關(guān)于中美貿(mào)易沖突，你應(yīng)該知道的五個問題

In the first year of the Trump administration, the president’s threats to upend the global trade system seemed like mostly bluster — lots of threats, not much action.

在特朗普政府執(zhí)政的第一年里，總統(tǒng)要顛覆全球貿(mào)易體系的威脅似乎大都是虛張聲勢——雷聲大雨點小。

Not anymore.

不再如此。

The administration moved forward Friday with a 25 percent tariff on $50 billion of Chinese imports. In recent weeks, it imposed taxes on imported steel and aluminum, including that from close allies like the European Union and Canada. And those actions both follow earlier measures on washing machines and solar panels.

特朗普政府周五宣布，對從中國進口的價值500億美元的產(chǎn)品加征25%的關(guān)稅。政府在最近幾周對進口鋼材和鋁材加征了關(guān)稅，包括來自歐盟和加拿大等親密盟友的鋼材和鋁材。這些行動是在早些時候?qū)ο匆聶C和太陽能電池板加征關(guān)稅之后采取的。

All of which prompts some important questions: Is the United States engaged in what should be classified as a trade war? And what are the economic consequences likely to be?

所有這一切引發(fā)了一些重要的問題：美國是否卷入了一場應(yīng)該被歸類為貿(mào)易戰(zhàn)的沖突?其經(jīng)濟后果可能會怎樣?

Is this a trade war?

這是一場貿(mào)易戰(zhàn)嗎?

Definitely maybe.

絕對可能是。

A “trade war” refers to measures and countermeasures on import restriction that escalate over time, causing trade between two countries to break down.

“貿(mào)易戰(zhàn)”是指國家之間對進口商品不斷升級的限制和反制，導(dǎo)致兩國之間的貿(mào)易崩潰。

But there is no specific definition. Everyone would agree that the Depression-era period of escalating tariffs was a trade war. Everyone would agree that, say, George W. Bush’s 2002 steel tariffs and the retaliation by Europe was not. But the exact line between trade skirmish and trade war is subjective.

但貿(mào)易戰(zhàn)并沒有具體的定義。所有人都會同意，大蕭條時期不斷提高的關(guān)稅是一場貿(mào)易戰(zhàn)。每個人都會同意，比如喬治·W·布什(George W. Bush)2002年對鋼鐵征收的關(guān)稅、以及歐洲的報復(fù)行動不是貿(mào)易戰(zhàn)。但貿(mào)易沖突和貿(mào)易戰(zhàn)之間的確切界線沒有客觀的定義。

“Yes, we are now in a trade war,” said Mary Lovely, an economist at Syracuse who studies trade. She emphasizes two factors. First, the Trump administration is signaling that it will meet Chinese retaliation with further retaliation, and second, “the two sides are no longer engaged in productive talks to defuse tensions.”

“是的，我們現(xiàn)在正在一場貿(mào)易戰(zhàn)中，”研究貿(mào)易的雪城大學(xué)(Syracuse)經(jīng)濟學(xué)家瑪麗·絡(luò)蕪里(Mary Lovely)說。她強調(diào)了兩個因素。第一，特朗普政府已發(fā)出信號，它將對中國的報復(fù)措施采取進一步的報復(fù)行動。第二，“雙方已不再為緩和緊張局勢進行有效益的談判。”

Chad Bown, a senior fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics, is more cautious. Is this a trade war? “In my view not yet,” he said. “My view of a trade war is when all countries start responding unilaterally, and without respect to international rules in terms of the levels of tariff retaliation that they engage in.”

彼得森國際經(jīng)濟研究所(Peterson Institute for International Economics)高級研究員乍得·鮑恩(Chad Bown)則持更謹慎的態(tài)度。這是一場貿(mào)易戰(zhàn)嗎?“在我看來還不是，”他說。“我對貿(mào)易戰(zhàn)的看法是，所有的國家都開始單方面地做出反應(yīng)，而且在所采取的報復(fù)關(guān)稅水平上，它們都不遵守國際規(guī)則。”

So far, China, the European Union and other trading partners have responded within the confines of World Trade Organization rules.

到目前為止，中國、歐盟，以及美國的其他貿(mào)易伙伴作出的反應(yīng)都是在世界貿(mào)易組織規(guī)定的范圍內(nèi)。

What’s the logic behind the administration’s action?

是什么邏輯在支配特朗普政府的行動?

For many years, American companies have complained of being treated shabbily as they try to do business in China. They often must partner with Chinese companies to be allowed to do business in the country, and frequently complain that their most advanced technologies are being stolen, among other concerns.

多年來，美國公司一直抱怨在中國做生意時受到不公正的對待。它們通常必須與中國企業(yè)合資，才能獲得在中國做生意的許可，美國公司還經(jīng)常抱怨，它們最先進的技術(shù)正在被竊走等等。

The Trump administration’s list of goods to be subjected to the tariffs is aimed at these high-tech sectors, including aerospace, telecommunications equipment and robotics.

特朗普政府將加征關(guān)稅的產(chǎn)品清單針對的是包括航天、電信和機器人在內(nèi)的高技術(shù)行業(yè)。

China has said it will place tariffs on $50 billion worth of American imports in retaliation. That’s where things get interesting. The Trump administration is threatening to escalate things further if China retaliates, pulling another $100 billion of goods into the mix. This increases the possibility that the dispute will spiral to encompass ever larger swaths of goods.

中國表示將對價值500億美元的美國進口產(chǎn)品征收報復(fù)性關(guān)稅。事情在這里變得有意思了。特朗普政府威脅說，如果中國采取報復(fù)行動的話，將讓事態(tài)進一步升級，政府已將價值1000億美元的更多商品納入可能加征關(guān)稅的行列。這就增加了糾紛不斷升級、把越來越多的商品包括進來的可能性。

Will it work?

會奏效嗎?

China views development of its high-tech industries as core to its economic strategy of the future and won’t want to give up advantages in those sectors lightly. On the other hand, the substantial U.S. trade deficit with China means the American side has more potential Chinese imports on which to slap punitive tariffs than the Chinese do, a potential source of leverage.

中國把發(fā)展高新技術(shù)產(chǎn)業(yè)作為未來經(jīng)濟戰(zhàn)略的核心，不會輕易放棄這些領(lǐng)域的優(yōu)勢。另一方面，美國對中國的巨額貿(mào)易逆差意味著，美國有更多對之征收懲罰性關(guān)稅的潛在中國進口，比中國能進行反制的多，這是美方砝碼的一個潛在來源。

The Trump administration’s negotiating strategy has been erratic. At one point last month, there seemed to be progress toward an accord in which China would buy more American agriculture and energy products. That would have helped reduce the United States’ trade deficit with China, one of the president’s major goals. But it wouldn’t have done much of anything about the longer-term issues around technology theft, and those talks fell apart.

特朗普政府的談判策略一直不穩(wěn)定。上月的某個時候，美國似乎在與中國達成協(xié)議方面取得了進展，中國將購買更多的美國農(nóng)產(chǎn)品和能源產(chǎn)品。那將有助于減少美國對中國的貿(mào)易逆差，減少逆差是特朗普總統(tǒng)的主要目標(biāo)之一。但那沒有解決多少圍繞著技術(shù)盜竊的長期問題，所以那些談判破裂了。

The United States might have a stronger negotiating position if it were joined by allies like Canada, Japan and the European Union. But given the steel and aluminum tariffs and tensions with Canada, the United States finds itself on its own in talks with China.

如果加拿大、日本和歐盟等盟友加入進來的話，美國的談判立場可能會更強。但考慮到美國對鋼鐵和鋁加征關(guān)稅、與加拿大緊張關(guān)系，它在與中國的談判中只能孤身作戰(zhàn)了。

Is this going to crash the U.S. economy?

這會讓美國的經(jīng)濟崩潰嗎?

Probably not.

可能不會。

The United States has gross domestic product of nearly $20 trillion, so a new tax on $50 billion (or, eventually, $150 billion or more) of Chinese imports is a rounding error. Even when you count the costs of steel and aluminum and other tariffs that have resulted from the president’s aggressive trade, it’s hard to get to numbers that move the dial much on overall growth.

美國的國內(nèi)生產(chǎn)總值(GDP)接近20萬億美元，因此對從中國進口的價值500億美元(最終或許達到1500億美元或更多)的產(chǎn)品征收新稅可以略而不記。即使你把特朗普聲勢浩大的貿(mào)易攻勢中所有的鋼鐵、鋁和其他關(guān)稅的代價計算進來，也很難達到能在較大程度上影響整體經(jīng)濟增長的數(shù)字。

As countries retaliate, they can certainly cause damage for individual American industries that export, but the reality is most of the economic activity in the United States is for domestic consumption. Exports constitute about 12 percent of G.D.P.

隨著其他國家采取報復(fù)行動，它們肯定會對從事出口的個別美國行業(yè)造成損害，但現(xiàn)實情況是，美國的大多數(shù)經(jīng)濟活動都是針對國內(nèi)消費進行的。出口只占GDP的12%左右。

That’s not to play down the potentially heavy damage in the industries caught in the middle. Soybean futures prices fell Friday, as commodities traders predicted China would buy fewer soybeans in retaliation. Some major industries that use steel and aluminum are complaining of sharply higher prices, which in turn makes them less competitive against global competitors.

這不是要淡化對那些卷入貿(mào)易爭端的行業(yè)可能帶來的嚴重損害。上周五，由于大宗商品交易商預(yù)測，作為報復(fù)，中國將減少購買美國大豆，大豆期貨價格下跌。一些使用鋼鐵和鋁的主要行業(yè)正在抱怨原材料價格大幅上漲，這繼而會降低它們在全球競爭對手面前的競爭力。

“The questions are does this escalate from here, is this part of a much bigger process, and how do business confidence and financial markets respond?” said Lewis Alexander, chief U.S. economist at Nomura. “With these relatively modest first-round things, it’s hard to make the case that it’s material” to the overall economy.

“問題是，將從這里升級嗎?這是一個更大過程的一部分嗎?商業(yè)信心和金融市場將如何反應(yīng)呢?”野村證券首席美國經(jīng)濟學(xué)家劉易斯·亞歷山大(Lewis Alexander)說。“只是這些相對溫和的首輪戰(zhàn)火，很難說對(整體經(jīng)濟)有實質(zhì)性影響。”

The risk comes if things spiral out of control in ways that crater the stock market or lead businesses to pull back significantly on their investment spending. Keep in mind the way that trade disputes can cause economic damage without triggering a recession. Gary Cohn, the former White House economic adviser, said this week that tariffs could wipe out economic gains from the tax cut passed late last year. Still, with the economy in relatively strong shape, there is a big difference between “not growing as fast as it would without a trade war” and outright recession.

如果發(fā)生導(dǎo)致股市崩盤、或?qū)е缕髽I(yè)大幅削減投資支出的事態(tài)失控的話，會產(chǎn)生風(fēng)險。請記住貿(mào)易爭端可能造成經(jīng)濟損失、但不引發(fā)衰退的方式。前白宮經(jīng)濟顧問加里·科恩(Gary Cohn)本周說，關(guān)稅可能會抵消去年底通過的減稅法案帶來的經(jīng)濟好處。盡管如此，由于經(jīng)濟狀況相對很好，“增長比在沒有貿(mào)易戰(zhàn)的情況下緩慢”與經(jīng)濟徹底衰退之間有很大的差別。

Will this mean higher prices?

這將意味著更高的價格嗎?

The initial tariffs on Chinese goods are not focused on consumer products. They are to be levied on products mainly purchased by businesses, such as industrial equipment. That could mean upward pressure on inflation eventually, but in subtle ways.

首批加征關(guān)稅的中國產(chǎn)品并不針對消費品。這些關(guān)稅是對主要由企業(yè)購買的產(chǎn)品征收的，比如工業(yè)設(shè)備。這可能意味著最終會有讓通貨膨脹上行的壓力，但是以一種微妙的方式。

Even if the dispute spreads to consumer goods, the actual amount American consumers will pay depends on many factors, including the availability of domestic substitutes and the competitiveness of the industry. For any given product, it is hard to predict how much of a 25 percent tariff will be passed through to consumers versus absorbed by producers and retailers.

即使?fàn)幎藬U大到消費品，美國消費者實際要掏出的錢取決于許多因素，包括國內(nèi)替代品的供應(yīng)和那個行業(yè)中有多少競爭。對任何給定產(chǎn)品來說，很難預(yù)測加征的25%的關(guān)稅中將有多少會轉(zhuǎn)嫁到消費者身上，而不是被生產(chǎn)商和零售商吸收。

Still, consumers ultimately pay the bill for trade barriers in one way or another. At the start of the year, the administration put a 20 percent tariff on imported washing machines; the price of laundry equipment is up 17 percent since then.

盡管如此，消費者最終還是會以某種方式為貿(mào)易壁壘買單的。今年初，政府對進口洗衣機加征了20%的關(guān)稅;洗衣設(shè)備的價格在那之后已經(jīng)上漲了17%。