美國將非洲戰(zhàn)略機遇讓給中國

From the South China Sea to the Middle East, the US is losing its status as an unrivalled superpower. In few places is this loss of influence so apparent as in Africa, where Beijing senses a strategic opportunity and where Washington is increasingly viewed as a fickle — even absentee — ally.

從南中國海到中東，美國正不斷失去其作為無可匹敵的超級大國的地位。這種影響力的喪失最明顯不過的地方之一就是非洲了——北京在非洲嗅到了戰(zhàn)略機遇，而華盛頓在非洲眼中越來越像一個反復(fù)無常、甚至缺席的盟友。

If there is a mirror image of Donald Trump’s America First policy, it is to be found in the world’s poorest continent. You could call it Africa Last.

如果唐納德•特朗普(Donald Trump)的“美國優(yōu)先”(America First)政策有一個鏡像，那么你將在這個全世界最貧窮的大洲找到它。你可以稱之為“非洲最后”(Africa Last)。

African leaders have mostly played down US disengagement. They have shrugged off Mr Trump’s lavatorial comparisons and his invention of the 55th African state of “Nambia”. They have ignored snubs, such as when Mr Trump walked out of the working session on Africa at last year’s G20 in Hamburg. But they cannot help noticing the Africa-shaped hole where Washington’s African strategy should be.

非洲領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人對美國的撒手不管基本表現(xiàn)得若無其事。他們沒理睬特朗普粗魯?shù)难哉撘约八炝说?5個非洲國家“Nambia”。對特朗普的怠慢——比如去年在漢堡20國集團(tuán)(G20)會議上特朗普退出非洲工作會議——他們視而不見。但他們無法不注意到華盛頓原本的非洲戰(zhàn)略不見了，只剩下一個非洲形狀的破洞。

The US, says Mo Ibrahim, a Sudanese telecoms billionaire and a champion of better governance, has lost its authority to “as the leader of the liberal world and backbone of the international order”. Dictators are increasingly isolated in Africa, as the recent ousting of Robert Mugabe in Zimbabwe confirms. But leaders sense waning US commitment to African democracy, says Mr Ibrahim, and those autocrats who remain gain succour from Mr Trump’s apparent admiration of strongmen.

莫•易卜拉欣(Mo Ibrahim)是蘇丹一位電信億萬富翁，他支持改善治理。易卜拉欣表示美國已經(jīng)失去了“作為自由主義世界的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)者和國際秩序的支柱”的權(quán)威性。就像羅伯特•穆加貝(Robert Mugabe)最近在津巴布韋被趕下臺所證明的，獨裁者在非洲日益受到孤立。但易卜拉欣表示，非洲領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人感到美國對非洲民主的承諾越來越無力，特朗普對強人的明顯贊賞還為那些依然在位的非洲獨裁者壯了膽。

America’s shrinking influence in Africa did not begin under Mr Trump. The commitment of Barack Obama, his Kenyan roots notwithstanding, fell short of that shown by George W Bush, whose conversion to African causes — particularly the fight against HIV — made him a hero on the continent.

美國在非洲的影響力下降并非始于特朗普上任。巴拉克•奧巴馬(Barack Obama)盡管祖籍肯尼亞，但其對非洲的承諾與小布什(George W Bush)相比要遜色不少——小布什對非洲事業(yè)的貢獻(xiàn)(尤其是在艾滋病防治方面)令他在非洲成了一位英雄。

However, the sense of US withdrawal has accelerated. Mr Trump’s threat to cut the US aid budget by 30 per cent signals a massive scaling down of its commitment to a health and poverty-reduction agenda that has enjoyed bipartisan support in Washington for decades.

然而，就人們的感覺而言，美國從非洲大陸脫身的速度加快了。特朗普威脅要將美國的援助預(yù)算下調(diào)30%，這意味著美國對如下這項數(shù)十年來得到兩黨一致支持的議程的承諾大幅減弱：促進(jìn)人類健康和減少貧困。

“There is no high policy, at least none that I can find,” says John Campbell, former US ambassador to Nigeria.

前美國駐尼日利亞大使約翰•坎貝爾(John Campbell)表示：“沒有高層政策，至少我沒發(fā)現(xiàn)。”

Why should this matter? Africa accounts for only 3 per cent of global trade, and the US has few of the colonial ties that have preserved commercial and diplomatic interest in the continent from Britain, France, Portugal and Belgium. The US business relationship with Africa is almost exclusively extractive. Oil majors, such as Chevron and ExxonMobil, secretary of state Rex Tillerson’s old company, are the biggest investors. The likes of GE, Google and Citigroup are among a handful of non-extractives making any sort of bet on a continent that, though poor, contains several of the world’s fastest-growing economies.

此事為何重要?非洲僅占全球貿(mào)易的3%，而且美國與非洲之間沒有多少殖民時代留下的紐帶——這種紐帶讓英國、法國、葡萄牙和比利時在非洲依然留有商業(yè)和外交利益。美國與非洲的商業(yè)關(guān)系幾乎完全局限于資源開采方面。像雪佛龍(Chevron)和?？松梨?ExxonMobil)——美國務(wù)卿雷克斯•蒂勒森(Rex Tillerson)曾執(zhí)掌的企業(yè)——這樣的石油巨頭是最大的投資者。通用電氣(GE)、谷歌(Google)和花旗集團(tuán)(Citigroup)等公司是少有的幾家投資了非洲的非資源型美國企業(yè)——非洲雖然貧窮，卻擁有多個全球增長最快的經(jīng)濟(jì)體。

There are non-commercial reasons to think harder about Africa. By 2050, the number of Africans will have doubled to more than 2bn and may double again by the end of the century. The danger is that Africa will become home to a restless, jobless urban youth, tempted to join the swelling flow of emigrants to Europe or prone to radicalisation.

看重非洲，還有一些商業(yè)以外的原因。到2050年，非洲人口數(shù)量將翻一番，達(dá)到20億以上，到本世紀(jì)末可能還要再翻一番。存在這樣的危險：非洲將有大量躁動不安的無業(yè)城市青年，他們可能會加入不斷壯大的移民大軍涌向歐洲，或易于變得激進(jìn)。

As the US presence fades, that of China has grown. Its influence is everywhere: in roads, rail, telecoms, infrastructure and in Djibouti, in a naval base. Of the UN Security Council’s five members, China has the most peacekeepers in Africa. When Zimbabwe’s generals were preparing to ease Mr Mugabe from power, it was Beijing, not Washington, they tipped off first.

隨著美國勢力消減，中國勢力漸長。從公路、鐵路、電信、基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施到吉布提海軍基地，中國的身影無處不在。在聯(lián)合國安理會(UN Security Council)五個常任理事國中，中國的駐非維和人員最多。當(dāng)津巴布韋的軍方將領(lǐng)們準(zhǔn)備把穆加貝趕下臺時，他們首先知會的是北京、而不是華盛頓。

Accusations surfaced last month that Beijing had been routinely bugging the $200m headquarters of the African Union it built in Addis Ababa. The muted African response suggested there were no secrets between friends.

今年初有人指控北京方面一直在監(jiān)聽非洲聯(lián)盟(African Union)位于亞的斯亞貝巴的總部大樓，那座造價2億美元的大樓是北京方面援建的。非洲方面的含混回應(yīng)暗示朋友之間沒有秘密。

“I don’t think there is anything done here that we would not like people to know,” Paul Kagame, president of Rwanda and chair of the AU, told reporters. At least, he seemed to be saying, the Chinese were listening.

非洲聯(lián)盟主席、盧旺達(dá)總統(tǒng)保羅•卡加梅(Paul Kagame)對記者表示：“我不認(rèn)為這里(非盟總部)有什么事情是我們不想讓人們知道的。”他的意思似乎是，至少中國人在聽。