歐盟比較大的考驗(yàn)將來自波蘭
波蘭是第二次世界大戰(zhàn)爆發(fā)之地，也是蘇聯(lián)帝國開始瓦解之地。如今，這個(gè)國家或?qū)⒃俅卧跉W洲的歷史上扮演重要角色。位于布魯塞爾的歐盟委員會(huì)(European Commission)與波蘭政府之間的一場斗爭，正在演變?yōu)殛P(guān)乎歐盟存亡的一場考驗(yàn)。
In December, for the first time ever, the commission started a formal procedure that could strip a member state of its voting rights. The Polish government stands accused of violating the EU’s founding principles, which include “democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights”.
去年12月，歐盟委員會(huì)史無前例地啟動(dòng)了一項(xiàng)可以剝奪一個(gè)成員國投票權(quán)的正式程序。波蘭政府被指違反了包括“民主、平等、法治、尊重人權(quán)”在內(nèi)的歐盟的基本原則。
The battle over Poland is turning into a test case over the strength of populism — not just in Europe, but around the world. Charles Kupchan, who ran the Europe department in the Obama White House, wrote last week: “With the United States missing in action, it is up to the European Union to defend the principles and practices of democratic society. The fate of Poland, Europe and the west is on the line.”
圍繞波蘭發(fā)生的這場斗爭，正在演變?yōu)閷γ翊庵髁x實(shí)力的一次測試——不僅在歐洲，而且是在全世界范圍內(nèi)。奧巴馬(Obama)主政白宮時(shí)期擔(dān)任歐洲事務(wù)高級官員的查爾斯•庫普錢(Charles Kupchan)不久前寫道：“由于美國不再出頭，要靠歐盟來捍衛(wèi)民主社會(huì)的原則和實(shí)踐了。這關(guān)系到波蘭、歐洲以及西方的命運(yùn)。”
But those hoping that the EU will win a decisive battle against populist authoritarianism in Poland are liable to be disappointed. A combination of politics and strategic considerations are more likely to lead to a messy compromise.
但那些希望歐盟能在與波蘭民粹威權(quán)主義的決戰(zhàn)中獲勝的人士，可能會(huì)大失所望。政治考量加上戰(zhàn)略考量，更有可能帶來一場稀里糊涂的妥協(xié)。
The Polish government moves that have alarmed the EU include turning state broadcasting into a propaganda arm of the government. But the main bone of contention is a set of new laws that have cleared the way for the government to stack the Polish courts.
波蘭政府令歐盟警惕的舉動(dòng)之一是將國家廣播電視機(jī)構(gòu)變?yōu)檎男麄鞑块T。但引發(fā)爭議的焦點(diǎn)是一系列新法律，這些新法律為波蘭政府在法院安插自己人掃清了道路。
The European Commission agonised long and hard before taking action over Poland. It knows that, in many important respects, Poland remains a proper democracy. State television is a bad joke, but there is still a strong independent media and there are vigorous opposition parties. However, the Polish government has already started to make life more difficult for the independent media and it is also pushing through “reforms” of the voting system that are raising fears about the integrity of future elections.
歐盟委員會(huì)在對波蘭采取行動(dòng)之前苦苦思索了很久。它清楚，在許多重要方面，波蘭仍是一個(gè)夠格的民主國家。雖然波蘭國家電視臺(tái)發(fā)生的事情讓人苦笑，但波蘭國內(nèi)仍存在著強(qiáng)大的獨(dú)立媒體以及強(qiáng)有力的反對黨。然而，波蘭政府已經(jīng)開始采取行動(dòng)讓獨(dú)立媒體的日子不好過，同時(shí)還在推動(dòng)投票體制的“改革”——此舉引發(fā)了對未來選舉公正性的擔(dān)憂。
The EU authorities felt they had to draw a line. However, they also know that Poland is potentially a “lose, lose” situation for them. If the EU fails to take action, it will stand accused of ignoring threats to democracy and the rule of law. But, by taking action, the authorities in Brussels allow a nationalist government to argue that foreign bureaucrats are attempting to undermine Polish independence. Even worse, this is a battle that the EU might well lose. Hungary, which is also sliding into authoritarian populism, has threatened to veto any move against Poland. That could leave the EU looking impotent, divided and unable to defend its core values.
歐盟當(dāng)局認(rèn)為他們不得不畫出一條底線。然而，他們也明白，波蘭對他們而言可能是一場“雙輸”。如果不采取行動(dòng)，歐盟將被指責(zé)無視民主和法治受到的威脅。但采取行動(dòng)又會(huì)貽人口實(shí)，讓一個(gè)奉行民族主義的政府有理由說，外國官僚企圖破壞波蘭的獨(dú)立。更糟糕的是，這是一場歐盟很可能會(huì)輸?shù)亩窢帯Ｍ瑯诱诨蛲?quán)民粹主義的匈牙利已經(jīng)威脅要否決任何針對波蘭的行動(dòng)。這可能會(huì)使歐盟看起來既軟弱又分裂，且無力捍衛(wèi)自己的核心價(jià)值觀。
The risks for the EU are only increased because the Polish government can make a case that it is being unfairly singled out. The Hungarian government, led by Viktor Orban, has gone even further than Poland in undermining the independence of the media and the courts, but has, so far, evaded censure. One reason might be that the EU was simply asleep at the wheel as Mr Orban made his moves. But a less palatable explanation is that Mr Orban has taken the precaution of keeping his Fidesz party within the European People’s party (EPP), which is the dominant grouping in the European Parliament. As a result he has powerful friends in Germany. By contrast, Poland’s governing Law and Justice party, led by Jaroslaw Kaczynski, is outside the EPP tent.
歐盟面臨的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)只會(huì)不斷增加，因?yàn)椴ㄌm政府可以主張歐盟不公平地單獨(dú)針對它。歐爾班•維克托(Viktor Orban)領(lǐng)導(dǎo)的匈牙利政府在破壞媒體和法院獨(dú)立性方面做得比波蘭更甚，但迄今并未受到譴責(zé)。其中一個(gè)原因或許是，歐爾班采取行動(dòng)時(shí)，歐盟在方向盤上睡著了。但是，一個(gè)讓人不太好想的解釋是，歐爾班采取了預(yù)防措施，把他的青民盟(Fidesz party)留在了歐洲人民黨(EPP)中，后者是歐洲議會(huì)(European Parliament)的第一大黨團(tuán)。因?yàn)檫@個(gè)原因，他在德國擁有了強(qiáng)大的盟友。相比之下，雅羅斯瓦夫•卡欽斯基(Jaroslaw Kaczynski)領(lǐng)導(dǎo)的波蘭執(zhí)政黨——法律與公正黨(Law and Justice party)并非歐洲人民黨會(huì)員。
The argument that the EU is guilty of double standards is bolstered by events in Spain, where elected politicians are in prison for staging a referendum on independence for Catalonia. The EU can respond that the referendum was illegal and that the Spanish courts have acted within the bounds of the current constitution and respected media freedom. Nonetheless, the government in Warsaw will point out that it is Spain — not Poland — that is currently imprisoning opposition politicians.
西班牙的事態(tài)支持了如下主張：歐盟執(zhí)行雙重標(biāo)準(zhǔn)。在西班牙，經(jīng)選舉產(chǎn)生的政治家因?yàn)榫图犹┝_尼亞獨(dú)立舉行公投而被捕。歐盟可以回應(yīng)，該公投為非法，西班牙法院在當(dāng)前憲法許可的范圍內(nèi)采取了行動(dòng)，且尊重了媒體自由。然而，華沙政府可以指出，現(xiàn)在將反對派政治家投入監(jiān)獄的是西班牙，而非波蘭。
The Polish government’s argument that it is being singled out because of its cultural conservatism and criticism of the EU may throw up enough smoke to obscure the clear-cut threat to the rule of law in Poland. And that, combined with broader geopolitical pressures, could push Brussels and Warsaw into a compromise.
波蘭政府主張，由于其文化保守主義和對歐盟的批評，它被單獨(dú)拎出來收拾，這一主張或許能制造足夠的煙幕，從而掩蓋波蘭國內(nèi)法治面臨的切實(shí)威脅。加上更廣泛的地緣政治壓力，這可能促使布魯塞爾與華沙達(dá)成妥協(xié)。
The German government in particular is very torn about taking action against Poland. For historical and geographical reasons, it regards reconciliation with Poland as a crucial imperative.
德國政府尤其對收拾波蘭感到為難。由于歷史和地理原因，德國將與波蘭和解視為一項(xiàng)重要的義務(wù)。
Compromise may already be in the works. Last week Poland reshuffled its government and removed some of the people regarded as “crazies” in Brussels. Early talks between the Polish government and the European Commission were conducted in polite terms. In Warsaw, there is now talk that the Polish government may come up with some cosmetic concessions, in the hope that this will buy off the commission.
妥協(xié)或許已在進(jìn)行之中。不久前，波蘭改組了政府，撤換掉了一些布魯塞爾方面視為“瘋子”的官員。在早先的會(huì)談中，波蘭政府與歐盟委員會(huì)都表現(xiàn)得彬彬有禮。在華沙，如今有傳言稱波蘭政府可能會(huì)做出一些表面上的讓步，希望這樣可以讓歐盟委員會(huì)買賬。
The EU, which already has its hands full with eurozone reform and Brexit, may be inclined to grab any olive branch that is offered by Poland. But that would be a mistake. The questions posed for the EU by Poland and Hungary are, ultimately, even more fundamental than the problem of Brexit. They challenge the EU’s very basis as a community of democratic, law-abiding nations. If the EU dodges the Polish issue now, it will come back to haunt it later.
已因歐元區(qū)改革和英國退歐而忙得不可開交的歐盟，可能傾向于抓住波蘭伸出的任何橄欖枝，但這將是錯(cuò)誤之舉。從長遠(yuǎn)來看，波蘭和匈牙利給歐盟帶來的問題，甚至比英國退歐的問題更為根本。他們挑戰(zhàn)的是歐盟作為一個(gè)民主、守法的國家共同體的根基。如果歐盟現(xiàn)在回避波蘭問題，這一問題未來還會(huì)回來作祟。
