從日美貿(mào)易摩擦看中美貿(mào)易發(fā)展趨勢

當(dāng)前，中美貿(mào)易摩擦愈演愈烈，美方對中方輸美商品加征關(guān)稅的范圍從500億美元增加到2500億美元，并威脅要擴大到全部輸美中國商品。日前，美國副總統(tǒng)彭斯又發(fā)表講話，指責(zé)中國的社會經(jīng)濟發(fā)展模式。中美貿(mào)易摩擦正由貿(mào)易領(lǐng)域向整個中美經(jīng)濟關(guān)系乃至政治軍事關(guān)系延伸。中美貿(mào)易摩擦將走向何處，將如何影響中美關(guān)系未來長遠的發(fā)展，值得我們認(rèn)真觀察。與中美貿(mào)易摩擦類似，從1968年到1996年，日美貿(mào)易摩擦持續(xù)了近30年。對照日美貿(mào)易摩擦進程，對中美貿(mào)易摩擦的發(fā)展趨勢我們會得出一些方向性啟示。

China-US trade tensions are intensifying, and the US threatens to ratchet up the pressure by imposing $200 billion tariffs on Chinese imports. A few weeks ago, Vice President Pence lashed out at China's development model in his speech, which was widely interpreted as a sign that the ongoing trade tensions would extend into the political and military arenas. It is a question on every one's mind — Where are China-US trade relations heading? In the years from 1968 to 1996, the trade war between the US and Japan went on for 30 years. It may well shed light on the China-US trade dispute.

日美貿(mào)易摩擦進程呈現(xiàn)階段性特征，其間就日本輸美商品有六次大的交鋒，每次持續(xù)兩年到六年不等。從1968年到1985年，日美圍繞具有競爭優(yōu)勢的日本輸美商品有過四次大的交鋒，每次圍繞單一行業(yè)商品進行談判，交鋒時間保持在兩年左右。這一階段，只要日本哪個產(chǎn)業(yè)發(fā)展快了，構(gòu)成對美國產(chǎn)業(yè)的競爭威脅，就會成為美國的攻擊目標(biāo)。雙方逐次圍繞紡織品、鋼鐵產(chǎn)品、彩電、汽車展開貿(mào)易攻防戰(zhàn)，交鋒的結(jié)果是簽訂了一系列有利于美國的行業(yè)性生產(chǎn)和進出口管制協(xié)議。進入80年代中期后，第三次工業(yè)革命浪潮推動日本的電子產(chǎn)業(yè)科技開始全面趕超美國，美日之間的貿(mào)易摩擦從單一行業(yè)向多元行業(yè)領(lǐng)域擴展。1985年至1991年，日美圍繞半導(dǎo)體、大型計算機和電信通訊業(yè)展開長達六年的談判，兩次簽訂日美半導(dǎo)體協(xié)議和四個市場協(xié)議，并達成日元升值的“廣場協(xié)議”和擴大開放日本內(nèi)需市場的前川報告。從1989年到1996年，日美進一步就市場結(jié)構(gòu)性障礙問題，如排他性政府采購、金融和其他市場管制、知識產(chǎn)權(quán)保護、非關(guān)稅壁壘等簽訂了結(jié)構(gòu)性改革協(xié)議、保險協(xié)議和全面經(jīng)濟改革協(xié)議等。將近30年的日美貿(mào)易摩擦并沒有拯救日薄西山的美國弱勢產(chǎn)業(yè)，卻極大地改變了日本產(chǎn)業(yè)的發(fā)展模式，日本由此加速走上產(chǎn)業(yè)全球化的發(fā)展道路，通過海外投資并購整合全球資源發(fā)展自己的產(chǎn)業(yè)，日本對外最大的十項并購都發(fā)生在2000年前后。

The trade war between the US and Japan escalated in different phases. Six confrontations lasting 2-6 years took place during the whole period. Whenever an industry began to emerge in Japan, or threatened to overtake its US peer, it would be subject to US trade sanctions. Over these years, Japanese exports like textiles, steel, TV, and cars were subjected to trade sanctions by the US, culminating in an array of agreements on production and export restrictions. In the late 1980s, the third industrial revolution swept the world, and Japan began to leapfrog over the US on all fronts, which ignited a full-blown trade war between the two countries. From 1985 to 1991, the US and Japan were entangled in six years of negotiations covering fields like semiconductors, super computers, and telecommunications, and signed a series of agreements, including two on semiconductors and four on market access, with the most notable ones being the Plaza treaty and the Maekawa report. From 1989 to 1996, the two countries signed agreements on structural reform, insurance, and comprehensive economic reform to address market access impediments. The decades-long trade war failed to reverse the decline in US industries but it did reshape Japan's development model, accelerate its supply chain development, and bolster its global mergers and acquisitions. The top 10 M&A cases all took place after 2000.

由此可見，兩個大經(jīng)濟體發(fā)生貿(mào)易摩擦是有一個過程的，解決之道是由點到面，依據(jù)雙邊經(jīng)濟發(fā)展態(tài)勢，分階段從解決單一行業(yè)競爭，到對整體市場經(jīng)濟關(guān)系逐次進行調(diào)整。而中美貿(mào)易摩擦卻似乎采取了跳躍式發(fā)展的節(jié)奏，這是中美經(jīng)濟關(guān)系的密切性和特殊性所決定的。自中國2000年加入WTO以來，對外經(jīng)濟交往日益密切，中國以自己的人力、土地和資源低成本優(yōu)勢與美國為主的西方國家形成緊密的優(yōu)勢互補的全球產(chǎn)業(yè)分工格局，推動了全球經(jīng)濟的復(fù)蘇和發(fā)展。因此，過去中美之間雖然在光伏、輪胎等產(chǎn)品上有過爭議，但雙方都認(rèn)為中美在雙邊貿(mào)易中是雙贏，美方認(rèn)為中國是美國日益重要的市場，中國在遵守國際貿(mào)易準(zhǔn)則方面雖不完美但進步很大，雙方很快在一些具體的貿(mào)易問題上達成協(xié)議。但特朗普當(dāng)選執(zhí)政以來秉承“美國優(yōu)先”的原則，推動降低美國的貿(mào)易逆差并吸引制造業(yè)回流，而中國作為美國的第一大貿(mào)易逆差來源國和世界發(fā)展最快的、最重要的制造業(yè)大國，自然成了特朗普的貿(mào)易保護主義首要打擊的對象。特朗普一改以往的從單個行業(yè)入手逐次開展貿(mào)易戰(zhàn)的做法，直接挑戰(zhàn)中國的經(jīng)濟發(fā)展模式、市場開放模式和產(chǎn)業(yè)政策，試圖迫使中國全盤接受美國的貿(mào)易政策主張，這令中國政府完全無法認(rèn)同美國政府的觀點。中國的經(jīng)濟發(fā)展模式和相關(guān)產(chǎn)業(yè)政策是依據(jù)中國經(jīng)濟的實際發(fā)展階段和市場結(jié)構(gòu)特點內(nèi)生而成的，存在著不足，但主體是適應(yīng)中國經(jīng)濟發(fā)展要求的。對不足之處的改革始終在推進中，但不可能一蹴而就。美國逼中國簽城下之盟的目標(biāo)難以達到。事實上，與中國產(chǎn)業(yè)鏈高度結(jié)合的美國經(jīng)濟本身也沒有做好與中國經(jīng)濟即刻分道揚鑣的準(zhǔn)備。因此，在美國中期選舉后，中美雙方還是要找到階段性緩解雙邊貿(mào)易摩擦的辦法。屆時雙邊的關(guān)稅戰(zhàn)不會結(jié)束，但會有所緩解，達成一些中間性的協(xié)議，以穩(wěn)定市場預(yù)期。

The trade war the US is initiating against China seems to be escalating much faster than the one it initiated against Japan. This is due to the extent of China-US economic relations. Since China's accession to the WTO in 2000, its external economic engagements have substantially increased, thanks to China's comparative advantages in labor, land, and resources, which contributed to economic recovery from the global crisis. Though China and the US have had their share of trade disputes in the past regarding photovoltaic and tire imports, the US recognized China as an important market which has made great strides in compliance with international trade laws. The Trump administration pursues the America First policy, and made reducing the trade deficit a prime target. Not surprising that China, as the fastest growing manufacturing power, and the largest source of the US trade deficit, has been bearing the brunt of protectionism-driven trade policies. What's more, the US is challenging the development model, market opening and industrial policies of China, with the ultimate goal of making China accept US trade policies, which is not acceptable to the Chinese government. China's development model and industrial policies are tailored to its development stage and market structure. Though it is not above improvement, it is being constantly refined, which is a process rather than an event. It is wishful thinking that the US can impose change on China, as China's industrial chain is highly integrated with the global chain and the US can ill-afford to disengage with China. After the mid-term elections, both sides should seriously strive to turn trade relations around. Though the tariffs are not likely to end, some initial improvement or stopgap measures could stabilize markets a bit.

未來源于中美結(jié)構(gòu)性矛盾的經(jīng)貿(mào)爭端不會停止，美國將在三個方向上對中國施加戰(zhàn)略性壓力。第一是全面孤立中國的國際經(jīng)貿(mào)環(huán)境。美墨加協(xié)議針對第三國的市場經(jīng)濟身份限制條款還會復(fù)制到美國與其他主要經(jīng)濟體的相關(guān)協(xié)議上去，同時美國還會聯(lián)合其他西方盟友推動主導(dǎo)改革WTO等國際經(jīng)濟組織，為中國參與國際經(jīng)濟活動設(shè)置高門檻。第二是美國將加強對中國高科技技術(shù)引進的封鎖。美國會嚴(yán)格審核中國企業(yè)在美投資并購活動，并聯(lián)合其他西方國家加強對中國高科技發(fā)展的限制。第三是美國會在中美文化教育科技交流以及事關(guān)中國核心利益的敏感戰(zhàn)略問題上不時敲打中國，以施加壓力。中國未來也必然會在以下三個方面積極作為，以對沖化解外部壓力。首先是加大投入，加強自主科技研發(fā)，為中國產(chǎn)業(yè)競爭力的持續(xù)發(fā)展提供可靠的技術(shù)基礎(chǔ)和動力。其次是通過擴大國內(nèi)市場開放和深化“一帶一路”建設(shè)擴大中國的對外經(jīng)濟交往，擴容中國與世界各國的自由貿(mào)易“大家庭”。再次是努力提升國內(nèi)人民的生活水平，通過降稅增加國民個人收入并支持中小企業(yè)發(fā)展，吸引國際國內(nèi)投資，擴大中國內(nèi)需市場，對沖外部市場的局部收縮。

Part of the trade disputes stem from structural trade issues between the two countries. The US may continue to ratchet up pressure on China for strategic reasons. First, it aim to isolate China in the global trade system. The USMCA enshrines a “poison pill” provision on exclusion of “non-market economies”, which may well be replicated in other trade agreements. The US may also reach out to other allies to advance WTO reform. Second, the US may tighten scrutiny on hi-tech exports to China. Chinese investment and merger activities in the US would be put under scrutiny, and America may even rally its western allies to do the same. Third, the US may hinder cultural and education exchanges and continue to gain leverage over China on its core interests.China may employ the following strategies. First, China will invest more in independent research and development to make its industries more competitive. Second, it could further open up its domestic market and promote the Belt and Road Initiative to empower external economic engagement and deeper integration into the global trade network. Third, it could deliver a better life for the Chinese people, continue to reduce taxes to support small and medium enterprises, attract more foreign investment, and tap domestic market potential to offset the impact of external shocks.

作者：鐘焰，中信改革發(fā)展研究院戰(zhàn)略與國際學(xué)部資深研究員