中國數(shù)據(jù)造假掩蓋了經(jīng)濟(jì)復(fù)蘇
中國的碳排放量正在上升，外國高管報告業(yè)績增長勢頭強(qiáng)勁，而在以煤炭為主導(dǎo)產(chǎn)業(yè)的城市，頂級酒店外面停滿了豪華轎車。
But the country’s economic growth for 2017, due for release on Thursday, is unlikely to reflect the revival because previous data never revealed the true extent of the downturn.
但中國將于本周四發(fā)布的經(jīng)濟(jì)增長數(shù)據(jù)不太可能如實反映經(jīng)濟(jì)的復(fù)蘇，因為之前的數(shù)據(jù)從未揭示出真正的經(jīng)濟(jì)放緩程度。
China’s gross domestic product grew 6.9 per cent last year, Premier Li Keqiang told a regional meeting in Cambodia last week. “The overall situation was better than expected,” he said.
中國總理李克強(qiáng)上周在柬埔寨舉行的地區(qū)會議上表示，去年中國國內(nèi)生產(chǎn)總值(GDP)預(yù)計增長6.9%。他說：“整體形勢好于預(yù)期。”
Mr Li’s estimate is higher than the 6.7 per cent growth reported for 2016 but the real recovery has been sharper. Corporate results are rosy, commodity imports are hitting new records and producer prices have shifted back to steady gains, signifying better industrial health.
李克強(qiáng)估計的這個數(shù)字高于2016年6.7%的增長率數(shù)據(jù)，但真實的復(fù)蘇程度更為強(qiáng)勁。公司業(yè)績良好，大宗商品進(jìn)口創(chuàng)出歷史新高，生產(chǎn)者價格恢復(fù)穩(wěn)定上升，這些表明工業(yè)狀況變得更為健康。
So why won’t China’s 2017 GDP data reflect the good news?
那么中國2017年的GDP數(shù)據(jù)為何不會反映這些好消息呢?
China’s national statisticians regularly discount local data to correct for local officials’ habit of inflating figures to look good. This “smoothing” masks fluctuations in China’s economic cycles and reduces the utility of publishing statistics in the first place.
中國國家統(tǒng)計人員經(jīng)常將地方數(shù)據(jù)打折，以糾正地方官員美化夸大數(shù)字的習(xí)慣。這種“平滑”掩蓋了中國經(jīng)濟(jì)周期的波動，從一開始就降低了發(fā)布的統(tǒng)計數(shù)據(jù)的實用性。
“We already have so much better quality data for 2017 that the official GDP growth rate, which I expect will be close to the 2016 pace, will not be valuable to investors when it is published next week,” said Andy Rothman, economist at Matthews Asia.
銘基亞洲(Matthews Asia)的經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家羅福萬(Andy Rothman)表示：“我們已經(jīng)獲得了2017年的一些更優(yōu)質(zhì)的數(shù)據(jù)，因此即將公布的GDP增長率——我預(yù)計與2016年的增長率相當(dāng)——對投資者沒有什么價值。”
The main factor masking the recovery is a slump in northern China from 2012 to 2016 that was never fully recognised. Three regions admit to faking some statistics in 2016 but FT analysis suggests the impact was deeper and longer than a single year of faked data would suggest.
掩蓋經(jīng)濟(jì)復(fù)蘇的主要因素是2012年至2016年中國北方地區(qū)經(jīng)濟(jì)的大幅放緩未在經(jīng)濟(jì)數(shù)據(jù)中完全體現(xiàn)出來。有三個地區(qū)承認(rèn)2016年一些統(tǒng)計數(shù)據(jù)注水，但英國《金融時報》的分析表明，一年偽造數(shù)據(jù)遠(yuǎn)遠(yuǎn)達(dá)不到這么深遠(yuǎn)的影響。
That matters, because China is on course to become the world’s largest economy by any measure. If the country’s data are skewed, so are the responses by governments, companies and institutions the world over.
這很重要，因為不管以哪種標(biāo)準(zhǔn)衡量，中國都即將成為世界上最大的經(jīng)濟(jì)體，如果這個國家的數(shù)據(jù)出現(xiàn)扭曲，那么世界各國政府、企業(yè)和機(jī)構(gòu)的反應(yīng)同樣會出現(xiàn)偏差。
For example, global climate change negotiators saw hope in flat global emissions from 2014 to 2016, when world growth appeared to be humming along thanks to reported GDP expansion in China. In 2017, when other indicators showed the real Chinese economy had improved, emissions began climbing again.
例如，全球氣候變化談判人員從2014年至2016年全球排放量持平中看到了希望，那幾年得益于中國公布的GDP增長數(shù)據(jù)，全球經(jīng)濟(jì)似乎仍在繼續(xù)增長。2017年，當(dāng)其他指標(biāo)顯示中國實體經(jīng)濟(jì)改善時，中國的排放量又開始回升。
For policymakers and observers worldwide, there is a big difference between believing an emissions slowdown is due to better policies or reflecting an economic slowdown in the smoke-belching northern half of the world’s largest carbon emitter.
對世界各地的政策制定者和觀察人士來說，相信排放放緩是更好的政策造成的，還是世界上最大碳排放國的北部重污染地區(qū)經(jīng)濟(jì)放緩造成的，兩者有著重要的區(qū)別。
Inner Mongolia, one of China’s most coal-dependent areas, and the major northern port city of Tianjin, have admitted to falsifying data that will probably require their 2016 GDP to be revised down. They join neighbouring Liaoning, the first province to admit to a contraction during the four-year correction in commodities markets.
中國最依賴煤炭的地區(qū)之一內(nèi)蒙古和中國北方主要港口城市天津均承認(rèn)數(shù)據(jù)造假，這導(dǎo)致它們可能需要向下修正2016年的GDP數(shù)據(jù)。此前相鄰的遼寧省已率先承認(rèn)在大宗商品市場為期4年的調(diào)整期間其經(jīng)濟(jì)出現(xiàn)了收縮。
This map of China shows the northern half of the country’s dependence on metals and mining (including crude oil and coal production). China stopped publishing the share of these industries in nominal GDP in 2012, the same year the commodity cycle turned sour.
這張中國地圖顯示了中國北方地區(qū)對金屬和采礦工業(yè)(包括原油和煤炭生產(chǎn))的依賴。從2012年開始，中國不再公布這些產(chǎn)業(yè)在名義GDP中的占比，同年大宗商品周期由盛轉(zhuǎn)衰。
Inner Mongolia admitted this month that its data for “added value of industrial enterprises of a certain scale” were inflated 40 per cent in 2016. According to the Chinese statistical yearbook, secondary industry comprises 47 per cent of its GDP. Assuming its 2015 figures are accurate, the revised 2016 figures mean the region’s economy shrank 13 per cent. If that sounds implausible, consider the likelihood that 2015 figures were also incorrect.
本月內(nèi)蒙古承認(rèn)其2016年“規(guī)模以上工業(yè)增加值”虛增了40%。根據(jù)中國統(tǒng)計年鑒，第二產(chǎn)業(yè)占該地區(qū)GDP的比例為47%。假設(shè)其2015年的數(shù)據(jù)是準(zhǔn)確的，2016年數(shù)據(jù)下修就意味著當(dāng)年內(nèi)蒙古經(jīng)濟(jì)收縮了13%。如果這聽起來不太可信，那么就應(yīng)該考慮內(nèi)蒙古2015年數(shù)據(jù)也不準(zhǔn)確的可能性。
Below is a chart showing the declared GDP growth of Inner Mongolia since 2011, and the contraction of 2016, assuming no other revisions.
下圖顯示了內(nèi)蒙古自2011年以來所公布的GDP增長率數(shù)據(jù)，以及不修正其他年份數(shù)據(jù)的情況下2016年的經(jīng)濟(jì)收縮情況。
For a clearer picture of the slump in the underlying commodities that affected the real economies of northern China, here are benchmark oil, coal and steel prices in China since 2010.
為了更清晰地把握影響中國北方地區(qū)實體經(jīng)濟(jì)的基礎(chǔ)大宗商品下滑情況，下圖顯示了在中國基準(zhǔn)原油、煤炭和鋼鐵價格自2010年以來的走勢。
Like Inner Mongolia, Liaoning admitted to a contraction in 2016 compared with its official performance in 2015. But in 2016, its economy should have been recovering.
和內(nèi)蒙古一樣，遼寧也承認(rèn)，與其2015年的官方數(shù)據(jù)相比，2016年GDP出現(xiàn)了收縮。但在2016年，遼寧的經(jīng)濟(jì)應(yīng)該是在復(fù)蘇的。
Liaoning admits it faked data for about five years but has not issued a revised series. It is the most economically diverse of the northern provinces, so whatever it suffered should have been worse in neighbouring regions such as Inner Mongolia.
遼寧承認(rèn)在大概5年時間里虛報數(shù)據(jù)，但是并未公布修正后的相關(guān)數(shù)據(jù)。遼寧是中國北方經(jīng)濟(jì)最多元化的省份，因此無論遼寧問題多么嚴(yán)重，內(nèi)蒙古等鄰近地區(qū)的問題應(yīng)該會更加嚴(yán)重。
Tianjin, one of the big ports that services northern China, could also see a revision. Its Binhai financial district, which offers tax and foreign exchange incentives to registered businesses, swelled to comprise roughly half of Tianjin’s reported GDP last year.
作為服務(wù)中國北方地區(qū)的大型港口城市之一，天津可能也會修正數(shù)據(jù)。去年，天津濱海新區(qū)——為注冊企業(yè)提供稅收減免和更寬松的外匯機(jī)制等激勵措施——對天津官方GDP數(shù)據(jù)的貢獻(xiàn)擴(kuò)大至一半以上。
Binhai included in GDP the commercial activity of companies that were only registered there for tax purposes, according to revelations last week. That could result in a 20 per cent drop in reported GDP for Tianjin in 2017, according to FT calculations. Binhai’s high debt levels and access to domestic and international financing make its phantom results a concern for broader markets.
據(jù)上周披露的信息顯示，濱海新區(qū)在GDP統(tǒng)計中加入了那些為享受稅收優(yōu)惠而僅僅把公司注冊在該區(qū)的企業(yè)的商業(yè)活動。據(jù)英國《金融時報》估算，這可能導(dǎo)致天津公布的2017年GDP數(shù)據(jù)減少20%。濱海的高債務(wù)水平，加上它為企業(yè)打通國內(nèi)和國際融資的渠道，致使其假數(shù)據(jù)在更廣泛市場引發(fā)了擔(dān)憂。
Another possible data offender is Shanxi, China’s most coal-dependent province. Its official GDP growth held up admirably during the commodities downturn.
另一個可能偽造數(shù)據(jù)的省份是山西——中國最依賴煤炭的省份。在大宗商品低迷期，山西的官方GDP增長堅挺得令人羨慕。
Last summer China’s anti-corruption watchdog announced unspecified problems with Jilin’s data, adding another troubled northeastern province to the list of candidates to watch. Jilin depends on grains more than coal mining, so we have not included its chart here.
去年夏天中國的反腐監(jiān)督部門宣布吉林的數(shù)據(jù)存在問題，但并未明確說明是什么問題，意味著又一個經(jīng)濟(jì)困頓的東北省份進(jìn)入了觀察名單。相比采礦，吉林更依賴于糧食生產(chǎn)，因此我們沒有專門繪圖展示該省的情況。
