人民幣不是打貿(mào)易戰(zhàn)的武器

The trade “war” between the United States and China continues to escalate. So far, the US has imposed tariffs on Chinese steel and aluminum products, leading the Chinese to retaliate with matching tariff rate increases on $3 billion in US exports in the spring.

中美之間的貿(mào)易“戰(zhàn)”在繼續(xù)升級。到目前為止，美國已經(jīng)對中國鋼鋁產(chǎn)品加征關(guān)稅，這導致中國采取報復行動，在春季對美國30億美元出口產(chǎn)品相應提高了關(guān)稅。

The total amount of trade now affected by large tariff rate increases both ways is $106 billion. The products covered includes a diverse list of items including soybeans, semiconductors, railway cars, almonds, and backpacks.

目前受雙邊高額關(guān)稅影響的貿(mào)易總額為1060億美元，涵蓋的產(chǎn)品包括不同類目，如大豆、半導體、鐵路車輛、杏仁和雙肩背包。

This disruption in trade flows has not led to a negotiated outcome yet, hence the US is planning to up the ante again by imposing 25% tariffs on another $200 billion in imported goods from China starting in September.

貿(mào)易上的這種對抗并沒有讓談判有所成就，因此，美國打算再次提高賭注，從9月份開始對中國的另外2000億美元進口商品征收25%的關(guān)稅。

So far, the focus of trade actions has been on increasing costs at the border for goods. But for China, keeping up reciprocal rate hikes is becoming a problem, since Chinese firms do not import as many products from the United States as China exports to the US.

到目前為止，貿(mào)易行動的焦點一直是增加商品的進口成本。但對中國來說，保持等額同步加稅正變得困難，因為中國企業(yè)從美國進口的產(chǎn)品不如中國出口到美國的產(chǎn)品多。

The hope of the American administration is that the Chinese government will recognize the impossibility of matching tariff increases and return to the negotiating table in earnest to resolve the issues around US Section 301, including problems with intellectual property and forced technology transfer.

中國政府將意識到等額同步加征關(guān)稅是不可能的，因此它將認真回到談判桌前，解決美國301條款所涉及的問題，包括知識產(chǎn)權(quán)問題和強制技術(shù)轉(zhuǎn)讓。

However, this rosy scenario may not materialize. Just because the Chinese cannot continue to match American actions on tariffs does not mean that China has no leverage it can exert.

然而，這一樂觀場景可能根本無法成為現(xiàn)實。僅僅因為中國不能繼續(xù)采取與美國同步的關(guān)稅行動并不意味著它沒有可用的杠桿。

As David Baldwin pointed out in his 1985 book, Economic Statecraft, countries have a variety of options available in their economic toolkit. While the primary focus at the time was on the use of sanctions as a “weapon” short of armed conflict, he also highlighted other economic tools that could be used to achieve foreign policy outcomes.

正如大衛(wèi)·鮑德溫在他1985年的《經(jīng)濟治國術(shù)》一書中所指出的，各國的經(jīng)濟工具箱中有各式各樣的選擇。雖然當時的主要焦點是將制裁作為武裝對抗以外的“武器”，但他強調(diào)國家也可以利用其他經(jīng)濟手段來實現(xiàn)外交政策目的。

One tool is the use of monetary policy, including the adjustment of the value of a country’s currency.

其中一個手段就是使用貨幣政策，包括調(diào)整國家貨幣的價值。

Currency adjustment is a blunt tool, rather than a surgical instrument. It affects the value of every item in the economy with every trading partner and is, consequently, not used as frequently as might be expected. But it can have utility in trade as a lower value currency will make exports cheaper. In a trade war, currency movements can offset tariff increases.

匯率調(diào)整并不是外科手術(shù)工具，它是一種鈍器，影響著經(jīng)濟中與每個貿(mào)易伙伴往來的每一項商品的價值，因此不像人們期待的那樣被頻繁使用。但匯率在貿(mào)易中也可以有實用性，因為較低的匯率會讓出口的產(chǎn)品更便宜。在貿(mào)易戰(zhàn)中，匯率變動可以用來抵銷關(guān)稅的增加。

Devaluing currency also drives up the cost of imports. Given the integration of Chinese firms into supply chains across Asia, a lower yuan is not automatically beneficial. Many of the products produced and assembled in China for the domestic market and for overseas consumers are created with raw materials and components sourced globally. A falling yuan can raise the prices for each of these items and may more than offset any cost savings in exports.

但貨幣貶值同時也提高了進口成本。鑒于中國企業(yè)在整個亞洲供應鏈的融入狀況，人民幣貶值不會自動產(chǎn)生收益。許多在中國為國內(nèi)市場和海外消費者生產(chǎn)組裝的產(chǎn)品，所使用的都是在全球范圍采購的原材料和零部件，人民幣貶值會提高這些商品的價格，抵銷任何出口成本的削減。

Despite the mixed effects of currency movements, recent US administrations have been concerned about China using yuan devaluation as a tool of economic statecraft. American law requires the US Treasury to report semi-annually on the macroeconomic and foreign exchange policies of major trading partners.

雖然匯率變動的效果不一而同，但近年美國政府一直擔心中國把人民幣貶值作為一種經(jīng)濟方略。按美國法律要求，美國財政部每半年要就主要貿(mào)易伙伴的宏觀經(jīng)濟政策和匯率政策提交報告。

During the presidential election campaign, Donald Trump promised to name China a currency manipulator. Such a designation would trigger a host of economic sanctions from the United States, yet, once elected, his administration declined to do so.

大選期間，唐納德·特朗普承諾要將中國列為匯率操縱國，這種認定會引發(fā)美國的一系列經(jīng)濟制裁。但當選之后，他的政府卻沒有這么做。

The launch of tariffs, though, also coincided with a fall in the value of the yuan, leaving many commentators wondering if the Chinese government had decided to explicitly intervene in the foreign exchange market to counter the damage from the trade war.

然而關(guān)稅的推出恰好碰上人民幣匯率下跌，許多評論人士因此懷疑中國政府是否已經(jīng)明令干預外匯市場，以應對貿(mào)易戰(zhàn)造成的損失。

However, the fall of the currency can also be seen as a natural byproduct of the escalating trade war. The collateral damage from the US-China trade war is likely to be substantial. Hence, currency traders and ordinary business operations are putting the yuan under substantial pressure.

不過，貨幣貶值也可以被視為貿(mào)易戰(zhàn)不斷升級的天然副產(chǎn)品。隨著全球經(jīng)濟進入未知水域——兩個最大的國家對價值數(shù)千億美元商品互征關(guān)稅，而且近期還可能增加——它的附帶破壞可能是巨大的。在這種情況下，外匯交易商和普通企業(yè)的運作都給人民幣造成了不小的壓力。

In response, it appears that the Chinese government is now trying to stabilize the situation, rather than allow the currency to continue to depreciate. The People’s Bank of China has returned to a method of counter-cyclical operations, to try to keep the yuan relatively fixed.

作為回應，中國政府似乎正試圖穩(wěn)定局勢，而不是讓人民幣繼續(xù)貶值。中國人民銀行已經(jīng)恢復使用反周期操作法，盡量保持人民幣的相對固定。

Thus, while China’s government could certainly lower the value of the yuan to cope with an escalating trade conflict, it appears to have taken this option off the table for now.

所以，中國政府固然可以把人民幣貶值作為經(jīng)濟工具來應對不斷升級的貿(mào)易沖突，但目前看來它已經(jīng)把這一選項排除出它的討論范圍。

The removal of the yuan from policy options does not leave China bereft of ideas to counter American actions. While China cannot match dollar-for-dollar tariff increases beyond another $60 billion or so, it still has considerable power to disrupt trade in other ways.

將人民幣排除在政策選項之外并不代表中國不再有反擊美方行動的考慮。雖然除了另外約600億美元商品，中國已經(jīng)無法再對同等金額的商品加征關(guān)稅，但在其他方面中國仍有相當大的能力干擾貿(mào)易。

For example, China could focus attention on American service exports, which are substantial. Government officials in China might opt to closely scrutinize paperwork, licenses, permits, and so forth, of American operations in China. All US imports of goods into China might be subjected to additional safety or security checks that might take weeks to complete.

例如，中國可以把注意力集中于美國的服務出口，這相當可觀。中國政府官員可能會格外注意美國在中國的文書、執(zhí)照、許可證等業(yè)務。進口到中國的所有美國商品都有可能受到額外安全檢查，而且也許需要數(shù)周之久。

In short, China can retaliate, should it choose to do so, even without using the blunt tool of yuan recalibration.

總而言之，即使不考慮調(diào)整人民幣匯率這種生硬的手段，中國仍然有很大的選擇余地進行報復。

Unfortunately for the global economy, the two sides do not seem to have a clear “off ramp” to resolve their dispute, opting instead to ramp up pressure in the hopes that the other side will concede. There are many options in the economic toolkit that might be used in the meantime, meaning this conflict is likely to continue for some time.

對全球經(jīng)濟來說不幸的是，雙方似乎沒有一個明確的出口來解決它們的爭端，而是選擇繼續(xù)加大壓力，以期對方的讓步。在此期間，經(jīng)濟方略工具箱中還有許多選項可以使用，這意味著這場沖突可能要持續(xù)一段時間。