FT社評(píng)：新興市場(chǎng)摸索自己的道路

Given that in 2017 the Federal Reserve repeatedly hiked interest rates, pressure to reduce oil production sent prices higher and a new US president took office threatening to start trade wars in all directions, emerging markets largely had a good year.

2017年，雖然美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)(Fed)多次提高利率，石油減產(chǎn)壓力推升油價(jià)，新任美國(guó)總統(tǒng)威脅要全方位發(fā)起貿(mào)易大戰(zhàn)，但新興市場(chǎng)這一年表現(xiàn)大致良好。

Growth was solid more or less throughout the emerging market world, inflation was more or less under control and there was even a reduction in vulnerabilities for some of the fragile countries with large current accounts. Emerging market equities, after the volatility of earlier years, went on a sustained rally.

整個(gè)新興市場(chǎng)的經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)大體穩(wěn)定，通脹大體受到控制，一些經(jīng)常賬戶赤字巨大的脆弱國(guó)家的脆弱性甚至有所下降。新興市場(chǎng)股市在經(jīng)歷數(shù)年波動(dòng)后開(kāi)始持續(xù)上漲。

Their prospects for 2018 defy easy generalisation, which in some ways is all to the good. A world in which their stocks and bonds are treated as generic risk assets does no favours to the countries concerned nor, ultimately, to investors. Following the taper tantrum of 2013 and the sudden sell-off across the asset class in early 2016, the lack of a simple animating story for the group last year is a positive development.

它們?cè)?018年的前景很難簡(jiǎn)單概括，這在某種程度上是好事。一個(gè)將股票和債券視為一般風(fēng)險(xiǎn)資產(chǎn)的世界，既不利于相關(guān)國(guó)家，最終也不利于投資者。繼2013年的“削減恐慌”(taper tantrum)和2016年初整個(gè)新興市場(chǎng)資產(chǎn)類(lèi)別的突然拋售之后，去年新興市場(chǎng)沒(méi)有發(fā)生什么跌宕起伏的故事，這是一個(gè)積極的發(fā)展。

Emerging market monetary authorities, for example, are not on a synchronised cycle. Some Latin American central banks, with inflation pressures ebbing, have been cutting interest rates. Others in central and eastern Europe, and east Asia, have been tightening. Diverse domestic considerations are more important for the moment than common external conditions.

例如，新興市場(chǎng)貨幣政策當(dāng)局并不處于一個(gè)同步的周期。一些拉美國(guó)家的央行在通脹壓力下降的情況下一直在降息。中東歐和東亞國(guó)家的央行則一直在收緊。現(xiàn)階段，各不相同的國(guó)內(nèi)因素比共同的外部條件更為重要。

The traditional patterns of emerging markets dancing to the tune of rich-country monetary policy, if not gone, are much weaker than before. A Fed hiking cycle, for example, traditionally creates problems for emerging markets with significant dollar borrowings, whether public or private, particularly if their currencies generally go up and down with the dollar.

新興市場(chǎng)受富國(guó)貨幣政策擺布的傳統(tǒng)模式即便沒(méi)有消失，也比以前大為削弱。例如，美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)的加息周期傳統(tǒng)上會(huì)給有大量美元借款的新興市場(chǎng)帶來(lái)問(wèn)題，無(wú)論公共還是私人領(lǐng)域，尤其對(duì)于那些貨幣通常與美元一起上下波動(dòng)的國(guó)家來(lái)說(shuō)。

On this occasion, however, the slow and clearly signalled pace of US rate increases means they have been absorbed even by economies with large current account deficits with relative ease. Moreover, although the dollar went on a tear at the end of 2016 as the “Trump trade” took hold, it has since given back those gains, reducing the competitiveness problems for emerging markets. And while short-term interest rates have risen, long-term Treasury yields have been capped by expectations of slow growth and low inflation. It turns out, in other words, that expectations of Fed tightening induced far more tantrums than the tightening itself.

然而這一次，美國(guó)加息步伐緩慢而且給出了明確的信號(hào)，使得即使是經(jīng)常賬戶赤字巨大的經(jīng)濟(jì)體也較為輕松地消化吸收。此外，盡管美元在2016年底因“特朗普交易”(Trump trade)影響經(jīng)歷了一次大漲，但后來(lái)已經(jīng)回落，減少了新興市場(chǎng)的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)力問(wèn)題。而且雖然短期利率有所上升，但長(zhǎng)期國(guó)債收益率一直受增長(zhǎng)緩慢和低通脹預(yù)期的束縛。換句話說(shuō)，事實(shí)證明，對(duì)美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)收緊政策的預(yù)期比收緊政策本身引發(fā)了更多恐慌。

If the worrywarts about US inflation and bond prices are right and there is a sudden rise in yields, the traditional patterns could reassert themselves quite quickly. Yet there are fewer vulnerable economies than before. Even the “fragile five” countries of India, South Africa, Brazil, Turkey and Indonesia, named for their dependence on external financing, have generally reduced their current account deficits.

如果對(duì)美國(guó)通脹和債券價(jià)格的擔(dān)憂是正確的、而且收益率突然上升，那么傳統(tǒng)模式可能很快卷土重來(lái)。然而，脆弱經(jīng)濟(jì)體的數(shù)量比以前減少了。就連因依賴外部融資而得名“脆弱五國(guó)”的印度、南非、巴西、土耳其和印度尼西亞，也普遍減少了各自的經(jīng)常賬戶赤字。

Other possible shocks include Mr Trump’s potential trade war and a sharp slowdown in China. Yet while the US president’s rhetoric about deficits remains frothy, any actions seem likely to be much more narrowly targeted on particular products from particular countries, such as steel and aluminium from China. As for the Chinese economy, debt levels remain high and the chance of a hard landing persists, but growth for the moment is solid and core inflation is contained, meaning that the People’s Bank of China has room to loosen if conditions worsen.

其他可能的沖擊包括特朗普可能發(fā)動(dòng)的貿(mào)易戰(zhàn)以及中國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)急劇放緩。然而，雖然美國(guó)總統(tǒng)關(guān)于貿(mào)易逆差的言論依然空洞，但任何行動(dòng)似乎都可能更集中地針對(duì)特定國(guó)家的特定產(chǎn)品，如產(chǎn)自中國(guó)的鋼材和鋁。至于中國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)，債務(wù)水平仍處于高位，硬著陸的可能性依然存在，但目前增長(zhǎng)穩(wěn)健，核心通脹受到控制，這意味著如果形勢(shì)惡化，中國(guó)人民銀行(PBoC)有放松政策的空間。

The fortunes of emerging markets can never be totally divorced from the lead given by the rich countries and their policymakers. But the fates of most of the big middle-income economies are, for the moment, largely in their own hands.

新興市場(chǎng)的命運(yùn)永遠(yuǎn)不可能完全脫離富裕國(guó)家及其政策制定者給予的引導(dǎo)。但目前而言，多數(shù)大型中等收入經(jīng)濟(jì)體的命運(yùn)主要還是掌控在它們自己手中。