在斯坦福大學(xué)(Stanford University)發(fā)表演講時(shí)回憶道，這位年輕的朝鮮領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人在平壤對(duì)美國(guó)國(guó)務(wù)卿邁克·龐皮歐(Mike Pompeo)說(shuō)，他在為未來(lái)做打算：“我是父親和丈夫。我有孩子。我不希望我的孩子們一輩子都要背負(fù)著核武器。”
Pompeo left the meeting hopeful, but wary.
會(huì)后龐皮歐滿懷希望，但也很謹(jǐn)慎。
The secretary of state bristled last week when asked to reflect on how the lessons of the Iran deal applied to North Korea. Sounding exasperated, he said they were “very different situations” and insisted that “the full and final denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in a verifiable manner” remained the ultimate goal.
上周，當(dāng)被問(wèn)及伊朗核協(xié)議的教訓(xùn)如何適用于朝鮮時(shí)，國(guó)務(wù)卿勃然大怒。他惱火地表示二者是“非常不同的情況”，并堅(jiān)稱“以可核查的方式實(shí)現(xiàn)朝鮮半島的全面和最終無(wú)核化”仍是最終目標(biāo)。
But whatever deal emerges in Vietnam will be compared to the one that President Barack Obama struck more than three years ago with Iran, and that Trump has now abandoned. In return for a lifting of sanctions, Tehran agreed to ship 97 percent of its atomic fuel out of the country and to halt virtually all new production until 2030.
但無(wú)論在越南達(dá)成什么樣的協(xié)議，都會(huì)被拿來(lái)與奧巴馬總統(tǒng)在三年多以前與伊朗達(dá)成的協(xié)議進(jìn)行比較（該協(xié)議現(xiàn)在已被特朗普廢除）。根據(jù)那份協(xié)議，作為對(duì)取消制裁的交換條件，德黑蘭同意將97%的核燃料運(yùn)出伊朗，并在2030年前停止幾乎所有新的核燃料的生產(chǎn)。
“The irony is that the best possible outcome for North Korea would look something like the Iran deal,” said Robert Litwak, who has compared the negotiations in his work at the Woodrow Wilson Center for International Scholars in Washington.
“具有諷刺意味的是，對(duì)朝鮮來(lái)說(shuō)，最好的結(jié)果可能就是達(dá)成類似于伊朗協(xié)議，”華盛頓伍德羅·威爾遜國(guó)際學(xué)者中心(Woodrow Wilson Center for International Scholars in Washington)的羅伯特·利特瓦克(Robert Litwak)說(shuō)。他的研究包括對(duì)兩次談判的比較。
There are a few other comparisons, from Ukraine to Kazakhstan to South Africa to Libya, that will also hang over the meetings. All gave up nuclear arsenals or the equipment to build one. But as Trump has discovered, there has never been a problem quite as complex as North Korea.
從烏克蘭到哈薩克斯坦，從南非到利比亞，這次會(huì)面也籠罩在其他一些比較的陰影之下。所有這些國(guó)家都放棄了核武庫(kù)或建造核武庫(kù)的設(shè)備。但正如特朗普發(fā)現(xiàn)的那樣，它們都不像朝鮮問(wèn)題那樣復(fù)雜。
Perhaps for that reason, Trump has moved away from using denuclearization as a measure of success, instead citing the dialogue itself — and the warmth between him and a dictator half his age — as the metric of progress. With an eye on the Nobel Peace Prize, he may not get any closer than this to an agreement as momentous as those that Ronald Reagan reached with Mikhail S. Gorbachev, the last leader of the Soviet Union.
或許出于這個(gè)原因，特朗普已經(jīng)不再把無(wú)核化作為衡量成功的標(biāo)準(zhǔn)，而是用對(duì)話本身——以及他與一位只有他一半年紀(jì)的獨(dú)裁者之間的友情——來(lái)衡量進(jìn)展。對(duì)于希望得到諾貝爾和平獎(jiǎng)的他而言，這可能是他最接近羅納德·里根(Ronald Reagan)與蘇聯(lián)最后一位領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人米哈伊爾·S·戈?duì)柊蛦谭?Mikhail S. Gorbachev)之間達(dá)成的那種重大協(xié)議的時(shí)候。
Speaking on CNN on Sunday, Pompeo drew a contrast with the Obama strategy for dealing with Pyongyang, which he said came down to test, pray and cower.
周日接受CNN采訪時(shí)，龐皮歐比較了奧巴馬與平壤打交道的策略。他說(shuō)，奧巴馬的戰(zhàn)略可以歸結(jié)為試驗(yàn)、祈禱和畏縮。
“Let them test missiles, let them test nuclear weapons, pray they stop, and cower when the North Koreans made a threat,” he said.
“讓他們?cè)囼?yàn)導(dǎo)彈，讓他們?cè)囼?yàn)核武器，祈禱他們停下來(lái)，然后在朝鮮人發(fā)出威脅時(shí)退縮，”他說(shuō)。
Trump and his national security team often cite the North’s moratorium on missile and nuclear testing, now stretching into its 16th month, as their biggest achievement so far.
特朗普和他的國(guó)家安全團(tuán)隊(duì)經(jīng)常把朝鮮暫停導(dǎo)彈和核試驗(yàn)（目前這種狀況已經(jīng)維持了16個(gè)月）作為迄今為止所取得的最大成就。
The testing moratorium is in fact significant. As Siegfried Hecker, a former head of Los Alamos National Laboratory, noted recently, “If you can’t test, you can’t make progress.”
暫停試驗(yàn)的確有重大意義。正如洛斯阿拉莫斯國(guó)家實(shí)驗(yàn)室(Los Alamos National Laboratory)前負(fù)責(zé)人西格弗里德·赫克(Siegfried Hecker)最近指出的，“如果你不能進(jìn)行測(cè)試，就無(wú)法取得進(jìn)展。”
And North Korea has not yet demonstrated it can design an intercontinental ballistic missile with a nuclear warhead that could survive the heat and stresses of returning through the atmosphere to reach its target.
而朝鮮尚未證明它有能力設(shè)計(jì)出重返大氣層打擊目標(biāo)時(shí)能經(jīng)受高溫和壓力的洲際彈道導(dǎo)彈。
But a halt to testing is not denuclearization. To make progress toward that goal, Trump needs to persuade Kim to begin dismantling the country’s main nuclear complex at Yongbyon, including a uranium enrichment facility shown to Hecker eight years ago — and to do so under the watch of outside inspectors. North Korea is also widely believed to operate at least one clandestine uranium enrichment plant outside Yongbyon.
但停止核試驗(yàn)并不是無(wú)核化。為了實(shí)現(xiàn)這個(gè)目標(biāo)，特朗普需要說(shuō)服金正恩開(kāi)始拆除朝鮮在寧邊的主要核設(shè)施，包括8年前向赫克展示的一個(gè)鈾濃縮設(shè)施，并在外部核查人員的監(jiān)督下進(jìn)行拆除。外界普遍認(rèn)為，朝鮮在寧邊邊上至少有一處秘密的鈾濃縮工廠。
“It will be particularly bad for South Korea and President Moon if Trump declares peace and changes the status of the U.S. military presence in the South” before denuclearization, said Lee Byong-chul, a senior fellow at the Institute for Peace and Cooperation in Seoul. “There will be a huge conservative backlash in South Korea.”
“如果特朗普宣布和平，并改變美國(guó)在韓國(guó)的軍事存在，這對(duì)韓國(guó)和文在寅總統(tǒng)尤其不利，”首爾的和平與合作研究所(Institute for peace and Cooperation)高級(jí)研究員李秉哲(Lee Byong-chul)說(shuō)。“韓國(guó)的保守派將出現(xiàn)巨大的反彈。”