中國科技集團(tuán)的金融雄心
美國監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)最近拒絕批準(zhǔn)螞蟻金服(Ant Financial)以12億美元收購總部位于達(dá)拉斯的匯款公司速匯金國際(MoneyGram International)，并不意味著這家做支付業(yè)務(wù)的阿里巴巴(Alibaba)關(guān)聯(lián)企業(yè)在美國的金融雄心的終結(jié)。
On one level, the scuppered deal suggests that Chinese companies, whether state-owned or otherwise, will have an ever harder time winning approval for US acquisitions. The move also confirms that the Americans now believe that the definition of national security — their basis for scrutinising overseas deals — embraces anything related to information and data.
某種程度上，從這一告吹交易可看出無論是國有企業(yè)還是其他企業(yè)，中國公司在美國的收購活動將越來越難獲得批準(zhǔn)。此舉也證明美國人現(xiàn)在認(rèn)為國家安全——其審查外國企業(yè)收購交易的基礎(chǔ)——的定義包含與信息和數(shù)據(jù)相關(guān)的一切。
But Ant Financial’s attempted US play also shows how much technology is undermining the dominance of traditional global titans, especially in the financial sphere. It is especially noteworthy that many of the upstart challengers to banks and other legacy companies increasingly either have a Chinese face or Chinese capital behind them. That, in turn, underscores how some Chinese players have leapfrogged into prominence across the world.
但螞蟻金服在美國的嘗試還顯示出，科技正大舉破壞全球老牌巨頭的統(tǒng)治地位，特別是在金融領(lǐng)域。尤其值得注意的是，在銀行和其他傳統(tǒng)公司受到的挑戰(zhàn)中，越來越多新貴挑戰(zhàn)者或是中國面孔，或背后有中國資本。這反過來又突顯了一些中國企業(yè)已在全球一舉成名。
Ant’s attempted takeover of MoneyGram is just one effort by that company to grab a slice of the US financial transactions business. In May it struck a deal with First Data, the payment infrastructure company bought by private equity group KKR in 2007. The joint venture will help the Chinese company install point-of-sale devices for Alipay across the US. It is initially targeting 10m Chinese tourists in the US but eventually hoping to also reach local spenders.
螞蟻金服試圖收購速匯金只是該公司進(jìn)軍美國金融交易業(yè)務(wù)的一次努力。去年5月它與支付基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施公司First Data達(dá)成了一筆交易，后者于2007年被私人股本集團(tuán)KKR收購。First Data將幫助螞蟻金服在美國各地安裝支付寶(Alipay) POS設(shè)備。螞蟻金服最初瞄準(zhǔn)的是美國的1000萬中國游客，但最終也希望能觸及當(dāng)?shù)叵M(fèi)者。
But Ant has so far studiously avoided buying or working with the banks that once stood at the heart of the financial system. Its strategy comes at a time when technological disruption of the financial system looks likely to accelerate. Tech companies that started in unrelated areas, such as ecommerce in the case of Alibaba or video games in the case of Tencent, are increasingly targeting core elements of banking, including payments, money transfers, lending or wealth management. If they succeed, they will play a larger and larger role in determining how capital is allocated globally.
不過迄今為止，螞蟻金服一直小心避免收購那些曾居于金融體系核心的銀行，或與之合作。這一策略出臺之際，科技對金融體系的顛覆似乎正在加速。從不相關(guān)領(lǐng)域起步的科技公司——如從電子商務(wù)起家的阿里巴巴，或從電子游戲發(fā)家的騰訊(Tencent)——開始越來越多地瞄準(zhǔn)銀行核心業(yè)務(wù)，包括支付、匯款、貸款和理財(cái)。如果它們成功了，它們將在決定全球資本分配方面發(fā)揮越來越大的作用。
These Chinese challengers have had an easy time making inroads at home. Banks there are largely state-owned behemoths and were established to channel cheap household savings to industry in a template imported from Japan. Even now few Chinese people have credit cards and investment accounts. Many of them are taking their cash straight from the mattress or current account to Alipay and Tenpay. The newcomers have also benefited because Beijing, rather than backing its incumbents, has used Alibaba and Tencent to shake up its sluggish bankers.
這些中國挑戰(zhàn)者在進(jìn)軍國內(nèi)金融業(yè)時度過了一段輕松時期。中國的銀行基本是國有巨頭，其成立目的是依照日本模式，將低成本的居民儲蓄輸送到工業(yè)。即使到了現(xiàn)在，中國人都很少擁有信用卡和投資賬戶。許多中國人直接將他們的現(xiàn)金從床墊底下或活期賬戶轉(zhuǎn)到支付寶和財(cái)付通(TenPay)。北京方面選擇利用阿里巴巴和騰訊來震撼缺乏活力的銀行，而不是支持現(xiàn)有金融企業(yè)，這也讓行業(yè)新入者受益。
In developed markets, where consumers have long-ingrained habits of using credit and debit cards, as in the US, digital disrupters may have a harder time. Institutions such as First Data gave sighs of relief when, for example, Apple Pay worked with the traditional payments architecture rather than develop its own infrastructure.
在消費(fèi)者使用信用卡和借記卡的習(xí)慣已根深蒂固的發(fā)達(dá)市場，如美國，數(shù)字顛覆者的日子可能更加艱難。例如，當(dāng)看到Apple Pay與傳統(tǒng)支付體系合作、而非自己開發(fā)支付基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施時，F(xiàn)irst Data之類的機(jī)構(gòu)松了一口氣。
Today, more than ever the battle lines seem to be between new fintech players versus banks and other traditional financial institutions. Historically, the US’s Bank Holding Act made it difficult for a conglomerate to operate a bank, even though that is common practice in much of Asia. But since the 2008 crisis, banks have played a much reduced role, with much of the financial activity in the US moving elsewhere. That is partly because the regulatory requirements for banks are hard for many newcomers to meet, even if they wanted to. But it also means that non-banks such as Blackstone’s credit arm GSO, are playing a larger role.
如今，新金融科技公司與銀行等傳統(tǒng)金融機(jī)構(gòu)之間的戰(zhàn)線似乎比以往任何時候都要清晰。歷史上，美國《銀行控股公司法》(Bank Holding Company Act)使得一家企業(yè)集團(tuán)難以經(jīng)營一家銀行，盡管這在亞洲很多地方是常見做法。但自2008年金融危機(jī)爆發(fā)以來，銀行的作用大為下降，美國的大部分金融活動都轉(zhuǎn)移至其他地方。這部分是因?yàn)?，許多新來者都難以滿足對于銀行的監(jiān)管要求，即使它們想要滿足。但這也意味著，非銀行機(jī)構(gòu)——如黑石(Blackstone)旗下的信貸公司GSO——正在發(fā)揮更大的作用。
Some analysts believe it is only a matter of time before Amazon, Alibaba’s big competitor in global ecommerce, comes up with something comparable to Alipay. They also point to India, where Alibaba has a 40 per cent stake in the mobile wallet company Paytm, and veto power over its strategic direction.
一些分析師認(rèn)為，阿里巴巴在全球電商領(lǐng)域的重要競爭對手——亞馬遜(Amazon)推出類似支付寶的產(chǎn)品只是時間問題。他們還提到了印度，阿里巴巴在印度移動支付公司Paytm持有40%的股份，且對該公司的戰(zhàn)略方向擁有否決權(quán)。
All this is part of a larger transformation in finance. We are in a time when blockchain technology holds out the potential for revolutionising the way financial trades are cleared and settled. If it succeeds, banks will also become less relevant in those parts of the financial system, to the advantage of the new digitally savvy operators. And change is only likely to accelerate in the year of the dog.
所有這些都是金融業(yè)大轉(zhuǎn)型的一部分。我們正處于一個區(qū)塊鏈技術(shù)有望給金融交易的清算和結(jié)算方式帶來革命性變化的時代。如果成功，銀行在金融體系的這些部分也將變得不那么重要，這將有利于新的精通數(shù)字技術(shù)的運(yùn)營商。而這種轉(zhuǎn)變在狗年只會加速。
